

Mirosław Banasik*

The mechanisms of the Russian Federation's domination in the regional and global security environment

Mechanizmy dominacji Federacji Rosyjskiej w środowisku bezpieczeństwa regionalnego i globalnego

Summary: The article explains the mechanisms leading to achieving the Russian Federation's dominance in the regional and global security environment. To solve the research problems, a systemic approach was applied and methods of literary analysis and critique, non-participant observation, and uncategorized interviews were used. In the research process, it was established that the dominance of the Russian Federation in the international arena is based on force. The key factors enabling its achievement are displayed by the quantitative and qualitative superiority of the armed forces, expressed by force correlation coefficients, strategic forecasting, and operational prediction as well as the modern forms and methods of using armed forces. The Russian Federation balances the existing international disparities with the use of adaptive strategy, blackmail of conflict escalation with the use of nuclear weapons, modern and technologically advanced operational capabilities, and offensive asymmetric activities.

Keywords: dominance, Russian Federation, regional and global security, military

Streszczenie: Celem badań, którego rezultaty przedstawiono w niniejszym artykule, było wyjaśnienie mechanizmów prowadzących do osiągnięcia przez Federację Rosyjską dominacji w środowisku bezpieczeństwa regionalnego i globalnego. Do rozwiązywania problemów badawczych zastosowano podejście systemowe oraz metody: analizę i krytykę literatury, obserwację nieuczestniczącą i wywiad nieskategoryzowany. W procesie badawczym ustalono, że dominacja Federacji Rosyjskiej na arenie międzynarodowej opiera się na sile. Kluczowym czynnikiem umożliwiającym jej osiągnięcie jest przewaga ilościowo-jakościowa sił zbrojnych, wyrażająca się współczynnikami korelacji siły, prognozowaniem strategicznym i przewidywaniem operacyjnym, a także stosowaniem nowoczesnych form i metod użycia sił zbrojnych. Występujące

* Mirosław Banasik – assoc. prof., Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland, ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9358-1240>, e-mail: miroslaw.banasik@interia.pl.

dysproporcje międzynarodowe Federacja Rosyjska równoważy stosowaniem adaptacyjnej strategii, szantażem eskalacji konfliktu przy użyciu broni nuklearnej, nowoczesnymi i zaawansowanymi technologicznie zdolnościami operacyjnymi oraz ofensywnymi działaniami asymetrycznymi.

Słowa kluczowe: dominacja, Federacja Rosyjska, bezpieczeństwo regionalne i globalne, sfera militarna

Introduction

The Russian Federation (RF) has been steadily destabilizing the regional and global international security environment. Aiming to achieve its geopolitical goals, it raises the risk of both full-scale military conflicts, limited armed conflict, and war below the threshold. It chooses its actions selectively, but comprehensively uses all available instruments of influence. It is fully aware that by having dominance in selected areas of its rivalry with the West, and especially in the military dimension, including nuclear and hypersonic weapons, combined with the use of blackmail to withhold supplies of energy resources, it places itself in a privileged role vis-à-vis the leaders of Western democracies, and wants to dictate the terms in resolving the tense crisis situations it has created.

The use of force in the international dimension is playing an increasingly important role for the RF. Russia's military activity outside the country's borders is intensifying. The growing spectrum of international influence is expressed in waging war against Ukraine, military integration with Belarus, or conducting joint exercises with China and Kazakhstan. Moscow has sent warships to the coast of South Africa¹, and nuclear-equipped Blackjack strategic bombers have flown to Venezuela². The RF learns lessons from each experience, such as the war in Syria, and continues to refine its strategy and capabilities for operating beyond its borders in an effort to dominate strategic rivals. The growing global presence of Russian armed forces suggests that Moscow has significant hard military power projection capabilities. The RF is aware that military dominance creates a specific strategic

- 1 A. Panda, *Chinese, Russian, South African Navies Conduct Trilateral Naval Exercises. The exercise was the first of its kind*, The Diplomat, 27 November 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/chinese-russian-south-african-navies-conduct-trilateral-naval-exercises/> [16.04.2022].
- 2 *US-Russian spat over bombers landing in Venezuela*, BBC News, 11 December 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46522358> [16.04.2022].

advantage and allows it to pursue the broader goals of internationally driven competition.

