



## Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej (Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe)

ISSN 1732-1395

Instrukcje dla autorów i Rocznik online:  
<https://ies.lublin.pl/rocznik>

### **New Balkan migration route and its impact on transit countries**

Magdalena Rekść<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Uniwersytet Łódzki (Polska)

Opublikowano online: grudzień 2019

Sposób cytowania: M. Rekść, *New Balkan migration route and its impact on transit countries*, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 4, s. 141-160, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.4.7>.

„Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” („Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”) jest kwartalnikiem. Poszczególne teksty bądź całe zeszyty publikowane są w języku polskim lub angielskim. Na liście czasopism naukowych MNiSW z 31 lipca 2019 roku „Rocznik IEŚW” znajduje się z liczbą 70 punktów. Jest również uwzględniony w bazach ICI Journals Master List, Central and Eastern European Online Library, BazEKon oraz ERIH PLUS.

Magdalena Rekić\*

## New Balkan migration route and its impact on transit countries

**Abstract:** In 2015, global public opinion was shaken by the migration crisis, as wave after wave of refugees from the Middle East, primarily from Syria, tried to get from Turkey and Greece to Western Europe via the so-called 'Balkan Route'. In time, the situation only seemed to be resolved. In the Balkan countries, there still are, according to estimates, tens of thousands of migrants who failed to get farther west, and more are constantly arriving. Meanwhile, since 2018, one can speak of a new, though a much smaller wave of immigrants who are trying to get from Greece to Croatia (and thus to the European Union), increasingly often bypassing Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina along the way. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to the phenomenon of the so-called 'New Balkan Route' and the problems it creates for the Balkans.

**Keywords:** Balkans, New Balkan Route, migration crisis, refugees, geopolitics

### 1 Introduction

In 2015, global public opinion was shaken by the news of a grievous migration crisis, as wave after wave of refugees from the Middle East, primarily from Syria, tried to get from Turkey and Greece to Western Europe via the so-called 'Balkan Route'. The overwhelming majority of refugees chose the route through Macedonia and Serbia, from where they headed to Croatia and Slovenia or to Hungary. Roads through Bulgaria and Romania were less popular. Media headlines were flooded with photos of columns of people wandering towards the EU border and crowds of refugees at Belgrade's train station and the nearby park, which the newcomers transformed into their 'town'.

After a few months, the topic stopped attracting attention. The EU borders were closed to these migrants and in some countries, barriers

\* Magdalena Rekić – PhD (hab.), is an assistant professor at the Faculty of International and Political Studies, University of Lodz, Poland. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6927-5489>. E-mail: [magdalena.reksc@uni.lodz.pl](mailto:magdalena.reksc@uni.lodz.pl).

had been erected. In March 2016, President of the European Council Donald Tusk signed an agreement with Turkey in which the Turks agreed to accept the return of migrants who had travelled to Europe from its territory. This gave the illusion of a solution to the problem. The inhabitants of the prosperous western world focused on other problems without realising that the situation was only seemingly under control, or in other words, that it had been moved outside the EU's borders. Meanwhile, in the Balkan countries, there still are, according to estimates, tens of thousands of migrants who failed to get farther west, and more are constantly arriving<sup>1</sup>.

## 2. The Balkan Route and local societies

One should remember that the countries of Southeastern Europe are not only poor but also weak, with numerous internal problems and generally ruled by corrupt politicians<sup>2</sup>. Their special services have long been unable to cope with organised crime<sup>3</sup>. Thus, the presence of people of unknown identities raises questions about the security of not only the Balkans but also of all of Europe. Unfortunately, the Old Continent has once again proved that it is not interested in the problems of the Balkan region and its inhabitants. Western decision-makers seem to think that the problems of the 'continental abroad' (*'kontinentalno inostranstvo'*), as metaphorically described by Muharem Bazdulj, are so distant that they can be underestimated, especially since they do not focus on the voters<sup>4</sup>. Meanwhile, among the migrants left alone in countries that were supposed to be transit points from the very beginning, the frustration has begun to build up. The

- 1 *Karitas: Izbeglice na Balkanu ponekad u katastrofalnim uslovima*, Danas, 18.07.2016, <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/karitas-izbeglice-na-balkanu-ponekad-u-katastrofalnim-uslovima/nzs8xoq> [25.07.2019].
- 2 R. Pejanović, *Tranzicija i nacionalna kultura. Ogledi iz društveno-ekonomske antropologije*, Novi Sad 2015, pp. 66-69; A. Ben-Meir, *Corruption in the Balkans Is Impeding EU Membership*, The Globalist, 11.01.2019, <https://www.theglobalist.com/european-union-membership-balkans-corruption/> [06.08.2019].
- 3 R. Woźnica, *Wpływ konfliktów w byłej Jugosławii na kierunki rozwoju transnarodowej przestępczości zorganizowanej na Bałkanach*, [in:] P. Chmielewski, S.L. Szczesio (eds), *Bałkany Zachodnie między przeszłością a przyszłością*, Łódź 2013, pp. 264, 274-275.
- 4 M. Bazdulj, *I oni su pjevali o ratu. Odjeci raspada Jugoslavije u engleskoj i američkoj književnosti*, Beograd 2013, p. 34.

feelings of hopelessness are well reflected in the words of a Kurdish woman from Iraq, who fate threw to Svilengrad in Bulgaria: ‘This is not Europe (...) We cannot work, we cannot go further. It’s a prison’<sup>5</sup>.

It is not difficult to notice that people who have travelled many thousands of kilometres to get to their ‘paradise’, and now are at its gates, will not suddenly change their minds just because politicians have decided to close the borders. Their determination is so powerful that they will try and try to reach Croatia illegally, and then to Slovenia which is part of the Schengen area. From there, it is very close to Italy, Austria, and Germany<sup>6</sup>. Meanwhile, left at the EU gates, often without a livelihood, these migrants are victims of organised crime. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have reported a number of cases of organ trafficking, prostitution, and child pornography<sup>7</sup>. On the other hand, migrants with money become targets of robberies<sup>8</sup>.

The attitude of local people towards the migrants has also been changing. Initially, in 2015, most Serbs, Macedonians, or Croats looked at them with compassion<sup>9</sup>. People spontaneously organised to provide help. Today, though, negative attitudes are gradually increasing<sup>10</sup>, which has led many migrants and refugees to travel to Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited mainly by Muslims, who themselves remember the recent war. They show solidarity with refugees from the Middle East. It is worth mentioning, however, that among Bosniaks, aversion to migrants has begun to show, especially in the north (Bihać), where refugees and migrants are many in number<sup>11</sup>. At the same time,

5 K. Kassabova, *Granica. Na krawędzi Europy*, Wołowiec 2019, p. 272.

6 *Granice istoka, Odkut migranti u Bosni?*, Al Jazeera Balkans, 26.07.2019, <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/video/granice-istoka-otkut-migranti-u-bosni> [06.08.2019].

