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Strategic consequences of the United States' energy abundance. A case study of the U.S. – Poland Strategic Energy Partnership

**Strategiczne konsekwencje rewolucji łąpkowej w USA.
Rozwój partnerstwa energetycznego Stanów Zjednoczonych i Polski**

Abstract: The goal of the article is to answer the question of why the United States and Poland developed a strategic partnership in the gas sector in 2017–2020.

This analysis is based on a systematic review of primary and secondary sources. The primary empirical materials consist of three groups: 1) documents published by the US administration and the Polish government; 2) speeches, official statements, and media interviews by politicians, officials, and business people from both countries; and 3) information published by companies engaged in gas relations between the United States and Poland. The secondary sources include statistical data and analyses from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the International Energy Agency (IEA), and the *Statistical Review* published by the Energy Institute.

The article sets out four arguments: 1) The development of the strategic partnership between the two countries in the energy sector was made possible by the shale revolution in the United States. 2) The United States pursued strategic and economic goals in promoting LNG exports to Europe. 3) The United States and Poland accepted the view that the world was reverting to great power competition. 4) Both states rejected Russian energy dominance in Europe.

Keywords: United States, Poland, geoeconomics, shale gas, energy security, LNG

Streszczenie: Celem artykułu jest odpowiedź na pytanie, dlaczego Stany Zjednoczone i Polska rozwinęły strategiczne partnerstwo energetyczne w sektorze gazu w latach 2017–2020.

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Artykuł bazuje na analizie źródeł pierwotnych i wtórnych. Źródła pierwotne obejmują: 1) dokumenty publikowane przez administrację Stanów Zjednoczonych i rząd Polski; 2) przemówienia, oświadczenia i wywiady medialne polityków, urzędników i przedsiębiorców z obu krajów oraz 3) informacje publikowane przez firmy zajmujące się relacjami gazowymi między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Polską. Źródła wtórne obejmują dane statystyczne i analizy Agencji Informacji Energetycznej (EIA), Międzynarodowej Agencji Energii (IEA) oraz *Przeglądu Statystycznego* publikowanego przez Energy Institute.

Artykuł wskazuje, że partnerstwo energetyczne pomiędzy Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Polską jest konsekwencją czterech czynników. Po pierwsze, rewolucja energetyczna w USA dała amerykańskiej administracji materialne możliwości konkurencji o rynki z tradycyjnymi dostawcami gazu. Po drugie, administracja USA wykorzystuje eksport LNG zarówno dla celów gospodarczych jak i strategicznych. Po trzecie, rządy USA i Polski podzielały pogląd, że świat ponownie wraca w erę rywalizacji mocarstw, a dostawy energii będą w tej rywalizacji odgrywać istotną rolę. Po czwarte, oba kraje odrzucały wizję Rosji jako państwa dominującego w dostawach gazu na rynek Europy.

Słowa kluczowe: Stany Zjednoczone, Polska, geoeconomia, gaz łupkowy, bezpieczeństwo energetyczne, LNG

Introduction

In the early 21st century, two factors emerged that have had a significant impact on the foreign policy of the United States. The first was the shale revolution and the second was the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia.

At the turn of the first and second decades of the 21st century, the US gas market moved from shortage to abundance. In 2009, the United States became the biggest natural gas producer in the world and over time the country has also become a significant exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and oil and petroleum products. As a consequence, a significant amount of attention has been paid to the strategic consequences of the shale revolution¹.

At the same time, the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia have continued, calling the primacy of the US into question and creating a shift away from unipolarity towards multipolarity. The world has returned to an era of great power competition².

Since the early years of the 21st century, Russia has based its foreign policy strategy on the geostrategic use of natural gas to enhance

- 1 V. Balafas, E.T. Fakiolas, *From Energy Security to Energy Dominance: US' Blending of Politics and Economics*, "Strategic Analysis" 2020, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 91–105.
- 2 G.J. Ikenberry, *Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order*, "International Affairs" 2024, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 121–138.

its position in Europe³. At the same time, new export capabilities in the gas sector gave the United States an instrument it could use to compete geoeconomically against Russia by improving the energy security of its European allies. This made Russia the main victim of the US shale bonanza⁴.

