K. Struve, *The Cold War origins of the Russian "Nazi" accusation against Ukraine: Soviet propaganda, Western memory, and historical knowledge*,
„Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe" 23 (2025), issue 4, pp. 149–169,
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.4.6

*Kai Struve**

The Cold War origins of the Russian "Nazi" accusation against Ukraine: Soviet propaganda, Western memory, and historical knowledge

Zimnowojenna geneza rosyjskiego oskarżenia Ukrainy o „nazizm". Sowiecka propaganda, zachodnia pamięć i wiedza historyczna

ABSTRACT:
This article analyses the origins of a central element of Russia's justification for its war against Ukraine, i.e., the claim that Ukraine is governed by a "Nazi regime", by tracing it back to the Soviet-era construction of "Ukrainian nationalism" as an enemy image. It further examines why similar narratives have resonated with Western audiences in recent years. The article argues that the roots of these perceptions also lie in the Cold War era. For this period, it outlines the main contexts in which public debates about Ukrainian nationalism during World War II occurred and compares public perceptions with the state of historical research in the latter half of the twentieth century. Overall, the article argues that Ukrainian memory of the period of World War II can only be properly understood when the threat posed by Soviet and Russian imperial ambitions is also taken into account.

KEYWORDS:
Soviet propaganda, Cold War, Ukrainian nationalism, historical studies, memory, Russian disinformation

* Kai Struve – Ludwig-Maximilian University in Munich, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4017-1985, e-mail: kai.struve@lmu.de.

STRESZCZENIE:
Artykuł śledzi genezę centralnego elementu rosyjskiego uzasadnienia wojny przeciwko Ukrainie – tezy o „nazistowskim reżimie" – wyprowadzając ją z sowieckiej konstrukcji „ukraińskiego nacjonalizmu" jako wizerunku wroga. Wyjaśnia, dlaczego pokrewne narracje w ostatnich latach zyskały rezonans na Zachodzie. W perspektywie historycznej rekonstruuje główne konteksty debat publicznych o ukraińskim nacjonalizmie w czasie II wojny światowej i zestawia społeczne wyobrażenia ze stanem badań w drugiej połowie XX w. Konkluduje, że pamięć Ukrainy o II wojnie światowej można adekwatnie zrozumieć tylko z uwzględnieniem zagrożenia wynikającego z sowieckich i rosyjskich ambicji imperialnych.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE:
sowiecka propaganda, zimna wojna, nacjonalizm ukraiński, badania historyczne, pamięć, rosyjska dezinformacja

1. Introduction

When Vladimir Putin justified the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by asserting that a "Nazi regime" was in power in Ukraine and declaring "denazification" as a central objective of the war, he was drawing upon the Soviet-era enemy image of Ukrainian nationalism. This enemy image had two central components: first, it portrayed Ukrainian nationalists as brutal executioners of fascist Germany during the German occupation in World War II; second, it emphasised that Ukrainian nationalists supported Nazi Germany because they shared its fascist ideology. In fact, this had little to do with actual events during World War II. Instead, Soviet publications crafted a narrative intended to discredit the Ukrainian struggle for independence and to justify its brutal repression, particularly in western Ukraine after 1944[1].

Moreover, the Soviet narrative presented not only a highly distorted and manipulative image of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" during World War II, but one of its core notions was that they were a largely immoral, corrupt, and alien element in Ukrainian and Soviet society who came from

[1] K. Struve, *Das sowjetische Feindbild des ukrainischen Nationalismus und Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine*, [in:] J. Kähler et al. (eds.), *Der Krieg gegen die Ukraine: Berichte, Positionen, Perspektiven*, Erlangen 2026 (forthcoming); T. Erlacher, *Denationalizing Treachery: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Late Soviet Discourse, 1945–1985*, "Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia 2013, no. 2, pp. 289–316.

outside in service of the enemies of the Soviet Union and had no real support in the country. After the war, they continued their hostile activities in the service of their new masters in the West, primarily the United States. Putin's views of Ukraine in the years before the full-scale invasion and of the role of the US and EU, as outlined in his essay *On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians* and in his speeches in February 2022, repeated similar motifs[2]. This also indicates that Putin might refer to the "Nazi regime" and the "banderovtsy" – a colloquial term for the followers of Stepan Bandera, the symbolic, controversial figure of wartime Ukrainian nationalism – not only for propagandistic reasons but that also the Soviet concept of "Ukrainian nationalism" continued to influence his and the Russian leadership's perceptions of Ukraine and, thereby, also their decisions. The view of weak support for an independent Ukrainian state in Ukrainian society, and of Ukraine as a kind of failed state, may have contributed to the initial expectation that a quick victory would be possible[3]. But also, the widespread acceptance of such notions in Russian society cannot be explained only by propaganda and manipulations in Putin's Russia in recent years; rather, they have been widespread already since Soviet times, and their current influence also rests on notions from the previous century[4].