7 *The Balkans: A migrant gateway for jihadists?*, Global Initiative, 01.03.2018, <https://globalinitiative.net/the-balkans-a-migrant-gateway-for-jihadists/> [10.08.2019].

8 *Uhapšena peta osoba osumnjčena za organizovanu pljačku migranata u Sarajevu*, Klix.ba, 01.08.2018, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/crna-hronika/uhapsena-peta-osoba-osumnjicena-za-organizovanu-pljacku-migranata-u-sarajevu/180801014> [20.08.2019].

9 Z. Szczerek, *Międzymorze. Podróże przez prawdziwą i wyobrażoną Europę Środkową*, Warszawa – Wołowiec 2017, pp. 37-44.

10 *2/3 ispitanika smatra da postoji mogućnost rasplamsavanja izbegličke krize*, Fondacija Ana i Vlade Divac, [https://www.divac.com/upload/document/kljucni\\_nalazi\\_istrazivanja\\_.pdf](https://www.divac.com/upload/document/kljucni_nalazi_istrazivanja_.pdf) [01.08.2019]; *Mladi imaju vrlo negativne stavove prema imigrantima, ali i nacionalnim manjinama*, Večernji list, 25.10.2016, <https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/branslava-baranovic-mladi-imaju-vrlo-negativne-stavove-prema-imigrantima-ali-i-nacionalnim-manjinama-1123682> [01.08.2019].

11 *Granice istoka, Odkut migranti u Bosni?...*

in neighbouring Croatia, the negative attitude towards refugees is increasing every year, as they are, very often wrongly, accused of acts of vandalism, violence, and theft. As Marita Brčić Kuljiš notes, the negative stereotypes about Serbs were easily transferred to the newcomers from the Middle East<sup>12</sup>.

These migrants themselves are also not without guilt. From time to time, media report on minor offences on their part, theft primarily<sup>13</sup>. Paul Scheffer rightly notes that immigrants are always under special pressure<sup>14</sup>. The author seems to refer to the fact that offences committed by strangers attract much more attention than those committed by 'ours'. Meanwhile, many migrants engage in smuggling or drug trafficking, working with the Balkan mafia. In June 2019, a young Afghan was killed in the centre of Belgrade, a victim of some internal gang score<sup>15</sup>. One day later, one of the killers was fatally wounded with a knife in a refugee camp in Krnjača, on the outskirts of the capital. According to Serbian police, the second crime was an act of revenge<sup>16</sup>. The tit-for-tat murder in Belgrade provoked numerous commentary throughout the region and gave a strong argument to those who see their Middle Eastern guests negatively.

The brutal acts of the young refugees can be explained by their desperation and lack of livelihood. The first of the two victims was a smuggler, the second (the juvenile) in January 2019, together with five colleagues, tried to illegally enter Croatia but was detained by Croatian border guards and sent to Serbia<sup>17</sup>. Having no money to pay the

12 *Policija: O migrantima se šire gnjusne laži, nemojte nasjedati*, 24sata, 06.11.2018, <https://www.24sata.hr/news/policija-o-migrantima-se-sire-gnjusne-lazi-nemojte-nasjedati-598679> - 24sata.hr [20.08.2019].

13 *Sarajevo: Dvojica migranata pretukli i opljačkali starca dok je išao platiti račune*, Source.ba, 07.04.2019, <http://www.source.ba/clanak/Crnahronika/492413/Sarajevo--Dvojica-migranata-pretukli-i-opljackali-starca-dok-je-isaio-platiti-racune> [20.08.2019].

14 P. Shefer, *Liberalna nelagodnost Evropske integracije*, Beograd 2007, p. 69.

15 M. Petrović, *UBISTVO U CENTRU BEOGRADA Migrant iz Avganistana stradao u tuči u Karadorđevoj*, Blic, 05.06.2019, <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/hronika/ubistvo-u-centru-beograda-migrant-iz-avganistana-stradao-u-tuci-u-karadordevoj/kk9kqmp> [20.08.2019].

16 *REŠENO UBISTVO DVOJICE MIGRANATA! Sumnja se da je Avganistanac Kulat podsticao na dvostruko ubistvo nožem!*, Espresso.rs, 10.06.2019, <https://www.espresso.rs/vesti/hronika/399869/reseno-ubistvo-dvojice-migranata-sumnja-se-da-je-avganistanac-kulat-podsticao-na-dvostruko-ubistvo-nozem> [21.08.2019].

17 J. Zorić, *Ubijen migrant koji je bio osumnjičen za ubistvo Avganistanca u centru Beograda*, N1, 06.06.2019, <http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a489941/Ubijen-migrant-koji-je-bio-osumnjicen-za-ubistvo-u-centru-Beograda.html> [21.08.2019].

fine, the young Afghans found themselves in an adult prison in Novi Sad, which caused a wave of criticism from human rights organisations, not only because of their age (three of them were minors) but also because of a lack of access to lawyers and a translator<sup>18</sup>.

On the one hand, this situation illustrates the tragic situation in which immigrants find themselves and, on the other, reveals the complexity of the problems and challenges faced by poor and inefficient countries. It is enough to mention that in dealing with its juvenile suspects, the president of the court explained that his institution did not have a Pashto translator<sup>19</sup>.

It is worth specifying that the Balkan Route was not born in 2015. Since the end of the warfare in the wake of the collapse of Yugoslavia, traffickers have been operating in Southeastern Europe, taking advantage of the weaknesses of both the states themselves and their uniformed services, amplified by pervasive corruption. Also, after the peak of the mass-migration crisis, the refugees kept coming, only on an incomparably smaller scale. For example, the Serbian authorities estimate that about 20,000 people pass through their country annually<sup>20</sup>.

Meanwhile, since 2018, one can speak of a new, although much smaller, wave of migrants who try to get to Croatia (thus to the EU) from Greece, more often passing through Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina along the way. The new route leads through territory inhabited mostly by Islamic people (in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina), and through Montenegro, where there are large clusters of Albanians and Slav Muslims<sup>21</sup>. The only challenge is crossing the Bosnian-Croatian border. Human rights organisations are constantly reporting violent behaviour by Croatian border guards, who use physical violence when deporting detained persons to the Bosnian side<sup>22</sup>.

