On 3 August, Nord Stream 2 AG, responsible for designing, developing and subsequent maintenance of Nord Stream 2 (North European Gas Pipeline, NS2), announced that one gas pipeline, located in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Sweden, was completed. However, the company has not been granted the permission to continue with NS2 on Danish waters. Jeppe Kofod, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, has expressed his negative feelings towards the development of NS2. However, after Nord Stream 2 AG withdrew one of its proposals, his hands are tied and he has no means for blocking the project further. The Danish Energy Agency (DEA), responsible for proceeding motions and proposals, is currently evaluating responses submitted in the course of consultations with stakeholders and countries of the region. Due to the complexity of the proposal and complications associated with the construction process itself, it is highly probable that NS2 will not be completed on schedule, i.e. by the end of 2019.
Estonia has been objecting to the EU’s 2050 climate neutrality strategy. The country’s decision-makers argue that the EU member states ought to enjoy enough flexibility as to select domestic instruments of climate policies in relation to the level of the country’s development and social justice. The issue revolves around Estonia being able to introduce incremental changes while maintaining the competitiveness of the country’s economy which pivots around the extraction of oil shale whose processing entails high CO2 emission. Estonia’s prospective position towards the EU’s climate strategy will be determined by the results of analyses outlining solutions offering the capability to shift to climate-neutral economy in the country. These are to be presented to the government in the autumn of 2019.
The suspension of the bilateral dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo proves that negotiations, ongoing since 2011 under the auspices of the EU, came to yet another standstill. Positions of both parties becoming stiff results in the prospects for the development of a compromise to end the conflict concerning Kosovo’s international legal status and boundaries becoming unlikely.
The anniversary commemorating the end of WWII is a significant day not only in Russia but also throughout the post-Soviet space. 9 May celebrations are treated as an instrument for shaping national identity and memory, developing political myths, and as a vital element of the politics of memory. However, a rift emerged between Russia’s narration concerning the Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War and the narration and formula of celebrations in the remaining countries. In Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, the discrepancy reflects an attempt at becoming independent from Russia’s influence. In each of these countries, the process has its own specific character and distinct motivations and determinants.
„Magna Hungaria” and „the Treaty of Trianon” are two of several fundamental terms featured in the Hungarian politics of memory. Owing to a strong position they occupy in the cultural memory of Hungarians, they are a flexible substance for Fidesz and Viktor Orbán to base their actions upon and subordinate these to their present political objectives. These encompass e.g. the legitimization of the governing party, and regional politics.