However, false or very one-sided ideas about Ukrainian nationalists, which are similar to the Soviet and Russian enemy image in various respects, are also widespread among the Western public. This did not only become apparent in 2022, but even more clearly during and after the Euromaidan in 2013–2014. The Russian accusation at the time that there had been a "fascist

---

2 V. Putin, *On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians*, 12 July 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 [5.11.2025]; *Address by the President of the Russian Federation*, 21 February 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828 [5.11.2025]; *Address by the President of the Russian Federation*, 24 February 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 [5.11.2025].

3 I. Zhegulëv, *Kak Putin voznenavidel Ukrainu*, Vërstka, 25 April 2023, https://verstka.media/kak-putin-pridumal-voynu [5.11.2025].

4 For the impact of this narrative in Russia after the full-scale invasion in February 2022, see J. McGlynn, *Russia's War*, Cambridge 2023, pp. 154–158; on Russian presentations of Ukrainian nationalism as fascism in the years before the full-scale invasion in Russia, J. McGlynn, *Memory Makers: The Politics of the Past in Putin's Russia*, London 2022, pp. 51–79. See also the contributions in A. Shekhovtsov (ed.), *Russia against Ukraine. Russian Political Mythology and the War on Ukrainian Identity*, Vienna 2025. On Russian historical politics under Putin, with many references to Ukraine, also A. Weiss-Wendt, *Putin's Russia and the Falsification of History: Reasserting Control over the Past*, London 2021.

coup" in Ukraine had a considerable resonance in Western public opinion, because it was consistent with with images and ideas about Ukraine and Ukrainian nationalism during World War II that were present in Western societies. These ideas also have a history in the twentieth century, especially during the Cold War[5]. The influence of such ideas has declined in Germany and other countries in recent years in view of their obvious misuse by Russia. However, they still exist.

In the following, the Soviet enemy image of "Ukrainian nationalism" will be briefly outlined, and its central components will be compared to the current state of historical research. A further section will then describe the contexts in which ideas about Ukrainian nationalism spread among the Western public in the second half of the 20th century, before concluding with a short discussion of memory and historiography on these topics in the period since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

For the West, I will primarily refer to the United States and Canada as the most important centres of the Ukrainian diaspora, and (West) Germany. The very specific Polish case with regard to views about Ukrainian nationalism during World War II will only be included in this brief outline to the extent that it will be analysed for what knowledge existed during the Cold War about the "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA, *Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia*) and massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Galicia in 1943–1944.

2. The Soviet enemy image of "Ukrainian nationalism"

The Soviet enemy image of "Ukrainian nationalism" had its origins in the revolutionary period after World War I, when the Ukrainian People's Republic and its troops under Symon Petliura opposed the Red Army in the years 1918–1920. By the late 1920s, attacks on "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" intensified in the context of Stalin's seizure of power, forced industrialisation, collectivisation of agriculture, and the Holodomor. The term "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism", which emerged during this period, was

[5] K. Tkachenko, *Rechte Tür Links. Radikale Linke in Deutschland, die Revolution und der Krieg in der Ukraine*, Stuttgart 2023; T. Kuzio, *Disinformation. Soviet Origins of Contemporary Russian Ukrainophobia*, [in:] O. Bertelsen (ed.), *Russian Active Measures: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*, Stuttgart 2021, pp. 137–175.

used to label all currents of the Ukrainian national movement deemed anti-Soviet. At the time, there was no clear distinction between this concept and the Soviet concept of fascism, which encompassed virtually all political movements and parties outside the Comintern and unsupportive of the Soviet Union[6]. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" remained the central concept in Soviet publications on Ukrainian nationalism. Only during the 1940s was it replaced by the term "Ukrainian-German fascists".

After World War II, Soviet portrayals of Ukrainian nationalism centred on its alleged support for the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 and collaboration during the occupation. The Ukrainian nationalists were depicted not only as traitorous supporters of the German attack but also as brutal enforcers in German service, responsible for numerous crimes against the Ukrainian and Soviet people. This image was particularly emphasised in western Ukraine during the second half of the 1940s, where it served to legitimise the Soviet fight against the armed resistance of UPA against the renewed Soviet occupation of these territories in 1944[7]. Compared to the prewar period, the accusations against the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" now carried much more weight, as they were linked to the German invasion and the crimes of the German occupation regime.