18 J. Zorić, *Maloletni migranti iz Avganistana završili u zatvoru za odrasle u Novom Sadu*, N1, 17.01.2019, <http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a452768/Maloletni-migranti-iz-Avganistana-završili-u-zatvoru-za-odrasle-u-Novom-Sadu.html> [21.08.2019].

19 Ibidem.

20 M. Zivanovic, *Myanmar's Persecuted Rohingya Join Balkan Route into Europe*, Balkan Insight, 02.08.2019, [https://balkaninsight.com/2019/08/02/myanmars-persecuted-rohingya-join-balkan-route-into-europe/?fbclid=IwARoKcdm4GZk5hC-F8W8Jz\\_7d\\_K6DWAV1ObOSTLGAHbDu2D-yTLvZtCgnrLtE](https://balkaninsight.com/2019/08/02/myanmars-persecuted-rohingya-join-balkan-route-into-europe/?fbclid=IwARoKcdm4GZk5hC-F8W8Jz_7d_K6DWAV1ObOSTLGAHbDu2D-yTLvZtCgnrLtE) [02.08.2019].

21 M. Memić, *Bošnjaci (Muslimani) Crne Gore*, Podgorica – Sarajevo 2003, p. 8.

22 *Croatia: Migrants Pushed Back to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Violence, Abuse; Denied Opportunity to Apply for Asylum*, Human Rights Watch, 11.12.2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/11/croatia->

As mentioned above, newcomers are particularly warmly received in Bosnia and Herzegovina (or more precisely, in the Federation of B&H), where the memory of the drama of war and loss of property is still very much alive. It is worth emphasizing that this alternative route has gained popularity not only because of the religious familiarity of the immigrants to the local population but also primarily for pragmatic reasons, since the old road leading through Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary is closed<sup>23</sup>. Even if today the scale of the phenomenon cannot be compared to that of 2015, experts talk about dozens or hundreds of people trying to illegally cross through the Balkans on their way to the dream, Western Europe, the problem seems serious for many reasons and certainly cannot be underestimated<sup>24</sup>.

The deadlock related to the migrants began to affect countries previously beyond the main migration routes and therefore not prepared to face the new situation. For example, the Montenegrin authorities estimate that six times as many refugees came to their country in 2018 than in the previous year<sup>25</sup>. As of August 2019, experts warn that in the coming months the number of migrants trying to get to Western Europe through the Balkans will increase significantly<sup>26</sup>. The so-called New Balkan Route or South-Balkan Route does not attract media attention due to its low-profile nature, and therefore poor 'transit' countries find it harder to obtain external funding for humanitarian aid and logistics facilities.

### **3. Political elites and migration crisis**

During the 2015 crisis, Western money did not come immediately. The EU acted late and inadequately, hiding behind bureaucratic procedures. Meanwhile, weak, poorly organised countries had to provide food, clothing, and protection, build camps, organise trans-

migrants-pushed-back-bosnia-and-herzegovina [06.08.2019].

23 *Nova balkanska ruta: opasnija i skuplja*, DW, 11.05.2018, <https://www.dw.com/sr/nova-balkanska-ruta-opasnija-i-skuplja/a-43736010> [01.08.2019].

24 *Ibidem*.

25 P. Tomović, *Talas migranata u Crnoj Gori*, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 28.02.2019, <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-migranti-porast-broja-izbjeglice/29796341.html> [20.08.2019].

26 *Balkan-Route zurück: Neue Flüchtlingswelle rollt an*, oe24, 07.07.2019, <https://www.oe24.at/welt/Balkan-Route-zurueck-Neue-Fluechtlingswelle-rollt-an/387713359> [15.08.2019].

port and develop logistics. In November 2015, the then-President of Macedonia Gjorge Ivanov, in an interview with *Gazeta Wyborcza*, complained that his country was spending €1 million a month to help migrants, €800,000 on police, and that the EU had allocated only €90,000, with a promised €1.5 million for procedural reasons would only be transferred in a few months<sup>27</sup>.

Similar statements were made by other Balkan politicians trying to capitalise on the interest of global media in the region of the former Yugoslavia<sup>28</sup>. Of course, it is difficult to believe the Balkan decision-makers completely, taking into account their well-known involvement in corrupt practices, money laundering, stealing international assistance, and links with organised crime, but it should be noted that the migration crisis forced these countries to take action for which they had no money<sup>29</sup>.

Moreover, the EU began to push transit countries to seal their borders and strengthen controls<sup>30</sup>. This only deepened the disappointment of Balkan societies with regard to Brussels, which cannot and does not want to propose a realistic prospect for them to become a member of the EU, just sets requirements. Macedonians also asked why suddenly the EU now saw in them, when it had an interest, a constructive partner when every day it blocks the possibility of accession due to the dispute with Greece over the name of the country. It is worth mentioning that at that time, Macedonia, ruled by the right-wing nationalist VMRO-DPMNE, was a model of stability, i.e., a hybrid mixture of democracy and authoritarianism<sup>31</sup>. In addition, the policy of then-Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, founded on emphasizing na-

27 R. Imielski, *Prezydent Macedonii: Unia zapomniała o Bałkanach. Zostaliśmy sami z problemem uchodźców*, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 18.09.2015, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75399,18845087,prezydent-macedonii-unia-zapomniała-o-balkanach-zostaliśmy.html> [12.04.2018].

28 *A Macedonian Perspective in the Migration Crisis*, Clingendael, 17.11.2016, <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/macedonian-perspective-migration-crisis> [05.08.2019].

29 M. Szpala, M. Jaroszewicz, *Macedonia a kryzys migracyjny*, *Analizy OSW*, 26.08.2015, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-08-26/macedonia-a-kryzys-migracyjny> [03.08.2019].

30 *Ibidem*.

31 Vide: *The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy*, Graz 2017, <http://www.biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/BIEPAG-The-Crisis-of-Democracy-in-the-Western-Balkans-Authoritarianism-and-EU-Stabilitocracy-web.pdf> [03.08.2019], pp. 3-6; F. Bieber, *The Rise (and Fall) of Balkan Stabilitocracies*, CIRSD, <https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-fall-of-balkan-stabilitocracies> [03.08.2019].

tional uniqueness and the country's ancient heritage, including Alexander the Great, the most telling example of which was the Skopje 2014 project, led to a Greek boycott of Skopje's efforts to join NATO and the EU<sup>32</sup>. It is not difficult to understand the frustrations of Macedonians as they were being treated instrumentally by Brussels. The more so since such bitter moods were skilfully released and strengthened by the rulers<sup>33</sup>.