The goal of the article is to answer the question of why the United States and Poland developed a strategic partnership in the gas sector in 2017–2020.

The article sets out four arguments: 1) The development of the strategic partnership between the two countries in the energy sector was made possible by the shale revolution in the United States. 2) The United States pursued strategic and economic goals in promoting LNG exports to Europe. 3) The United States and Poland accepted the view that the world was reverting to great power competition. 4) Both states rejected Russian energy dominance in Europe.

This analysis is based on a systematic review of primary and secondary sources. The primary empirical materials consist of three groups of information: 1) documents published by the administrations of the United States and the governments of Poland; 2) speeches, official statements, and media interviews by politicians, officials, and business people from both countries; and 3) information published by companies engaged in gas relations between the United States and Poland. The secondary sources include statistical data and analyses from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the International Energy Agency (IEA), and the *Statistical Review* published by the Energy Institute.

This article contributes to the literature on the strategic consequences of the US shale revolution and on the consequences of the use of economic means for strategic purposes.

It consists of four parts. In the first part, I briefly outline “the age of geoeconomics”⁵. Then, I discuss the role of energy resources

3 A. Vihma, M. Wigell, *Unclear and present danger: Russia's geoeconomics and the Nord Stream II pipeline*, “Global Affairs” 2016, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 377–388.

4 Z. Selden, *Taming the bear: American liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports and the negation of Russian influence in Europe*, “Global Affairs” 2020, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 149–165.

5 J.C. Hsiung, *The age of geoeconomics, China's global role, and prospects of cross-strait integration*, “Journal of Chinese Political Science” 2009, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 113–133.

in the geoeconomic strategy of the United States. In the third part, I discuss challenges to the energy security of Poland. Finally, I elaborate on the creation of the US-Poland Strategic Energy Partnership

1. The age of geoeconomics

The end of the Cold War brought about a reassessment of the importance of different instruments of power, with a revaluation of economic instruments and a devaluation of military ones. In his influential essay from 1990, Edward Luttwak suggested that “methods of commerce” are “displacing military methods”. He proposed the term geoeconomics to capture this “admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce”⁶.

According to this view, states increasingly rely more on economic means of exercising power, and less on military means, exploiting asymmetries in economic relations strategically. The world has entered “the age of geoeconomics”. Economic instruments are increasingly used to promote and defend national interests and to attain beneficial geopolitical results⁷. The list of those instruments is long and diverse, but certainly, control over supplies of energy and other commodities places near the top. In the early 21st century, Russia mastered this strategy using the dependence of several countries on Russian gas supplies to achieve political and economic concessions⁸.

Of course, states take various measures to minimise the impact of other states using geoeconomic instruments against them. For example, importers of energy resources diversify their sources of energy supply, develop alternative energy sources, and improve their energy efficiency.

Importantly, by applying geoeconomic strategies, states do not strive for total confrontation with an opponent state. The goal is to weaken an opponent’s internal cohesion by underlining or creating differences between the interests of different groups, in the hope of building

6 E.N. Luttwak, *From Geopolitics to Geo-economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce*, “National Interest” 1990, no. 20, pp. 17–23.

7 R.D. Blackwill, J.M. Harris, *War by other means: geoeconomics and statecraft*, Cambridge 2016, p. 20.

8 M. Wigell, A. Vihma, *Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics: The Case of Russia’s Geostrategy and Its Effects on the EU*, “International Affairs” 2016, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 605–627.

a coalition that furthers the state's interests. Bringing about an internal division within the target state should also hinder that state from building an effective international coalition to protect its own interests. Using geoeconomic strategy, a state tries to drive a political wedge into the target country, and/or between that country and its allies⁹.