A new phase in Soviet propaganda began around 1960, during the post-Stalin "thaw". Many former UPA members and supporters who had been imprisoned in the Gulag returned to Ukraine, prompting Soviet authorities from the late 1950s onwards to fear a resurgence of nationalist activity. This concern led to renewed investigations and trials, particularly targeting members of the local police during the German occupation. Many of these proceedings had the character of show trials and received extensive public

[6] S. Yekelchyk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory. Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination*, Toronto 2004, pp. 15–16; J.M. Faraldo, *An Antifascist Political Identity? On the Cult of Antifascism in the Soviet Union and post-Socialist Russia*, [in:] H. Garcia et al. (ed.), *Rethinking Antifascism. History, Memory and Politics, 1922 to the Present*, New York 2016, pp. 202–227. See with various quotes on this also T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*, Ithaca 2001, pp. 211–308.

[7] G. Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult*, Stuttgart 2014, pp. 363–388.

coverage, often highlighting links to Ukrainian nationalism. Cases in which the accused were residing in the West were given particular prominence[8].

The beginning of the 1960s heralded a new phase in Soviet propaganda activities against Ukrainian nationalism for yet another reason. From this time onwards, the Soviet Union intensified its activities against the various Soviet diaspora groups, including Ukrainians, in Western countries. Numerous Soviet publications on Ukrainian nationalism were now aimed at discrediting anti-Soviet activists and organisations within the Ukrainian diaspora and in the eyes of the Western publics, especially in the United States and Canada[9].

The number of Soviet publications on "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" since the 1960s was substantial. Bibliographies compiled in Soviet Ukraine list hundreds of books and articles[10]. In the following, central elements of Soviet accounts of Ukrainian nationalism after World War II will be sketched and confronted with the current state of historical research[11].

Soviet publications obscured or misrepresented the rupture between Stepan Bandera's Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN, *Orhanizatsiia ukraïnskykh natsionalistiv*) and Nazi Germany in the summer and

8 I. Sklokina, *Trials of Nazi Collaborators in the Context of Soviet Propaganda: Nationality Policy and the Cold War (1960–1980s)*, [in:] P. Black (ed.), *Collaboration in Eastern Europe during the Second World War and the Holocaust*, Vienna 2019, pp. 67–86; A.V. Prusin, *The 'Second Wave' of Soviet Justice: The 1960s War Crimes Trials*, [in:] N.J.W. Goda (ed.), *Rethinking Holocaust Justice. Essays Across Disciplines*, New York 2018, pp. 129–157.

9 On the Ukrainian diaspora in North America; V. Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, London 2002.

10 Cf. the bibliography by M.A. Bal'o et al., *Reaktsiina sut' ideolohiï i polityky ukraïns'koho burzhuaznoho natsionalizmu. Bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk*, Lviv 1976, which lists 719 Ukrainian- and Russian-language publications for the period from 1945 to 1975, and M.A. Bal'o et al., *Reaktsiina sut' ideolohiï i polityky ukraïns'koho burzhuaznoho natsionalizmu. Pokazhchyk literatury za 1976–1985 rr.*, Lviv 1987. This bibliography contains 1059 titles. However, not all of the titles listed here are actually relevant, as titles from the history of the labour movement, editions of Lenin's and Leonid Brezhnev's works, and also some newspaper articles have been included. Approximately two-thirds of the titles concern those groups and activists who in the Soviet Union were labelled as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists". In addition, English-language books and brochures were printed in the Soviet Union and distributed abroad, though in much smaller numbers. They are not included in these bibliographies.

11 The following outline is based on a review of a selection of major Soviet publications since the 1960s, including K. Dmytruk, *Bezbatchenky*, Lviv 1972; R. Symonenko, *Na utrymanni reaktsiï (Ukraïns'kyi burzhuaznyi natsionalizm – voroh miru i suspil'noho prohresu)*, Kyiv 1977; V. Cherednichenko, *Collaborationists*, Kyiv 1975; V. Styrkul, *We accuse: Documentary sketch*, Kyiv 1984, and others.

autumn of 1941, following Bandera's arrest in early July 1941. They also concealed the armed conflict between UPA and the German armed forces in 1943–1944, instead emphasising some contacts that persisted into or were renewed in 1944.

The Soviet narrative conflated the local Ukrainian police units and administrations to a large extent with Ukrainian nationalism and also with the OUN. In fact, the Ukrainian militias, which had emerged in almost all places during the initial phase of the German occupation in western Ukraine, had been largely controlled by Stepan Bandera's OUN. Bandera and Andrii Mel'nyk's OUN also had a considerable influence on the local police in many places in the Ukrainian territories further east. However, this gradually changed from August 1941, when the German Security Police disbanded the militias and replaced them with the "Ukrainian Auxiliary Police" in District "Galizien" and "Schutzmannschaften" in the "Reichskommissariat Ukraine", which were then subordinated to the German Order Police. The aim was also to eliminate the influence of the OUN. Nonetheless, many OUN members remained covertly in these units, since the OUN tried to maintain influence in the police[12].