On the other hand, the West must have been aware that international assistance directed to corrupt states ruled by populist autocrats would not reach the needy untouched, but would 'dissolve' along the way. This had always been the case with funds transferred to this region since the 1990s, including as recently as funds transferred to Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina after the tragic floods of 2014<sup>34</sup>.

The situation is similar today. Solving the problems and facing the challenges related to the influx of refugees is beyond the capabilities of the countries of this region. Although there was a change of power in Macedonia – Zoran Zaev's coalition cabinet re-evaluated both internal and foreign policy, which resulted in an agreement with Greece on the new name of the country – the other countries in the region, Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania, are still ruled by populist autocrats, whose dictatorial tendencies do not translate into effective security services, state institutions, or the uniformed forces. In weak countries, political decision-making processes are not thoroughly thought-out but motivated by the pragmatic interests of decision-makers, oligarchs, and pressure groups. In practice, they often turn into chaotic or indecisive action, and thus inaction. Meanwhile, new circumstances require swift, decisive responses.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is considered dysfunctional, inefficient, and paralyzed, the processes through which refugees recently have been so willing to go through, are even more difficult to

32 P. Majewski, *(Re)konstrukcje narodu. Odwieczna Macedonia powstaje w XXI wieku*, Gdańsk 2013, pp. 176-182.

33 *A Macedonian Perspective in the Migration Crisis...*

34 *GDE SU PARE? 2014. godine smo dobili MILIONE za prevenciju poplava, A SAD NAM SE DEŠAVA ISTI PAKAO! KAKO?*, *Espresso.rs*, 09.06.2019, <https://www.espresso.rs/vesti/drustvo/397167/gde-su-pare-2014-godine-smo-dobili-milione-za-prevenciju-poplava-a-sad-nam-se-desava-isti-pakao-kako-foto> [20.08.2019]; *Misteriozno nestao novac plasiran u BiH*, *Jabuka.tv*, 17.07.2016, <https://www.jabuka.tv/misteriozno-nestao-novac-plasiran-u-bih/> [20.08.2019].

conduct<sup>35</sup>. The complicated division of a country (into entitlements and cantons) in the absence of a clear distribution of competences very often leads to shifting responsibility by representatives of various levels of government. This situation was also repeated in connection with the influx of refugees when Bosnian decision-makers could not agree on the financing of projects related to the stay of the newcomers from the Middle East<sup>36</sup>.

## 4. Security issues

● Only a small proportion of migrants can afford to rent even a cheap room or flat. Most live in refugee centres, which are old or quickly built, supported financially by the EU. However, despite this, there are constant media reports of people camping in the open air (e.g., in a park in the centre of Sarajevo) or looking for a makeshift shelter in construction sites and uninhabited houses. Meanwhile, as emphasized already several times, these transit countries are both poor and poorly organised, which translates into the low quality of assistance to the migrants, who very often remain dependent on the charity of the local population.

A situation in which tens of thousands of newcomers from the Middle East bide time on the EU's southeastern border, often with an undetermined or false identity, raises questions about the internal security not only of the Balkan countries but also of the entire continent. It is hard not to notice that among the masses of political refugees or economic immigrants, there may also appear individuals associated with terrorist groups. What's more, for years there has been talk of radical Islamic cells in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzego-

35 T.D. Curp, *Human Rights and Wrongs in Failed States: Bosnia-Herzegovina, the International Community and the Challenges of Long-Term Instability in Southeastern Europe*, [in:] I. Trauschweizer, S.M. Miner (eds), *Failed States and Fragile Societies: A New World Disorder?*, Athens – Ohio 2014, pp. 32-33.

36 *Izbjeglice u Sarajevu bez pomoći vlasti*, YouTube, 01.05.2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4inJywDrXbQ> [06.08.2019]; D. Kalan, *In Bosnia, a Migrant Way Station Is Becoming a Winter Prison*, Foreign Policy, 20.02.2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/20/in-bosnia-a-migrant-way-station-is-becoming-a-winter-prison-bihac-croatia-borici-refugees/> [06.08.2019]; S. Govedarica, *Flüchtlinge auf der neuen Balkanroute. Gefangen im Niemandsland*, Deutschlandfunk, 13.12.2018, [https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/fluechtlinge-auf-der-neuen-balkanroute-gefangen-im-724.de.html?dram:article\\_id=435899](https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/fluechtlinge-auf-der-neuen-balkanroute-gefangen-im-724.de.html?dram:article_id=435899) [15.08.2019].

vina. There are plenty of cases of Muslims from the country going to fight for ISIS<sup>37</sup>. Unfortunately, not only Bosnia and Herzegovina but also other countries of the region, being plunged into their own internal problems, do not closely monitor the migrants.

The author, visiting Belgrade in June 2019, met Tunisians permanently living in Italy who officially came to the Serbian capital for tourist purposes but instead of sightseeing, spent every day with migrants. The question remains whether these ‘tourists’ actually met the city’s residents and then decided to abandon their plans to explore the city in favour of hearing the story of the hardships of passing through the Balkan route, or maybe they came to help their countrymen get into the EU illegally. If so, there may be more of these cases. However, they won’t show up in the statistics because the Tunisians, in this case, entered Serbia on Italian identity documents.

As noted above, after closing the EU borders to the migrants, whose primary goal is to make it to their dreamland, illegally if necessary, in practice this means they have to pay smugglers. Balkan criminal organisations, which have been cooperating with each other for decades despite the political animosities between conflicting nations, deal with crossing the border. Deprived of their money, the migrants become victims. This uncomfortable problem for politicians is not publicised, either in the Balkans or in the West<sup>38</sup>.

## 5. Balkan autocrats and the mass-migration crisis

Balkan autocrats have been using the influx of refugees from the Middle East since 2015 as an argument to legitimise both their internal and external policies<sup>39</sup>. Pressure from the opposition or from international organisations on compliance with democratic rules can easily be viewed as diverting attention from real, serious problems. Analogous reasoning can also be seen in Western diplomats, although they,

37 J. Kędziora-Płachciak, *Is Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Becoming a Breeding Ground for International Terrorism?*, [in:] D. Gibas-Krzak (ed.), *Terrorism in the Balkans in the 20th and 21st Century*, Toruń 2018, pp. 149-153; P. Planeta, *Bośnia i Hercegowina na rozdrożu. Odbudowa muzułmańskiej tożsamości czy islamizacja kraju?*, „Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne” 2017, no. 26, pp. 163-190.

38 P. Lovšin, *Kodo tihotapi migrante v Slovenijo*, „Dnevnik”, 25.05.2019, pp. 1, 3.

39 *A Macedonian Perspective on the Migration Crisis...*

unfortunately, rarely pay attention to the authoritarian tendencies of the 'continental abroad'. Undoubtedly, the mass-migration crisis has strengthened the international position of the Balkan *apparatchiks*, who now appear in the West as guarantors of stopping the painful problem of refugees outside the EU.

