

Łukasz Jureńczyk\*

# Polish-American cooperation to support Ukraine after Russian aggression in 2022

Współpraca polsko-amerykańska na rzecz wsparcia Ukrainy po rosyjskiej agresji w 2022 roku

**Abstract:** The article analyses and evaluates Polish-American cooperation in support of Ukraine after Russia's full-scale aggression in 2022. It answers the question regarding the importance of Polish-American cooperation in supporting the Ukrainian state and society. It assumes that Polish-American cooperation plays a key role in the areas of military and non-military assistance for Ukraine and Ukrainians. Both countries are among the main donors of military equipment to Ukraine, which is delivered via the territory of Poland. In addition, they put great pressure on European countries to increase military support to Ukraine. Polish-American cooperation in non-military areas is also of great importance. Poland's aid for Ukrainian refugees is crucial, and the US is involved in its delivery and financing. The US, in turn, is of paramount importance in imposing sanctions on Russia to force it to stop its aggression and in providing economic assistance to Ukraine. Poland participates in the sanctions system and strives to make them as severe as possible. Another area of Polish-American cooperation is LNG trade, which allows Poland, and potentially also other CEE countries, including Ukraine, to secure natural gas supplies after abandoning imports from Russia. During the research, interviews with American scientists and experts were conducted, and the method of analysing the content of text sources was used.

**Keywords:** Polish-American cooperation, war in Ukraine, military aid, refugees, energy security

**Streszczenie:** Artykuł analizuje i ocenia polsko-amerykańską współpracę na rzecz wsparcia Ukrainy po rosyjskiej pełnoskalowej agresji w 2022 r. Odpowiada na pytanie dotyczące znaczenia współpracy polsko-amerykańskiej we wsparciu państwa i społeczeństwa ukraińskiego. Zakłada, że współpraca polsko-amerykańska odgrywa kluczową rolę w obszarach pomocy wojskowej i niewojskowej Ukrainie. Państwa są jednymi z głównych donatorów sprzętu militarnego

\* Łukasz Jureńczyk, PhD Habil., Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, Poland, ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1149-925X>, e-mail: [lukaszjurencyk@ukw.edu.pl](mailto:lukaszjurencyk@ukw.edu.pl)

na Ukrainę, który dostarczany jest przez terytorium Polski. Ponadto wywierają one dużą presję na państwa europejskie, aby zwiększały pomoc wojskową dla Ukrainy. Istotne znaczenie ma również współpraca polsko-amerykańska w obszarach pozawojskowych. Pomoc Polski dla ukraińskich uchodźców jest kluczowa, a w jej dostarczanie i finansowanie angażuje się USA. USA z kolei ma największe znaczenie w nakładaniu sankcji na Rosję, aby zmusić ją do zaprzestania agresji oraz w pomocy gospodarczej dla Ukrainy. Polska uczestniczy w systemie sankcji, jak również zabiega, aby były one możliwie najdotkliwsze. Innym obszarem współpracy polsko-amerykańskiej jest handel LNG, który pozwala Polsce, a potencjalnie również innym państwom Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, w tym Ukrainie, zabezpieczyć dostawy gazu ziemnego po odejściu od importu z Rosji. Podczas badań przeprowadzono wywiady z amerykańskimi naukowcami i ekspertami oraz skorzystano z metody analizy źródeł tekstowych.

**Słowa kluczowe:** współpraca polsko-amerykańska, wojna w Ukrainie, pomoc wojskowa, uchodźcy, bezpieczeństwo energetyczne

## Introduction

The United States is committed to keeping Europe “whole, free, and at peace”, and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine poses a grave threat to this vision<sup>1</sup>. For Poland, Russia’s neo-imperial policy, manifested by military operations in Ukraine, is the most serious threat<sup>2</sup>. In their messages, the heads of state of the United States and Poland strongly condemned the Russian aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022. President Joe Biden said that Russian aggression was “a brutal assault on the people of Ukraine without provocation, without justification, without necessity”<sup>3</sup>. President Andrzej Duda said that Ukrainians “not only defend their freedom but the freedom of us all. In this respect, they can count on full support from Poland”. In the same speech, he acknowledged the leadership role of the USA in the fight against the Russian threat: “Today, in a situation where security is under threat, we can see clearly how strong and important transatlantic ties are.