A search of the literature in the area of broadly defined issues of international rivalry proved that there is a lack of knowledge concerning the meaning of domination and the processes shaping this objective. In the literature on armed forces, domination is understood in a limited way through the prism of shaping advantage in an armed clash and rather in quantitative than qualitative terms. Experts and scholars focusing on international security issues devote relatively much attention to the use of various instruments of influence, but consciously or unconsciously overlook the phenomenon of shaping international dominance by the RF. There is also a lack of assessments of the instruments of international influence used by the RF leading to the establishment of dominance over its strategic rivals.

On the basis of the existing cognitive gap, the main research problem was formulated, which is: what mechanisms lead to the Russian Federation achieving dominance in the regional and global security environment? To the guidance of the research process, a research hypothesis was formulated, expressed by the following assumption; The Russian Federation achieves dominance in the international arena through force. The key factors enabling the achievement of military dominance are the quantitative and qualitative superiority of the armed forces, expressed by force correlation coefficients, strategic foresight, and operational prediction as well as the use of modern forms and methods of the deployment of armed forces.

To verify the hypothesis it was necessary to answer the following specific research questions: 1) In what is the essence of international domination expressed; 2) How does the Russian Federation seek to achieve domination; 3) What factors determine the achievement of domination in the military sphere? The purpose of the research, the results of which are presented in this article, was to clarify the mechanisms leading to the achievement of dominance by the Russian Federation in the regional and global security environment. A systems approach was used to study the interactions, interdependencies, and relationships between the behavior of the Russian Federation and participants in the international security environment. In solving research problems and obtaining objective qualitative data, main-

ly literature analysis and criticism, non-participant observation, and uncategorized interviews were used.

1. The notion of international dominance

A state's capabilities to achieve its own goals in the international arena is based on its strength³. In Max Weber's classical view, the power of a state is expressed by the probability of realizing its intentions in a situation of resistance by the opposing party⁴. The effectiveness of force can be assessed along two dimensions; the first relates to a state's willingness to yield or submit to another state⁵. The second dimension relates to the ability of the state to achieve the desired results, that is, it is related to the effectiveness of state governance⁶.

Determining the value of a state's strength, and especially comparing it with a competing state, is an extremely difficult task, due in part to the fact that it changes over time. The strength of modern states is based on the capabilities of the armed forces, the economy, legal stability, credibility, and national identity and culture. It is strengthened by well-functioning institutions and people's commitment to its development⁷. In the English-language literature, these factors are referred to as hard power, soft power, and smart power. Recently, the term sharp power has emerged in relation to the RF, which denotes the use of soft power instruments in a manipulative and confrontational manner. These instruments pierce, penetrate, or perforate the political and informational environment through the use of the media, educational institutions, and culture and entertainment in order to undermine the political system of a particular state or upset its social order⁸.

3 R. Łoś, *Sila współczesnych państw. Ujęcie teoretyczne*, "Przegląd Politologiczny" 2018, no. 2, p. 33.

4 I. Wallimann, N.C. Tatsis, G.V. Zito, *On Max Weber's Definition of Power*, "Journal of Sociology" 1977, vol. 13, issue 3, pp. 231-235; J.S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, New York 2002, p. 4.

5 D. Wrong, *Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses*, New Brunswick and London 2002, pp. 21-64.

6 V. Ledyayev, *Domination, Power and Authority in Russia: Basic Characteristics and Forms*, "Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics" 2008, no. 24(1), p. 28.

7 R. Łoś, op. cit., p. 36.

8 J.S. Nye Jr., *How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power. The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence*, "Foreign Affairs", 24 January 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power> [16.04.2022].

