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Polish-Ukrainian Treaty of Good Neighbourhood. Analysis of the decision-making process

Polsko-ukraiński traktat o dobrym sąsiedztwie. Analiza procesu decyzyjnego

Abstract: 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. In the presented article, by applying elements of decision analysis, an attempt was made to explain the decision to conclude the Treaty. First, the decision-making centres in Poland and Ukraine, and their awareness with respect to Polish-Ukrainian relations, were presented as three separate circles: public opinion, political parties, and groups of the most important decision-makers. The decision to sign the treaty was possible thanks to the political and intellectual elites who originated in the former communist-era opposition, both in Poland and Ukraine. Those elites convinced the governing circles to accept their conception of foreign policy. In Poland, this was all the easier because people originating directly from those elites formed part of the decision-making bodies. In Ukraine, however, the foreign policy conception of the dissident circles was internalised by the President. Secondly, using the game theory and assuming the rationality of decision-makers, the decision-making process was reconstructed, understood in the category of interactions between two decision-making centres. The two states aimed to conclude a treaty that would satisfy both parties. It can thus be concluded that they demonstrated a readiness to compromise during the negotiations. It can also be assumed that this readiness was slightly asymmetrical in Poland's favour. Ukraine was willing to sacrifice much more in order for the treaty to be negotiated.

Keywords: Polish-Ukrainian relations, Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, political decision

Streszczenie: W 2022 r. przypada 30. rocznica zawarcia przez Polskę i Ukrainę Traktatu o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i współpracy. W prezentowanym artykule, stosując elementy analizy decyzyjnej, podjęto próbę wyjaśnienia decyzji o zawarciu Traktatu. Po pierwsze, przedstawiono ośrodki decyzyjne w Polsce i na Ukrainie oraz stan ich świadomości w odniesieniu do stosunków polsko-ukraińskich na poziomie trzech kręgów: opinii publicznej,

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partii politycznych oraz grup najważniejszych decydentów. Decyzja o zawarciu traktatu była możliwa dzięki elitom politycznym i intelektualnym, wywodzącym się z byłych środowisk opozycji komunistycznej, zarówno w Polsce, jak i na Ukrainie. Elity te przekonały do swoich koncepcji polityki zagranicznej ośrodki rządzące. W Polsce było to o tyle łatwiejsze, iż w skład ośrodków decyzyjnych wchodziły osoby bezpośrednio wywodzące się z tych elit. Na Ukrainie natomiast nastąpił proces internalizacji koncepcji polityki zagranicznej środowisk dysydenckich przez prezydenta. Po drugie, wykorzystując teorię gier, zakładającą racjonalność decydentów, dokonano rekonstrukcji procesu decyzyjnego, rozumianego w kategorii oddziaływań dwu ośrodków decyzyjnych. Obydwa państwa dążyły do zawarcia takiej umowy, która satysfakcjonowałaby obydwie strony. Można wnioskować więc, że podczas rokowań wykazywały gotowość do kompromisów. Można także przypuszczać, iż gotowość ta była lekko asymetryczna na korzyść Polski. Ukraina skłonna była znacznie

Słowa kluczowe: stosunki polsko-ukraińskie, traktat o dobrym sąsiedztwie, decyzja polityczna

Introduction

18 May 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation between Poland and Ukraine.¹ The difficult history of Polish-Ukrainian relations did not inspire any confidence in the early 1990s such that contacts between the two countries could be expected to improve. Until recently, after all, Poles and Ukrainians were divided by almost everything – national aspirations, territorial disputes, national stereotypes, and the memory of harm done to one another. Poland and Ukraine have made various treaties and pacts during the course of their history, but these were always unequal in terms of rights, with Poland treating Ukraine as an object, rather than subject, of policy. In this context, the Polish-Ukrainian Treaty of 1992 constituted a new quality in mutual relations.

The aim of this article is not to analyse the provisions of the Treaty, or to compare them with the provisions of other treaties signed between Poland and its neighbours in the 1990s,² but rather to discern the

- 1 Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i współpracy, Dz.U. 1993, no. 126, item 573.
- 2 There is fairly substantial literature analysing Poland's treaties with its neighbours. See, for example, J. Kukułka, *Traktaty sąsiedzkie Polski Odrodzonej*, Wrocław 1998; W. S. Staszewski, *Polityka traktatowa Polski w zakresie umów o przyjaźni i współpracy po "Jesieni ludów" 1989 r.*, "Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej", 2019, vol. 1, pp. 281-302; W. S. Staszewski, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w traktatach o przyjaźni i współpracy zawartych przez Polskę z państwami sąsiednimi*, "Studia Prawnicze KUL", 2019, no. 2, pp. 201-230; L. Leszczenko, *Kwestie praw człowieka w traktatach dwustronnych o dobrosąsiedztwie między Rzeczpospolitą Polską*

Treaty in terms of an explainable political decision. Due to the limited size of the article, no full analysis was made in terms of the decision (decision-making situation, decision-making process, the decision itself, and its implementation),³ but the general decision-making circles in Poland and Ukraine were analysed, as was the decision-making process.⁴ The hypothesis that the Polish-Ukrainian Treaty of Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation was first and foremost a decision by narrow decision-making circles implementing the foreign policy concepts defined by political and intellectual elites is subjected to verification.

The basic method applied in the article is a decision-making analysis. The first part applies an axiological decision-making analysis assuming that the Polish-Ukrainian Treaty was the result of the system of ideological, political, and moral values accepted by the decision-making circles. Meanwhile, in the second part, a mathematical type of decision-making analysis is applied, manifested in the form of game theory.

1 Decision-making circles

● In the case of the decision to sign the Polish-Ukrainian Treaty, we are undoubtedly looking at an international decision-making centre, functioning in bilateral relations. The decision is thus a consequence of the interaction of two national decision-making centres – Polish and Ukrainian. For the requirements of this article, a simplified scheme of the substantive scope of the decision-making circles was adopted, consisting of three such circles. The first circle is general public opinion, expressed in social attitudes, reflected in sociological studies, and shaped mainly by historical awareness. The second circle is the political and intellectual elites and their perception of international reality, shaped by various visions and concepts of Polish foreign policy (especially its Eastern policy) and the foreign policy of Ukraine. Finally,

a Białorusią, Rosją i Ukrainą. Uwarunkowania polityczne, [in:] *Wybrane problemy ochrony praw człowieka w Polsce*, L. Leszczenko, J. Szablicka-Żak (eds.), Wrocław 2016, pp.127-140.