- 1 The White House, *National Security Strategy*, October 2022, p. 39, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf> [10.01.2023].
- 2 Prezydent RP, *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Warsaw 2020, p. 6, <https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/nowa-strategia-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego-rp-,1752> [10.01.2023].
- 3 The White House, *Remarks by President Biden on Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified attack on Ukraine*, 24 February 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/24/remarks-by-president-biden-on-russias-unprovoked-and-unjustified-attack-on-ukraine/> [12.01.2023].

The United States is, and should remain, a leader in world security”<sup>4</sup>. Poland and the United States stood up for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Representatives at the highest levels of both countries have repeatedly assured that they will never recognize the demands made of Ukraine and their implementation through a brutal war. For the USA, Poland is “a crucial strategic ally in Central Europe”, with which it cooperates on various forums to maintain security and stability in the region<sup>5</sup>. During the war in Ukraine, Polish-American cooperation to help Ukraine became particularly important.

The aim of the article is to analyse and evaluate Polish-American cooperation to support Ukraine after the Russian military aggression in 2022. The main research problem is the question of the significance of Polish-American cooperation in supporting Ukraine and Ukrainians. The thesis assumes that this cooperation, in both the military and non-military areas, is crucial. Poland plays a key role in the delivery of American and Western arms to Ukraine as a transit country. Given the difference in potential, Poland’s military aid to Ukraine is much smaller than that of the US, but despite this, Poland is one of the main donors of military aid. In addition, Poland plays a key role in helping Ukrainian refugees, who have taken refuge in Poland in the largest number. The United States supports Poland’s efforts to help refugees to some extent, but the main burden of assistance has been taken by the Polish state and society. Poland does not play a key role in the system of Western sanctions imposed on Russia under the leadership of the US. However, Poland’s pressure on the European forum to deepen sanctions against Russia is significant. An important role is also played by Polish-American cooperation for energy security, which allowed for mitigating the effects of Russian pressure on raw materials. Polish-American cooperation to help Ukraine encountered some problems, which mainly resulted from the lack of proper communication. Poland’s stepping out of line without consulting the US could, however, have been a deliberate move by the Polish authorities, who wanted to start an international debate in favour of increasing sup-

4 Prezydent RP, *Message from the President of the Republic of Poland*, 24 February 2022, <https://www.president.pl/news/message-from-the-president-of-the-republic-of-poland,49387> [12.01.2023].

5 U.S. Department of State, *U.S. security cooperation with Poland*, 31 October 2022, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-poland/> [12.01.2023].

port, mainly military, for Ukraine. As part of the research, interviews were conducted with scientists and experts from research centres in Washington D.C. and New York. The interviews were individual, non-standardized, and in-depth. The article also uses the method of analysing the content of text sources.

## **1. The policy of Poland and the USA to bring Ukraine closer to the West**

Already in the 1990s, Poland and the United States cooperated to support the Ukrainian armed forces and familiarize them with Western standards. First of all, the US supported the formation of the Polish-Ukrainian Peace Force Battalion (POLUKRBAT), among others by supplying Humvee military vehicles and communication equipment<sup>6</sup>. In turn, in the second decade of the 21st century, the Americans supported the creation of a larger tactical unit – the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG). Poland and Ukraine cooperated closely in US-led military operations in Kosovo and Iraq. Poland and the United States jointly supported Ukraine's efforts to become a member of NATO, which was symbolically manifested by forcing the state's inclusion of the Membership Action Plan during the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008<sup>7</sup>. Although this did not happen due to the resistance of Western European countries, NATO promised Ukraine that it would become a full member of the organization in the future<sup>8</sup>.

Poland and the United States supported the processes of the democratization of Ukraine. Among other things, they gave political support to pro-democracy and pro-Western uprisings in Ukraine – the Orange Revolution at the turn of 2004 and 2005 and the Euro-maidan Revolution at the turn of 2013 and 2014. These countries also criticized Russia's energy blackmail against Ukraine, supporting its efforts to diversify supplies of energy resources. This was done, among others, by pushing the project to build the Odessa-Brody-Płock oil

6 S. Pifer, *Interview given to the author*, Washington DC, 29 April 2022.

7 T. Haesebrouck, S. Taghon, H. Van Coppenolle, *The war in Ukraine*, Ghent 2022, p. 6.

8 NATO, *Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008*, 3 April 2008, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_8443.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm) [10.01.2023].

pipeline, or including Ukraine in regional energy and infrastructure projects, including those implemented as part of the Three Seas Initiative (TSI/3SI).