2. The role of energy resources in the geoeconomic strategy of the United States

Regarding the United States' formulation and application of a geoeconomic strategy, there are widely divergent views. As Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris stated in 2016, the United States has failed to use its geoeconomic potential to produce beneficial geopolitical results¹⁰. Others argue that the United States has a well-developed geoeconomic strategy¹¹. The shale revolution has provided the US with an opportunity to include energy resources as an instrument of its geoeconomics strategy that it can use to revive that strategy and support US allies that are dependent on external energy supplies¹².

In 2017, the United States became a net exporter of natural gas. According to Statistical Review of World Energy from 2010 to 2022, domestic natural gas production increased from 575.2 bcm/annum to 978.6 bcm/annum, peaking in 2022. Between 2015 and 2022, the United States became a leading LNG exporter; in 2022 it ranked in third place behind Qatar (114.1 bcm/annum) and Australia (112.3 bcm/annum). In 2015, the United States exported 0.7 bcm, in 2016 4.0 bcm, in 2017 17.1 bcm, in 2018 28.6 bcm, in 2019 47.4 bcm, in 2020 61.4 bcm, in 2021 94.7 bcm, and in 2022 104.3 bcm¹³.

At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the Obama administration admitted to the importance of economic instruments in US foreign policy. In 2011, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton said she had put "economic statecraft at the heart of (...)

9 M. Wigell, *Hybrid interference as a wedge strategy: a theory of external interference in liberal democracy*, "International Affairs" 2019, vol. 95, no. 2, pp. 255–275.

10 R.D. Blackwill, J.M. Harris, *War by other means...*, pp. 152–178.

11 C.F. Bergsten, *We Are All Geoeconomists Now*, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-04-06/we-are-all-geoeconomists-now> [14.05.2024].

12 M.L. O'Sullivan, *Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and Strengthens America's Power*, New York 2017.

13 Energy Institute, *Statistical Review of World Energy*, 2023.

the foreign policy agenda”¹⁴. Over time, the use of energy resources for geopolitical purposes came to be debated among members of the administration. But it was during the term of President Donald Trump that this newly found US energy wealth was put at the centre of US foreign policy strategy.

During the Bloomberg Future of Energy Global Summit in 2017, U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry argued “that energy policy is (...) a vital element of U.S. foreign policy” and added: “We have all seen energy used as a political tool to hold countries hostage. And that is an act of economic aggression that needs to be confronted. Our response cannot be lofty words, but a set of clear deeds”¹⁵.

Speaking at the Unleashing American Energy event on 29 June 2017, President Donald Trump declared that the world was entering an era of USA “energy dominance”. He argued: “We’re going to be an exporter. (...) We will be dominant. We will export American energy all over the world, (...). These energy exports will (...) provide true energy security to our friends, partners, and allies all across the globe”¹⁶. Rick Perry believed that by exporting energy the United States would be able to free its allies from being energy dependent on unfriendly nations. Members of the Trump administration connected the rise of US gas exports with freedom. Terms like “freedom gas” or “molecules of US freedom” began to be used to describe US LNG exports¹⁷.

The concept of American energy dominance found its final form in the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States, which assigned economic tools an important role in US foreign policy strategy and indicated that they “can be important parts of broader strategies

14 H.R. Clinton, *Economic Statecraft*, Economic Club of New York. U.S. Department of State, 14 October 2011, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175552.htm> [14.05.2024].

15 As quoted [in:] R. Perry, *We will become a dominant energy force, using our research, development, and delivery capabilities. Statement by Rick Perry, U.S. Secretary of Energy, on LNG Shipments to the Netherlands & Poland*, Department of Energy, 9 June 2017, <https://www.energy.gov/articles/statement-rick-perry-us-secretary-energy-lng-shipments-netherlands-poland> [14.05.2024].

16 Trump White House Archive, *Remarks by President Trump at the Unleashing American Energy Event*, 29 June 2017, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-unleashing-american-energy-event/> [14.05.2024].