The term force is inextricably linked to national and international security. In the classical view of international relations theory, states compete for resources in order to gain as much power as possible. The modern view is that the most fundamental goal of states is security, while force is the means of ensuring it⁹. In general, states that seek to gain as much power as possible are perceived by others as dangerous. They may, as exemplified by the RF, provoke an escalation of negative reactions, expressed in efforts to gain dominance in their offensive capabilities, which raises the risks of aggression on the international stage¹⁰. The second leading goal of interstate rivalry is to gain status, which means high standing in global politics¹¹. Russia's status goals are integrally linked to its demands to revise the international order, create spheres of influence, and play a greater role in deciding how to solve global security problems¹². It is important to remember, however, that changes in the world order must be made with respect for international law. In other cases, as exemplified by the RF's annexation of Crimea, they are processes inextricably linked to the possibility of potentially serious international conflicts¹³.

The concept of domination in international relations describes the permanent relationship between states and is closely related to the concept of hegemony. Hegemony is a state of disequilibrium in the international system in which one state becomes so powerful that it can exercise leadership or dominance. Referred to as a hegemon or imperial power, a state has the ability to exercise fundamental control over the structures of the international system and the behavior of the individuals that comprise it¹⁴, it is also based on the use of coercion. There are two basic characteristics that define domination. First, domination is continuous, or recurrent in nature. Second, it allows benefits to the dominators and brings specific losses to the dom-

9 M.J. Mazarr, J.S. Blake, *Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition. Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*, Santa Monica 2018, p. 19.

10 *Ibidem*, p. 20.

11 *Ibidem*.

12 A. Radin, C. Reach, *Russian Views of the International Order*, Santa Monica 2017, p. 12.

13 W. Putin, *Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club*, 22 October 2015, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548> [16.04.2022].

14 A. Antoniadou, *From 'Theories of Hegemony' to 'Hegemony Analysis' in International Relations*, Sussex 2008, p. 3, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/2709786.pdf> [16.04.2022].

inated¹⁵. Dominance is usually based on power. Advantage plays a key role in achieving hegemony and domination. This advantage can be created through factors of geography, natural resources, industrial, financial, and economic potential, armed forces, population and its morale, governance, and religion and national identity. These factors are described by quantitative and qualitative indicators. The constitutive factors in the formation of dominance are military capabilities, the ability to have control over raw materials, markets, and capital, and competitive advantages in highly valued goods¹⁶.

2. The aspirations of the Russian Federation to achieve international domination

In the RF, it is believed that the main instrument in competing and achieving dominance in the international arena is the instrument of military influence because, with it, one can subjugate other states¹⁷. It is believed that by combining freedom of maneuver, precision fire, and efficient logistics with comprehensive military protection it is possible to achieve military dominance across the full operational spectrum. Achieving such a state, however, requires a constant inflow of new technologies and permanent modernization of the possessed equipment¹⁸. However, material superiority alone is insufficient to achieve dominance. Of greater importance is modern doctrine, good organization of troops, their training and leadership, as well as preparation of personnel to take full advantage of the opportunities that modern combat technology will offer. It is believed that the key factor determining dominance on the future battlefield will be information superiority¹⁹. The revolution that is taking place in the information sphere will relatively quickly change the image of international com-

15 V. Ledyaeu, op. cit., p. 18.

16 A. Antoniadou, op. cit., p. 3.

17 M. Russell, *Russia's armed forces. Defence capabilities and policy*, Brussels 2021.

18 M. Kofman, A. Fink, *Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts*, Washington 2021, p. 23.

19 J. Edmonds, S. Bendett, *Russian Battlefield Awareness and Information Dominance: Improved Capabilities and Future Challenges*, "Strategy Bridge", 26 February 2019, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/2/26/russian-battlefield-awareness-and-information-dominance-improved-capabilities-and-future-challenges> [16.04.2022].

petition²⁰. To achieve the full spectrum of dominance, it is necessary to have a strategic deterrence capability, to conduct rapid, sustained, and synchronized operations in the sea, land, air, space, and information domains, and to have a power projection capability²¹. Based on the arguments cited above, one can conclude that the RF will seek domination by depriving its opponent of its key advantage.