After the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the initiation of the war in the Donbass, Poland and the United States, together with other NATO allies, took action to support Ukraine's security sector. In 2015, the US and Poland along with the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Lithuania, and non-NATO member Sweden established the Multinational Joint Commission (MJC), which aims to reform and train the Ukrainian army and police. In turn, at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, the Allies adopted the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP). The goal of the CAP, in which the USA and Poland participate, is to support the transformation of Ukraine's security and defence sector through consulting and a range of capacity-building programs and initiatives<sup>9</sup>. In addition, Poland and the US opted for the supply of military equipment by NATO to Ukraine and gradually began to carry out these deliveries<sup>10</sup>. For example, from the end of 2017, the US began to deliver lethal weapons to Ukraine, including the FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile systems.

After Joe Biden took over the presidency in the US, there were signs that problems in Poland with respecting the principles of liberal democracy and the rule of law could limit Polish-American cooperation in the CEE region. However, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine led to the intensification of this cooperation. The key role played by Poland in helping refugees from Ukraine and the transfer of American arms to the Ukrainian army meant that contentious issues moved into the background<sup>11</sup>. As Kimberly Morgan notes, the strong US and Polish support for Ukraine plays an important role in the process of revitalizing NATO, which in recent years has seemed to be in disrepair. In the context of the war, there was a kind of renewal of allied commitments, which made NATO a vibrant organization once again<sup>12</sup>.

9 NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016*, 9 July 2016, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm) [10.01.2023].

10 F. Bryjka, *The importance of western arms supplies for Ukraine*, "PISM Spotlight" 2022, vol. 34, p. 1.

11 M. Doyle, *Interview given to the author*, New York, 27 April 2022.

12 K. Morgan, *Interview given to the author*, Washington DC, 5 May 2022.

## 2. Cooperation in the field of military support for Ukraine after the outbreak of war in 2022

After the outbreak of war in 2022, Poland became the main centre for the transfer of arms and military equipment from the West, mainly the USA, to Ukraine. The United States has set up a temporary military base in Rzeszów in the Subcarpathian Voivodeship, near the Ukrainian border. The Rzeszów-Jasionka airfield has become the main point of entry for military supplies for Ukraine. From there, armaments and military equipment are sent by land to Ukraine, but the details of this logistics operation are shrouded in military secrecy. A repair centre has also been organized near Rzeszów, as some military vehicles and equipment require repairs before being sent to the front. As Stephen Biddle states, it is particularly important for the USA that Poland dared to meet the need and lent its territory to send military equipment to Ukraine. That is perceived by most Americans as a heroic acceptance of risk on behalf of the defence of nonaggression norms and democracy<sup>13</sup>.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion, the amount of military support for Ukraine from both the United States and Poland skyrocketed. Between February and the end of 2022 alone, the USA allocated approximately USD 24.3 billion in security assistance for training and equipment. Equipment delivered included various missile systems, including the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), anti-tank systems, unmanned aerial systems, armoured vehicles, light vehicles, vessels, artillery systems, howitzers and mortars, helicopters, grenade launchers, small arms, sets of body armour and helmets, protective and medical equipment, radars and other electronic devices of various types, and huge amounts of artillery rounds, ammunition, and explosives. The US authorities also gave permission for NATO Allies and partners to transfer US-made military equipment to Ukraine<sup>14</sup>. In turn, Poland donated, among others, Krab howitzers, T-72 and PT-91 tanks, Piorun anti-aircraft systems, BWP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, BM-21 Grad rocket launchers, RGP-40 grenade launchers, FlyEye

<sup>13</sup> S. Biddle, *Interview given to the author*, New York, 5 May 2022.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Department of State, *U.S. security cooperation with Ukraine*, 18 January 2023, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/> [18.01.2023].

reconnaissance drones, Grot rifles, and large stocks of ammunition. For the first six months of the war, Poland was the second largest donor of military equipment to Ukraine after the USA and before Great Britain, allocating more than USD 1.6 billion for this purpose<sup>15</sup>. In the following months, this support slowed down due to the depletion of its own stocks and by the end of the year, it barely exceeded USD 1.8 billion<sup>16</sup>. American authorities greatly appreciate Poland's efforts in delivering military equipment to Ukraine as well as the effectiveness of the delivered weapons, especially modern Krab howitzers.

