



3/2019

# POLICY PAPERS

Monika Sus

## Pivotal Shifts in European Security – Implications for Poland

2019  
3





**Publishing series** Policy Papers

**Number** 3/2019

**Series editors** Beata Surmacz and Tomasz Stępniewski



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# **Pivotal Shifts in European Security – Implications for Poland**

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**ISBN** 978-83-66413-08-5

**Published and edited** Instytut Europy Środkowej

ul. Niecała 5

20-080 Lublin

[www.ies.lublin.pl](http://www.ies.lublin.pl)

**Cover design and typesetting** [www.targonski.pl](http://www.targonski.pl)

**Cover photo** © PopTika | [shutterstock.com](http://shutterstock.com)

**Print** [www.drukarniaakapit.pl](http://www.drukarniaakapit.pl)



Monika Sus<sup>1</sup>

## **Pivotal Shifts in European Security – Implications for Poland<sup>2</sup>**

### **Key Findings**

- Today's world is increasingly portrayed as a VUCA world meaning that it has become volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. Due to globalization and digitalization, the interdependence between actors has been growing and challenges they are facing have become as complex as ever.

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<sup>2</sup> This publication has been compiled on the basis of the LSE Ideas Report *European Security 2030. The results of the Dahrendorf Foresight Project*, M. Sus and M. Hadeed (eds), September 2019.

- In order to grasp the complexity of the policy world, foresight approaches are gaining popularity. They allow to identify key drivers which will most likely exert an impact upon particular policy problems.
- Among the driving forces which will most likely determine European security in a mid-term perspective, Polish foreign and security community seems to under-appreciate technological progress (including cybersecurity) and climate change as factors which might impact Poland's security posture in a mid-term perspective.
- Two most recent strategic documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense perceive the threat from Russia, due to its aggressive and revisionist policy, as the most significant current and future challenge to Polish security.

## **1. Introduction**

The concept of the VUCA world (Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous) coined by U.S. Army War College in the early 1990s to describe the situation after the end of the Cold War, has never seemed more accurate than today. The world is transforming rapidly, and states as well as other actors of the international order, are confronted with challenges they are not prepared for. Strategic surprises such as the financial crisis, the Arab spring, the Russian annexation of Crimea, war in Syria, migration and refugee waves overflowing Europe, and Brexit have presented the European Union with considerable impetus to adapt and to respond to these events. European Union's member states are obvious-

ly by default affected and forced to re-think their strategic options. This observation constitutes a point of departure for this study. The rationale of this paper is to discuss current challenges to European security and view them against the backdrop of Polish foreign and security policy. Since the dominant narrative of Polish foreign and security policy is centered on the threat originating from Russia, this paper aims at taking a more complex look and at identifying major threats to European security Poland is a part of and is affected by, in mid-term perspective of 10 to 15 years. The analysis proceeds as follows. In the introductory remarks, shifts occurring in the world and repercussions they have for European security are examined. Next, eight driving forces which will exert an impact upon European security in the mid-term perspective are identified. The subsequent section discusses the extent to which two recent strategic documents which guide Polish foreign security and defense policy – “Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021”<sup>3</sup> and the “Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland”<sup>4</sup> reflect on these key drivers. In the concluding section, observations are summed up and three policy recommendations for Polish decision-makers are offered.

## 2. Overview of current security challenges

On the eve of the Munich Security Conference 2019, its chairman argued that “the global security situation is more

<sup>3</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs RP, “Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021”, <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/what-we-do> [2.11.2019].

<sup>4</sup> Ministry of National Defence RP, “The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland”, May 2017, <https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/defenceconcept-publication> [2.11.2019].



dangerous today than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We are experiencing an epochal shift; an era is ending, and the rough outlines of a new political age are only beginning to emerge”<sup>5</sup>. Ischinger’s view is evidently shared by leading policymakers who notice that the global order is under pressure and may fray<sup>6</sup>. A similar tone was present in the European Union’s Global Strategy (EUGS) announced in June 2016 by Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The EUGS argues: “We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption”<sup>7</sup>. Last but not least, the Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021, published in 2017, shares this view by claiming the following: “In this second

<sup>5</sup> W. Ischinger, “Who Will Pick up the Pieces?”, Munich Security Conference 2019, <https://securityconference.org/en/press/in-the-media/full/food-for-thought-who-will-pick-up-the-pieces/> [14.01.2020].

<sup>6</sup> D.R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 2018, <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf>, p. 4 [2.11.2019]; F. Mogherini, “Speech by HR / VP Mogherini at the Annual EU Ambassadors Conference 2018”, European External Action Service (EEAS), September 2018, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/50025/speech-hrvp-mogherini-annual-eu-ambassadors-conference-2018\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/50025/speech-hrvp-mogherini-annual-eu-ambassadors-conference-2018_en) [2.11.2019].

<sup>7</sup> EEAS, “Shared Vision. Common Action: a Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, June 2016, p. 7, [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf) [9.11.2019].

decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the world has become less stable and less predictable. The international order – established in the wake of the Cold War, when the West defeated Communist totalitarianism, and the countries of Central Europe rejoined the free world – has in recent years been steadily eroding. At the heart of this process lies a deep and multi-faceted crisis of the Western world”<sup>8</sup>.

The unprecedented shift of power from the West to multiple poles around the world, and the threat to the rule-based global order are related to a range of challenges, among which the US-China relationship seems to be one of the most pressing. The growing competition between the USA as the traditional superpower and China as the rapidly rising power has been hotly debated<sup>9</sup>. There is disagreement between those who argue that these countries are trapped in ‘Thucydides Trap’ (the US continuing to decline while China continues to rise until it can claim the global power status and challenge the US position)<sup>10</sup> and those who question the inevitability of a power transition, noting that while China is booming, it is doubtful whether it will outcompete

<sup>8</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> K. Creutz at al., “The changing global order and its implications for the EU”, FILA Report No. 59, March 2019; M. Huotari at al., “China’s Emergence as a Global Security Actor. Strategies for Europe”, Merics Papers on China, No. 4, July 2019, <https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/chinas-emergence-global-security-actor-1> [9.11.2019]; W.M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States”, Congressional Research Service, June 2019, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf> [2.11.2019]; S.M. Walt, “Europe’s Future Is as China’s Enemy. Foreign Policy”, foreignpolicy.com, January 22, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/22/europes-future-is-as-chinas-enemy/#> [5.11.2019].

<sup>10</sup> G. Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2017.

the US in the near future<sup>11</sup>. Moreover, developments in both countries have direct security implications for Europe: a disturbed transatlantic relationship shaped by the growing rift between European and American interests and values is posing a threat to NATO<sup>12</sup>. Moreover, China's growing geopolitical and economic ambitions in and towards Europe in the form of hi-tech takeovers, cyber-operations, and big data capture constitute a further destabilizing factor<sup>13</sup>. A case in point is the ongoing 5G debate which takes place in European capitals and an attempt to find a common position among member states. Another challenger to the global rule-based order is Russia, which is perceived, especially by its neighbors, as the major threat to European security. Starting with the war in Georgia in 2008, Russia has successfully exported hybrid warfare in its neighborhood and beyond. It also carried out a series of cyber-attacks on US and European politics<sup>14</sup>. Furthermore, Moscow has invested massively in defense in the recent decade – Russian defense spending was more than 60 percent higher in 2015 when compared with 2010<sup>15</sup>. Moreover, the country continues to modernize, develop, and field a wide range of advanced nuclear, conventional, and asymmetric capabilities<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> T. Christiansen, *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power*, W.W. Norton & Company, 2016.

<sup>12</sup> C. Pazzanese, "A Spirited Defense of NATO as Bulwark", *The Harvard Gazette*, February 14, 2019; S.M. Walt, op.cit.

<sup>13</sup> M. Huotari et al., op.cit.

<sup>14</sup> M. Matishak, "What we know about Russia's election hacking", *Politico*, July 18, 2018; S. Meister, "The 'Lisa case': Germany as a target of Russian disinformation", *NATO Review*, July 25, 2016, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/lisa-case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/EN/index.htm> [5.11.2019].

<sup>15</sup> E. Hunter, "Does Russia Have the Financial Means for Its Military Ambitions? ", *NATO Review*, October 21, 2016.

<sup>16</sup> D.R. Coats, op.cit., p. 24.