3 Z. J. Pietraś, *Decydowanie polityczne*, Warszawa-Kraków 2000.

4 For a full decision-making analysis of the Treaty, see B. Surmacz, *Współczesne stosunki polsko-ukraińskie. Politológica analiza traktatu o dobrym sąsiedztwie*, Lublin 2002.

the third circle, certainly the most difficult to analyse, is the group of the major decision-makers in both countries.

1.1. Decision-making circles in Poland

Public opinion. In a survey by the Centre for Public Opinion Research in 1991, covering 25 nationalities, the list of Poland's neighbours for whom Poles felt the greatest affection was topped by Lithuanians, while the lowest level of affection for neighbours was expressed for Ukrainians – 9% like, 38% dislike, and 53% indifference (23rd place).⁵ Of the closest neighbours, Ukrainians were the nation inspiring the greatest dislike. In CBOS surveys reflecting Poles' attitudes to other nationalities, Ukrainians instilled far greater antipathy than affection in both 1992 and 1993. In 1992, 30% of respondents declared affection for them, 40% antipathy, and 28% indifference, with only Russians being the subject of greater antipathy.⁶ Poles had a similar view of other nationalities' attitudes towards them when indicating the extent of affection and friendship they felt for Poland. A full 52% of those surveyed saw Ukrainians as being unfriendly towards Poles, and only 23% described them as a friendly nation.⁷ In 1992, CBOS also conducted surveys into the public perception of the transformations in the former USSR, and threats to Poland from her neighbours. In response to the question about a threat to Poland from her neighbours, the CBOS respondents considered that this was greatest with regard to Germany (60%), Ukraine (53%), and Russia (47%).⁸

Among Poles' attitudes towards Ukrainians, two factors seem to be dominant. Firstly, there was the historical experience of conflicts during the Second World War and the resentment, particularly among the older generation, connected with the loss by Poland of its so-called Eastern Borderlands. Here, those wartime experiences overlapped with the traditional literary stereotype of Ukrainians.⁹ To put it more

5 See A. Jasińska-Kania, *Transformacja ustrojowa a zmiany postaw Polaków wobec różnych narodów i państw*, [in:] *Nacjonalizm. Konflikty narodowościowe w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, S. Helnar-ski (ed.), Toruń 1994, p. 88.

6 "Serwis informacyjny CBOS", 1992, no. 7.

7 "Serwis informacyjny CBOS", 1992, no. 6.

8 *Ibidem*.

9 D. Sosnowska, *Stereotyp Ukrainy i Ukraińca w literaturze polskiej*, [in:] *Narody i stereotypy*, T. Walas (ed.), Kraków 1995, pp. 125-131.

picturesquely *Luny w Bieszczadach* (*Glow in the Bieszczady Mountains*) overlapped with the image of Ukrainians presented in *Ogniem i mieczem* (*With Fire and Sword*) by Sienkiewicz and the 19th-century stereotype of Ukrainians. The second factor contributing to the unfavourable attitude towards Ukrainians was a low assessment of the level of economic and civilisational development in Ukraine. Polish public opinion did not see Ukraine as a partner which could offer any financial, technological, or economic assistance. Society's expectations in this regard were set definitely towards the West, to Germany in particular. Expectations towards Ukraine were rather of an influx of temporary migrants seeking work. Ukraine was also not attractive to Poles in terms of the culture or lifestyle of its society. In the early 1990s, cultural differences in the East were not noticed either. That region was associated in general with the Soviet system despised by Poles, which was not appealing or worth emulating in any cultural or economic aspect.

The religious aspect was also of no small significance; for the overwhelmingly Catholic public opinion in Poland, both the Greek Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity practised in Ukraine were different, alien religions. None of these associations, whether historical, cultural, religious, or economic in nature, were conducive to any positive attitudes forming towards Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Political elites. In the early 1990s, none of the parties present on the Polish political stage had developed their own original conception for an Eastern policy.¹⁰ Their political thought in this area was the legacy of three different visions of Poland's relations with its Eastern neighbours.¹¹ Two of these were from the inter-war period (political parties still thought in the categories of two Polish figures from that era – Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski), while the third was the

10 It should be mentioned here that political parties generally made little mention in their manifestos of any vision of Polish Eastern policy. They seemed unprepared to broach the subject and afraid of any binding declarations for the future.

11 There is a wealth of literature dedicated to the matter. See P. Kowal, *Testament Prometeusza. Źródła polityki wschodniej III Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa-Wojnowice 2019; *Polityka wschodnia Polski. Uwarunkowania, koncepcje, realizacja*, A. Gil, T. Kapuśniak (eds.), Lublin-Warszawa 2009.

achievements and work of the émigré community involved with the Paris-based journal "Kultura."¹²

The Eastern policy tasks formulated by the Foreign Ministry – an active policy of bilateral relations, development of economic relations, protection of Poles in the east, support for democratic transformation, and statehood of the eastern neighbours – were accepted by most of the political parties belonging to both the government coalition and the opposition. Many parties, such as Democratic Union (UD), Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD), Polish Peasant Party (PSL), and Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP) obviously differed in their views on the importance of specific priorities or methods of Polish diplomacy, but those differences did not extend beyond the framework of the general consensus.

For SdRP, Eastern policy was a somewhat sensitive topic, mainly due to the necessity of taking a stance towards their recent ally – Russia. In their manifesto, the Social Democrats played up the economic aspect of relations with the East, stressing the necessity for closer cooperation between countries that formerly belonged to Comecon.¹³

There was also a strong pro-Russian lobby within the PSL. That party considered that the interests of its electorate lay mainly in Eastern markets.¹⁴ It was aware that the Russian market provided an opportunity for Polish agriculture, and Ukraine could, after relatively minor modernisation of its agriculture, squeeze Poland out of that market. It should also be remembered that the traditional PSL voter base was in the south-eastern regions, where generally people were unfavourably disposed towards Ukraine.