The so-called Color Revolutions fit well into the strategy of achieving complete domination. Although the RF claims that they are a security destabilization mechanism used by the West, Moscow also uses them to achieve its own political goals. To achieve them, it conducts information campaigns aimed at the conflict-affected population. From a strategic point of view, they should be convincing and reach the widest possible audience. They are to lead to the emergence of certain dichotomies in society²². The essence of the Color Revolutions according to Russian views boils down to gaining social dominance. The idea is to create a strong enough social movement and then publicly confront it with the state and attempt to overthrow the legitimate government²³.

The RF can achieve international dominance through unconventional warfare²⁴. To this end, it supports activities that enable resistance or insurgency movements to defeat or overthrow government forces by operating underground, or by using guerrilla warfare in areas not accessible to regular troops²⁵. The goals of unconventional warfare, which are usually indirect, are achieved by exploiting the vulnerability of the state under attack to external influences in the political, military, economic, and psychological spheres. In order to weaken states and secure its own interests, the RF uses the local, internal resistance movement, to which it gives broad support. It supports the opposition's struggle with all possible instruments of influence, especially

20 *Joint Vision 2020*, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington 2000, p. 3.

21 A. Serzhantov, S. Mazhuga, *Wars of the future: what will they be like?*, "Independent Military Review" 2019, no. 35, https://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2019-09-27/3_1063_futurewars.html [16.04.2022].

22 M. Minkina, M. Kaszuba, *Color Revolutions as a Threat to Security of the Russian Federation. An Analysis of Russian Perspective*, "Torun International Studies" 2021, vol. 1, no. 14, pp. 77-79.

23 A. Korybko, *Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change*, Moscow 2015, p. 30.

24 M. Clark, *The Russian View of Future War: Unconventional, Diverse, and Rapid*, Washington 2020.

25 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, Fort Bragg 2010, p. 94, <https://nsnbc.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/special-forces-uw-tc-18-01.pdf> [16.04.2022].

non-military ones. It organizes underground groups and spy networks. It employs saboteurs, provocateurs, and people involved in bribing and overthrowing the legal authorities. It is worth noting that it always does so below the line of open provocation and/or confrontation²⁶. Russian unconventional warfare relative to conventional warfare has a richer scenario, as it employs a variety of opportunities to exert pressure from outside and influence from within. However, it should be remembered that it never engages regular armed forces to wage open war²⁷. Rather, the RF achieves its political goals using small groups of special subdivisions and local opposition forces²⁸.

The combination of Color Revolutions and unconventional war creates hybrid war²⁹, which in Russian-language studies is referred to as new-generation warfare. The Russian concept of new-generation war reflects an innovative way of thinking about the conduct and settlement of conflicts and includes multi-level efforts aimed at destabilizing the functions of the state and changing its internal order. In contrast to conventional war, the center of gravity of new-generation war is focused on society³⁰. It is based on the assumption that the main battle space is the human mind, therefore, all activities should be focused on informational and psychological activities³¹. In the RF, it is predicted that it will also be possible to achieve set political goals by influencing the behavioral sphere, at the core of which lies the manipulation of behavioral algorithms, habits, activities, and stereotypes as well as interference in the cultural sphere³².

Russia's new-generation warfare is a mechanism for achieving international domination that is based at its core on chaos management³³.

26 N. Fedyk, *Russian "New Generation" Warfare: Theory, Practice, and Lessons for U.S. Strategists*, *Small War Journals*, 5 April 2017, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/russian-%E2%80%99Cnew-generation%E2%80%99D-warfare-theory-practice-and-lessons-for-us-strategists-0> [16.04.2022].

27 O. Olikier, *Russian Influence And Unconventional Warfare Operations In The "Gray Zone": Lessons From Ukraine*, Washington 2017.

28 A.E. Wall, *Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities, and Covert Action*, "Harvard National Security Journal" 2011, vol. 3, p. 113.