Iran poses another challenge and has become a cause of a recent disagreement between the EU and the US. The American withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the so-called ‘Iran Deal’) due to alleged violations of the agreement by Iran, took the European partners by surprise. EU member states decided to respect the conditions of the deal, and thus a common transatlantic approach to Iran became a thing of the past<sup>17</sup>. Both Iran and Russia play, in turn, crucial roles in the ongoing military conflict in Syria, alongside the US and Turkey. The four states have divergent views on Syria’s future. If one would present it in a simplistic way, one could say that Russia and Iran, despite their differences, seek to keep Assad’s regime in power; the US focuses on supporting the Syrian democratic forces; and Turkey fights against Kurdish forces. Yet, the key interest of all four actors is to protect their own political and economic interests in the region<sup>18</sup>. The conflict, which has been going on since 2011, is still destabilizing the Middle East. It produced over 10 million internally displaced Syrian citizens, posing an immense humanitarian and political challenge, and prompted the EU to agree to a refugee deal, which contradicts its own core values, with increasingly authoritarian Turkey<sup>19</sup>.

India constitutes another cause of global disorder, as the decades-long struggle with Pakistan has recently been

<sup>17</sup> F. Mogherini, *op.cit.*

<sup>18</sup> A. Vatanka, “Iran and Russia, Growing Apart. Rising Dissent Over the IRGC’s Militias”, *foreignaffairs.com*, November 29, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-11-29/iran-and-russia-growing-apart> [5.11.2019].

<sup>19</sup> M. Garavoglia, “The EU-Turkey Dirty Deal on Migrants: Can Europe Redeem Itself?”, *Brookings*, March 14, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/03/14/the-eu-turkey-dirty-deal-on-migrants-can-europe-redeem-itself/> [6.10.2019].

reopened and the risk of a serious military confrontation between these nuclear-armed neighbors has increased<sup>20</sup>. In addition, the security situation in Africa remains perilous as civil war (Libya, South Sudan), terrorism (Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt), violence (Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo), and instability (Mali, Burundi) continue to ravage the continent<sup>21</sup>.

Furthermore, today's challenges go far beyond the power politics of single actors and involve global risks shared by many international players. One of the challenges is the growing threat posed to the international community by cyber-security issues. As experts argue, the number of countries capable of setting up a cyber-attack has grown from 10 in 2011 to over 30 in 2017<sup>22</sup>. Evidence was found that Russia, Iran, and North Korea have been testing aggressive cyber-attacks which pose growing threats to the Western world.

Another major global risk is presented by weapons of mass destruction – such as chemical weapons used in Iraq and Syria – and their uncontrolled proliferation. Due to the Russian violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and concerns about China's unconstrained arsenal of INF Treaty-range missiles, the US announced its suspension of and withdrawal from the Treaty in February 2019,

<sup>20</sup> J. Slater and P. Constable, "The India-Pakistan Relationship Is Facing the Most Serious Escalation in Decades. Here's How It Got to This Point", *Washington Post*, February 26, 2019.

<sup>21</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, "Global Conflict Tracker", 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/?category=us> [3.04.2019].

<sup>22</sup> D.R. Coats, op.cit., p. 5.

bringing back the risk of a global missile arms race<sup>23</sup>. With all its flaws, the INF Treaty has been the most far-reaching and successful nuclear arms reduction agreement in history, leading to the verifiable elimination of Soviet weapons and missiles based in Europe<sup>24</sup>.

Terrorism constitutes a next global risk. Notwithstanding the decreasing number of terrorist attacks worldwide<sup>25</sup>, 67 countries have experienced at least one fatality due to terrorism in 2017<sup>26</sup>. Despite the territorial defeat of the so-called Islamic State, the MENA region, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa remain a hotbed for violent extremist terrorists<sup>27</sup>. Within the EU, Europol counted a total of 205 foiled, failed, or completed terrorist attacks in nine member states in 2017 (when compared to 142 in 2016), killing 68 people and injuring 844<sup>28</sup>.

Moreover, environmental degradation and climate change constitute both direct and indirect threats to human life and security which so far have seemed to be neglected by mainstream policy. According to the European Environment

<sup>23</sup> D.G. Kimball, "The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance", Arms Control Association, August 2019, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty> [4.11.2019].

<sup>24</sup> D.G. Kimball, "INF Treaty Crisis: Background and Next Steps", Arms Control Association, February 2019.

<sup>25</sup> A. Taylor, "Terrorist Attacks Are Quietly Declining around the World", *The Washington Post*, August 15, 2018, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/15/terrorist-attacks-are-quietly-declining-around-world/?utm\\_term=.fb5ec4c6b401](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/15/terrorist-attacks-are-quietly-declining-around-world/?utm_term=.fb5ec4c6b401) [7.11.2019].

<sup>26</sup> Institute for Economics & Peace, "Global Terrorism Index 2018. Measuring the Impact of Terrorism", December 2018, <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018.pdf> [2.11.2019].

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Europol, "TESAT: European Union Situation and Trend Report", June 20, 2018, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018> [8.11.2019].

Agency<sup>29</sup>, exposure to air pollutants (PM2.5, NO<sub>2</sub>, and O<sub>3</sub>) was responsible for over half a million premature deaths. Indirect security threats emanate from the negative impact of climate change on water and food security and infrastructure caused by extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods, storms, and wildfires<sup>30</sup>.

Finally, human rights are also at risk. In 2018 alone, we faced large-scale atrocities, such as Syria's war on civilians in areas held by anti-government forces, the Saudi-led coalition's killing and starving of Yemeni civilians, and the Myanmar army's mass murder of Rohingya Muslims<sup>31</sup>. Powerful autocrats, such as Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, or the Philippines' President Rodrigo Duterte – to name just a few – continue their disregard for basic rights, posing an ongoing threat to their citizens<sup>32</sup>.

To sum up this brief and far from exhaustive overview of today's global challenges: "No matter where you look, there are countless conflicts and crises – crises that greatly affect us Europeans"<sup>33</sup>. At the same time, the European Union is also being challenged from within: Brexit has turned into a political and economic mess; illiberal tendencies in Hungary and Poland threaten to undermine the Union's core values<sup>34</sup>; and the eurozone and migration crises have fueled

<sup>29</sup> European Environment Agency, "Air Quality in Europe – 2018 Report", October 29, 2018, <http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/air-quality-in-europe-2012> [2.11.2019].

<sup>30</sup> D.R. Coats, op.cit.

<sup>31</sup> Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2019. Events of 2018", February 17, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/haiti> [5.11.2019].

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>33</sup> W. Ischinger, op.cit.

<sup>34</sup> L. Pech and K.L. Scheppele, "Illiberalism within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU", *Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies*, vol. 19, 2017.

Euroscepticism across the whole European continent<sup>35</sup>. The European elections of 2019 have seen the traditional power-houses lose significant vote shares: the European People's Party lost 36 seats – down from 221 to 180; while the Socialists and Democrats lost 45 seats – down from 191 to 146. At the same time, the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy expanded their faction by six seats<sup>36</sup>. This increase came despite the establishment of another Eurosceptic faction in 2015, the Europe of Nations and Freedom, which in turn was also able to increase the number of its seats by 22. Liberal and pro-European factions were also successful, with the liberal ALDE gaining 42 seats, incorporating President Macron's *République en Marche* and the Greens/ European Free Alliance gaining 19 seats.

The brief overview of today's security challenges is mirrored by the argument Mogherini made at the recent Munich Security Conference by claiming that “[t]he nature of the security threats that we all face is completely different today from even a few years ago: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, new arms races, terrorist fighters, but also the impact of climate change, or the challenges posed by the use of new technologies, for instance artificial intelligence”<sup>37</sup>.

<sup>35</sup> N. Conti, “National political elites, the EU, and the populist challenge”, *Politics*, vol. 38, 2018, no. 3, pp. 361-377; E. Hernández and H. Kriesi, “The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe”, *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 55, 2016, no. 2, pp. 203-224; A.L. Pirro et al., “The populist politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: Comparative conclusions”, *Politics*, vol. 38, 2018, no. 3, pp. 378-390.

<sup>36</sup> European Parliament, “2019 European Election Results”, July 2, 2019, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en> [7.11.2019].