The direct conceptual base of Poland's Eastern policy implemented by the Foreign Ministry was the Democratic Union (UD), a party whose ranks included former opposition intellectuals, mainly from

12 See the texts by J. Mieroszewski published in "Kultura." For example J. Mieroszewski, *Polska "Ostpolitik"*, "Kultura", 1973, vol. 309, no. 6; id. *Rosyjski kompleks Polski i obszar ULB*, "Kultura", 1974, vol. 324, no. 9. Many monographs and scientific texts have dealt with the idea of ULB (Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus) and the influence of "Kultura" writings on the Polish foreign policy towards the East.

13 *Program społeczno-gospodarczy Socjaldemokracji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, March 1991, [in:] *Programy partii i ugrupowań parlamentarnych 1989-1991*, vol. 2, I. Słodkowska (ed.), Warszawa 1995, pp. 29-30.

14 *Program Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego*, June 1991, [in:] *ibidem*, p. 39.

KOR (Workers' Defence Committee) circles. Its manifesto most clearly highlighted the influence of thinking about the East in terms of the vision of the "Kultura." This was manifested above all in the unambiguous acceptance of Poland's Eastern neighbours' right to pursue independence.¹⁵

Entirely different concepts for an Eastern policy were espoused by certain groupings included in the governing coalition. These included the Christian National Union (ZChN), which postulated a change to the principles and priorities of the Eastern policy. The absolute priority for ZChN in Poland's relations with its Eastern neighbours was the matter of the Polish minorities in those states, and its goal was to rebuild the national identity of Poles in the East.¹⁶ ZChN politicians proposed the adoption of the principle that the nature of the Polish Republic's relationship with the countries beyond its eastern border would depend on the treatment by each of those countries of their Polish minority. At the same time, in line with the tradition and values of the pre-war National Democracy movement, they proposed prioritising relations with Russia in Poland's Eastern policy.¹⁷

Parties originating in pro-independence circles, such as Ruch dla Rzeczypospolitej (Movement for the Republic of Poland), Ruch III Rzeczypospolitej (Movement of the Third Republic), and Porozumienie Centrum (Centre Agreement) presented their own concepts of Eastern policy. These ideas, formulated during the previous era when they operated illegally, stressed the necessity to cooperate with pro-independence and democratic movements in the Soviet Republics, and support centrifugal tendencies within the USSR. Those parties criticised the two-track policy realised by the Foreign Ministry, accusing it of being overly cautious and failing to take advantage of the chance to influence a course of events beyond the eastern border which would be beneficial for Poland.¹⁸ They suggested prioritising relations with Ukraine over those with Russia.

15 *Uchwała programowa Zjazdu Zjednoczeniowego UD*, May 1991, [in:] *ibidem*, p. 230.

16 *Uchwała o polityce bieżącej 1991*, [in:] *ibidem*, p. 105.

17 See M. Piłka, *Założenia polityki Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wobec Polaków zamieszkałych na Wschodzie*, Warszawa 1991, *passim*; also M. Jurek, *Osuszanie bagna*, "Sprawa Polska", July-August 1992.

18 See "Rzeczpospolita", August 29, 1991 and October 1, 1991.

The most distinctive manifesto for an Eastern policy among extra-parliamentary groups was undoubtedly that of the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN). The vision of Intermarium (Międzymorze), as presented by party leader L. Moczulski, was similar in many aspects to the federative conceptions of J. Piłsudski and formed an alternative approach to the idea of uniting Poland with Europe. He proposed the creation of a commonwealth of Intermarium, led by Poland and Ukraine, comprising countries of Central and Eastern Europe lying between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas. The concept of integrating Intermarium was based on the assumption that each of those countries is too weak to be an equal economic partner for western Europe or a political partner for Russia. Combined, however, they would form a force to be reckoned with on the international stage, with an enormous consumer market and economic and intellectual potential.¹⁹ There was absolutely no realisation of this concept in Poland's foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry decisively rejected ideas that could have hindered or delayed "Poland's return to Europe."

The Eastern policy conceptions presented by Polish political parties can be summarised by stating that three options existed. One, which could be called conservative, until the end of 1991, assumed a high likelihood of the Soviet structures surviving, and after the collapse of the USSR, still recommended caution in relations with the new states to the East. The second option, which can be called Promethean, relied on the newly-independent Soviet republics, particularly Ukraine, proposing a reluctant policy towards Russia. And the third option, perhaps the most poorly represented, assumed a normalisation of relations above all with Russia, even at the expense of weaker links with the new post-Soviet states. None of these options gained a decisive advantage, as reflected in the discussions and conflicts among the main decision-makers concerning the shape of Poland's Eastern policy.

Decision-making groups. The third decision-making circle, the narrowest and the one directly making decisions regarding Polish-

19 On the topic of Intermarium: *Program gospodarczy KPN*, August 1991, [in:] *Programy partii...*, pp. 266-268; *Tezy programowe Konfederacji Polski Niepodległej. IV Kongres marzec 1992*, Warszawa 1993, p. 14; L. Moczulski, *U progu niepodległości. Rewolucja bez rewolucji*, Lublin 1990, passim; L. Moczulski, *Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i przestrzeni*, Warszawa 1999, pp. 543-546.

Ukrainian relations, was the circle consisting of the group of the most important decision-makers in foreign policy. This circle is by far the most difficult to analyse. In the first half of 1992, there were three decision-making centres in Poland in the field of foreign policy, which were characterised by rather poor coordination with regard to external relations. The first decision-making centre consisted of President L. Wałęsa and the Presidential Chancellery, while the second and third formed within the government of J. Olszewski. On the one side there was the Prime Minister himself, along with the ministers who influenced foreign policy (J. Parys) and a group of the Prime Minister's advisers with Z. Najder as head of the advisory team, while on the other, almost halfway between the President and the Prime Minister, was the Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski. The first half of 1992 saw a plethora of minor conflicts between the President and the government. These mainly concerned three spheres where the competences of the President and the government overlapped, namely national defence, internal affairs, and foreign policy. This overlap in competences resulted in the Presidential Chancellery occasionally striving to play a role that was more autonomous with regard to the government than that arising from its formal entitlements and the expectations of other decision-making authorities.