17 U.S. Department of Energy, *Department of Energy Authorizes Additional LNG Exports from Freeport LNG*, 29 May 2019, <https://www.energy.gov/articles/department-energy-authorizes-additional-lng-exports-freeport-lng#:~:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20D.C.%20%E2%80%93%20Today%2C%20the%20U.S.%20Department%20of,Freeport%20LNG%20Terminal%20located%20on%20Quintana%20Island%2C%20Texas> [14.05.2024].

to deter, coerce, and constrain adversaries”¹⁸. Further, it was declared that “the United States will help our allies and partners become more resilient against those that use energy to coerce”¹⁹.

President Trump made no secret of the fact that one of his priorities was to reduce the dependence of America’s European allies on Russian gas supplies. US opposition to the Russian gas pipeline projects Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream was rooted in America’s objection to energy being used to coerce other nations. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline was seen by the US administration as a potential instrument of Russian leverage over Europe, while the German government’s support for Nord Stream 2 and its complete lack of interest in potential US LNG supplies was criticised in Washington, culminating in the famous words of President Trump, who in July 2018 described Germany as a “captive of Russia”²⁰.

3. Challenges to the energy security of Poland

The situation was completely different in Poland. For the three decades since the end of the Cold War, every one of Poland’s published energy policy strategies prioritised the country’s energy security and diversification of energy supplies, however, very little improvement was seen. Polish dependence on Russia for its supply of natural gas proved to be one of the long-term consequences of having been part of the Soviet Block, as it was for other CEE countries. Since 2016, though, as US production has grown, Poland has been eager to sign long-term contracts for LNG and wean itself off Russian gas.

At the beginning of the 2020s, Poland was still dependent on gas supplies from Russia; moreover, its gas consumption continues to grow. From 1985 to 2015, the share of natural gas in total final consumption increased in Poland from 8% to 16%. Due to insufficient local production and underdeveloped import infrastructure, in 2015 Russia sup-

18 Trump White House Archive, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, p. 34, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf> [14.05.2024].

19 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

20 J. Mason, *Trump lashes Germany over gas pipeline deal, calls it Russia’s “captive”*, Reuters, 11 July 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-pipeline-idUSKBN1K1oVI> [14.05.2024].

plied 55% of all natural gas consumed in Poland and 72% of Polish gas imports. In 2021 it still bought most of its gas from Russia on the basis of the long-term Yamal contract with Russia, which was signed initially in 1996.

Poland's dependence on Russian gas supplies was seen as a threat to national security. In the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2020, Russia was defined as a "neo-imperial" country keen to use its position on the gas markets of CEE countries as an "instrument of political pressure" In the same document, the "strategic partnership" with the United States was praised, and one of its pillars described cooperation in the energy sector²¹.

In 2006, the Polish government took the decision to invest in an LNG terminal that would enable it to gain access to the rising global LNG market. It was built in northwest Poland, in the city of Świnoujście, and has an annual import capacity of 5 bcm. In the second phase, capacity was planned to grow to 8.3 bcm/ annum by the end of 2023²². This target will probably be achieved in 2024. The first delivery of LNG was made in December 2015, and since June 2016, the terminal has been taking in commercial deliveries. Poland is also considering additional investments in an FSRU (floating storage regasification unit) after 2025. The decision to build the terminal was strategically and economically motivated. Gazprom acts as a discriminating monopolist, demanding higher prices when it has a stronger market position and lower prices in more competitive markets. Russia was not a cheap supplier for Poland, and diversification actually offered a chance to reduce the import bill. As observed in 2018 by the Vice-President of the Management Board for Trade at PGNiG (Polish Oil and Gas Company), Maciej Woźniak: "The delivery terms from the supplier from the East do not correspond to market conditions. The Russian gas price is not market-oriented, it is sold to us too expensively. Until there is a complete alternative, it will be like that"²³.

21 BBN, *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 2020, pp. 6–10, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Republic_of_Poland_2020.pdf [14.05.2024].

22 Ministry of Climate and Environment, *Energy Policy of Poland until 2040*, 2021, p. 37, <https://www.gov.pl/web/climate/energy-policy-of-poland-until-2040-epp2040> [14.05.2024].