<sup>37</sup> F. Mogherini, “Speech by High Representative / Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Munich Security Conference”, EEAS, February 15, 2019, <https://eeas.europa.eu/dele->



### 3. Future of European security – key drivers

Taking stock of the multidimensional security risks of today, the next part of this analysis attempts to present eight key driving forces which will impact the European security environment in the next decade. While hypothetical in nature, these key drivers are nonetheless informative. Their added value is to bring us closer to identifying the common patterns which should be considered by developing European and national policies and to increase policymakers' capacity for anticipatory governance. The list of the driving forces is not exhaustive as the examination of all possible security threats is impossible<sup>38</sup>. Yet, I believe the key drivers to be presented in the next section give a good indication on how the European, and thereby also Polish, security environment might change in the next decade.

#### 1. Migration from the MENA region

Migration has dominated the European agenda since 2014<sup>39</sup>, but sustainable solutions have remained elusive. The migration and refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016, when more than

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gations/iran/58232/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-munich-security-conference\_en [7.11.2019].

<sup>38</sup> The list was inspired by discussions during the Dahrendorf Foresight Workshop which took place in October 2018 at the Hertie School and was held within the Dahrendorf Forum-Debating Europe, a joint project between the Hertie School and the London School of Economics. For more, see: <https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/research-2017-2019-governance-institutions-and-policy-foresight-project/>.

<sup>39</sup> European Council (EC), "European Council Meeting, 17 and 18 December 2015 – Conclusions", <https://www.europeansources.info/record/meeting-european-council-17-18-december-2015/>; EC, "European Council Meeting, 15 December 2016 – Conclusions", <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/15/euco-conclusions-final/>; EC, "European Council Meeting 19 October 2017 – Conclusions", <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21620/19-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf>; EC, "European Council Meeting 13 and 14 December 2018 – Conclusions", <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2018/12/13-14/> [2.11.2019].

1.3 million people arrived in Europe<sup>40</sup>, driven by a deteriorating security and economic situation in the MENA region, subsequently triggered a political crisis across the continent. These events showed that existing political frameworks<sup>41</sup> were unable to cope, and the European Commission's relocation plan aimed at rebalancing the burden-sharing among the member states failed to be implemented<sup>42</sup>. In order to reduce the numbers of refugees and migrants, the EU struck deals with Turkey to prevent sea-crossings from its shores, and with Libyan local authorities, tribal leaders, and armed groups to stop the smuggling of people and to increase border controls. Numbers have indeed decreased – in 2018 around 580,800 first-time asylum seekers applied for protection, less than half the number of the peak year 2015<sup>43</sup>.

Yet, critics argue that Europe compromised itself by making deals with authoritarian regimes. It became increasingly evident that people who wanted to come to Europe are held in detention centers where refugees and migrants are arbitrarily and indefinitely held, and routinely exposed

<sup>40</sup> UNHCR, "Refugees & Migrants Sea Arrivals in Europe UNHCR", <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205> [1.11.2019].

<sup>41</sup> Such as the Common European Asylum System, and the Dublin III Regulation. See: European Commission, "Common European Asylum System", [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en) [2.11.2019]; "Regulation (EU) no 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person", *Official Journal of the European Union*, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:en:PDF> [2.11.2019].

<sup>42</sup> N. Nielsen, "One Year after Launch, EU Fails on Relocation", *EUobserver*, September 5, 2016, <http://www.euobserver.com/migration/134919> [7.11.2019].

<sup>43</sup> European Commission, "Asylum in the EU Member States – 580 800 First-Time Asylum Seekers Registered in 2018, down by 11% Compared with 2017 – Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis Continued to Be the Top Citizenships", March 14, 2019, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_STAT-19-1690\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-19-1690_en.htm) [7.11.2019].

to serious human rights violations including torture<sup>44</sup>. The situation remains tense, and even with a controlled influx, Europe is facing the following problems: how to accommodate asylum seekers waiting for decisions on their cases; how to integrate them with the economy and into society if their applications are approved; and how to deport them if not. Moreover, the deteriorating situation in the EU's neighborhood might soon become the sole reason behind the migration influx to Europe. As the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) warned, desertification alone could force up to 135 million people to migrate by 2030, 60 million of which could migrate from Sub-Saharan Africa towards Europe<sup>45</sup>. The World Bank Group further points to the increased risk of droughts, floods, and declining crop yields, pushing up to 100 million people into extreme poverty, further increasing incentives to emigrate<sup>46</sup>.

The political fallout of the EU's inability to resolve the issue has already been evident and much discussed. The EUGS called for the need to develop an "effective migration policy" by supporting transit countries to improve reception and asylum capabilities, by stemming irregular flows, etc.<sup>47</sup>. An uncontrolled influx of migrants might cause socio-po-

<sup>44</sup> Amnesty International, "Libya: European governments complicit in horrific abuse of refugees and migrants", December 12, 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/12/libya-european-governments-complicit-in-horrific-abuse-of-refugees-and-migrants/> [6.11.2019].

<sup>45</sup> B. Müller at al., "Klimamigration – Definitionen, Ausmaß und politische Instrumente in der Diskussion", Working Paper 45, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2012, [https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/WorkingPapers/wp45-klimamigration.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=11](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/WorkingPapers/wp45-klimamigration.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=11) [8.11.2019].

<sup>46</sup> S. Hallegatte at al., *Shock Waves – Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty*, The World Bank Group, Washington 2016.

<sup>47</sup> EEAS, op.cit.

litical disruptions, and thus put the European security at risk. At the same time, however, due to population aging, Europe needs to open its borders for workforce from third countries. In order to minimize security risks, this should be done within a framework of a joint EU policy, which however, is not in sight at the moment.

## **2. China's global power projection**

Already in 2008, G. John Ikenberry argued that the rise of China due to its “extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy”<sup>48</sup> will impact the Western world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. With a population of 1.3 billion, China is the second largest economy after the USA. It noted economic growth in 2017 at 9.7 and in 2018 at 6.4 percent (in comparison, the EU's economy grew by 1.4 percent in 2018)<sup>49</sup>. Today, China is expanding its flagship trading and infrastructure projects, notably the Belt and Road Initiative, into the European Union. Furthermore, Beijing applies its economic strength to pursue its security interests and to shape institutions and norms which guide global security. By doing so, it challenges European security ambitions<sup>50</sup>.

Recent examples illustrating this trend are the joint naval drills with Russia in the Mediterranean and the Baltic; a missile defense exercise near Moscow; the construction of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti; Chinese security forces

<sup>48</sup> G.J. Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Can the Liberal System Survive?,” *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2008, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west> [8.11.2019].

<sup>49</sup> Trading Economics, “GDP Annual Growth Rate – Countries – List. Europe”, 2019, <https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp-annual-growth-rate?continent=europe> [1.11.2019]; W.M. Morrison, op.cit.

<sup>50</sup> M. Huotari et al., op.cit.

operating in Afghanistan; China financing development in the MENA region; and Beijing's Poly Group aiming at joint arms production with Serbia, one of the EU's direct neighbors<sup>51</sup>. China is also emerging as a pivotal player in the international human rights system, in particular within the UN framework<sup>52</sup>. Chinese security interactions combined with China's aggressive policy to popularize its high-tech products and services in Europe are already affecting core European economic, political, and security interests in the immediate and broader European neighborhood – and this trend will most likely continue.

The wider security implications associated with booming China relate, on the one hand, to the build-up of its military capabilities, and, on the other hand (and more concretely), to technological exchange and leadership. This has been acknowledged by High Representative Mogherini, who stated in her Strategic Outlook of 2019 that “China's increasing military capabilities coupled with its comprehensive vision and ambition to have the technologically most advanced armed forces by 2050 present security issues for the EU, already in a short to mid-term perspective. Cross-sectoral hybrid threats including information operations and large military exercises not only undermine trust, but also challenge the EU's security and must be addressed in the context of our mutual relationship”<sup>53</sup>. The major question for Europe is whether China will

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 15-16.

<sup>52</sup> T. Piccone, “China's Long Game on Human Rights At the United Nations”, Brookings, September 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-long-game-on-human-rights-at-the-united-nations/> [8.11.2019].

<sup>53</sup> F. Mogherini, “Speech by High Representative/ Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Munich Security Conference”, op.cit.

limit its foreign policy engagement to its neighborhood or rather emerge as a full-spectrum global security actor and for example decide to embrace its involvement in EU's neighborhood. The latter would dramatically change Europe's security situation and pose a direct threat to its security interests.