At the Presidential Chancellery, the foreign policy of the state was the sphere of operation of the National Security Bureau, which was then led by J. Milewski, and the International Affairs Bureau. In general, the position of the President and his advisers was characterised by caution and an unwillingness to make risky choices in the face of a political struggle with the USSR and the measures which could have been taken to preserve its empire. Different options clashed within the Chancellery, which became noticeable especially during the coup in Moscow in August 1991. The position of President Wałęsa during the coup was ambiguous, to say the least. Rather than an explicit condemnation of the coup leaders, and an expression of support for B. Yeltsin, Wałęsa issued a generalised declaration which clarified nothing. The first option was represented by Z. Najder, who accused Polish foreign policy towards the East of having been passive, lacking clear directives for the previous two years. He proposed immediate recognition of Ukrainian independence, without even waiting for the result of the referendum which was to be held in Ukraine in

December. He believed that Poland had to finally redirect its policies and recognise that the Soviet Union no longer existed. He proposed not to send any delegation to Russia, but instead to go to the individual republics.²⁰

These decisive propositions from Z. Najder in August 1991 were not accepted either by the remaining advisers or by the President himself. They presented the second – conservative – option and were convinced that some form of communist federation would remain in the East, so they unequivocally preferred to act cautiously and prudently. President's policy assumed a high probability that Soviet structures would persist and was not entirely convinced that the process of the disintegration of the USSR was inevitable.²¹ This had the specific consequences for the intensity of contacts with the East.

The government of J. Olszewski consisted of centre-right parties (ZChN, PC, PL), which varied in their foreign policy options, although it is tempting to theorise about their anti-Russian character. The greatest influence on the image of that government, however, was exerted by a group of people from independence-oriented circles, some of whom had been connected with Polish Independence Party (Prime Minister J. Olszewski, Z. Najder, R. Szeremietiew). In its Eastern policy, part of the governing coalition proposed a conception, formulated when their activities were still illegal, emphasising the necessity to cooperate with pro-independence movements in the Soviet republics. During the years 1990-91, they criticised the government for its lack of effective action towards Soviet military withdrawal from Poland, and a lack of support for the independence of the republics, and in effect a failure to take advantage of the chance to influence the course of events in a way that would be beneficial to Poland. When that group came to power, it attempted to prioritise relations with Ukraine over those with Russia.

The Foreign Ministry, and more precisely K. Skubiszewski as Foreign Minister, was to a great extent an autonomous decision-making circle within the structures of J. Olszewski's government. Minis-

20 Z. Najder, *Jaka Polska. Co i komu doradzałem*, Warszawa 1993, p. 261.

21 J. M. Nowakowski, *Polska polityka wschodnia w 1991 roku*, "Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej", 1991, p. 87; M. Menkiszak, M. A. Piotrowski, *Polska polityka wschodnia*, [in:] *Polityka zagraniczna RP 1989-2002*, R. Kuzniar, K. Szczepanik (eds.), Warszawa 2002, p. 216.

ter K. Skubiszewski had held the function since 1989 and was, therefore, implementing his own line of foreign policy in the third consecutive government. He ensured his foreign policy substantial autonomy or even “distance to the situation and internal affairs of the country.”²² Poland’s eastern policy had been based, since 1989, on the concept of two-track policy, meaning maintaining parallel political contacts with Moscow and with the Soviet republics.²³ The greatest success became the swift recognition of Ukrainian independence and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Following the collapse of the USSR and the creation of independent states beyond Poland’s eastern frontier, Minister Skubiszewski concentrated in 1992 on forming institutional and treaty bases for relations with these new neighbours.

All three decision-making circles, namely the President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister, were in agreement with regard to the pro-Western course of Polish foreign policy. They also appreciated the importance of an independent Ukraine and the necessity and benefits of building up good neighbourly Polish-Ukrainian relations. They differed, however, in their priorities for the Eastern policy. Prime Minister J. Olszewski and the group of advisers concentrated around him (particularly Z. Najder and B. Cywiński) held the most anti-Russian position and were determined to prioritise relations with Ukraine. Among other things, this attitude, and of course steps taken by Ukrainian diplomacy, led Poland to sign a treaty with Ukraine before signing a treaty with Russia, which had a clear symbolic resonance. President L. Wałęsa conducted a far more cautious policy, attempting to balance the importance of the relations – Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian – in Eastern policy. And finally, the Foreign Ministry, which possessed substantial autonomy in conducting foreign policy, found itself mid-way between the rationale of the

22 R. Kuźniar considers this to be a necessary step, faced with the political processes which were of a turbulent nature in Poland at the time. Otherwise, we would have had a turbulent foreign policy reflecting the twists and tensions accompanying each successive electoral campaign or dramatic change of government. This peculiar umbrella, held over foreign policy thanks to the unique position and authority of Minister Skubiszewski, ensured its continuity, responsibility, and professionalism. See R. Kuźniar, *Polityka zagraniczna czasu wyzwań 1989-1993*, [in:] *Pozycja Polski w Europie*, D. Popławski (ed.), Warszawa 1994, p. 66.

23 K. Skubiszewski, *Polska polityka zagraniczna w 1991 roku*, “Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej”, 1991, p. 21.

President and that of the Prime Minister. This dispersal of decision-making bodies and lack of proper coordination among them meant that Polish Eastern policy was at times unclear for observers both in the country and abroad.

1.2. Decision-making circles in Ukraine

Public opinion. Analysing the attitudes of Ukrainian public opinion towards Poland and Poles in 1992, it can be argued that they were closely connected with questions of national consciousness and history. Due to historical circumstances, a range of significant differences existed between eastern and western Ukraine. These concerned, first of all, the level of national consciousness, overgrown in the west and atrophied in the east. Secondly, historical circumstances meant that Ukrainians did not have a single, common historical memory. This is why only certain symbols of Ukrainian history, such as Cossacks and the Great Famine, were and are generally accepted in Ukraine. Others, such as Kievan Rus' as a symbol of the birth of the Ukrainian state, or the UPA, inspire numerous controversies.²⁴ Historical awareness, both in the east and the west of the country, resulted in the two parts of Ukraine having separate attitudes to Poland and Poles; traditionally hostile, full of suspicion, prejudices, and stereotypes in Western Ukraine (mainly Galicia), and evolving from ambivalent to sympathetic interest in the centre and East of the country. Despite this, most Ukrainians had no negative attitude towards Poles, or indeed any. In central and eastern Ukraine, "the Polish question" played no role whatsoever.