The Soviet narrative portrayed the Ukrainian nationalists as willing accomplices of the Germans and emphasised a shared fascist ideology as the primary motive for collaboration. In contrast, historical research shows that the central motive was the pursuit of Ukrainian statehood, despite some ideological proximity between the OUN and fascist movements[13].

---

[12] See J.P. Himka, *Ukrainian Nationalists and the Holocaust: OUN and UPA's Participation in the Destruction of the Ukrainian Jewry, 1941-1944*, Stuttgart 2021, pp. 339–357; Yu. Radchenko, *Dopomizhna politsiia, mistseva administratsiia, SD ta Shoa na ukraïns'ko-rosiis'ko--bilorus'komy pohranychchi (1941–1943)*, Kyiv 2024. For a concise overview of the various Ukrainian police units and their role in the Holocaust D. Pohl, *Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden*, [in:] G. Paul (ed.), *Die Täter der Shoah. Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?*, Göttingen 2002, pp. 205–234.

[13] The extent to which the ideology of the OUN can be described as fascist remains a controversial question. While Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, for example, emphasises the fascist character of the Bandera-OUN and its proximity to National Socialism, Oleksandr Zaitsev tends to highlight the differences, G. Rossoliński-Liebe, *Der europäische Faschismus und der ukrainische Nationalismus. Verflechtungen, Annäherungen und Wechselbeziehungen*, "Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft" 2017, vol. 65, pp. 153–169; idem, *Stepan Bandera…*; O. Zaitsev, *Fascism or ustashism? Ukrainian integral nationalism in comparative perspective, 1920s–1930s*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies" 2015, vol. 48, no. 2–3, pp. 183–193; see also the contributions to this discussion in A. Umland, Y. Yurchuk (eds.), *Special Section: A Debate on Ustashisms, Generic Fascism, and the OUN*, "Journal

Soviet accounts named Soviet citizens and Ukrainians as victims of violence and murder, while crimes against Poles and Jews remained in the background or the identity of the victims was completely concealed. In reality, Poles and Jews were the principal victims of OUN and UPA crimes during the period of German occupation. They committed these crimes mostly independently and, as in the case of the massacres of Poles, even in close connection with the armed conflict with the Germans. In Volhynia and Galicia, probably 60,000–80,000 Poles fell victim to massacres in 1943–1944, most of them in Volhynia in 1943. In addition, several thousand Jews were probably killed by militias formed by Stepan Bandera's OUN in summer 1941 and UPA in 1943–1944[14].

3. Controversies about Ukrainian nationalism in World War II in the West during the Cold War

Between 1945 and the late 1980s, Ukrainian nationalism during World War II attracted attention in Western public discourse primarily in three distinct contexts.

The first context was debates in the late 1940s and early 1950s that emerged over the immigration of Eastern European "Displaced Persons" (DPs) from the Western zones of occupation in Germany and Austria to the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Critics – particularly left-wing, pro-Soviet groups, including such groups within the Ukrainian diaspora – drew upon Soviet portrayals of DPs as criminal collaborators with Nazi Germany. Jewish organisations and individuals also voiced concerns,

of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Societies" 2021, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 111–214; ibid. 2021, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 137–184; ibid. 2023, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 1–28.

[14] For comprehensive information on the acts of violence against Jews, see J.P. Himka, *Ukrainian Nationalists…*; on the mass murders of Poles and the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, see G. Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstańczej Armii*, Warsaw 2015; I. Patryliak, *„Vstan' i borys'! Slukhai i vir…". Ukraïns'ke natsionalistychne pidpillia ta povstans'kyi rukh 1939–1960 rr.*, Lviv 2012; G. Motyka, *From the Volhynian Massacre to Operation Vistula: The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict 1943–1947*, Paderborn 2023; D.K. Markowski, *W cieniu Wołynia. „Antypolska Akcja" OUN i UPA w Galicji Wschodniej 1943–1945*, Cracow 2023.

emphasising high numbers of former collaborators and war criminals among the non-Jewish DPs[15].