29 M. Clark, op. cit., p. 16.

30 M. Banasik, *Wojna hybrydowa w teorii i praktyce Federacji Rosyjskiej*, "Bellona" 2015, no. 4, pp. 47-62.

31 J. Berzins, *Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy*, "Policy Paper" 2014, no. 2, Riga 2014, p. 5.

32 T.L. Thomas, *Russian Forecasts of Future War*, "Military Review", May-June 2019.

33 A. Polyakova, M. Boulègue, *The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare*, Washington 2021, p. 2.

Its initiation can be compared to an ideological virus, circulating in the information sphere, whose task is to destroy the targeted social system. If it fails to intimidate the government and force it to step down on its own, or to overthrow it by force, then the RF begins to wage an unconventional war³⁴. The chaos that is created can be systemic and controllable. The incorporation of chaos principles into new-generation warfare theory makes it likely, due to its non-linear nature and unpredictability, to produce strategic effects and lead to systemic changes in international relations³⁵. In the RF, it is believed that by skillfully managing chaos, it is possible to unite opposition political groups against the existing government, undermine the credibility of state leaders and the loyalty of the armed forces, and destabilize the internal situation with the help of violent demonstrators or criminals, and finally to bring down the government through a coup d'état or during so-called democratic elections³⁶. In summary, the new-generation warfare, treated in the RF as organized chaos, is a unique hybrid package of kinetic and non-kinetic opportunities for international domination, both directly and indirectly.

3. Determinants of the Russian Federation's strategic dominance in the military sphere

Achieving strategic dominance means being able to win rivalries and be victorious in conflicts, and in each case, the applied strategy of action should lead to optimal results. It appears that the RF is currently pursuing a dominant strategy, which means that it is making optimal moves regardless of how rivals behave³⁷, as it can predict the behavior of adversaries. Based on an assessment of the Russian-language literature, it was determined that the key factors in applying this strategy and achieving dominance are strategic forecasting and foresight,

34 A. Korybko, op. cit., p. 24.

35 Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York 1998.

36 S. Shashkov, *The theory of 'manageable chaos' put into practice*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1 March 2011.

37 Ch. Majaski, *Comparing a Dominant Strategy Solution vs. Nash Equilibrium Solution*, Investopedia, 13 June 2021, <https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/071515/what-difference-between-dominant-strategy-solution-and-nash-equilibrium-solution.asp> [16.04.2022].

correlation of forces (the ratio of forces and means), and forms and methods of using armed forces. The aforementioned factors have been treated as key in Russian military thought since the early 1960s and have the same significance in the conditions of the RF's contemporary new-generation warfare.

Strategic foresight is the process of gaining knowledge about changes that are associated with the nature and conduct of future wars, defining the objectives, missions, and action plans, the overall composition of the armed forces of individual states, or coalitions of states³⁸, which are inextricably linked to global political developments³⁹. Closely related to the term forecasting is the term prediction. The two terms are often used interchangeably; however, foresight in Russian military thought is focused on the near future and is related to the art of war, operational and tactical. Foresight in the art of war depends on a clear understanding of the nature of the future war, a correct assessment of the opponent's combat capabilities and resources at his disposal⁴⁰. The art of war manifests itself in the commander's ability to choose from a variety of methods of action and find the most appropriate one for a given situation, as each conflict is governed by its own logic. In view of the above, it seems that the results of a confrontation depend on the intellect of the commander. However, the ratio of forces cannot be underestimated. In order to achieve victory over the intellect of the commander of the opposing side and defeat his armed forces, it is necessary to use new, unconventional methods of operation and control over the course of the battle⁴¹. As far as the material factor is concerned, at present, the RF achieves its strategic dominance through the use of modern technologies that increase the possibilities of influence in cyberspace, the use of hypersonic missiles, unmanned means, and robotization of the battlefield.

In addition to the importance of forecasting and prediction in achieving strategic dominance, equally important are new forms and methods of using the armed forces, an example of which can be the im-

38 V. Chuev, Yu.B. Mikhailov, *Forecasting in Military Affairs*, Moscow 1975, p. 17.

39 *Ibidem*, p. 18.

40 V.D. Ryabchuk, V.I. Nichipor, *On the Roles and Place of Forecasting and Anticipation in the System of Operational and General Work Planning*, "Military Thought" 2007, no. 10, pp. 61-67.