In the early 1990s, not only were there stereotypes and prejudices against Ukrainians on the Polish side but also in the general Ukrainian consciousness (particularly in Western Ukraine) there existed deeply ingrained stereotypes and prejudices against Poles. Ukrainians' prejudices against Poles were shaped above all by two factors – history and religion, which were closely entwined. The essence of the historical relations between Poles and Ukrainians was a lack of partnership.

²⁴ See Z. Kohut, *History as a Battleground: Russian Ukrainian Relationship in Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine*, [in:] *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, S. F. Starr (ed.), New York 1994, pp. 123-146.

On the Polish side, the attitude towards Ukrainians was inextricably linked to a lack of recognition of their subjectivity. On the Ukrainian side, for centuries it had been impossible to consider Poland as a partner since someone who forms an obstacle to one's basic goals (in this case the creation of their own state) cannot be a partner. Ukrainians' mistrust of Poles is a deep-rooted phenomenon. It reaches back to Cossack times, and later Poles' failure to acknowledge the national aspirations in Galicia during the Peoples' Spring revolutions of 1848, and then further during the Polish-Ukrainian battles for Lviv, and later the short-lived alliance between S. Petlura and J. Piłsudski deepened that mistrust still further.

Another factor shaping the perception of Poland in the consciousness of Ukrainian society was that of religion. The Catholic Church exists in Ukraine in two rites – Greek and Latin, mainly in Western Ukraine. Since 1990, relations between the two rites have not been easy. The Roman Catholic Church was generally associated with Polishness. Ukrainians believed that the Roman Catholic Church would only serve Poles and would be used for political purposes, particularly Polonisation.²⁵ Bitterness also increased towards the Vatican, which declared Ukraine a “missionary land”²⁶ and thus somehow open to the religious activities of Polish priests.

Both of the factors cited above – history and religion – shaped the attitudes of Ukrainian society towards Poland, mainly in Western Ukraine. The stereotypes and prejudices applied to Poles cannot, therefore, be generalised for the whole of Ukraine. The eastern part was dominated by indifference and a lack of interest in Polish matters. However, in 1992, a sympathetic interest could be observed in Kyiv towards the political and economic transformation processes in Poland.

Political elites. The attitude of the Ukrainian political elites towards the question of the young state's foreign policy was formed to a great extent by a dual feeling of national identity. The Ukrainian elites had to contend with the dichotomy deeply ingrained in the Ukrainian historical awareness and political thought – Russia or

25 See the discussion *Polska – Ukraina – Białoruś: nowa formuła sąsiedztwa*, “Polska w Europie”, 1993, no. 12, p. 135. The lack of any mass in Ukrainian at Lviv Cathedral was also emphasised.

26 B. Osadczyk, *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie*, “Kultura”, 1994, vol. 559, no. 4.

Europe,²⁷ therefore, Eurasian or Euroatlantic civilisation. For most of the Ukrainian intellectuals and politicians connected with the dissident movement (the *szesztydziesiatniki*), and referred to as national democrats in independent Ukraine, Ukraine was an inseparable part of European civilisation, or more strictly speaking, Central European civilisation.²⁸ The European civilisational identity, defined in opposition to the Asian identity of Russia, determined the choice of strategy in the foreign policy of the independent Ukrainian state. Groups in the political centre and the nationalist right proclaimed the slogan “Ukraine’s return to Europe” through definitive integration with the West.

The first step on this route was to be integration with Central Europe and the creation of an international image of Ukraine as a central European state.²⁹ To do so involved above all rebuilding links with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania. Those countries were treated as Ukraine’s natural allies in restraining Russia,³⁰ which had become a reference point for all Ukrainian attempts to conceptualise foreign policy. Among the states of Central Europe, Poland was ascribed a specific role. The national democratic elites expected Poland to take on the role of partner to co-create a political, and perhaps in future military, alternative for Ukraine. They expected Poland to understand and help in creating a Central European identity, provide support in Ukrainian-Russian conflicts, and thus internationalise them, and finally to play the role of a bridge to Western Europe. This was the foreign policy concept that found an unlikely ally in the form of President L. Kravchuk and the national communists, who formed the amorphous “party of power.” It thus became the dominant concept in the early 1990s, realised by the governing camp.

27 Cf. one of the most important political texts on Ukrainian nationalism: D. Doncow, *Rosija czy Jewropa ta inszy eseji*, Kyiv 1992, pp. 6-20.

28 As I. Dziuba stated: “The history of Ukraine is part of European history, and not of the history of Russia’s periphery.” See I. Dziuba, *Ukraina i swit*, [in: *Quo vadis Ukraino?*, I. Ostasz (ed.), Odessa 1992, p. 11.

29 See R. Ozołas, *Miż Schodom i Zachodom; Litwa i Ukraina*, “Złoty Worota”, 1994, no. 2, p. 33.

30 I. Kowal, *Ukraina i Wostoczna Jewropa w poiskach regionalnoj bezopasnosti*, [in: *Ukraina i Rossija: osnovnyje napravlienijsja wniesznopoliticeskoj dejatelnosti*, S. E. Appatov, B. A. Szmelov (eds.), Odessa 1994, passim.

The other concept, presented by the forces of the Ukrainian left, saw Ukraine as a part of Eurasian civilisation. In the independent Ukraine, only for extreme communist groups could an Eurasian civilisational identity mean a desire to incorporate Ukraine into Russia or revive a union along the lines of the USSR.³¹ Most of the proponents of this option, while stressing that Ukraine was part of the Eurasian bloc, supported an independent Ukrainian state. They believed that emphasising a Central European identity was actually harmful for Ukraine, as it provoked Russia into attempting to regain control of Ukraine.³² For the Eurasian orientation, Central Europe, including Poland, was not a strategic partner. Of course, bilateral, good neighbourly relations would have to be maintained with Poland, but with limited strategic significance.

In the early 1990s, the decision-making circles realised their foreign policy based on the pre-European conceptions presented by the national democrats.