### **3. The US role in European security**

There is no doubt that US commitment to the transatlantic partnership will play a decisive role for European security in the coming decade. It is due to the fact that the US remains the biggest guarantor of Europe's hard security, providing more than 67 percent of all NATO funding<sup>54</sup>. Through Article 5, it also serves as Europe's largest nuclear deterrent and remains an indispensable partner in intelligence co-operation as current NATO spending figures demonstrate<sup>55</sup>. The average defense expenditure as a share of GDP of the 22 NATO and EU member states decreased from 2.01 percent in 2000 to 1.47 percent in 2016 (*ibid.*). Only four countries – Poland, Estonia, Greece, and the UK – meet the 2 percent rule and spend 2 or more percent of GDP on their defense budgets. Germany is often singled out as the most problematic case in this regard, since its defense spending (1.2 percent of GDP in 2016) is far below what it ought to be able to contribute based on the size of its economy and population. At the beginning of November, German Defense Minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, discussed German military spending and announced that „we need an increase to 1.5%

<sup>54</sup> NATO, „Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010-2017)”, June 29, 2017, [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2017\\_06/20170629\\_170629-pr2017-111-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_06/20170629_170629-pr2017-111-en.pdf) [7.11.2019].

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

of the GDP by 2024 and to 2% by 2031 at the latest”<sup>56</sup>. It is too early to judge whether this promise will be met. Looking at the EU28 in 2017, its member states spent €227 billion in total on defense, whereas the US spent €545 billion<sup>57</sup>. Moreover, it is not only the question of how much the Union spends, but how it spends it. There are 178 different weapon systems in the EU countries and only 30 in the US<sup>58</sup>. According to data gathered by the European Commission, 80 percent of European defense procurement is purely national. In addition, the opportunity cost of defense market fragmentation and the lack of interoperability are estimated at €30 billion at least. The security implications of the US being no longer willing to act as a provider for European security would thus be significant as the EU would lose not only most of the military assets it can access today but also the bulk of its nuclear deterrent. President Trump has mentioned his willingness to exit the alliance on several occasions over the past three years<sup>59</sup>. His main argument was the EU’s free-riding on American defense capabilities – the US still provides roughly two-thirds of all NATO expenditure and the above mentioned numbers prove he is right.

<sup>56</sup> A. Kramp-Karrenbauer, “Speech by Federal Minister of Defence at the Bundeswehr University Munich”, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, November 7, 2019, <https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/speech-federal-minister-of-defence-security-policy-147072> [10.11.2019].

<sup>57</sup> European Commission, “EU Budget for the Future”, December 4, 2018, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/eu-budget-future-2018-dec-04\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/eu-budget-future-2018-dec-04_en) [1.11.2019].

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> V. Stracqualursi and J. Acosta, “New York Times: Trump Raised Withdrawing the US from NATO Several Times in 2018”, CNN Politics, January 15, 2019, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/15/politics/trump-nato-us-withdraw/index.html> [6.11.2019].

Against this backdrop, the growing risk of a US withdrawal from European affairs<sup>60</sup> and the need of certain European leaders to emancipate Europe militarily from the US by developing its strategic autonomy<sup>61</sup> have driven recent progress in European defense. Strategic autonomy, understood as the capability of the EU to act on its own if necessary (*ibid.*), has recently become a fashionable term, since more than ever, today, Europe needs to take greater responsibility for its own security. In response to this fragmentation and to the deterioration of security environment around Europe combined with the risk of US withdrawal, the EUGS set in motion the Implementation Plan on Security and Defense<sup>62</sup> which introduced the following four major initiatives in this policy area aimed at countering the insecurities<sup>63</sup>:

- permanent structured co-operation (PESCO) within which groups of like-minded and capable member states can put forward more advanced projects in defense and security<sup>64</sup>. At the end of 2019, the list of PESCO projects consists of 47 projects<sup>65</sup>;

<sup>60</sup> S. Tisdall, "America Is Retreating from World Affairs and Circling the Wagons", *The Guardian*, January 20, 2019.

<sup>61</sup> S. Biscop, "All or Nothing? European and British Strategic Autonomy after the Brexit", EG-MONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations, September 5, 2016, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/european-british-strategic-autonomy-after-brexite/> [9.11.2019].

<sup>62</sup> EEAS, "Implementation Plan on Security and Defence", March 6, 2018, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34215/implementation-plan-security-and-defence-factsheet\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34215/implementation-plan-security-and-defence-factsheet_en) [9.11.2019].

<sup>63</sup> M. Sus, "Institutional Innovation of EU's Foreign and Security Policy: Big Leap for EU's Strategic Actorness or Much ADO about Nothing?", *International Politics*, vol. 56, 2019, p. 411-425.

<sup>64</sup> Council of the European Union, "Permanent Structured Cooperation – PESCO", December 2017, [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32081/qa\\_pesco.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32081/qa_pesco.pdf) [9.11.2019]; Council of the European Union, "Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Updated List of PESCO Projects – Overview – 19 November 2018", <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37028/table-pesco-projects.pdf> [9.11.2019].

<sup>65</sup> For more, see: PESCO, <https://pesco.europa.eu> [9.11.2019].



- the European Defense Fund (EFD), marking the historic decision by the European Commission to directly engage in the field of security and defense. From 2020 onwards, the Commission will spend €500 million per annum on defense research, which would make the EU the fourth biggest funder of defense research in Europe, after the UK, France, and Germany<sup>66</sup>;
- the Co-ordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) carried out by the European Defense Agency and aimed at monitoring national defense spending in order to identify possibilities for co-operation and pooling resources;
- and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as the permanent military headquarters for missions and operations.

However, the road towards the enhancement of Europe's capabilities is rocky, and EU military power projection is still a long way ahead. The added value of the introduction of the initiatives will be seen in a couple of years.

Another aspect of this key driver is the fact that US engagement in the rest of the world would also cause severe implications for European security. As advocates of international law and institutions, the EU and US have traditionally sought out multilateral channels to conduct international relations, particularly the UN and the G20. Not only is the US the largest sponsor of international institutions, but it also carries a strong voice which often converges with European security interests. A pivot away from multilateralism,

<sup>66</sup> For more, see: European Commission: "European Defense Fund", [https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence/european-defence-fund\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence/european-defence-fund_en) [9.11.2019].

as indicated by the *ex post* rejection of the Iran nuclear deal or the Paris Accords, can significantly weaken the pursuit of European international interests, including in security policy. A foundational paradigm of the transatlantic partnership – the commitment to liberal norms – seems to be already shaking on both sides of the Atlantic. In joint diplomatic practices, we assume the spirit of co-operation, as well as the exchange of information and co-operation to lead to greater cohesion. This implies the potential for a domino effect of failures in transatlantic co-operation: the failure of one joint endeavor can jeopardize subsequent ones.

In case of a negative scenario and the withdrawal of the US from the alliance with Europe and from the multilateralism, Europe would be left in the face of the necessity to independently provide security for itself.

#### **4. Rise of Eurosceptic parties**

Since the global financial crisis in 2008, we have witnessed landslide election losses of incumbent and established mainstream parties, an increase in popular mass demonstrations and movements, and electoral success of challenger parties<sup>67</sup>. Between 2008 and 2013, in 22 national elections across the EU, 15 incumbent governments were voted out of office. In 23 national elections in 2015, 2016, and 2017, 31 new parties entered national Parliaments<sup>68</sup>. ECFR experts noted that “[a]cross Europe, traditional political elites are being

<sup>67</sup> L. Hooghe and G. Marks, “Grand Theories of European Integration in the Twenty-First Century”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 26, 2019, p. 1113-1133.