Immediately after the outbreak of war, President Volodymyr Zelensky called on NATO to establish a "no-fly zone" over Ukraine, which was supported by the Polish authorities. However, the United States rejected this possibility, fearing that it would lead to a direct military clash between NATO and Russia<sup>17</sup>. In early March 2022, the Polish government proposed to hand over 28 MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine free of charge. The delivery by Poland and other former Warsaw Pact states of Soviet-era aircraft such as the MiG-29 and Sukhoi SU-25 to Ukraine would be a serious reinforcement of the Ukrainian air force<sup>18</sup>. In return, Poland was to receive multi-role F-16 aircraft from the USA. However, Poland demanded that the transfer be made via the U.S. base in Ramstein, Germany. The public announcement of this demand put the American authorities in an uncomfortable position. John Kirby, the U.S. Defense Department spokesperson, rejected this possibility, questioning the rationality of this action and the associated risk for the US and NATO: "The prospect of fighter jets "at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America" departing from a U.S./ NATO base in Germany to fly into airspace that is contested with Russia over Ukraine raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance. It is simply not clear to us that there is a substantive rationale

15 M. Szopa, *Polish weapons defending Ukraine*, Defence.24, 24 May 2022, <https://defence24.com/industry/polish-weapons-defending-ukraine-analysis> [15.01.2023].

16 D. Brown, J. Horton, T. Ahmedzade, *Ukraine weapons: What tanks and other equipment are the world giving?*, BBC, 17 January 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62002218>.

17 J. Choonara, *The devastation of Ukraine: NATO, Russia and imperialism*, "International Socialism" 2022, vol. 2, no. 174, p. 21.

18 R.D. Hooker Jr., *Ukraine can win*, Atlantic Council, 20 July 2022, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-can-win/> [15.01.2023].



for it”<sup>19</sup>. The Biden administration believed at the time that it would be too provocative towards Russia, causing an escalation of the conflict, and preferred not to “poke the Russian bear”<sup>20</sup>. There were also arguments undermining the potential effectiveness of the MiG-29 in Ukraine and distrust of the Americans towards the information provided by Ukraine regarding their air resources<sup>21</sup>.

Poland has provided Ukraine with about 250 tanks from the T-72 family, including some modernized tanks of the PT-91 Twardy version. In return, Poland signed a contract with the US for the purchase of 116 used, older versions of M1 Abrams tanks. However, the versions of the tanks and the amount of the contract have not been made public. In mid-2022, information also appeared in the public space that Poland was to send 232 PT-91 tanks to Ukraine, i.e., all it had, and fill this gap with the purchase or receipt of another 300 used Abrams tanks from the US. So far, this has not happened, and only in January 2023 did Poland declare the transfer of another 30 PT-91 tanks to Ukraine. Before the war, Poland signed a contract for the purchase of 250 M1A2 Abrams in the new SEPv3 variant and in July 2022 it signed a contract for the purchase of 180 Korean K2 tanks as well as production in Poland of another 820 tanks in the K2PL version. Representatives of the American administration have repeatedly emphasized and appreciated the fact that Poland is the leader in the supply of armoured vehicles to Ukraine. At the beginning of 2023, the USA decided to deliver the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine. Soon after, it was decided to send 31 M1 Abrams tanks to encourage Germany to send Leopard 2A tanks, which was strongly encouraged by Poland declaring to send 14 of its own Leopard tanks.

In early March, the US transferred two batteries of Patriot surface-to-air missile systems to Poland, which are to secure the supply of equipment to Ukraine via Poland. In mid-November 2022, a bal-

19 U.S. Department of Defense, *Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby on Security Assistance to Ukraine*, 8 March 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2960180/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-on-security-assistance-to-uk/> [12.01.2023].

20 A. Mackinnon, J. Detsch, *Ukraine wants NATO Jets. Biden says not yet*, “Foreign Policy”, 9 March 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/09/ukraine-nato-jets-russia-biden/> [15.01.2023].