Decision-making groups. Formulating and realising foreign policy belonged to three basically competing centres – the parliamentary foreign affairs commission, the foreign ministry, and the president and his advisers. While the role of the parliamentary commission was, in theory, stronger, as it could block in parliament any international agreements concluded by the president or foreign minister,³³ in practice there developed a situation where the commission, dominated by the national democrats under the leadership of D. Pavlychko, shared the presidential vision of foreign policy. The key figure in constructing and realising foreign policy was thus President L. Kravchuk and the sphere of his closest collaborators and advisers, of whom an influential element came from opposition circles

31 W. Kremini, *Ukraina w geopolitycznym prostori: obiektywne tendencje i subiektywne oczekiwania*, "Polityka i Czas", 1993, no. 10, pp. 21-22; id. *Rossija – Ukraina – Biforus: czy mozlywy schidnoslowkanskij trykutnyk*, "Nowa Polityka", July 1995, pp. 7-13.

32 Cf. S. R. Burant, *Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus*, "Europe-Asia Studies", 1995, vol. 47, no. 7, p. 1139.

33 T. Kuzio is one of those who share this opinion. See T. Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy*, Washington 1995, p. 30.

(M. and B. Horyn, I. Zayets, I. Jukhnovski, D. Pavlychko, S. Holovaty, W. Mulava, A. Bazylevskyy).³⁴

The figure of L. Kravchuk and his metamorphosis is a peculiar political phenomenon. He quite quickly absorbed nationalist rhetoric, becoming the first defender of an independent Ukraine. His past attracted those who had mixed feelings about independence, their own national identity, or capitalism. The nationalist rhetoric, supported by a tough line in support of independence, gave hope to nationalists that independence would be consolidated. The well-known Ukrainian commentator M. Ryabchuk described this situation as a Faustian syndrome – “a pact with the Devil in search of an independent Ukrainian state.”³⁵ His main fields of interest became strengthening presidential authority, and foreign policy – above all bringing an independent Ukraine into the international arena and creating an image of it as a state separate from and independent of Russia.³⁶ In matters of external policy, the President completely accepted the conceptions of the national democrats.

In Ukraine’s policy towards the CIS, President L. Kravchuk applied the tactic of a full Ukrainian presence in every Commonwealth matter, while simultaneously distancing itself from those decisions and structures which would or could threaten the state independence of Ukraine.³⁷ The greatest of those threats, according to the President and his advisers, was Russia’s neo-imperial policy. L. Kravchuk’s team conducted a policy of building up the “Russian threat” and maintaining controlled tension in Ukrainian-Russian relations.³⁸

In early 1992, L. Kravchuk declared that Ukraine was a European state and would strive to be included in all European processes and

34 Ł. Leszczenko, W. Paszczuk, *Na wistri wielikoj polityki. Prezydent i zowniszni znosiny Ukrainy*, “Polityka i Czas”, 1993, no. 8, pp. 19-25.

35 See M. Riabczuk, *Dylemat ukraińskiego Fausta*, “Nasze Słowo”, 8 November 1992, and R. Solchanyk, *Ukraine: a Year of Transition*, “RFE/RL Research Report”, 1993, no. 1, p. 58.

36 One such symbolic gesture was Ukraine leaving the Moscow time zone.

37 Ukraine was the main instigator of the creation of national armed forces and the liquidation of the Soviet Army, it refused to participate in the Tashkent Pact involving a joint security space for the post-Soviet states, and also spoke out against the idea of creating an interparliamentary gathering for the CIS member states. It was not for nothing that Kravchuk was known in Moscow as a “sly fox.” See “Argumenty i Fakty”, 1993, no. 8.

38 J.F. Dunn, *The Determinants and Future of Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy*, Sandhurst 1995, p. 8.

structures.³⁹ Poland, according to the Ukrainian President's conception, was to fulfil two basic functions. Firstly, it was to be Ukraine's "road to Europe." L. Kravchuk hoped that, with Poland's help, Ukraine would, first of all, enter the central European structures (Visegrad Triangle, Central European Initiative), and thus empowered, would have a significantly easier road to the West. Secondly, close links with Poland would form a counterbalance to Ukrainian-Russian relations. There is no doubt – as J. Kozakiewicz and A. Kamiński write – "that the main foreign policy goal of Kravchuk's team was to convince Poland to become involved in the intensifying Ukrainian-Russian conflict by providing Ukraine with unambiguous political support."⁴⁰ Ukraine was interested in creating a Polish-Ukrainian axis capable of serving as a basis for a regional security system.

L. Kravchuk's team seems to have been subject to a certain misperception when assessing the fears of the Polish decision-making centre faced with the "Russian threat," and the readiness of the Polish government to form a "coalition" against Russia. President L. Kravchuk's political entourage was so determined to build a "coalition" with Poland that they pressurised the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry to adopt a sympathetic attitude towards Polish expectations while negotiating the treaty, particularly in the matter of national minorities. The political impasse in which Ukraine found itself, and the search for outside support, meant that the Ukrainian decision-making circles were ready to make far-reaching concessions towards Poland.

2. Process of negotiations

The negotiating procedure involved the participants formulating initial positions then offers being submitted with regard to concessions, acceptance, or rejection of these, and then the defining of counter-proposals. The basis for negotiating the Treaty of Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation between the Polish Republic and Ukraine was the draft developed by the Polish Foreign Ministry.

39 Cf. the collection of President Kravchuk's speeches. L. Krawczuk, *Je taka dierzawa Ukraina*, Kiev 1992.

40 A. Z. Kamiński, J. Kozakiewicz, *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie. Raport*, Warszawa 1997, p. 30.