The influx of migrants has been successfully used by Milorad Dodik, a Serb representative in the praesidium of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He spreads stories that this phenomenon is part of a great plan to increase the Muslim population in the country<sup>40</sup>. This supposed Islamic threat became the pillar of his successful 2018 election campaign, as the politician managed to defeat the incumbent member of the praesidium, Mladen Ivanić<sup>41</sup>. Dodik has repeatedly claimed that there is no place for these migrants in Republika Srpska and that he will not accept EU money to build camps. He also claimed that Republika Srpska was and would remain safe and that he would not allow it to be flooded by 'aliens'.

Such populist narratives are characteristic of Dodik, who eagerly refers to the collective emotions of Bosnian Serbs, including the fear of the Islamic world, of which the Bosnians are part. In his vision of reality, Turkey and the Middle East are trying to use Bosnia to gain a Muslim foothold in Europe, which would threaten Serbian B&H residents. It is worth recalling that these views are based on the thesis of Bosnia being an artificial creation, incompatible with the Balkan ideal of the nation-state, created after the breakup of Yugoslavia and constantly reproduced in Serbian nationalist discourse. For example, Radovan Karadzic compared Bosnia's ethnic relations to oil and water, which clearly suggested the impossibility of building a lasting community, and also justified ethnic cleansing, because it was necessary to 'fix' the effect of the 'mixing solution' during the existence of Yugoslavia<sup>42</sup>. Dodik, in turn, talks about Bosnia as an impossible community (*nemoguća zajednica*)<sup>43</sup>.

40 D. Kalan, *In Bosnia, a Migrant Way Station...*

41 S. Županić, *BiH 2018: Dodik jedini politički profitirao na migrantima*, Express, 24.10.2018, <https://www.express.hr/top-news/bih-2018-dodik-na-migrantima-jedini-politicki-profitirao-18201> [15.08.2019].

42 J. Husanović, *Između traume, imaginacije i nade. Kritički ogledi o kulturnoj produkciji i emancipativnoj politici*, Beograd 2010, p. 109.

43 *Dodik: U BiH se pravi islamska država*, Mondo, 03.07.2016, <http://mondo.rs/a917466/Info/Ex-Yu/Dodik-o-popisu-stanovnistva-u-BiH.html> [15.08.2019].

It is also notable that among the nationalist-oriented part of Serbian society, opinions about the inevitability of another war with Bosnia are common. War would be perceived as a consequence of Bosnia's multi-ethnic (and thus 'inappropriate') character, as well as the rivalry of powers for influence in both B&H and the entire Balkans. Such moods are further fuelled by Russia, which conducts an intensive information campaign among Orthodox residents of the region, using a wide range of soft-power instruments. It is no wonder that the Orthodox Serbs count on Moscow's support in the event of a great conflict of civilisations. It is significant that in Serbocentric analyses of the geopolitical factor, where the interests of the powers are described in detail, Russia's aspirations are presented quite enigmatically, as if they were limited only to the defence of the Orthodox brothers<sup>44</sup>.

So Bosnian Serbs, plunged into economic crisis, believe in narratives about a Muslim conspiracy to colonise B&H, even if they are not plausible, especially since the overwhelming majority of migrants from the Middle East do not plan to stay in Bosnia or the Balkans, but dream about getting to the West<sup>45</sup>. Moreover, spreading fear of immigrants while also emphasizing that Republika Srpska is not threatened sounds cynical considering the geographical location of the entity. A quick glimpse at the map is enough to notice that the roads from Serbia and Montenegro to B&H always pass through the territory of Republika Srpska. Dodik's strategy seems very simple and clear, instead of facing the challenges associated with the influx of refugees, it is easier to explain that there is no problem, and at the same time, to spread the atmosphere of fear against the Islamic world and Bosniaks, which turns attention away from the difficult reality, prolonging to infinity the economic collapse and inefficiency of state institutions. The words of one Croatian journalist claiming that Dodik turned out to be the only winner in the politics of the migration crisis seem significant<sup>46</sup>.

Meanwhile, the other consequence of these narratives is the reproduction and strengthening of negative stereotypes about their

44 Vide: S. Nišić, *Globalna sila i bezbednost Balkana*, Beograd 2002.

45 According to data from 7/7/2019, 1,764 people have applied for asylum in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See *Austrijski mediji: Balkanu prijete novi talas izbjeglica*, antimigrant.ba, 08.07.2019, <https://antimigrant.ba/austrijski-mediji-balkanu-prijete-novi-talas-izbjeglica/> [15.08.2019].

46 S. Županić, *BiH* 2018...

Muslim neighbours, which further strengthens internal divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What's more, consolidating the divisions between Christianity and Islam can easily spread outside B&H, especially since the collective ideas of the South Slavic nations are abundant with anti-Muslim narratives, due to centuries of dependence on the Ottoman Empire, as well as subsequent conflicts with their Islamic Balkan neighbours. Such content can be easily subjected to new interpretations and clarifications, and as the example of Dodik shows, some politicians may resort to such strategies to ensure that they come to power or maintain it.

For Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia, the mass-migration crisis also meant the postponement of joining the Schengen area into the indefinite future, even though all these countries had met the requirements of accession to the agreement<sup>47</sup>. This largely explains the brutal behaviour of the Croatian border guards or the Bulgarians' decision to build a wall on the border with Turkey. One could probably ask, if not for the refugees and the atmosphere of increasing border controls, would the three youngest EU countries join Schengen, given the high level of corruption<sup>48</sup>. The politicians of these countries prefer to shift full responsibility to the migrants. The fact is, however, that from 2015, Sofia, Bucharest, and Zagreb must constantly prove to Brussels that they can perfectly protect EU borders. Considering that being outside the space of free movement of people is an obstacle to the development of the tourism industry, it is not difficult to anticipate the growth of negative attitudes towards the newcomers from the Middle East, especially in Croatia, which became part of the New Balkan Route.

The problems related to mass migration strengthen tensions and animosities between the Balkan countries, already in conflict. Confrontational politicians willingly accuse their neighbours of letting migrants pass through to their land through inadequate border protection, as was evident in 2015 on the Athens-Ankara, Skopje-Athens, Zagreb-Belgrade, and Ljubljana-Zagreb transit lines<sup>49</sup>. Today, the issue

47 *Može li Hrvatska uopće brzo u Schengen?*, DW, 31.07.2019, <https://www.dw.com/hr/mo%C5%BEEli-hrvatska-uop%C4%87e-brzo-u-schengen/a-49800781> [17.08.2019].