A second major context was the campaign by the GDR, the Soviet Union, and other Eastern European states against the then West German minister Theodor Oberländer in 1959–60. In 1941, Oberländer had been one of the German officers in the "Nachtigall" battalion, which had been set up by the "Abwehr", the military intelligence of the Wehrmacht, in cooperation with Stepan Bandera's OUN, to support the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Public debate centred on the pogrom-like riots against Jews in L'viv at the beginning of July 1941 and the question of whether Oberländer and the "Nachtigall" battalion had been involved there. The Oberländer case received much public attention, not only in Germany but also internationally; it was one of the great political scandals of the early Federal Republic. As a more detailed analysis shows, neither Oberländer nor "Nachtigall" were responsible for the crimes they were accused of in connection with the events in L'viv, but units of the German Security Police, above all Einsatzgruppe C, and the local Ukrainian militia, which, however, was also controlled by Stepan Bandera's OUN[16]. Nevertheless, the result of this campaign was that motifs of the Soviet enemy image of the Ukrainian nationalists as brutal German executioners were disseminated to the Western public and remained effective in connection with the names Oberländer and "Nachtigall" in the following decades.

---

15 V. Satzewich, op. cit., pp. 81–84; M. Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans. Roots and Aspirations, 1884–1954,* Toronto 1991, pp. 265–302; on Jewish organisations and the immigration of Jewish and non-Jewish DPs to the USA, L. Dinnerstein, *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust*, New York 1982; on critical statements about the Eastern European DPs as Nazi collaborators, especially pp. 22–23, 177–178. For Canada and Great Britain, and the special case of former members of the Waffen-SS Division "Galicia", see H. Troper, M. Weinfeld, *Old Wounds. Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada*, Markham 1988, pp. 66–80; O. Khromeychuk, *"Undetermined Ukrainians": Post-War Narratives of the Waffen-SS "Galicia" Division*, Bern 2013, pp. 127–131, 140–144.

16 On the complicated and multi-layered contexts of this campaign and its impact, see K. Struve, *Theodor Oberländer and the Nachtigall Battalion in 1959/60 – an Entangled History of Propaganda, Politics, and Memory in East and West*, "Slavic Review" 2022, vol. 81, no. 3, pp. 677–700; on the events in Lviv in 1941, idem, *Deutsche Herrschaft, ukrainischer Nationalismus, antijüdische Gewalt. Der Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine*, Berlin 2015, pp. 298–379; J.P. Himka, *The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd*, "Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes" 2011, vol. 53, pp. 209–243.

The third and most significant context was public debates in the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, first in the USA and soon in Canada and other countries, about the perpetrators of German mass crimes during the war, most importantly the Holocaust, among Eastern European immigrants who had arrived in the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s. These discussions were driven by the growing awareness of the Holocaust in Western societies during this period. They led to suspicions in the public that Eastern European immigrants, especially Ukrainians, were Nazi sympathisers hiding a large number of Holocaust perpetrators among themselves and being unwilling to confront critical questions about their own community during World War II. The Ukrainians were particularly scrutinised due to the high-profile case of John/Ivan Demjanjuk in the US and the presence of many former members of the Waffen-SS Division "Galicia" in Canada, the UK, and Australia[17].

4. Historical knowledge in the West

Actual historical knowledge, based on serious historical research, about local police in Ukraine and their participation in the Holocaust or other crimes, as well as the possible involvement of OUN and UPA, remained quite limited throughout the second half of the 20th century. However, the most important studies in English on these issues had already appeared in the 1950s and research in the following decades until the 1990s did not advance significantly beyond their findings. These studies appeared in John A. Armstrong's book *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945,* first published in 1955[18], and a longer article by Filip (Philip) Friedman, one of the most important historians of early Holocaust research, on Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the German occupation[19].

[17] V. Satzewich, op. cit., pp. 165–178. On Canada, also H. Troper, M. Weinfeld, op. cit.; on the US, R. Rashke, *Useful Enemies: John Demjanjuk and America's Open-Door Policy for Nazi War Criminals*, New York 2013.

[18] J.A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945*, New York 1955. The subsequent editions appeared under the somewhat abbreviated title *Ukrainian Nationalism*, New York 1963 (reprint Littleton, Col., 1980); 3rd, amended ed. Englewood, Col. 1990.

[19] Ph. Friedman, *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation*, "YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science" 1958/1959, vol. 12, pp. 259–296 (also in idem, *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust*, New York 1980, pp. 176–208).

Armstrong's study, based on his doctoral thesis at Columbia University's Russian Institute, sought to assess the support for Ukrainian nationalism in central and eastern Ukraine during the German occupation. More importantly, his book also included a well-researched analysis of relations between the Germans and the various Ukrainian political actors during the time of the war, which was based, among other things, on more than a hundred interviews with key participants on both sides.