After initial agreement at the export level, the draft was sent to the heads of ministries and central departments in order for comments to be collated. Z. Najder, the head of the Prime Minister's advisers, remembers that he submitted several comments to the draft treaty. He considered above all that either part of the Preamble or the Introduction should have a form and content suitable for reproducing in textbooks. He was also of the opinion that the draft contained some "simply unwise sentences." For example, that "all components of the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations will be conducive to extending cooperation." All, wondered the Secretary of State, "including the Volhynia massacres and Operation Vistula?" There was also mention of "further extension of cooperation, although the Ukrainian state previously did not exist."⁴¹

The text of the Treaty was agreed during two rounds of negotiations: 27-28 January in Kyiv and 9-12 March in Warsaw. The Polish delegation was accompanied by Secretary of State J. Makarczyk, and its members included the Secretary of State of the Chancellery of the President, J. Milewski, members of parliament B. Borusewicz and A. Małachowski, and representatives of the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Abroad, and the Central Customs Office.⁴² The Polish side assessed the course of the negotiations positively, indicating the far-reaching readiness of their Ukrainian partners to seek compromise solutions satisfactory to both parties.⁴³

The basic controversies concerned three matters:

The Ukrainian side expressed a wish for the title of the pact to include the formulation "on friendship," but during the negotiations settled on the Polish proposal "on friendly relations."

During the negotiations, particular attention was paid to provisions concerning the rights of national minorities. The Polish side proposed a detailed codification of those rights in three extensive articles of the treaty. The Ukrainian side, conversely, proposed including this question in a separate bilateral protocol and treating the matter more generally in the treaty. By way of a compromise, the two sides decided to

41 See Z. Najder: *Jaka Polska...*, pp. 317-318.

42 M. Cieślak, *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie*, "Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej", 1992, p. 136.

43 *Uzasadnienie wniosku o zatwierdzenie Traktatu między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i współpracy*, unpublished document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, March 17, 1992.

agree on a detailed provision regarding national minorities in a single article of the Treaty.

For the Polish side, it was important to have an unambiguous provision concerning the return of cultural assets of one state which, as a result of war or illegal activities, found themselves on the territory of the other state. The Ukrainian side filed reservations with regard to this provision, fearing a wave of future claims from the Polish side or state, or from former owners. By way of a compromise, the two sides agreed to a “softer” provision that “the parties would aim to reveal and return cultural and historic assets.”

An attempt can also be made to reconstruct the decision-making process by formulating hypotheses regarding the hierarchy of preferences – both subjective and objective – of the participants of the process, in other words, Poland and Ukraine. It should be emphasised here that this reconstruction is from the viewpoint of an external observer. Game theory will be applied to the analysis. Of course, political relations almost never take the form of a formalised game, as it is very difficult to meet the informational conditions formulated by mathematical game theory. This means that game theory can only be used on the basis of analogy.⁴⁴

We are dealing with two players with only two strategies – peace strategy **P**, and war strategy **W**. This means that from the perspective of player A, there can be 4 possible results: *Reward*, *Temptation* to achieve a unilateral victory, *Threat* meaning defeat (Sucker’s payoff), and *Punishment* in the form of conflict.

Payoff matrix 1: General hierarchy of preferences

		B	
		P	W
A	Reward	Sucker’s payoff (Threat)	
	Temptation	Punishment	

Let us try to establish what the individual values mean for Poland and Ukraine.

⁴⁴ I used the book by Z. J. Pietraś to construct the game theory assumptions. See Z. J. Pietraś, op. cit., pp. 175-294.

Payoff matrix 2: Hierarchy of preferences for Poland and Ukraine

		UKRAINE	
		P	W
POLAND	P	Concluding a treaty at a point willingly accepted by both parties	Concluding a treaty at a point very close to Ukraine's initial position, but not accepted willingly by Poland
	W	Concluding a treaty at a point very close to Poland's initial position, but not accepted willingly by Ukraine	Termination of negotiations

In the case of talks between Poland and Ukraine, strategy P indicated a tendency towards far-reaching compromises if only this led to a treaty being concluded. Strategy W meanwhile indicated increasing unwillingness to compromise, even at the cost of terminating the negotiations. Choosing this strategy, the parties subjectively want to conclude an agreement, but at the closest possible point to their initial position. Objectively, though, this could lead to a bilateral failure.

For Poland, it was most desirable to conclude a treaty with Ukraine at a point accepted willingly by both parties ($N=4$). It definitely wanted to avoid breaking off the negotiations ($K=1$). By hierarchising the centre values, we reach the conclusion that it clearly preferred a unilateral victory in the form of signing an agreement at a point very close to its initial position ($P=3$), while the unilateral defeat, i.e., concluding a treaty at a point very close to Ukraine's initial position had a lower value ($Z=2$). The system of preferences for the Polish side was reflected by the relations: cooperation, unilateral victory, unilateral defeat, conflict (RTSP – Reward, Temptation, Sucker's payoff, Punishment). This order of values indicates that Poland was playing a Harmony type game. Assuming Ukraine had the same hierarchy of preferences, the game would have been symmetrical.

Payoff matrix 3: Poland-Ukraine: Harmony game

		UKRAINE	
		P	W
POLAND	P	4,4	2,3
	W	3,2	1,1

For Ukraine, it was most valuable to conclude a treaty with Poland at a point accepted willingly by both parties ($R=4$). The least valuable

was conflict, i.e., termination of negotiations ($P=1$). The order of centre elements was slightly different, however. Ukraine ascribed a higher value to threat ($S=3$) and slightly less to temptation ($T=2$). This type of game can be called the Sacrifice game (RSTP).⁴⁵ Assuming, also theoretically, that the system of preferences was the same as for Poland, we have the following game:

Payoff matrix 4: Poland-Ukraine: Sacrifice game

		UKRAINE	
		P	W
POLAND	P	4,4	3,2
	W	2,3	1,1

An analysis of the game indicates that the parties were condemned to cooperate, as the use of strategy W was not profitable for either player from the viewpoint of individual, cooperative, and rivalrous rationality.