48 *Ibidem*.

49 O. Dragouni, *Granica prze-obrażona. Między Grecją a Macedonią*, „Herito. Dziedzictwo, kultura, współczesność” 2018, no. 1, pp. 40-41.

of refugees primarily affects Slovenian-Croatian relations: in July 2019, Slovenian Prime Minister Marjan Šarec proposed that the Croatian border with Serbia and Bosnia be guarded by Frontex, which caused outrage in Zagreb, which is trying to join Schengen<sup>50</sup>. Šarec's statement seems to be a response to the allegations by populist opposition Slovenian Democratic Party member Janez Janša about the lack of active measures to stop the migrants<sup>51</sup>.

The examples of Slovenia and Republika Srpska show that the influx of newcomers from the Middle East acts in favour of populist narratives, which is not surprising since one of the properties of populism is appealing to collective fears and heating negative emotions<sup>52</sup>. Here, it is worth noting that the Balkan populisms are not uniform, which is not surprising since populism is a very broad and complex concept. Populism assumes that the rulers will use the rhetoric that most people want to hear, but the perceptions and expectations of each society are very different<sup>53</sup>. A similar situation occurs in Southeastern Europe, where despite mental proximity, social imaginations are not uniform. In other words, the negative attitudes towards migrants from the Middle East are not dominant everywhere (at least for now). For example, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić said that Serbia should follow the example of Germany and Angela Merkel – who opened her country to refugees – because it would help with the demographic crisis that is beginning to plague Serbia<sup>54</sup>. Similar statements are made by other representatives of the ruling camp, such as the president's adviser, a former member of the legendary band Idoli, Nebojša Krstić, who

50 E. Zebić, *Hoće li se Zagreb protiviti slovenskom prijedlogu o Frontexu na granici?*, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 09.07.2019, <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/hrvatska-slovenija-frontex/30045618.html> [17.08.2019].

51 Ibidem.

52 J. Dzwonczyk, *Populistyczne tendencje w społeczeństwie postsocjalistycznym (na przykładzie Polski)*, Toruń 2000, p. 10.

53 A. Pelinka, *Populizm w Europie – w poszukiwaniu znaczenia mglistego pojęcia*, [in:] J.-M. De Waele, A. Pacześniak (eds), *Populizm w Europie. Defekt i przejaw demokracji?*, Warszawa 2010, p. 23.

54 Vučić o "strahu od migranata": *Trebaju nam ljudi, ne prazne livade*, N1, 02.03.2019, <http://ba.n1info.com/Regija/a319463/Vucic-o-naseljavanju-migranata.html> [20.08.2019]; CELA SRBIJA SE SMEJE: *Vučić o migrantima koji će rešiti problem nataliteta*, Srbin.info, 15.07.2018, <https://srbin.info/politika/cela-srbija-se-smeje-vucic-o-migrantima-koji-ce-resiti-problem-nataliteta/?lang=lat> [20.08.2019].

expressed the opinion that it is better for abandoned Serbian villages to be inhabited by migrants than to let them sit empty<sup>55</sup>.

Both statements were rather negatively received by Serbian society, not only because of the successively growing number of opponents to the culturally foreign migrants but also primarily because of the cynical nature of the statements. It is well known that in recent years, young and better-educated Serbs are leaving for the West, in record-breaking numbers of late. In May 2019, *Slobodna Evropa* published the results of research conducted in the Balkan countries (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Romania) in which it appears that 75 percent of young Serbs dream of emigrating from the country, the highest in the region<sup>56</sup>. Meanwhile, instead of developing constructive programmes to keep the best-educated and most-entrepreneurial parts of society, the authorities are proposing to replace them with migrants, who mostly are not planning to stay in Serbia.

The proposal to fill the demographic gap with migrants sounds outrageous, given the incident involving the imprisonment of Afghans without providing them access to an interpreter. As everyone knows, opening up to newcomers entails the requirements of respecting their separateness while maintaining specific procedures. Having a comprehensive immigration policy remains a separate issue. The shortcomings are instead blamed on the Western countries, including Germany, Vučić's model. Meanwhile, Serbia, as well as other Balkan countries, has not developed a vision of a multicultural society.

The opinions of Vučić and his supporters, although sounding strange, perfectly match the official discourse, not only in Serbia but also in the entire Balkans, where corrupt regimes do not act for the public good, rather in the name of their own private interests, which they cover with populist rhetoric.

55 NEBOJŠA KRSTIĆ: *Srpska sela treba da kolonizuju migranti*, Dnevna gazeta, 12.12.2018, <https://dnevna gazeta.rs/2018/12/12/nebojsa-krstic-srpska-sela-treba-da-kolonizuju-migranti-foto/> [20.08.2019].

56 *Bez komentara: Vučića im preko glave, rekordnih 75% Srba želi da emigrira iz Srbije*, Vidiportal, <https://www.vidiportal.ba/index.php/novosti/11558-vucica-im-preko-glave-rekordnih-75-srba-zeli-da-emigrira-iz-srbije> [20.07.2019].

In their demagogic rhetoric, Balkan autocrats refer to the problem of migrants, but at the same time adopt different strategies, depending on the shape of their collective representations. Some see strangers as strangers, often negatively stereotyping them, often using existing clichés regarding neighbours while others value them positively in an attempt to gain social support. However, the actual goal is always the pragmatic interests of politicians, not the welfare of the migrants, who are troubled by numerous problems in the Balkans.

## 6 Conclusion

It can be said that the migration crisis is a consequence of the Balkans' location, which is described by various metaphors, such as the gate of Europe<sup>57</sup> or a bridge (between East and West), suggesting the suspension of the region between two worlds. These pictorial comparisons can be referred to as today's socio-political reality, in which refugees trying to get from the Orient to the Occident are locked up in a transition zone, theoretically close to the West, where Western standards officially exist but in practice are not observed. Corruption and organised crime, however, function well in the Middle East. Existence in this 'no man's land' without solid plans to expect a better future turns to understandable frustration among the migrants. On the other hand, subsequent waves of refugees further complicate the already difficult situation in the Balkans, by the way of showing the inefficiency of these countries. The constantly growing number of undocumented guests from the Middle East is becoming a barrier hindering the region's integration with the European Union.