<sup>68</sup> K. Weissenbach, “New Parties in Europe: A Comeback for the Parties or Just Another Symptom for Their Decline?”, The European Consortium for Political Research, 2018, <https://ecpr.eu/Events/SectionDetails.aspx?SectionID=778&EventID=115> [9.11.2019].

challenged by newer, smaller, and leaner parties from both left and right. The majority of the newcomers and challenger parties belong to the Eurosceptic – they have become the largest opposition party (e.g. Germany), junior partners in governments (e.g. Austria, Denmark), or are in charge of governing themselves (e.g. Italy, Poland, Hungary). The Eurosceptics are winning office – currently holding 1329 seats in 25 countries, and playing a role in government in eight member states”<sup>69</sup>. They are capturing the political agenda and forcing mainstream parties to adopt their positions. They also constitute a challenge to the previously largely uncontested status quos concerning the support for the European project. Some also challenge liberal democracy and European values such as pluralism, liberalism, and the rule of law. The EUGS spoke about safeguarding the quality of our democracies<sup>70</sup> and put forward the notion of resilience perceived as living up to liberal values and the rule of law. It also recognized that the resilience of democracies determines the Union’s external credibility and influence<sup>71</sup>. And yet, the EU’s capabilities to counter the internal Eurosceptic and illiberal trend remain fairly limited<sup>72</sup>. The recent idea

<sup>69</sup> National Rally in France, the Danish People’s Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the German AfD, the Austrian FPÖ, the Finnish Finns Party, the Polish Law and Justice party, the Hungarian Fidesz and Jobbik, the Czech Platform of Dissatisfied Citizens, the Sweden Democrats, and Italian Five Star Movements are examples of Eurosceptic parties which entered national parliaments or formed national governments after 2008; S. Dennison and D. Pardijs, “The World According To Europe’s Insurgent Parties: Putin, Migration and People Power”, European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2016, [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR\\_181\\_-\\_THE\\_WORLD\\_ACCORDING\\_TO\\_EUROPE’S\\_INSURGENT\\_PARTIES\\_NEW.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_181_-_THE_WORLD_ACCORDING_TO_EUROPE’S_INSURGENT_PARTIES_NEW.pdf) [8.11.2019].

<sup>70</sup> EEAS, op.cit., p. 15.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>72</sup> G. Verhofstadt, “The EU Must Stop Funding Illiberalism”, Project Syndicate, April 30, 2018, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/poland-hungary-freeze-eu-cohesion->

to make cohesion funds conditional upon abiding by the rule of law could be a step in the right direction, yet its implementation is still uncertain as some member states are against this idea<sup>73</sup>.

Furthermore, the 2019 European Parliamentary elections saw Eurosceptic parties on the rise, albeit to a lesser extent than many observers had feared. In 2014, the three Eurosceptic factions in the European Parliament, European Conservative Reformers (ECR), Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) and Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), won 155 seats – or 20.7 percent of the chamber. In 2019, Eurosceptic parties succeeded in increasing their vote share to 23.2 percent, although in different constellations, as the EFDD resolved itself, the ENF is now called Identity and Democracy (ID) and the Five-Star Movement and the Brexit Party have not yet chosen, which faction, if any, they will join<sup>74</sup>.

The trend towards Euroscepticism poses a threat to European security since many Eurosceptic parties oppose further integration, especially of foreign and security policy at the EU level, which is a necessary condition for the EU to be able to project its power. The consolidation of liberal values abroad lies at the heart of the EU's conduct of for-

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funds-by-guy-verhofstadt-2018-04 ?barrier=accesspaylog [6.11.2019].

<sup>73</sup> G. Gotev, "Bulgaria Dislikes Commission Plan to Link EU Funding to Rule of Law", EURACTIV, May 3, 2018, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/bulgaria-dislikes-commission-plan-to-link-eu-funding-to-rule-of-law/> [6.11.2019]; E. Zalan, "Trouble Ahead", *Berlin Policy Journal*, January 26, 2018.

<sup>74</sup> EURACTIV Network, "Five Star Movement in Search of 'New Home' in EU Parliament", September 5, 2019 <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/five-star-movement-in-search-of-new-home-in-eu-parliament/> [8.11.2019]; C. Tilford et al., "European Elections 2019: Live Results", *Financial Times*, July 2, 2019, <https://ig.ft.com/european-elections-2019-results/> [9.11.2019].

eign policy. Losing the consensus about the necessity of media freedom and the rule of law at home hurts credibility abroad, thereby diminishing the EU's soft power capabilities. Moreover, such diverging positions can make finding agreement in the Foreign Affairs Council more difficult, for example in questions concerning preconditions for international partnerships. This would come at the detriment of the EU's capacity to act. The rise of Eurosceptic and illiberal parties leads to growing ideological differences between member states, and results in contradictory policy preferences, which decrease the capability to exert power, especially in the realm of security and defense where unanimity is obligatory.

## **5. Resilience of the eurozone**

Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the financial stability and resilience of the eurozone has been a frequently-discussed topic among macroeconomists. In the aftermath of the ensuing sovereign debt crisis, European institutions ramped up their supervisory power to monitor member states' macroeconomic developments and issue, when needed, warnings and punishments for accruing excessive imbalances in order to manage risks which emanate from one member state onto others. However, political salience of crisis resolution rose particularly in those countries affected by the crisis and austerity. Overall, it produced a new cleavage between creditor and debtor countries. It framed national discourses everywhere, and defined member states' approach to the EU more broadly, consuming political capital and dominating the agenda. Braun and Tausendfund note that "support for the EU declined in all 27 member states

from April 2007 to November 2012. However, the sharpest decline occurred during the time of the Euro crisis”<sup>75</sup>.

Although growth and employment indicators have developed modestly since then, such imbalances in Italy still harbor risks for the entire eurozone. Emergency funds have been instated to prevent any future national financial crisis from becoming European. Yet, there is a wide consensus they would be insufficient to rescue Italy, which is simply ‘too big to fail’<sup>76</sup>. Would other member states step in again to bail others out? The vehement German rejection of a common deposit insurance scheme indicates that German ‘generosity’ might be stretched to the maximum.

Apart from these political considerations, the functioning of the common currency is also being challenged more fundamentally. Among those arguing that the eurozone is trying to square the circle are influential American economists, such as Nobel Prize laureates Paul Krugman and Josef Stiglitz, who view the current setup of the eurozone very critically, in the latter case even advocating its end<sup>77</sup>. Even among German researchers, the integrity of the currency union is no longer unchallengeable. For example, the former director of the Max-Planck Institute, Fritz W. Scharpf, argues for the necessity of splitting the eurozone in half<sup>78</sup>.

<sup>75</sup> D. Braun and M. Tausendpfund, “The Impact of the Euro Crisis on Citizens’ Support for the European Union”, *Journal of European Integration*, vol. 36, 2014, no. 3, p. 242.

<sup>76</sup> F. Heinemann, “Italy Is Too Big to Fail, Making the Eurozone Vulnerable to Blackmail”, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, May 5, 2018, <https://www.zew.de/en/presse/pressearchiv/italien-ist-too-big-to-fail-und-die-eurozone-damit-erpress-bar/> [9.11.2019].

<sup>77</sup> J. Stiglitz, *The Euro: And Its Threat to the Future of Europe*, Penguin Books, 2017.

<sup>78</sup> F. W. Scharpf, “Südeuro”, *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, December 4, 2017, <https://www.ipg-journal.de/rubriken/europaeische-integration/artikel/suedeuro-2449/> [3.11.2019].

A dissolution of the eurozone would drastically impact the security of the continent and shake its economic stability and prosperity. As the EUGS states, prosperity is tantamount to peace, democracy and a rules-based global network of the vital interests of the EU underpinning its external action. Only an economically stable and prosperous Union is able to exert power and engage in global affairs.

## 6. Fluctuation and direction of global trade

Free trade has been at the heart of the EU and it is one of the factors underpinning Europe's prosperity<sup>79</sup>. What is more, the single market has since its inception been a driver of integration. It also remains one of the least contested and most comprehensive European projects. As a champion of free trade, the EU has recently witnessed the stalling of globalization since the great recession<sup>80</sup>. Negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) failed and were put on hold, the WTO's Doha Round has progressed slowly at best over the last 16 years, and the UK has opted to leave the EU and the single market. Despite the EU having concluded comprehensive trade agreements with Canada, Japan, and Vietnam recently, the future of global trade might depend on other external factors.

The ongoing trade war between the US and China has already forced the WTO to revise its trade forecast down for 2019<sup>81</sup>. The impact upon investments and economic growth

<sup>79</sup> EEAS, op.cit., p. 14.

<sup>80</sup> A. Keck at al., "Perspectives for global trade and the international trading system", *Wirtschaftsdienst*, vol. 98, 2018, pp. 16-23.

<sup>81</sup> World Trade Organization, "WTO Downgrades Outlook for Global Trade as Risks Accumulate", September 27, 2018, [https://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/pres18\\_e/pr822\\_e](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres18_e/pr822_e).

is felt in the EU as well, as Commissioner Moscovici made clear in his interim forecast of 2018<sup>82</sup>. Moreover, the EU itself might become a target of protectionist policies set elsewhere – as recent threats by President Trump to slap tariffs on German car imports to the US indicate<sup>83</sup>. Global tariffs constitute a significant risk for European economic growth and employment.