23 As quoted [in:] PAP, *Naimski: Najpóźniej w 2022r. spoza Rosji – 17 mld m sześć. gazu rocznie*, 26 September 2018, <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1374189%2Cnaimski-najpозniej-w-2022r-spoza-rosji--17-mld-m-szesc-gazu-rocznie.html> [14.05.2024].

The investment in the LNG terminal enabled Poland to access the LNG market. In 2008, PGNiG and Qatargas signed the first long-term contract for the supply of LNG to Poland from Qatar, and in 2017 another contract was signed, giving Poland access to significant amounts of non-Russian gas for the first time and access to the LNG market. The contracts with Qatargas stipulate a supply of 2 million tonnes/ annum (2.7 bcm/ annum after regasification) between 1 January 2018 and June 2034. They marked an important step in improving the gas security of Poland, but further measures were needed²⁴.

4 • The US-Poland Strategic Energy Partnership

The interests of the United States and of Poland in the gas sector mesh perfectly. Between 2017 and 2020, an intensive diplomatic exchange between the two countries took place on developing cooperation in the gas sector.

During his visit to Poland in July 2017, President Donald Trump expressed support for Poland's struggles to improve its energy security and offered the cooperation of the United States. In his public speech at Krasiński Square, he expressed the US' commitment to securing Polish access to alternative (non-Russian) sources of energy, "so Poland and its neighbours are never again held hostage to a single supplier of energy"²⁵. During the visit, Trump assured the government of Poland that the United States would not allow other states to use energy to coerce Poland and that the United States was committed to transforming the gas market into one that was open, fair, and competitive²⁶. During meetings between Trump and the Polish President Andrzej Duda in the years 2018–2020, and in those between US Vice President Mike Pence and President Duda, energy security was high on the agenda. The US president and vice-president reassured their Polish partners about the determination of the United States to strengthen

24 Ministry of Climate and Environment, *Energy Policy of Poland...*, p. 36.

25 Trump White House Archive, *Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland*, 6 July 2017, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-people-poland/> [14.05.2024].

26 M. Farber, *Read Donald Trump's Remarks at the Three Seas Initiative Summit in Poland*, Time, 6 July 2017, <https://time.com/4846780/read-donald-trump-speech-warsaw-poland-transcript/> [14.05.2024].

the energy security of the US allies in Europe. As expressed in a joint statement issued by the presidents of the United States and Poland in 2020, the two countries share the same view: “Energy security is national security”²⁷. The convergent interests of the US and Poland have led to the signing of a series of agreements on energy cooperation.

Simultaneously, intensive relations began at the corporate level between Polish and American gas companies. The first supply of LNG from the United States to Europe took place in April 2016 and to Poland on 8 June 2017. Poland was the first CEE country to import American LNG. The supplier was Cheniere Energy²⁸.

In November 2017, a five-year contract was signed between PGNiG and Centrica LNG for the supply of LNG sourced from the Sabine Pass LNG Terminal. It was the first medium-term contract for the supply of LNG from the United States to a CEE country. This contract obligated Centrica to deliver 9 shipments of gas to the LNG terminal in Świnoujście during the period 2018–2022²⁹.

In 2018, PGNiG became the first company from the CEE region to sign a long-term contract for LNG from the United States. Between 2018 and 2021, it signed a series of such contracts. PGNiG has built up an LNG portfolio of over 12 bcm/annum after regasification, of which 9.3 bcm/ annum is contracted from the United States³⁰.

27 Trump White House Archive, *Joint Statement by President Donald J. Trump and President Andrzej Duda*, 24 June 2020, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-president-andrzej-duda/> [14.05.2024].

28 PGNiG, *Historic delivery of gas to Poland. PGNiG receives American LNG*, 8 June 2017, <https://en.pgnig.pl/news/-/news-list/id/historic-delivery-of-gas-to-poland-pgnig-receives-american-lng/newsGroupId/1910852?changeYear=2017¤tPage=2> [14.05.2024].

29 PGNiG, *PGNiG signed a 5-year contract for LNG with Centrica*, 21 November 2017, <https://en.pgnig.pl/news/-/news-list/id/pgnig-signed-a-5-year-contract-for-lng-with-centrica/newsGroupId/1910852?changeYear=2017¤tPage=1> [14.05.2024].