21 J. Yaffa, *Inside the U.S. effort to arm Ukraine*, “The New Yorker”, 17 October 2022, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/10/24/inside-the-us-effort-to-arm-ukraine> [15.01.2023].



listic missile launched by the Ukrainian army to shoot down a Russian missile fell in the village of Przewodów in the Lublin Voivodeship. After this, the Germans proposed to transfer three Patriot batteries to Poland. The Polish authorities took advantage of this situation to start an international debate on the need to transfer Patriot systems to Ukraine. In December 2022, the United States finally decided to transfer one Patriot battery to Ukraine, even though the Kremlin considered it a provocation. This was another step in helping Ukraine because the Patriot is the most advanced system handed over to Ukraine.

Military support for the Ukrainian army has been accompanied by the strengthening of the American military contingent in Poland. In the first months of 2022, an additional 4,700 American soldiers were sent to Poland, joining the approximately 5,000 soldiers previously stationed in the country. The stationing of American soldiers in Poland and other countries on NATO's eastern flank is intended to discourage Russia from transferring military operations in Ukraine to the territory of the Alliance countries. They are backed up by tanks, air defence, and intelligence and surveillance units. The forces are combat-ready, but mainly act as a trip wire, triggering reinforcements in the event of a Russian assault<sup>22</sup>. In addition, American soldiers stationed in Poland are involved in the training of Ukrainian soldiers, in which Poland plays a leading role. US soldiers teach Ukrainian soldiers how to use the delivered armaments and military equipment, which, according to the US administration, takes the form of "liaising with Ukrainian forces, not of training in the classic sense".

Because of the war in Ukraine, the issue of the permanent stationing of American troops in Poland has returned to the public space. At the NATO summit in Madrid in June 2022, President Biden announced that the permanent HQ of the US Army's V Corps would be established in Poland. Therefore, hopes have also increased in Poland for the permanent transfer of larger tactical units. According to James Goldgeier, after the brutal attack on Ukraine in 2022, the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 is dead, so the US may be more willing to move elements of the permanent infrastructure of NATO to

22 T. Big-Alabo, E.C. MacAlex-Achinulo, *Russia-Ukraine crisis and regional security*, "International Journal of Political Science" 2022, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 30-31.

Poland<sup>23</sup>. However, President Vladimir Putin has a paranoid approach to US military cooperation with CEE countries, including Poland. He believes, for example, that U.S. ballistic missile defence platforms in Poland and Romania are intended for firing on Russia<sup>24</sup>. As part of the disinformation campaign, Russia has been trying to undermine both the importance of Polish-American cooperation around Ukraine and the credibility of American security guarantees for Poland. The strengthening of Polish-American military cooperation is facilitated by Poland's purchases of military equipment and armaments from the USA. In the period leading up to and during the war, Poland signed further multi-billion dollar contracts with the US, including the purchase of Abrams tanks, Aegis systems, Patriot systems, F-35 aircraft, Apache attack helicopters, HIMARS, and Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)<sup>25</sup>.

### 3. Cooperation and support for Ukraine in non-military areas

An important issue is helping refugees from Ukraine, most of whom went to Poland. By mid-January 2023, over 9 million people from Ukraine had entered Poland, and almost 6.9 million had returned to the country<sup>26</sup>. According to the Polish Economic Institute, the estimated value of the total annual expenditure of public authorities to help Ukrainian refugees is PLN 15.9 billion. This assistance includes expenses for accommodation, food, access to benefits, social assistance and public services. On the other hand, the estimated value of Poles' private spending on helping refugees only during the first three months of the war amounted to about PLN 9-10 billion<sup>27</sup>. According to Julie George, Poland has definitely become a leader in protecting Ukrain-

23 J. Goldgeier, *Interview given to the author*, Washington DC, 16 May 2022.

24 J. Yaffa, op. cit.

25 M. Rudy, *Ambasador USA o relacjach amerykańsko-polskich: to wyjątkowy i szczególny czas*, PAP, 5 June 2022, <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1233782%2Cambasador-usa-o-relacjach-amerykansko-polskich-wyjatkowy-i-szczegolny-czas> [15.01.2023].

26 UNHCR, *Ukraine refugee situation*, 17 January 2023, [https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#\\_ga=2.29159420.1164648425.1654871881-2130049685.1651174834](https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.29159420.1164648425.1654871881-2130049685.1651174834) [12.01.2023].