The EU's trade policy increasingly serves non-commercial policy goals, such as ensuring adherence to human rights<sup>84</sup>. Sanctions in the form of trade embargoes, such as restrictions on arms exports, belong to the strategic arsenal of the EU's external action and make trade a channel for its wider foreign policy. In this context, the direction of trade is another aspect to consider when thinking about its link to security, because it defines economic interests and might further determine dependencies. Since 2010, for some member states, among them Germany and France, extra-EU trade has grown stronger than intra-EU trade<sup>85</sup>. In 2017, Germany's biggest sales market was the USA. China was its third largest

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htm [5.11.2019].

<sup>82</sup> P. Moscovici, "Commissioner Pierre Moscovici Presents the Summer 2018 Interim Economic Forecast", European Commission, July 12, 2018, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-18-4485\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-4485_en.htm) [20.10.2019].

<sup>83</sup> M. Chambers and E. Taylor, "German Carmakers Hit by Report Trump Threatens to Drive Them off U.S. Streets", Reuters, May 31, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-autos-germany/german-carmakers-hit-by-report-trump-threatens-to-drive-them-off-u-s-streets-idUSKCN1WoLP> [5.10.2019].

<sup>84</sup> K. Meissner and L. McKenzie, "The Paradox of Human Rights Conditionality in EU Trade Policy: When Strategic Interests Drive Policy Outcomes", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 26, 2018, no. 9, pp. 1273-1291.

<sup>85</sup> Eurostat, "Intra-EU Trade in Goods – Recent Trends. Statistics Explained", 2018, [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Intra-EU\\_trade\\_in\\_goods\\_-\\_recent\\_trends](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Intra-EU_trade_in_goods_-_recent_trends) [6.11.2019].



market while being the biggest exporter to Germany itself<sup>86</sup>. Another aspect of the interplay between trade and security are the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) which the EU has offered to some of its members in the east (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) and in the south (Morocco, and ongoing negotiations with Tunisia). DCFTAs constitute one of the key tools of the European Neighborhood Policy and an instrument to enhance state and societal resilience in the neighboring countries. Against this backdrop, the impact of fluctuation and direction of global trade on European security goes far beyond the direct link in the form of the arms trade. In case of a slowdown of global trade, the EU will most likely fail to secure its trade agreements. It would cause not only economic but also political losses.

## 7. Technological progress in the EU

Technological progress is vital for European security, affecting societal cohesion and resilience as much as defensive capabilities against 21<sup>st</sup>-century warfare. The EU has acknowledged that innovation and technological progress are essential for the adequacy of its defensive capabilities (Council of the European Union, 2016). Yet, Europe has been left far behind, a situation caused by insufficient investment in R&D. According to the OECD, in 2017, \$464 billion were invested in R&D in the US (2.79 percent of GDP), while \$410 billion were invested in China (2.37 percent of GDP). In the EU, on the other hand, it amounted to 'only'

<sup>86</sup> Statistisches Bundesamt, "Foreign Trade – Ranking of Germany's Trading Partners in Foreign Trade", November 1, 2019, [https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/ForeignTrade/TradingPartners/Tables/OrderRankGermanyTradingPartners.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile](https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/ForeignTrade/TradingPartners/Tables/OrderRankGermanyTradingPartners.pdf?__blob=publicationFile) [9.11.2019].

\$350 billion (1.93 percent of GDP)<sup>87</sup>. It is hard to imagine the EU catching up technologically without significantly increasing the resources it apportions to R&D. While the Lisbon strategy, launched in 2000, formulated the aspiration of Europe becoming “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”, almost 20 years later, the EU seems to be falling behind in the technological race. National and European budgets for R&D remain below those of its main competitors, as do private venture capital investments. In the 2018 *Forbes* “Top 100 Digital Companies” ranking, the first European firm ranks 29<sup>th</sup><sup>88</sup>, and the world’s largest 10 tech companies come from the US, China, and South-East Asia<sup>89</sup>. As technological progress encompasses all aspects of modern life, global competitiveness has wide-ranging societal implications. The World Intellectual Property Organization reported that in 2017 1.38 million patent applications were filed in China, over 600,000 in the US, but only 166,000 in the EU (behind Japan and South Korea)<sup>90</sup>. The EU lacks a dedicated agency to make new technologies fit for defensive purposes, something comparable to the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which has contributed significantly to technological advancement in both civilian and military sectors. Recent calls for the establishment of such an agency by the French president

<sup>87</sup> OECD, “Gross Domestic Spending on R&D”, 2019, <https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm> [29.10.2019].

<sup>88</sup> *Forbes*, “Forbes Top 100 Digital Companies. Pars. International Corp.”, September 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/top-digital-companies/list/> [9.11.2019].

<sup>89</sup> K. Stoller, “The World’s Largest Tech Companies 2018: Apple, Samsung Take Top Spots Again”, *Forbes.com*, June 6, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristinstoller/2018/06/06/worlds-largest-tech-companies-2018-global-2000/#4de26304de61> [9.11.2019].

<sup>90</sup> World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), *World Intellectual Property Indicators 2018*, WIPO 2018.

Emanuel Macron have been rejected by the Commission<sup>91</sup>. This puts the EU at a further disadvantage vis-à-vis its global competitors.

Furthermore, the roll-out of the recent 5G network across Europe has sparked a public debate on cyber-security and Europe's relations with China. In March 2019, the European Parliament issued a warning concerning the involvement of Chinese companies in the construction of the required digital infrastructure, as it would entail as yet unknown security risks<sup>92</sup>. The US ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, had shortly before threatened that the exchange of intelligence between Germany and the US would be impeded should Germans decide to engage Chinese tech-giant Huawei in the construction of its 5G infrastructure<sup>93</sup>. The Polish government, due to its vital interests to secure a substantial presence of American soldiers in the region, is also under pressure from the US administration not to engage in the negotiations with China on the 5G infrastructure.

In addition, the impact of technological progress is not necessarily only positive. The impact of automation and digitalization on employment is hotly debated. Frey and Osborne<sup>94</sup> estimate that 47 percent of US jobs are at high risk

<sup>91</sup> P. Tefer, "EU Shelves Macron Idea for European Darpa", *EUobserver*, April 25, 2018.

<sup>92</sup> European Parliament, "Security threats connected with the rising Chinese technological presence in the EU and possible action on the EU level to reduce them. (debate)", February 13, 2019, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-8-2019-02-13-ITM-027\\_EN.html](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-8-2019-02-13-ITM-027_EN.html) [9.11.2019].

<sup>93</sup> K. Atwood and N. Gaouette, "US Warns Germany That Using Huawei Tech Will Come at a Cost", CNN Politics, March 12, 2019, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/11/politics/us-germany-huawei-letter/index.html> [28.10.2019].

<sup>94</sup> C.B. Frey and M.A. Osborne, "The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?", *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, vol. 114, 2017, pp. 254-280.

of replacement by automation. For Europe, some studies suggest that 45-60 percent of all workers may be replaced before 2030<sup>95</sup>. Others see the risk of replacement as significantly lower. Arntz et al.<sup>96</sup>, for example, calculate the automation risk for US jobs at only 9 percent. Analyzing the German labor market, Dengler and Matthes<sup>97</sup> find 15 percent of German jobs at risk. Managing the labor market and the social impact of technological progress will thus be a key determinant of socio-economic cohesion in the future – it will therefore also affect internal security.

## 8. Climate change

The risk of a devastating environmental catastrophe in Europe is not much talked about as a security threat. Yet, in 2017, 200 people died as a result of natural disasters in Europe<sup>98</sup>, almost three times as many as from terrorist attacks<sup>99</sup>. Climate change is only increasing the likelihood of devastating natural disasters. Since the late 1990s, the number of recorded natural disasters has markedly increased. 1999 was the first year ever recorded in which the total num-

<sup>95</sup> *Technology, Globalisation and the Future of Work in Europe: Essays on Employment in a Digitised Economy*, T. Dolphin (ed.), Institute for Public Policy Research, March 2015, <https://www.ippr.org/publications/technology-globalisation-and-the-future-of-work-in-europe> [7.11.2019].