41 *Ibidem*.

plementation of the concept of conducting a new generation of war. They are selected in accordance with the scope or scale of the confrontation to be conducted and the capabilities of the possessed weapon systems, the purpose of the operation and the nature of the mission to be carried out⁴². Forms are external indications of the use of force determined by the goals and objectives, available space and time, possessed organizational structure of troops, and command systems⁴³. Methods, on the other hand, are understood as the aggregation of forms, modern techniques, and procedures used in a specific logical sequence to effectively solve a specific military problem⁴⁴. That is, forms appear to be the organizational side of the use of armed forces, while methods refer to the weapons and art of war used. Thus, method cannot be limited to the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of weapons as it relates to the art of their use. It seems that for the RF, in maintaining its strategic dominance, it is crucial to gain and maintain the initiative and to prevail over the will of the opponent, but it is still valid to follow the principles of the art of war⁴⁵.

In Russian military thought, the correlation of forces and means (force ratio), as mentioned earlier, is deeply rooted in planning at the strategic level. The pursuit of strategic dominance is based on the possession of a favorable ratio of forces, including quantitative and qualitative aspects as well as economic, socio-political, and spiritual factors⁴⁶.

It must be taken into account that the established correlation of forces determines the actual capabilities of the parties to influence each other at any given time with a given probability of success. In this process, the advantage is gained by the side that significantly exceeds the other in terms of combat power, taking into account the whole of the capabilities, or the most significant components of it. Having an advantage allows one to act more boldly and decisively, impose one's will on the opponent, and attack them more effectively, which conse-

42 N.V. Ogarkov, op. cit., p. 782.

43 T. Thomas, *Russia's Forms and Methods of Military Operations The Implementers of Concepts*, "Military Review", May-June 2018, p. 32, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Thomas-Russias-Forms-Methods.pdf> [16.04.2022].

44 N.V. Ogarkov, op. cit., p. 440.

45 *The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics*, Field Manual No. 100-2-1, Washington 1984, pp. 2-3.

46 *Ibidem*, p. 27.

quently speeds up the process of physically and psychologically defeating them⁴⁷. In addition, it fosters flexibility in the choice of forms and methods of conducting combat operations, and it expands the range of ratios between conventional and nuclear means. Conversely, an evident shortage of forces significantly limits the ability to repel an enemy strike. It should be made clear, however, that using only the concept of superiority is a gross oversimplification. Even a significant advantage is only an opportunity and does not guarantee success. Turning it into reality is a complex and contradictory process in which commanders play a decisive role⁴⁸.

The ratio of forces in the RF is defined as an objective indicator of the combat power of opposing sides, allowing them to determine the degree of superiority of one side over the other. Correct calculation and estimation of the forces of the stronger side help to make the right operational decisions so that it is possible to dominate the opponent at the appropriate place and time. In the RF, it is determined by comparing the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of all organizational units of the armed forces together with the equipment of its own and the enemy's troops. It is calculated on a strategic, operational, and tactical scale over the entire area of the confrontation conducted and/or on selected operational factors⁴⁹. Some Russian analysts add to this assessment the need to take into account the intellectual capabilities of commanders⁵⁰. Others, such as Machmut Garjeev, point to the need to conduct force ratio assessments for both direct and indirect operations⁵¹.

In conducting an armed struggle between two opposing sides, the fundamental problem remains the maintenance of military-technical dominance. Therefore, in addition to quantitative and qualitative indicators, when assessing the correlation of forces in the RF, other important factors that affect the achievement of superiority are taken into account; it is believed that quantitative-qualitative advantage

47 J.D. Douglass Jr., A.M. Hoerber, *Selected Readings From Military Thought 1963-1973*, "Studies of Communist Affairs" 1976, vol. 5, part II, p. 64.

48 Ibidem.

49 N.V. Ogarkov, op. cit., p. 691.

50 V.D. Ryabchuk, V.I. Nichipor, *On the Roles and Place of Forecasting and Anticipation in the System of Operational and General Work Planning*, "Military Thought" 2007, no. 10, p. 20.