27 Ł. Baszczak et al., *Pomoc polskiego społeczeństwa dla uchodźców z Ukrainy*, Warsaw 2022, pp. 16, 19.

ian refugees and establishing centres for them. The Polish response was swift, immediate, and supportive<sup>28</sup>. Sharon Wolchik believes that from the American perspective, Poland plays an extremely important role as a state providing help to refugees from Ukraine as well as being a transit point for aid to Ukraine, not only military but also humanitarian<sup>29</sup>. By the end of 2022, the USA had already provided more than USD 1.9 billion in humanitarian assistance to people affected by the war in Ukraine, located both in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries. A significant part of this amount went to Poland. U.S.-funded humanitarian organizations cooperate with the Polish authorities to provide assistance to Ukrainians residing on its territory, including food, shelter, medical supplies, psychological assistance, legal assistance, etc.<sup>30</sup> Importantly, the US allocated USD 12.6 billion in direct budget support to the Government of Ukraine to help maintain critical government services, including for the public<sup>31</sup>. Without this huge support, the scale of emigration to Poland could be even greater. In addition, the United States has opened its borders to 100,000 Ukrainian citizens<sup>32</sup>. Polish-American institutions, foundations, and associations joined in helping Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees residing in Poland. This applies both to those in Poland such as the Polish-American Freedom Foundation, the American Chamber of Commerce in Poland, the Polish-American Foundation for Aid to Ukraine, and in the USA, including the Polish-American Congress, the Polish-American Association, and the Kosciuszko Foundation. These entities have been implementing a number of aid and development programmes.

The United States, due to its economic potential and leadership role in the West, has become the main promoter of sanctions against Russia. In mid-April 2022, the U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken,

28 J. George, *Interview given to the author*, New York, 23 May 2022.

29 S.L. Wolchik, *Interview given to the author*, Washington DC, 18 May 2022.

30 The White House, *FACT SHEET: The Biden administration announces new humanitarian, development, and democracy assistance to Ukraine and the surrounding region*, 24 March 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/24/fact-sheet-the-biden-administration-announces-new-humanitarian-development-and-democracy-assistance-to-ukraine-and-the-surrounding-region/> [15.01.2023].

31 USAID, *USAID announces additional \$125 million in urgent energy support for Ukraine*, 18 January 2023, <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jan-18-2023-usaid-announces-additional-125-million-urgent-energy-support-ukraine> [15.01.2023].

32 The White House, *FACT SHEET...*

outlined the main purpose of the sanctions, saying “to ratchet up pressure on Putin’s crumbling economy together will help weaken the Russian Government’s position and further isolate them from the world until Russia ends its unprovoked and unjustified war on Ukraine”<sup>33</sup>. The statement of US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin during his visit to Poland was maintained in a similar vein: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine”<sup>34</sup>. The sanctions covered both representatives of the Russian regime, Russian oligarchs, as well as individual sectors of the Russian economy. It was particularly important to cut Russia off from the international financial system, modern technologies, and the possibility of selling energy resources to the West. As part of the individual packages of sanctions imposed on Russia by the European Union, Poland opted each time for the most far-reaching restrictions<sup>35</sup>.

In the context of Polish-American cooperation, the diversification of natural gas supplies is also important. Poland was able to significantly reduce the pressure from Russia in the form of cutting off gas supplies from Gazprom on 27 April 2022, made possible thanks to energy investments implemented over previous years, including the LNG terminal in Świnoujście and the Baltic Pipe natural gas pipeline<sup>36</sup>. These investments were carried out with the strong support of the US government and the common resistance against the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline<sup>37</sup>. In mid-May 2022, Polish Oil Mining and Gas Extraction (PGNiG) signed a contract for the import of 3 million metric tons of LNG per year from the United States, which is to satisfy

33 K. Atwood, J. Hansler, *Austin says the US wants to see Russia’s military capabilities weakened*, CNN, 25 April 2022, <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/25/politics/blinken-austin-kyiv-ukraine-zelensky-meeting/index.html> [15.01.2023].

34 M. Ryan, A. Timsit, *U.S. wants Russian military ‘weakened’ from Ukraine invasion, Austin says*, “The Washington Post”, 25 April 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/> [15.01.2023].

35 I. Trusewicz, *Nowe sankcje UE wobec Rosji. Polska i Litwa chcą więcej*, “Rzeczpospolita”, 17 January 2023, <https://www.rp.pl/gospodarka/art37795751-nowe-sankcje-ue-wobec-rosji-polska-i-litwa-chca-wiecej> [15.01.2023].