<sup>96</sup> M. Arntz et al., "Revisiting the risk of automation", *Economics Letters*, vol. 159, 2017, pp. 157-160.

<sup>97</sup> K. Dengler and B. Matthes, "The Impacts of Digital Transformation on the Labour Market: Substitution Potentials of Occupations in Germany", *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, vol. 137, 2018, pp. 304-316.

<sup>98</sup> European Commission, "RescEU: European Commission Proposes to Strengthen EU Disaster Management: Questions and Answers", November 23, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO\\_17\\_4732](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_4732) [9.11.2019].

<sup>99</sup> Europol, "Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment", September 18, 2018, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-2018> [6.11.2019].

ber of natural disasters exceeded 300. Since then, this mark has only been missed twice – in 2017 and 2018<sup>100</sup>. Natural disasters have wide-ranging consequences for the security of human beings: they can in themselves be deadly, displacing people by making their homes uninhabitable. They can damage and destroy critical infrastructure, such as energy and water grids, hospitals, and communication systems. Since 2010, the global costs of dealing with natural disasters have exceeded \$1.35 trillion worldwide<sup>101</sup>. Although the EU has been significantly less affected than other regions of the world, such as South-East Asia, in 2016 alone, it still cost EU member states close to €10 billion<sup>102</sup>. This damage can have deadly consequences, hampering the states' capacities to respond as well as deliver basic public services. The authors of the "Global Trends to 2030" report claim that the effects of global warming are beginning to be felt by the public and policymakers alike, triggering deep societal concerns<sup>103</sup>. They foresee that in case of an increase in temperature by 1.5 degrees compared to pre-industrial times, the world will incur economic and environmental damage. Yet, so far, policy makers have not done enough to stop global warming.

Currently, the EU has limited capacity to deal with it, but the issue is actually high on the contemporary political agenda. A reform of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the so-called *rescEU* mechanism, foreseeing significantly

<sup>100</sup> H. Ritchie and M. Roser, "Natural Disasters – Empirical View", Our World in Data, November 2019, <https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters> [9.11.2019].

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> European Environment Agency, op.cit.

<sup>103</sup> F. Gaub, "Global Trends to 2030 – Challenges and Choices for Europe", EU Institute for Security Studies, April 8, 2019, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/global-trends-2030---challenges-and-choices-europe> [6.11.2019].

increased resources, entered into force in March 2019, and the proposal for the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework foresees a budget hike of 169 percent compared to the virtual EU27 MFF for 2014-20<sup>104</sup>. When and where a natural disaster hits cannot be reasonably foreseen, but preparedness is a policy issue.

#### 4. Implications for Poland

The eight driving forces which will most likely define the European security environment in the mid-term perspective will by default have an impact on Polish security. As a consequence, this paper takes stock of these key drivers and reflects on them in light of the strategic documents which guide Polish foreign and security policy: Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021<sup>105</sup> and the Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland<sup>106</sup>.

The Polish Foreign Policy Strategy takes stock of Poland's international environment and defines the country's strategic goals in the short-term perspective. It recognizes changes in the international order which has become "less stable and less predictable"<sup>107</sup> and points to the heart of the process –

<sup>104</sup> M. Parry and M. Sapala, "2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and New Own Resources. Analysis of the Commission's Proposal", European Parliament Think Tank, July 26, 2018, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS\\_IDA\(2018\)625148](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_IDA(2018)625148) [9.11.2019].

<sup>105</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs RP, 2017.

<sup>106</sup> Ministry of National Defence, op.cit. For the sake of the analysis, I take into account two most recent strategic documents which have been released after the current governing party, Law and Justice, came to power. An overview of all strategic documents guiding Polish foreign and security policy in the last decade can be found at <https://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/bezpieczenstwo-narodowe/akty-prawne-i-dokumenty-1/5973,Akty-prawne-i-dokumenty-strategiczne.html>.

<sup>107</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs RP, op.cit., p. 2.

to the deep and multi-faceted crisis of the Western world. Two major reasons underlying this crisis are (1) the failure to counter the revisionist policy of Russia in an adequate way and (2) the economic crisis in Europe. Against this backdrop, the Strategy sets three priorities for Poland for 2017-2021: security, growth and high standing, meaning shaping a positive image of Poland globally. Since the latter has not much in common with the geopolitical shifts in the world and deals with the internal capability of Polish power projection, I focus here on the first two priorities and consider them in relation to the key drivers presented above. What stands out while analyzing the first priority – Security – is that it focuses mostly on the threat coming from “revisionist power” – Russia<sup>108</sup>. Poland’s eastern neighbor is mentioned 35 times in the document in the context of it posing a danger to the Western world, to Poland’s direct neighborhood and to the global order. In relation to the risk coming from the East, the Strategy devotes considerable attention to the necessity to enhance NATO’s eastern flank via the cooperation with Poland’s key ally – the US- but also to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy which might be an additional source of security for Poland. The second priority – Growth – provides a reference to the EU single market as a crucial precondition for economic growth both in Poland and in Europe, and announces Polish willingness to protect free trade and the coherence of the single market.

Of the eight key drivers for European security in the mid-term perspective, the Polish Foreign Policy Strategy mainly touches upon three – the US role for European security, the

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

combination of fluctuation and direction of global trade, and the resilience of the eurozone since they both relate to the economic growth. The other drivers, such a migration being defined as a challenge to transatlantic security if uncontrolled, and the cause of division among the EU member states are mentioned only very briefly<sup>109</sup>. Climate change is also mentioned very briefly and mainly in combination with protecting Polish economic interests and its energy policy. The Strategy puts forward the following task: “When negotiating legislative proposals relating to the European Commission’s Clean Energy for All Europeans package, ensure that EU member states retain the freedom to shape their own energy mix, energy and climate policy, and investment decisions – while upholding the principle of subsidiary and technological neutrality”<sup>110</sup>. Technological progress and cybersecurity are touched upon in passing by announcing that Poland should “cooperate with countries in our region, as well as with non-European countries, with a view to advancing scientific research and creating innovative products and technologies”<sup>111</sup>. China is mentioned only once and in the context of infrastructure cooperation with non-European partners e.g. via Belt and Road Initiative. Euroscepticism appears merely once as well. It is referred to as one pole of the polarized discussion on the future of the European project which opposes the federalist vision of a European super-state<sup>112</sup>. It goes without saying the Polish Foreign Policy Strategy has to reflect on its major security

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid., pp. 2-3.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., p. 3.



threats and this is undoubtedly the threat of Russia. Moreover, a strategic document aiming to define Polish policy goals for the coming 5 years does not necessarily have to provide a detailed discussion of future global trends which will most likely impact European and Polish security in the mid-term perspective. However, one could argue that most of these trends, such as China's global power projection or technological progress in the EU, have already started to influence Polish security via e.g. the growing Chinese presence in EU's neighborhood, which the Strategy defines as one of the key areas for Polish diplomacy or via the debate about 5G and cyberattacks on EU member states, which are directly linked with Polish security. The final strategic document on cybersecurity was published by the former Polish President Bronisław Komorowski in 2015 and has not been updated since. Taking into account that this type of warfare constitutes a significant element of the Russian threat, the absence of a more comprehensive reflection on this particular and other current security risks is worrying.

"The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland" is clearly focused on the defense policy. However, it provides a global outlook of Polish security environment in the coming 15 years and reflects on main threats and challenges<sup>113</sup>. It starts with the recognition that national security must be understood in a broad sense and that it is composed not only of factors influencing national defense, but also other aspects, such as the security of energy supplies<sup>114</sup>. Again, as in the case of the document examined above, the aggressive

<sup>113</sup> Ministry of National Defence RP, op.cit.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

policy of Russia and the unstable situation on NATO's eastern flank are identified as most important threats which are essential to Polish security. Next, however, the Defense Concept offers insights on a range of security threats from a multi-faceted crisis at the southern border of NATO, via the threat of religiously-motivated terrorism, political transformation in NATO and EU member states, economic and social environment, arguing that the capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces are linked with the state's economic situation and the well-being of its citizens, to the risks of the use of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and technological progress in general. With regard to the latter, the Defense Concept offers a diversified picture and argues that the results of dynamic technological development will not always bear positive implications, but they may become a source of instability. The document also points to the growing differentiation of actors who play a role in the security domain, and devotes attention to non-state actors such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, social movements and/or extremist groups<sup>115</sup>. Apart from Euroscepticism, climate change and global trade flows, the aforementioned document touches upon most of the key drivers presented in the previous part of the paper. Given the lack of direct link between these three challenges and the defense environment, their absence is plausible. The most striking issue yet which seems to be missing is, as in the case of "Polish Foreign Policy Strategy", the discussion of the role of China. This rising power has not been mentioned even once. Again, it is quite surprising, taking into account the

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

aforementioned growing global engagement and technological risks coming from this state which already now is being referred to as the world's 21<sup>st</sup> century superpower<sup>116</sup>. Moreover, the Defense Concept is based on an assumption that by 2032, the US will still be dominant in terms of military and technological power<sup>117</sup>. Considering the rapid growth of Chinese economy and its substantial investment in military capabilities, this assumption may not hold.