57 S. Nišić, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

## References

- 2/3 *ispitanika smatra da postoji mogućnost rasplamsavanja izbegličke krize*, Fondacija Ana i Vlade Divac, [https://www.divac.com/upload/document/kljucni\\_nalazi\\_istrazivanja\\_.pdf](https://www.divac.com/upload/document/kljucni_nalazi_istrazivanja_.pdf) [01.08.2019].
- A Macedonian Perspective in the Migration Crisis*, Clingendael, 17.11.2016, <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/macedonian-perspective-migration-crisis> [05.08.2019].
- Austrijski mediji: Balkanu prijete novi talas izbjeglica*, antimigrant.ba, 08.07.2019, <https://antimigrant.ba/austrijski-mediji-balkanu-prijeti-novi-talas-izbjeglica/> [15.08.2019].
- Balkan-Route zurićk: Neue Flüchtlingswelle rollt an*, oe24, 07.07.2019, <https://www.oe24.at/welt/Balkan-Route-zurueck-Neue-Fluechtlingswelle-rollt-an/387713359> [15.08.2019].
- Bazdulj M., *I oni su pjevali o ratu. Odjeci raspada Jugoslavije u engleskoj i američkoj književnosti*, Beograd 2013.
- Ben-Meir A., *Corruption in the Balkans Is Impeding EU Membership*, The Globalist, 11.01.2019, <https://www.theglobalist.com/european-union-membership-balkans-corruption/> [06.08.2019].
- Bez komentara: Vučića im preko glave, rekordnih 75% Srba želi da emigrira iz Srbije*, Vidiportal, <https://www.vidiportal.ba/index.php/novosti/11558-vucica-im-preko-glave-rekordnih-75-srba-zeli-da-emigrira-iz-srbije> [20.07.2019].
- Bieber F., *The Rise (and Fall) of Balkan Stabilitocracies*, CIRSD, <https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-fall-of-balkan-stabilitocracies> [03.08.2019].
- CELA SRBIJA SE SMEJE: Vučić o migrantima koji će rešiti problem nataliteta*, Srbin.info, 15.07.2018, <https://srbin.info/politika/cela-srbija-se-smeje-vucic-o-migrantima-koji-ce-resiti-problem-nataliteta/?lang=lat> [20.08.2019].
- Croatia: Migrants Pushed Back to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Violence, Abuse; Denied Opportunity to Apply for Asylum*, Human Rights Watch, 11.12.2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/11/croatia-migrants-pushed-back-bosnia-and-herzegovina> [06.08.2019].
- Curp T.D., *Human Rights and Wrongs in Failed States: Bosnia-Herzegovina, the International Community and the Challenges of Long-Term Instability in Southeastern Europe*, [in:] I. Trauschweizer, S.M. Miner (eds), *Failed States and Fragile Societies: A New World Disorder?*, Athens – Ohio 2014.
- Dodik: U BiH se pravi islamska država*, Mondo, 03.07.2016, <http://mondo.rs/a917466/Info/Ex-Yu/Dodik-o-popisu-stanovnistva-u-BiH.html> [15.08.2019].
- Dragouni O., *Granica prze-obrażona. Między Grecją a Macedonią, „Herito. Dziedzictwo, kultura, współczesność” 2018, no. 1.*
- Dzwończyk J., *Populistyczne tendencje w społeczeństwie postsocjalistycznym (na przykładzie Polski)*, Toruń 2000.

- GDE SU PARE? 2014. godine smo dobili MILIONE za prevenciju poplava, A SAD NAM SE DEŠAVA ISTI PAKAO! KAKO?*, Espresso.rs, 09.06.2019, <https://www.espresso.rs/vesti/drustvo/397167/gde-su-pare-2014-godine-smo-dobili-milione-za-prevenciju-poplava-a-sad-nam-se-desava-isti-pakao-kako-foto> [20.08.2019].
- Govedarica S., *Flüchtlinge auf der neuen Balkanroute. Gefangen im Niemandsland*, Deutschlandfunk, 13.12.2018, [https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/fluechtlinge-auf-der-neuen-balkanroute-gefangen-im-724.de.html?dram:article\\_id=435899](https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/fluechtlinge-auf-der-neuen-balkanroute-gefangen-im-724.de.html?dram:article_id=435899) [15.08.2019].
- Granice istoka, Odkut migranti u Bosni?*, Al Jazeera Balkans, 26.07.2019, <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/video/granice-istoka-otkut-migranti-u-bosni> [06.08.2019].
- Husanović J., *Između traume, imaginacije i nade. Krički ogleđi o kulturnoj produkciji i emancipativnoj politici*, Beograd 2010.
- Imielski R., *Prezydent Macedonii: Unia zapomniala o Bałkanach. Zostaliśmy sami z problemem uchodźców*, Gazeta Wyborcza, 18.09.2015, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75399,18845087,prezydent-macedonii-unia-zapomniala-o-balkanach-zostalismy.html> [12.04.2018].
- Izbjeglice u Sarajevu bez pomoći vlasti*, YouTube, 01.05.2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4inJywDrXbQ> [06.08.2019].
- Kalan D., *In Bosnia, a Migrant Way Station Is Becoming a Winter Prison*, Foreign Policy, 20.02.2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/20/in-bosnia-a-migrant-way-station-is-becoming-a-winter-prison-bihac-croatia-borici-refugees/> [06.08.2019].
- Karitas: *Izbeglice na Balkanu ponekad u katastrofalnim uslovima*, Danas, 18.07.2016, <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/karitas-izbeglice-na-balkanu-ponekad-u-katastrofalnim-uslovima/nzs8xoq> [25.07.2019].
- Kassabova K., *Granica. Na krawędzi Europy*, Wołowiec 2019.
- Kędziora-Płachciak J., *Is Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Becoming a Breeding Ground for International Terrorism?*, [in:] D. Gibas-Krzak (ed.), *Terrorism in the Balkans in the 20th and 21st Century*, Toruń 2018.
- Lovšin P., *Kodo tihotapi migrante v Slovenijo*, „Dnevnik”, 25.05.2019.
- Majewski P., *(Re)konstrukcje narodu. Odwieczna Macedonia powstaje w XXI wieku*, Gdańsk 2013.
- Memić M., *Bošnjaci (Muslimani) Crne Gore*, Podgorica – Sarajevo 2003.
- Misteriozno nestao novac plasiran u BiH*, Jabuka.tv, 17.07.2016, <https://www.jabuka.tv/misteriozno-nestao-novac-plasiran-u-bih/> [20.08.2019].
- ‘Mladi imaju vrlo negativne stavove prema imigrantima, ali i nacionalnim manjinama’*, Večernji list, 25.10.2016, <https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/brani-slava-baranovic-mladi-imaju-vrlo-negativne-stavove-prema-imigrantima-ali-i-nacionalnim-manjinama-1123682> [01.08.2019].
- Može li Hrvatska uopće brzo u Schengen?*, DW, 31.07.2019, <https://www.dw.com/hr/mo%C5%BEe-li-hrvatska-uop%C4%87e-brzo-u-schengen/a-49800781> [17.08.2019].