36 B. Schmitt, *European Energy Security Post-Russia*, CEPA, 7 June 2022, <https://cepa.org/european-energy-security-post-russia/> [15.01.2023].

37 *Joint Declaration between the United States Department of Energy and the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Poland concerning Enhanced Cooperation on Energy Security*, GOV.PL, 8 November 2018, <https://www.gov.pl/web/aktywa-panstwowe/wzmocnienie-polsko-amerykanskiej-wspolpracy-w-zakresie-bezpieczenstwa-energetycznego> [12.01.2023].

20% of Poland's annual demand for natural gas. Ukraine also needs to replace natural gas from Russia with supplies from other directions. Poland may be an increasingly important transit country for LNG to Ukraine, as Ukraine does not have its own installation that could receive LNG from tankers<sup>38</sup>. The cooperation between PGNiG and Energy Resources of Ukraine (ERU) has so far enabled two deliveries of American LNG, which, after unloading at the terminal in Świnoujście and re-gasification, was sent to Ukraine via the interconnector.

## Conclusions

Polish-American cooperation is crucial in the context of both military and non-military support for Ukraine. The United States is incomparably the largest donor of arms and military equipment to Ukraine, which is supplied through Poland. In the first months of the conflict, Poland was the second-largest donor of armaments. It replenishes its depleted stocks by purchasing American armaments systems, both of the older generation and the most modern ones. The United States and Poland are strongly pushing European countries to increase military aid to Ukraine. Poland started an international debate on the delivery of aircraft, modern tanks, and Patriot systems to Ukraine by NATO, and the creation of a "no-fly zone", which sometimes put the American administration in an uncomfortable position. The goal, however, was to increase military aid to Ukraine, and Poland's attitude contributed to this. Besides, almost 5,000 American soldiers were sent to Poland to increase the security of NATO's eastern flank, but also to secure supplies of military equipment to Ukraine and support the training of Ukrainian soldiers in the use of this equipment.

The help provided by Poland and Poles for Ukrainian refugees, in which the United States is involved, is also of great importance. The US also plays a key role in imposing sanctions on Russia, which are intended to prevent it from continuing its military operations in the long term. Of particular importance is Russia being cut off from modern technologies and international financial markets as well as stop-

38 G. Geletukha et al., *Analysis of actions for Ukraine to replace Russian natural gas*, "Ecological Engineering & Environmental Technology" 2022, vol. 23, no. 4, p. 5.

ping the purchase of Russian energy resources. The Polish economy is too small to play a crucial role in the sanctions system, but Poland's pressure on European partners to tighten these sanctions is significant. In addition, Polish-American energy cooperation may play an increasingly important role in the context of the war. The LNG terminal in Świnoujście along with interconnectors may enable the supply of LNG, including American LNG, to Ukraine and other countries in the region cut off from supplies from Russia.

## References

1. Atwood K., Hansler J., *Austin says the US wants to see Russia's military capabilities weakened*, CNN, 25 April 2022, <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/25/politics/blinken-austin-kyiv-ukraine-zelensky-meeting/index.html>.
2. Baszczak Ł. et al., *Pomoc polskiego społeczeństwa dla uchodźców z Ukrainy*, Warsaw 2022.
3. Biddle S., *Interview given to the author*, New York, 5 May 2022.
4. Big-Alabo T., MacAlex-Achinulo E.C., *Russia-Ukraine crisis and regional security*, "International Journal of Political Science" 2022, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 21-35.
5. Brown D., Horton J., Ahmedzade T., *Ukraine weapons: What tanks and other equipment are the world giving?*, BBC, 17 January 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62002218>.
6. Bryjka F., *The importance of western arms supplies for Ukraine*, "PISM Spotlight" 2022, vol. 34, pp. 1-2.
7. Choonara J., *The devastation of Ukraine: NATO, Russia and imperialism*, "International Socialism" 2022, vol. 2, no. 174, pp. 3-30.
8. Doyle M., *Interview given to the author*, New York, 27 April 2022.
9. Geletukha G. et al., *Analysis of actions for Ukraine to replace Russian natural gas*, "Ecological Engineering & Environmental Technology" 2022, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 1-9.
10. George J., *Interview given to the author*, New York, 23 May 2022.
11. Goldgeier J., *Interview given to the author*, Washington DC, 16 May 2022.
12. Haesebrouck T., Taghon S., Van Coppenolle H., *The war in Ukraine*, Ghent 2022.
13. Hooker Jr R.D., *Ukraine can win*, "Atlantic Council", 20 July 2022, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-can-win/>.
14. *Joint Declaration between the United States Department of Energy and the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Poland concerning Enhanced Cooperation on Energy Security*, GOV.PL, 8 November 2018, <https://www.gov.pl/web/aktywa-panstwowe/wzmocnienie-polsko-amerykanskiej-wspolpracy-w-zakresie-bezpieczenstwa-energetycznego>.
15. Mackinnon A., Detsch J., *Ukraine wants NATO Jets. Biden says not yet*, "Foreign Policy", 9 March 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/09/ukraine-nato-jets-russia-biden/>.
16. Morgan K., *Interview given to the author*, Washington DC, 5 May 2022.
17. NATO, *Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest*