## 5. Conclusions

As the authors of Defense Concept argue, “the recent series of events in Poland's security environment has been the most significant since the fall of the Soviet Union. We observe more and more dramatic changes, not only political, but also economic, social and cultural in their nature”<sup>118</sup>. Taking this into account, the reflection on security challenges which might influence Europe and Poland in the mid-term perspective seems to be very timely. The comparison of the key eight driving forces impacting the European security with the two most recent strategic documents which guide Polish foreign, security and defense policy allows for three conclusions to be drawn.

First of all, Russia as the destabilizing factor, dominates the Polish security environment, and the Russian threat is considered to be most significant in both strategic documents. Given the geographic proximity between Poland and

<sup>116</sup> S. Tisdall, “Rivals in the Scramble to Be the World's 21st-Century Superpower”, *The Guardian*, October 19, 2019.

<sup>117</sup> Ministry of National Defence, op.cit., p. 37.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

Russia, it is not surprising. What is interesting, however, is the fact that the international group of scholars, including Poles and representatives of other Central European countries, did not decide to put Russia on the list of key challenges. They believe Russia poses a threat, but in the mid- and especially long-term perspective, this threat will be managed by the Western world. It was of course a subjective decision of a group of scholars, policy-makers and experts. Yet, if we take into account key drivers for European security developed within other foresight exercises across Europe, Russia is indeed largely absent as a long-term challenge<sup>119</sup>.

Another interesting conclusion is that the rise of China and challenges it poses, which are broadly discussed among experts dealing with European security, do not seem to be taken into consideration in Poland. As already mentioned in the description of the key drivers, it is not only the technological advantage China has over the Western world but also Beijing's growing ambitions to exercise their power globally and to become a fully-fledged international actor, which might challenge European security. As many experts argue, China is already emerging as a capable and proactive actor whose engagement is reshaping international affairs in many dimensions such as the US-led security order in the Asia – Pacific region, the practice of international military and humanitarian intervention, the use of naval power<sup>120</sup>. Finally, the examination of both strategic documents revealed

<sup>119</sup> European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), "Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe", April 2019, [https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/espas\\_report2019.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/espas_report2019.pdf) [9.11.2019].

<sup>120</sup> *China's Global Engagement. Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century*, J. DeLisle and A. Goldstein (eds), Brookings Institution Press 2017.

that the Defense Concept offers a more comprehensive and in-depth outlook upon Polish security environment than the Polish Foreign Policy Strategy. Keeping in mind the different characters of both documents, one can however be tempted to point to one possible reason for the indicated distinction between these documents. The Polish Foreign Policy Strategy does not provide any insights on the methodology on which it has been based, whereas the Defense Concept claims to be a result of the “most innovative projects in the history of the Ministry”<sup>121</sup>. The document is an outcome of the work of a team of interdisciplinarity experts from several institutions, such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, and Ministry of Development, the National Security Bureau, Institute for Western Studies, Centre for Eastern Studies, Polish Institute for International Affairs as well as from the academia and non-governmental research centers from Poland and abroad. In addition, the Concept refers to the use of various methods such as scenario and Delphi methods, wargaming systems and simulations<sup>122</sup>. The complex and tailor-made approach applied during the development of this document resulted in a more comprehensive picture of challenges and threats.

The analysis carried out in this paper makes it possible to propose three recommendations for Polish policy-makers who deal with foreign, security and defense issues.

First of all, with all the attention that the Russian threat poses, it is not the only factor which might put Polish se-

<sup>121</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

curity environment at risk. There is a range of other issues which might develop into substantial threats in the mid-term perspective and should be considered while planning Polish foreign, security and defense strategies. Apart from the growing role of China and climate change, cyber-security constitutes yet another essential issue. At the EU level, several steps have been recently taken to enhance its resistance to cyber-threats. The annual report of the implementation of the EUGS in 2017 refers to the introduction of the European Commission's cyber-security package aimed at improving resilience, detection, and response to threats. A 'cyber diplomacy toolbox' has also been adopted. It should contribute to conflict prevention, the mitigation of cyber-security threats, and greater stability in international relations. Furthermore, since 2016, the EU has put forward several cyber exercises, such as PACE17, CyberEurope, as well as the CYBRID exercise, and enhanced its cyber dialogues with the US, Japan, India, South Korea, Brazil, and China, as well as with NATO and the OSCE. Moreover, in 2017, the Helsinki-based European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats was launched following the Joint Declaration of the EU and NATO signed in December 2016. All the initiatives point to the fact that the EU has recognized the importance of the threat linked to cyber-space. Poland has also recently adopted the Strategy for Cybersecurity for 2019-2024. Yet, the document provides only very general remarks on the link between cybersecurity and the overall security posture of Poland<sup>123</sup>. It would be advisable to con-

<sup>123</sup> Ministry of Digital Affairs RP, "Strategia Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na lata 2019-2024", October 2019, <https://sip.lex.pl/akty-prawne/mp-monitor-polski/strate->

nect the cybersecurity strategy with strategic documents dealing with foreign, security and defense policy, since the documents would complement one another.

The second policy recommendation pertains to the engagement of Polish policy-makers in the improvement of the decision-making process within security and defense policy at the European level. With NATO being the first security provider for Poland, and for the continent in general, the European Union can be safely considered as the second. As presented above, a range of initiatives has been recently launched by the EU to enhance its defense capabilities. However, the decision-making procedures remain slow since they are based on the unanimity rule. In order to improve the effectiveness of EU security and defense policy, a new modus for decision-making has to be found. This issue has already been debated by scholars and experts, and has been picked up by policymakers. In September 2018, Jean-Claude Juncker presented a proposal to introduce qualified-majority voting in three areas of security policy: EU positions in the field of human rights issues in international forums, decisions on sanctions, and on EU civilian missions. The idea behind this change is to speed up the decision-making process and to counter situations in which one country blocks consensus. These changes do not require a revision of the treaties and can be introduced by a unanimous decision of the member states. So far, there is no agreement among them and the debate has been postponed. Given that the European security environment is being determined by external insecurities, as this analysis argues, adapting to

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gia-cyberbezpieczenstwa-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-na-lata-2019-18906165 [9.11.2019].

the challenges by introducing QMV in security and defense policy, at least in some areas, seems to be urgently needed. Enhancing the effectiveness of the Union's action will be beneficial for Poland as a country which declares that it is in the "interest of the European Union to develop Common Security and Defense Policy capabilities enabling it to engage in autonomous operations in theatres where united NATO involvement is redundant"<sup>124</sup>.

The third recommendation is more general in nature and goes back to the aforementioned approach applied for the development of the Defense Concept. Such an approach still seems to be quite unique in Polish government circles, and yet, I would argue that its influence is quite inspiring. The comprehensiveness of the strategic outlook the documents offer enriches the debate concerning Polish security posture by putting forward topics which so far have not been a part of a mainstream debate, e.g. the impact of technology and the role of non-state actors. I would argue that it would be beneficial for Polish politics if such a multi-method approach was applied more frequently in generating documents of strategic character and going beyond the present. Given the diverse nature of today's and tomorrow's security threats, confronting them requires a broad understanding of security. Security has already become hybrid and the trend will continue. Security vulnerabilities can pertain to technology, politics, trade, currency issues, and environmental degradation, among other things. Therefore, designing strategies for foreign and security policies is a comprehensive undertaking, spanning a diverse field of civilian and military policy

<sup>124</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *op.cit.*, p. 18.



areas. Such a tailor-made approach consisting of team-work and foresight methods seems to be the only way to grasp the challenges lying ahead of us.

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ISBN 978-83-66413-08-5



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