30 PGNiG, *PGNiG signed a strategic agreement with Qatargas*, 14 March 2017, <https://en.pgnig.pl/news/-/news-list/id/pgnig-signed-a-strategic-agreement-with-qatargas/newsGroupId/1910852> [14.05.2024]; PGNiG, *24-year contract with Cheniere signed – deliveries of American LNG to Poland will commence in 2019*, 8 November 2018, <https://en.pgnig.pl/news/-/news-list/id/pgnig-24-year-contract-with-cheniere-signed-deliveries-of-american-lng-to-poland-will-commence-in-2019/newsGroupId/1910852?changeYear=2018¤tPage=2> [14.05.2024]; PGNiG, *PGNiG will purchase more natural gas from Venture Global LNG*, 2 September 2021, <https://en.pgnig.pl/news/-/news-list/id/pgnig-will-purchase-more-natural-gas-from-venture-global-lng/newsGroupId/1910852?changeYear=2021¤tPage=2> [14.05.2024].

When commenting on the signing of these contracts, politicians and businesspeople from Poland and the United States all emphasised both their strategic and economic importance.

US politicians spoke about a strengthening of the ties between the United States and Poland, an enhancement of Poland's energy security, and a reduction of Russia's ability to use gas as an instrument of political coercion. Rick Perry indicated that the partnership between the US and Poland is "fortified by a shared commitment to energy security and an understanding that true energy security is achieved through energy diversity"³¹. Further, the economic benefits of these contracts for the United States were underlined numerous times. President Trump argued: "A tremendous amount of LNG will be exported to Poland. We're giving them a pretty good price, but they're buying a lot of it, and that's going to be great"³².

Representatives of Poland also pointed to the strategic and economic aspects of the deals. They underlined on numerous occasions that buying LNG from the United States gives Poland access to gas that is not controlled by Russia, involves diverse pricing methods that are not related to the price of oil and is achieved at a price significantly lower than the price of Russian gas. According to PGNiG Vice-President for Trade Maciej Woźniak and to Secretary of State Piotr Naimski, the price of US LNG for Poland (including liquefaction, transportation to the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, and regasification) is over 20% lower than that of Russian gas under the Yamal contract. The authorities of PGNiG have also commented numerous times on the difference between negotiating with Russian partners and Western partners, the difference being that negotiations with Gazprom are political in nature, whereas negotiations with Western companies are economic in nature³³.

31 Ibid.

32 Trump White House Archive, *Remarks by President Trump and President Duda of the Republic of Poland in Joint Press Conference*, 18 September 2018, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-duda-republic-poland-joint-press-conference/> [14.05.2024].

33 G. Balawender, *Woźniak: Amerykańskie LNG jest 20 proc. tańsze od rosyjskiego gazu*, Rzeczpospolita, 24 June 2019, <https://energia.rp.pl/surowce-i-paliwa/art17008081-wozniak-amerykanskie-lng-jest-20-proc-tansze-od-rosyjskiego-gazu> [14.05.2024]; Reuters Staff, *LNG contracted by Poland's PGNiG 20–30% cheaper than Russian gas -minister*, Reuters, 6 September 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/poland-gas-russia-idINL5N25X1LG> [14.05.2024]; M. Woźniak, *Nic nie wskazuje na*

Due to progress made in finding alternatives to supplies from Gazprom, the Polish government and PGNiG decided not to extend the long-term contract with Gazprom beyond 31 December 2022³⁴. Russia's decision to stop deliveries to Poland in April 2022 only hastened the end of gas cooperation between the two countries. The development of LNG import capacity and the resulting increases in LNG imports from 2016 and 2020 contributed to a reduction in the share of natural gas coming to Poland from the East of almost 90% in 2016, down to 60.8% in 2020. LNG imports of 3.76 bcm covered more than one-quarter of Poland's gas imports in 2020³⁵, and in 2021 that figure increased to 3.94 bcm³⁶. In 2022, Poland imported 4.4 million tonnes, which already represents 1/3 of Polish demand for natural gas. In 2023, imports increased to 4.66 million tonnes of LNG³⁷. The share of the United States in LNG imports to Poland is expected to grow in the coming years. Also, from the US perspective, we can expect Poland's importance for US LNG exports to grow, as well. From February 2016 through January 2022, Poland ranked 17th as a destination for US LNG exports, with a share of only 1.4% of total US LNG exports³⁸.