To be able to hypothesise about either the subjective or objective reconstruction of the two sides' preferences, let us assign values on a scale of 1-10. Extending the scale allows for a better and more flexible nuancing of the players' preferences. The subjective reconstruction created for the hierarchy of preferences for both sides looks as follows:

POLAND			
R	T	S	P
10	8	4	2

UKRAINE			
R	S	T	P
10	7	5	1

The Polish side had a Harmony-type preference hierarchy (RTSP), while the Ukrainian side had a sacrifice type (RSTP). For Poland, the

⁴⁵ I took this name from the fact that the player "makes sacrifices" and thus, applying strategy P even in response to the other player's use of strategy W, always achieves greater strategic benefits.

highest value was concluding the treaty with Ukraine at a point willingly accepted by both parties, and it thus valued joint success higher (10). Above all, a treaty satisfactory for both parties had a significantly higher chance of being implemented in future. What mattered for Poland was an agreement that took into account the entirety of the problems which were of importance for both states and provided a good basis for developing further bilateral relations. The temptation for the Polish side to take a hard line in the negotiations was rather strong, as Poland was aware of Ukraine's inexperience and weakness on the international stage. There are also those who claim that Poland's initial unwillingness to compromise, or the delay in negotiating and signing the treaty, were connected with Polish-Russian relations. In spring 1992, Poland and Russia were conducting negotiations concerning the final withdrawal of the Russian military from Poland, and there may have been fears that excessive closeness with Ukraine during that period would annoy Russia and cause its position to harden. This was why the final signing of the treaty with Ukraine was delayed until negotiations with Russia were complete.⁴⁶ On the other hand, Poland had no interest in weakening the position of the young state, on the contrary, reinforcing bonds with Ukraine would pull it towards Europe, away from Russia, consolidate its independence, and at the same time its presence on the international stage. There was additionally a psychological aspect at play. Too hard a line by Poland would create the impression that it had not yet shed its previously characteristic sense of superiority over Ukraine. Polish politicians were concerned with showing that they considered Ukraine a partner on an equal footing. This is why the Temptation to conduct "tough" negotiations was assigned 8 preference points, and Threat (Sucker's payoff) only 4.

For Ukraine, the highest value was also concluding a treaty that was satisfactory to both parties (10). The Temptation to pursue strategy W was small, as the young state wished to settle its relations with Poland, to create an image of a good neighbourly country on the international arena, and at the same time reinforce its presence in Europe. Poland played a specific role in Ukraine's policy – firstly as an alter-

46 See, for example, S. R. Burant: *International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours – Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine*, "Europe-Asia Studies", 1993, vol. 45, no. 3, p. 412.

native to relations with Russia, and secondly as a guide on the road to Europe. This meant that Ukraine was prepared to make many compromises in the negotiations in order for the treaty to be concluded as swiftly as possible. This was also to prove, especially to Russia, that Ukraine was not isolated internationally,⁴⁷ and to the international community that it was a state willing to compromise, and further that its independence did not threaten its neighbours in any way. This is why the Temptation to apply strategy W, which could have led to a termination of negotiations with Poland, was assessed at only 6 points, while readiness for tactical compromises to save the treaty scored 7.

Termination of negotiations was the least desired outcome for both parties. However, I consider that the Punishment value was different for each. It was more severe for Ukraine, as it would have meant a fiasco for its pro-European policy. An inability to reach an agreement with Poland would have left Ukraine isolated in the international arena and would have created the impression of a country which had not yet matured enough for independence, could not settle its relations with its neighbours and was therefore unreliable. It would have strengthened Russia's arguments about the "transitional" nature of Ukrainian statehood and brought it into Russia's orbit. For this reason, Punishment scores only 1 point in Ukraine's hierarchy of preferences.

For Poland, the value of terminating negotiations was assessed as 1 point higher so, from the point of view of rivalrous rationality, Poland would have gained more, or rather lost a little less. Failure of the negotiations would not have meant any fundamental retreat in Poland's pro-European policy, but Poland would have been a significantly more valuable partner for Europe if its relations with its Eastern neighbours were settled. So, with regard to Europe, lack of success on its eastern border would not have closed Poland's road to Europe but would certainly have hindered it. With regard to Russia, meanwhile, a lack of Polish-Ukrainian agreement would have lost Poland the favourable buffer which is Ukraine.

Having established a subjective hierarchy of preferences for each side, we can create a hypothetical objective reconstruction.

47 E. Mironowicz, *Polityka zagraniczna Ukrainy*, Białystok 2012, p. 65.

Payoff matrix 5: Poland (Harmony) – Ukraine (Sacrifice)

		UKRAINE	
		P	W
POLAND	P	10,10	4,5
	W	8,7	2,1

Adopting the peace strategy (PP) enabled both players to achieve the best result. This was the optimum solution from the point of view of both individualistic and cooperative rationality. In Poland's case, there was a temptation to select strategy W from the point of view of rivalrous rationality. In the case of Ukraine, the temptation to pursue strategy W was very weak, as the advantage over the other party achieved in this way was very small (1), and from the point of view of individualistic rationality, entirely senseless. It can, therefore, be hypothesised that Ukraine was decisive in choosing strategy P.

Conclusions

Treaties on friendship and cooperation (political treaties) are political decisions that are subject to explanation. In the presented article, by applying elements of decision analysis, an attempt was made to explain the decision to conclude the Treaty of Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation, which was signed by Poland and Ukraine in 1992.

Summarising the considerations on decision-making bodies, we can talk of three tiers, or circles, of these. At the level of public opinion, reflecting the mutual attitudes of Poles and Ukrainians towards one another, the decision-making situation was not conducive to signing the treaty. This circle was characterised by the existence of deep-seated prejudices and stereotypes, conditioned above all by historical and religious factors. At the beginning of 1992, the process of transnational influences among societies had not yet begun. Mutual knowledge of one another was negligible and resulted only from the tragic history of Polish-Ukrainian relations, and not from current reality. There may have existed a certain dichotomy in the mutual perception, in that Polish society was more anti-Ukrainian than Ukrainian society was anti-Polish. However, it was a dichotomy in the level of

hostility or indifference, and not affection.⁴⁸ The decision to sign the treaty was possible thanks to the political and intellectual elites who originated in the former communist-era opposition, both in Poland and Ukraine. Those elites convinced the governing circles to accept their conception of foreign policy. In Poland, this was all the easier because people originating directly from those elites formed part of the decision-making bodies. In Ukraine, however, the foreign policy conception of the dissident circles was internalised by the President.

Summarising the attempt to reconstruct the subjective and objective preferences of Poland and Ukraine in the decision-making process, it can be said that the two states aimed to conclude a treaty that would satisfy both parties. It can thus be concluded that they demonstrated a readiness to compromise during the negotiations. It can also be assumed that this readiness was slightly asymmetrical in Poland's favour; Ukraine was willing to sacrifice much more in order for the treaty to be negotiated.

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