Armstrong made the conflicts and the breakup between the two parts of the OUN and the Germans very clear and showed that cooperation with Stepan Bandera's OUN had already largely ended in the summer and autumn of 1941, and with Andrii Mel'nyk's OUN in the winter of 1941/42. He also described UPA's armed resistance against the Germans beginning in the first months of 1943.

Regarding the motives for cooperation, Armstrong showed that it was not ideological affinity but the aim of founding a state that underpinned this cooperation. Nevertheless, Armstrong acknowledged the ideological proximity and believed that the cooperation with Nazi Germany at the end of the 1930s had contributed to the ideological radicalisation of OUN. While he noted the involvement of OUN members in local police and administrative structures in central and eastern Ukraine, he interpreted this as a strategic success in the nationalist struggle for a Ukrainian state, rather than as problematic collaboration[20].

Armstrong's book also included a lengthy chapter on the emergence of UPA and its resistance to the German and Soviet forces in Volhynia. However, neither the 1955 nor the 1963 editions addressed UPA's massacres of Polish villagers in Volhynia in 1943 and in Galicia in 1944[21]. Only in the 1990 edition did Armstrong give a few brief references to this, but these still did not reveal the extent and number of victims, especially in Volhynia[22].

Armstrong's book thus ultimately confirmed the account that OUN and UPA gave of themselves and was most influential among the anti-Soviet majority of the Ukrainian diaspora, i.e., as a liberation movement that had fought both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. At the end of the 1940s

[20] J.A. Armstrong, op. cit. (1963), p. 285.
[21] Ibid., pp. 130–157.
[22] J.A. Armstrong, op. cit. (1990), pp. 110–112.

and in the 1950s, this narrative aligned well with the early Cold War-era view of both as equally totalitarian regimes.

Armstrong's book also very clearly reflected the fact that mass crimes during World War II did not attract much interest in the early 1950s, neither among the public nor in historical and social science research. Apparently, possible crimes committed by OUN and UPA or other Ukrainian forces were not a question that Armstrong was interested in.

Philip Friedman's article was, for the time, an impressively rich and knowledgeable study of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the German occupation, which, according to the current state of research, was not right on all issues, but went far beyond the previous state of knowledge. Friedman dealt in detail with acts of violence committed by the Ukrainians in the first days of the German-Soviet war in the summer of 1941, which he interpreted as largely spontaneous outbreaks of violence and pogroms, while he attributed only a minor role to the local Ukrainian militias and did not recognise their close ties to the OUN[23].

More importantly, Friedman was the first to clearly document crimes committed by UPA against the Jews in the years 1943–1944. However, it is also noteworthy that Friedman apparently knew little about the mass murders of the Polish population in Volhynia and Galicia in this same period. He made references to them, but without recognising their extent and significance[24]. Obviously, this is not meant as a critique because the fate of the Poles was not the topic of the research he presented in his article. Rather, this omission demonstrates how little was known about this, the largest crime committed by Ukrainian nationalists in the postwar decades.

Academic discussions on issues of Ukrainian nationalism during World War II intensified during the 1980s under the impact of public controversies about Holocaust perpetrators and war criminals among Eastern European and, above all, Ukrainian immigrants. Yet hardly any new findings emerged that substantially expanded upon Armstrong and Friedman's studies[25].

---

23 See for more detail K. Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft…*

24 Ph. Friedman, *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations…*, p. 270.

25 Most important was the volume Y. Boshyk (ed.), *Ukraine during World War II. History and its Aftermath*, Edmonton 1986. More comprehensively on historiography during the Cold War with a discussion of further publications, K. Struve, *Die ukrainischen Nationalisten im Zweiten Weltkrieg und die historische Forschung während des Kalten Kriegs*, [in:] G. Grinchenko, K. Struve (eds.), *Krieg und Okkupation. Deutschland und die Ukra-*

Two important events in this period were major conferences, which were mainly organised on the initiative of Ukrainian historians in North America, and dealt with Ukrainian-Polish relations and Ukrainian-Jewish relations. The conferences took place in 1977 and 1983, and proceedings were published in 1980 and 1988[26]. However, their focus was not on World War II, but on other periods. Nevertheless, World War II seems to have been "the elephant in the room" at both conferences. In a contribution to the volume on Polish-Ukrainian relations, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky wrote an introductory overview entitled *The Burden of History* that, however, effectively ended in the year 1939: "The subject [of relations during World War II] is too important and too painful to deal with in a casual manner; rather, it must be left to the labours of future historians and political scientists"[27]. At the conference on Ukrainian-Jewish relations, questions of World War II were central to the controversial final discussion. At the conference itself, however, only two contributors had taken up this topic, and neither significantly advanced the findings of Friedman's study from 1959[28].