- on 3 April 2008, 3 April 2008, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_8443.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm).
18. NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016*, 9 July 2016, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm).
  19. Pifer S., *Interview given to the author*, Washington DC, 29 April 2022.
  20. Prezydent RP, *Message from the President of the Republic of Poland*, 24 February 2022, <https://www.prezydent.pl/news/message-from-the-president-of-the-republic-of-poland,49387>.
  21. Prezydent RP, *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Warsaw 2020, <https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/nowa-strategia-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego-rp-,1752>.
  22. Rudy M., *Ambasador USA o relacjach amerykańsko-polskich: to wyjątkowy i szczególny czas*, PAP, 5 June 2022, <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1233782%2CAmbasador-usa-o-relacjach-amerykansko-polskich-wyjatkowy-i-szczegolny-czas>.
  23. Ryan M., Timsit A., *U.S. wants Russian military 'weakened' from Ukraine invasion, Austin says*, "The Washington Post", 25 April 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/>.
  24. Schmitt B., *European Energy Security Post-Russia*, CEPA, 7 June 2022, <https://cepa.org/european-energy-security-post-russia/>.
  25. Szopa M., *Polish weapons defending Ukraine*, Defence24, 24 May 2022, <https://defence24.com/industry/polish-weapons-defending-ukraine-analysis>.
  26. The White House, *FACT SHEET: The Biden Administration Announces New Humanitarian, Development, and Democracy Assistance to Ukraine and the Surrounding Region*, 24 March 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/24/fact-sheet-the-biden-administration-announces-new-humanitarian-development-and-democracy-assistance-to-ukraine-and-the-surrounding-region/>.
  27. The White House, *National Security Strategy*, October 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>.
  28. The White House, *Remarks by President Biden on Russia's unprovoked and unjustified attack on Ukraine*, 24 February 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/24/remarks-by-president-biden-on-russias-unprovoked-and-unjustified-attack-on-ukraine/>.
  29. Trusewicz I., *Nowe sankcje UE wobec Rosji. Polska i Litwa chcą więcej*, "Rzeczpospolita", 17 January 2023, <https://www.rp.pl/gospodarka/art37795751-nowe-sankcje-ue-wobec-rosji-polska-i-litwa-chca-wiecej>.
  30. UNHCR, *Ukraine refugee situation*, 17 January 2023, [https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#\\_ga=2.29159420.1164648425.1654871881-2130049685.1651174834](https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.29159420.1164648425.1654871881-2130049685.1651174834).
  31. USAID, *USAID announces additional \$125 million in urgent energy support for Ukraine*, 18 January 2023, <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jan-18-2023-usaid-announces-additional-125-million-urgent-energy-support-ukraine>.
  32. U.S. Department of Defense, *Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby on Security Assistance to Ukraine*, 8 March 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2960180/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-on-security-assistance-to-uk/>.



33. U.S. Department of State, *U.S. security cooperation with Poland*, 31 October 2022, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-poland/>.
34. U.S. Department of State, *U.S. security cooperation with Ukraine*, 18 January 2023, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/>.
35. Wolchik S.L., *Interview given to the author*, Washington DC, 18 May 2022.
36. Yaffa J., *Inside the U.S. effort to arm Ukraine*, "The New Yorker", 17 October 2022, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/10/24/inside-the-us-effort-to-arm-ukraine>.