Conclusions

The shale revolution allowed the United States to further develop its geoeconomic strategy by extending it with energy exports. Its main victim was Russia. The use of LNG exports to weaken the USA's allies'

to, abyśmy mieli kontynuować kontrakt jamalski, Biznes Alert, 19 March 2019, <http://biznesalert.pl/kontrakt-jamalski-pgnig/> [14.05.2024].

- 34 PGNiG, *Declaration of will to terminate Yamal Contract effective December 31, 2022*, 15 November 2019, <http://en.pgnig.pl/news/-/news-list/id/declaration-of-will-to-terminate-yamal-contract-effective-december-31-2022/newsGroupId/1910852?changeYear=2019¤tPage=1> [14.05.2024].
- 35 PGNiG, *LNG imports by PGNiG on the rise*, 4 February 2021, <https://en.pgnig.pl/news/-/news-list/id/lng-imports-by-pgnig-on-the-rise/newsGroupId/1910852?changeYear=2021¤tPage=6> [14.05.2024].
- 36 PGNiG, *150th delivery of liquefied natural gas for PGNiG*, 18 January 2022, <https://en.pgnig.pl/news/-/news-list/id/150th-delivery-of-liquefied-natural-gas-for-pgnig/newsGroupId/1910852?changeYear=2022¤tPage=1> [14.05.2024].
- 37 PGNiG, *Kolejny rekordowy rok pod względem importu LNG do Polski*, 3 January 2024, <https://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/kolejny-rekordowy-rok-pod-wzglem-importu-lng-do-polski/newsGroupId/10184?changeYear=2024¤tPage=2> [14.05.2024].
- 38 U.S. Department of Energy, *LNG Monthly*, March 2022, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/LNG%20Monthly%20January%202022_2.pdf [14.05.2024].

dependence on Russian gas supplies became one of the pillars of the US geoeconomic strategy. Poland, which, like the United States, saw Russia as a strategic threat, had been enthusiastic about cooperating with the United States in its quest to free itself from dependence on Russian gas. It was determined to use the opportunity offered by the US shale revolution to reduce that dependence. The strategy of developing a strategic energy partnership with the United States was rooted in the desire to do away with the last remaining mechanism of dependence on Russia, which Poland inherited from its Cold War dependence on the Soviet Union. An intense diplomatic exchange between the two countries provided an impulse for companies to develop partnerships. Between 2017 and 2021, a series of long-term contracts were signed that guaranteed Poland a significant share of its future gas consumption from the United States. Those supplies will be one of the pillars of Poland's future gas supply. They also guarantee US companies an export market and guarantee the United States a strategic advantage in competing against Russia in Europe.

The strategic energy partnership between the United States and Poland shows how the energy partnership between Europe and the United States could work; it also contributes to the discussion about the strategic consequences of the US energy abundance for its ally, Poland. At the same time, the development of a strategic energy partnership with Poland brings strategic and economic advantages to the United States.

The development of the energy partnership between the United States and Poland demonstrates the limited usefulness of energy supplies as an instrument of foreign policy. Russia's behaviour in this regard only encouraged its neighbours to look for alternative suppliers, and the United States to direct part of its booming LNG production towards Europe. Manipulating the gas supply for strategic purposes has proved to be self-defeating for Russia, for it has led to two events that Russia would have preferred to avoid. Firstly, the strengthening of the alliance between Poland and the United States, and secondly, the loss of Poland as a market for its gas.

Finally, in the face of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that began in February 2022, Poland's development of a strategic energy partnership with the United States as well as other investments in diversifying its sources of natural gas has proved to be prudent.

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