Thus, by the end of the Cold War in the 1980s, a stark gap had emerged between public perceptions and academic research on Ukraine and the

ine 1939-1945, Leipzig 2026 (forthcoming); see also Ya. Prymachenko, *Pivnichnoamerykans'ka istoriohrafiia diial'nosti OUN i UPA*, Kyiv 2010.

26 P.J. Potichnyj (ed.), *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, Edmonton 1980; H. Aster, P.J. Potichnyj (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, Edmonton 1990 (1st ed. 1988). On the Polish-Ukrainian conference O. Avramchuk, *Rzeczpospolita Uczonych. Powstanie studiów ukraińskich i polsko-ukraiński dialog historyków w Stanach Zjednoczonych, 1939–1991*, Warsaw 2024, pp. 239–264.

27 I.L. Rudnytsky, *Polish-Ukrainian Relations: The Burden of History*, [in:] P.J. Potichnyj (ed.), op. cit., pp. 3–31, here p. 26. In fact, the conference had three papers related to World War II, but two of them discussed publications from the Polish People's Republic and one episode of cooperation between UPA and the Polish anti-Soviet underground after 1944.

28 Aharon Weiss followed Friedman's theses and presented further sources, A. Weiss, *Jewish--Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine During the Holocaust*, [in:] H. Aster, P.J. Potichnyj (eds.), op. cit., pp. 409–420. Yaroslav Bilinsky essentially limited himself to questioning some of Friedman's findings and calling for further aspects to be considered in the discussion, without, however, presenting results of serious research of sources on the controversial issues, Y. Bilinsky, *Methodological Problems and Philosophical Issues in the Study of Jewish-Ukrainian Relations During the Second World War*, [in:] H. Aster, P.J. Potichnyj (eds.), op. cit., pp. 373–407. His comparison of Jews as perpetrators of Soviet mass crimes with the participation of Ukrainians in the Holocaust during the German occupation was a central trigger for the controversial final discussion, H. Aster, P.J. Potichnyj (eds.), op. cit., pp. 479–512.

Ukrainian nationalists in World War II. While the view of Ukrainians as German collaborators and accomplices in the Holocaust gained traction in public discourse – especially in the context of controversies about legal investigations against Eastern European immigrants – actual historical knowledge, based on academic research, hardly went beyond the level reached at the end of the 1950s. Armstrong and Friedman had provided important, in a way complementary, insights, but their impact on public understanding was limited. Perceptions were determined more by the larger frame of dominant interests and views among the public. In the 1950s, this was the early Cold War, when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were seen as equally "totalitarian" regimes and the Soviet Union as a new existential threat. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, Nazi Germany became considered to have been the "unadulterated evil", as Orest Subtelny put it in a discussion about Ukrainian collaboration with Nazi Germany in 1981. In a critical turn against such a perception of the 20th century, he argued that the threat from Soviet rule that existed for Ukrainians also had to be taken into account when making judgments on Ukrainian nationalists and collaboration with Nazi Germany in World War II[29].

Nevertheless, collaboration with Nazi Germany and the Holocaust became the dominant lens through which Ukrainian nationalism was viewed, while UPA's resistance against Soviet and, even more so, against German occupation faded from public awareness. Above all, the resistance against the German occupation was barely recognised by the public. Consequently, perceptions in the West converged in important respects with the Soviet narrative: collaboration became a defining feature of Ukrainian nationalism, distinctions between different nationalist factions were ignored, and, above all, the various Ukrainian police units in German service became identified to a large extent with Ukrainian nationalism. The key difference to the Soviet narrative was that Western perceptions centred on participation in the Holocaust, while Soviet accounts largely ignored Jews as victims. Paradoxically, the largest crime committed by OUN and UPA, the mass murder of

[29] *Symposium: Ukrainians in World War II: Views and Points*, "Nationalities Papers" 1982, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1–39, here p. 36.

Poles in Galicia and Volhynia in 1943–44, remained largely unknown both in academic research and to the public[30].

5. After the Cold War

More intensive research into the history of Ukrainian nationalism during World War II only began in the 1990s, when more sources became available after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and when Soviet censorship came to an end. However, this research was developed within the distinct contexts of memory shaped in the previous decades in the East and West. Accordingly, there was a strong focus in Western research on topics relating to the history of the Holocaust. This also included the question of the participation of members of the local population, even if the focus of the research was initially on acquiring basic knowledge about the German occupation regime and how it implemented the mass murder of Jews[31].