51 Ibidem.

alone is not sufficient. It is thought that intangible factors such as morale or training should also be considered, but the commander's skills are always crucial. Second, nuclear weapons should be considered first when determining the correlation of forces. Besides, it should be remembered that their use can rapidly change the ratio of forces and the picture on the battlefield⁵². Using the resultant effects of conventional and nuclear forces may also be insufficient, as the consequences of using nuclear weapons are not really known. The correlation of forces is the key determinant in choosing the type of military action, i.e., offensive or defensive. A clear preponderance of forces creates the conditions for pushing offensive actions, while its absence usually makes it necessary to move to a more defensive action. The RF as mentioned earlier, prefers offensive actions, which in themselves can lead to a change in the correlation of forces, after all, it is the attacker who usually has the initiative in choosing the direction, time, and methods of executing strikes against the enemy, whether they have an advantage or not⁵³. In this case, surprise can play a special role in changing the correlation of forces, which in turn is closely related to maneuver and fire. Generally, it can be said that all the above-mentioned objective factors leading to an advantage are important, but the decisive factor is still the subjective one, which is the knowledge and skills of the commander.

Conclusions

As a result of the conducted research, it has been established that domination should be understood as a state of imbalance in the international arena expressed in the privileged position of a state, allowing it to control, influence, and/or force acceptance of a certain order and behavior from other states. The dominance of the RF in the international arena is based on the use of force, military superiority, religious traditions, and cultural identity. The RF seeks to achieve strategic dominance through the use of hard, soft, smart, and sharp power. The key factor determining the achievement of this goal is quantitative and

52 J.D. Douglass Jr., A.M. Hoeber, op. cit., p. 67.

53 Ibidem.

qualitative superiority expressed in force correlation coefficients, strategic foresight, and operational prediction as well as the use of modern forms and methods of using armed forces. The existing international disproportions relating to the strength of strategic rivals are balanced by the use of an adaptive strategy and blackmail escalation of conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, modern operational capabilities, and offensive asymmetric actions.

Research has confirmed that Moscow is constantly making efforts to achieve world domination by legitimizing its great power status. The strategy to achieve the goal of the multipolar world vision is based on the use of pressure and aggression as well as asymmetry in the use of a variety of instruments of influence. Russia's power to undermine the existing global order is growing steadily, and it is to be expected that it will use it to change the shaped system of international security. This is due not only to the relatively successful transformation of the armed forces but also to Russia's strong political will to achieve its strategic goal of global domination.

Based on the research, it is established that proxy actions, disinformation, and other means of hybrid non-military influence are not a substitute for hard international influence. New-generation warfare is conceptually anchored in the commitment of the entire state to achieve the goals of strategic competition, which combines the power of soft and hard influence, but without the military instrument, all other activities lose their meaning.

Research has confirmed that the armed forces are an essential component of state power, enabling both regional and global dominance. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee of the RF's strategic dominance in the world. On the other hand, the constantly lowered threshold of its use and the aggressive use of conventional armed forces lead to the degradation of the security environment and the violation of its stability. The RF's constant efforts to change the balance of power can, in a relatively short period of time, lead to the provocation of a regional or even global conflict.