- NEBOJŠA KRSTIĆ: *Srpska sela treba da kolonizuju migranti!*, Dnevna gazeta, 12.12.2018, <https://dnevnagazeta.rs/2018/12/12/nebojsa-krstic-srpska-sela-treba-da-kolonizuju-migranti-foto/> [20.08.2019].
- Nišić S., *Globalna sila i bezbednost Balkana*, Beograd 2002.
- Nova balkanska ruta: opasnija i skuplja, DW, 11.05.2018, <https://www.dw.com/sr/nova-balkanska-ruta-opasnija-i-skuplja/a-43736010> [01.08.2019].
- Pejanović R., *Tranzicija i nacionalna kultura. Ogledi iz društveno-ekonomske antropologije*, Novi Sad 2015.
- Pelinka A., *Populizm w Europie – w poszukiwaniu znaczenia mglistego pojęcia*, [in:] J.M. De Waele, A. Paczeński (eds), *Populizm w Europie. Defekt i przejaw demokracji?*, Warszawa 2010.
- Petrović M., *UBISTVO U CENTRU BEOGRADA Migrant iz Avganistana stradao u tuči u Karađorđevoj*, Blic, 05.06.2019, <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/hronika/ubistvo-u-centru-beograda-migrant-iz-avganistana-stradao-u-tuci-u-karadordevoj/kk9kqmp> [20.08.2019].
- Planeta P., *Bośnia i Hercegowina na rozdrożu. Odbudowa mużulmańskiej tożsamości czy islamizacja kraju?*, „Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne” 2017, no. 26.
- Policija: *O migrantima se šire gnjusne laži, nemojte nasjedati*, 24sata, 06.11.2018, <https://www.24sata.hr/news/policija-o-migrantima-se-sire-gnjusne-lazi-nemojte-nasjedati-598679-24sata.hr> [20.08.2019].
- REŠENO UBISTVO DVOJICE MIGRANATA! *Sumnja se da je Avganistanac Kulat podsticao na dvostruko ubistvo nožem!*, Espresso.rs, 10.06.2019, <https://www.espresso.rs/vesti/hronika/399869/reseno-ubistvo-dvojice-migranata-sumnja-se-da-je-avganistanac-kulat-podsticao-na-dvostruko-ubistvo-nozem> [21.08.2019].
- Sarajevo: *Dvojica migranata pretukli i opljačkali starca dok je išao platiti račune*, Source.ba, 07.04.2019, <http://www.source.ba/clanak/Crnahronika/492413/Sarajevo--Dvojica-migranata-pretukli-i-opljackali-starca-dok-je-isao-platiti-racune> [20.08.2019].
- Shefer P., *Liberalna nelagodnost Evropske integracije*, Beograd 2007.
- Szczerek Z., *Międzymorze. Podróże przez prawdziwą i wyobrażoną Europę Środkową*, Warszawa – Wołowiec 2017.
- Szpala M., Jaroszewicz M., *Macedonia a kryzys migracyjny*, Analizy OSW, 26.08.2015, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-08-26/macedonia-a-kryzys-migracyjny> [03.08.2019].
- The Balkans: A migrant gateway for jihadists?*, Global Initiative, 01.03.2018, <https://globalinitiative.net/the-balkans-a-migrant-gateway-for-jihadists/> [10.08.2019].
- The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy*, Graz 2017, <http://www.biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/BIEPAG-The-Crisis-of-Democracy-in-the-Western-Balkans.-Authoritarianism-and-EU-Stabilitocracy-web.pdf> [03.08.2019].

- Tomović P., *Talas migranata u Crnoj Gori*, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 28.02.2019, <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-migranti-porast-broja-iz-bjeglice/29796341.html> [20.08.2019].
- Uhapšena peta osoba osumnjičena za organizovanu pljačku migranata u Sarajevu*, Klix.ba, 01.08.2018, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/crna-hronika/uhapsena-peta-osoba-osumnjicena-za-organizovanu-pljacku-migranata-u-sarajevu/180801014> [20.08.2019].
- Vučić o "strahu od migranata": *Trebaju nam ljudi, ne prazne livade*, N1, 02.03.2019, <http://ba.n1info.com/Regija/a319463/Vucic-o-naseljavanju-migranata.html> [20.08.2019].
- Woźnica R., *Wpływ konfliktów w byłej Jugosławii na kierunki rozwoju transnarodowej przestępczości zorganizowanej na Bałkanach*, [in:] P. Chmielewski, S.L. Szczesio (eds), *Balkany Zachodnie między przeszłością a przyszłością*, Łódź 2013.
- Zebić E., *Hoće li se Zagreb protiviti slovenskom prijedlogu o Frontexu na granici?*, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 09.07.2019, <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/hrvatska-slovenija-frontex/30045618.html> [17.08.2019].
- Zivanovic M., *Myanmar's Persecuted Rohingya Join Balkan Route into Europe*, Balkan Insight, 02.08.2019, [https://balkaninsight.com/2019/08/02/myanmars-persecuted-rohingya-join-balkan-route-into-europe/?fbclid=IwARoKcdm4GZk5hC-F8W8Jz\\_7d\\_K6DWA-V1ObOSTLGAHbDu2DyTLvZtCgnrLte](https://balkaninsight.com/2019/08/02/myanmars-persecuted-rohingya-join-balkan-route-into-europe/?fbclid=IwARoKcdm4GZk5hC-F8W8Jz_7d_K6DWA-V1ObOSTLGAHbDu2DyTLvZtCgnrLte) [02.08.2019].
- Zorić J., *Maloletni migranti iz Avganistana završili u zatvoru za odrasle u Novom Sadu*, N1, 17.01.2019, <http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a452768/Maloletni-migranti-iz-Avganistana-završili-u-zatvoru-za-odrasle-u-Novom-Sadu.html> [21.08.2019].
- Zorić J., *Ubijen migrant koji je bio osumnjičen za ubistvo Avganistanca u centru Beograda*, N1, 06.06.2019, <http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a489941/Ubijen-migrant-koji-je-bio-osumnjicen-za-ubistvo-u-centru-Beograda.html> [21.08.2019].
- Županić S., *BiH 2018: Dodik jedini politički profitirao na migrantima*, Express, 24.10.2018, <https://www.express.hr/top-news/bih-2018-dodik-na-migrantima-jedini-politicki-profitirao-18201> [15.08.2019].