References

- Antoniades A., *From 'Theories of Hegemony' to 'Hegemony Analysis' in International Relations*, Sussex 2008, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/2709786.pdf>.
- Banasik M., *Wojna hybrydowa w teorii i praktyce Federacji Rosyjskiej*, "Bellona" 2015, no. 4.
- Berzins J., *Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy*, Policy Paper 2, Center for Security and Strategic Research, Riga 2014.
- Brzezinski Z., *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostategic Imperatives*, New York 1998.
- Chuev V., Mikhailov Yu.B., *Forecasting in Military Affairs*, Moscow 1975.
- Clark M., *The Russian View of Future War: Unconventional, Diverse, and Rapid*, Institute for the Study of War, Washington 2020.
- Douglass J.D., Hoeber A.M., *Selected Readings From Military Thought 1963-1973*, "Studies of Communist Affairs" 1976, vol. 5, part II.
- Edmonds J., Bendett S., *Russian Battlefield Awareness and Information Dominance: Improved Capabilities and Future Challenges*, Strategy Bridge, 26 February 2019, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/2/26/russian-battlefield-awareness-and-information-dominance-improved-capabilities-and-future-challenges>.
- Fedyk N., *Russian "New Generation" Warfare: Theory, Practice, and Lessons for U.S. Strategists*, Small War Journals, 5 April 2017, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/russian-%E2%80%9Cnew-generation%E2%80%9D-warfare-theory-practice-and-lessons-for-us-strategists-o>.
- Joint Vision 2020*, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington 2000.
- Kofman M., Fink A., *Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts*, Washington 2021.
- Korybko A., *Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change*, Moscow 2015.
- LedyaeV., *Domination, Power and Authority in Russia: Basic Characteristics and Forms*, "Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics" 2008, no. 24(1), pp. 17-36, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233014878_Domination_Power_and_Authority_in_Russia_Basic_Characteristics_and_Forms/citations.
- Łoś R., *Siła współczesnych państw. Ujęcie teoretyczne*, "Przegląd Politologiczny" 2018, no. 2.
- Lynch III T.F., *Strategic Assessment 2020. Into a New Era of Great Power Competition*, Washington 2020.
- Majaski Ch., *Comparing a Dominant Strategy Solution vs. Nash Equilibrium Solution*, Investopedia, 13 June 2021, <https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/071515/what-difference-between-dominant-strategy-solution-and-nash-equilibrium-solution.asp>.

- Mazarr M.J., Blake J.S., *Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition. Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*, Santa Monica 2018.
- Minkina M., Kaszuba M., *Color Revolutions as a Threat to Security of the Russian Federation. An Analysis of Russian Perspective*, "Torun International Studies" 2021, vol. 1, no. 14.
- Nye Jr. J. S., *How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power. The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence*, Foreign Affairs, 24 January 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power>.
- Nye Jr. J.S., *The Paradox of America Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone*, New York 2002.
- Oliker O., *Russian Influence And Unconventional Warfare Operations In The "Gray Zone": Lessons From Ukraine*, Washington 2017.
- Panda A., *Chinese, Russian, South African Navies Conduct Trilateral Naval Exercises. The exercise was the first of its kind*, The Diplomat, 27 November 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/chinese-russian-south-african-navies-conduct-trilateral-naval-exercises/>.
- Polyakova A., Boulègue M., *The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare*, Washington 2021.
- Putin W., *Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club*, 22 October 2015, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548>.
- Radin A., Reach C., *Russian Views of the International Order*, Santa Monica 2017.
- Russell M., *Russia's armed forces. Defence capabilities and policy*, Brussels 2021.
- Ryabchuk V.D. Nichipor V.I., *On the Roles and Place of Forecasting and Anticipation in the System of Operational and General Work Planning*, "Military Thought" 2007, no. 10, pp. 61-67.
- Serzhantov A., Mazhuga S., *Wars of the future: what will they be like?*, "Independent Military Review" 2019, no. 35, https://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2019-09-27/3_1063_futurewars.html.
- Shashkov S., *The theory of 'manageable chaos' put into practice*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1 March 2011, <https://en.interaffairs.ru/article/the-theory-of-manageable-chaos-put-into-practice/>.
- Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, Fort Bragg 2010, <https://nsnbc.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/special-forces-uw-tc-18-01.pdf>.
- The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics*, Field Manual No. 100-2-1, Washington 1984.
- Thomas T., *Russia's Forms and Methods of Military Operations The Implementers of Concepts*, "Military Review", May-June 2018, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Thomas-Russias-Forms-Methods.pdf>.
- Thomas T.L., *Russian Forecasts of Future War*, "Military Review", May-June 2019, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MJ-19/Thomas-Russian-Forecast.pdf>.

- US-Russian spat over bombers landing in Venezuela*, BBC News, 11 December 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46522358>.
- Wall A.E., *Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities, and Covert Action*, "Harvard National Security Journal" 2011, vol. 3.
- Wallimann I., Tatsis N.C., Zito G.V., *On Max Weber's Definition of Power*, "Journal of Sociology" 1977, vol. 13, issue 3.
- Wrong D., *Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses*, New Brunswick and London 2002.