In Ukraine, by contrast, historical research turned to previously suppressed topics, such as Soviet mass crimes – most notably the Holodomor – but also the anti-Soviet resistance of OUN and UPA. Under Soviet rule, preserving a positive memory of UPA in the face of Soviet propaganda had itself been a form of resistance. After independence, this memory merged with the narrative developed in Ukrainian exile, which portrayed the history

[30] In fact, Orest Subtelny addressed this issue briefly in his seminal *Ukraine. A History*, published in 1988, p. 474–475. Here, he referred mostly to studies from communist Poland, most importantly A. Szcześniak, W. Szota, *Droga do nikąd. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i jej likwidacja w Polsce*, Warsaw 1973. The first academic articles in English addressing the issue of the mass murder of Poles in 1943–1944 seem to have been T. Snyder, *"To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All". The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947*, "Journal of Cold War Studies" 1999, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 86–120, here on Volhynia and Galicia 1943/44, pp. 93–100; more extensively on Volhynia idem, *The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943*, "Past and Present" 2003, vol. 179, pp. 197–234. See also the edition of Polish testimonies, T. Piotrowski (ed.), *Genocide and Rescue in Wołyń: Recollections of the Ukrainian Nationalist Ethnic Cleansing Campaign Against the Poles During World War II*, Jefferson 2000.

[31] Important studies from this context were, for example, D. Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944. Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens*, München 1996; M. Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–1944*, Basingstoke 2000.

of OUN and UPA as a struggle against the two totalitarian regimes, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union[32].

However, research into the Holocaust also began to take root in Ukraine during the 1990s, largely driven by Jewish historians or institutions. For Ukrainian Jews, this research was a vital effort to recover and document their own suppressed history. Over the past two decades, these topics – including the difficult issue of collaboration – have increasingly been taken up also by non-Jewish Ukrainian historians. Knowledge of and interest in the history of the Holocaust has increased considerably in Ukrainian society during this period[33].

Nevertheless, the Soviet narrative of the "Great Patriotic War" remained influential in Ukraine even after 1991. The most important historical-political conflict in Ukraine until 2014 revolved around the question of how to evaluate the struggle of OUN and UPA against Soviet rule in relation to the Soviet army's fight against Nazi Germany (and its accomplices). This conflict intensified in the decade between 2004 and 2014 and was part of a strong political polarisation between parties and politicians who sought to strengthen Ukrainian independence from Russia, and Russian-oriented forces that were strongly rooted in Soviet traditions. It was primarily in this context that Bandera monuments and other memorials to OUN and UPA were erected in western Ukraine. At the same time, in the east and south of Ukraine, pro-Russian forces built some monuments in memory of members of the Soviet security forces and others who had been killed by UPA[34].

---

[32] For an analysis of memory conflicts in Ukraine since independence, G. Kasianov, *Memory Crash: The Politics of History in and around Ukraine from the 1980s to the 2010s*, Budapest 2022. On the historiography of OUN and UPA in Ukraine after independence, see also D. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*, Budapest 2007.

[33] A. Portnov, *The Holocaust in the Public Discourse of Post-Soviet Ukraine*, [in:] J. Fedor et al. (eds.), *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, Cham 2017, pp. 347–370; see also with a more critical view J.P. Himka, *The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Ukraine*, [in:] J.P. Himka, J. Michlic (eds.), *Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe*, Lincoln 2013, pp. 626–661.

[34] A background for this was that the fighting in western Ukraine between UPA and Soviet forces had also features of a Ukrainian civil war with many personnel within the Soviet armed forces and administration from central and eastern Ukraine, see on the Ukrainian memory landscape in the decades after independence as one of a society after civil war, O. Shevel, *The Politics of memory in a divided society: A comparison of post-Franco Spain and post-Soviet Ukraine*, "Slavic Review" 2011, vol. 70, pp. 137–164.

In the Western public and also in Poland, these Bandera monuments and other memorials were often interpreted as evidence of a strong refusal within Ukrainian society to critically confront the issue of collaboration with Nazi Germany, as well as the crimes committed during World War II. Such interpretations reinforced existing stereotypes about Ukraine in Western public opinion and contributed to the resonance of Russian propaganda that a "fascist coup" had taken place in Ukraine in 2014. Even after Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, the perception that Ukraine had failed to adequately address its history of collaboration continued to weaken support for Ukraine against the Russian invasion in Western countries.

Conclusion

Western interpretations of Ukrainian memory of World War II were often shaped by frameworks developed during controversies over Holocaust remembrance and the prosecution of Nazi crimes in Western countries. These frameworks critically highlighted the problematic persistence of heroic national self-images and the reluctance to confront uncomfortable truths and persecute perpetrators. While such dynamics were certainly present in Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora, the situation was more complex. The Ukrainian case involved a struggle between a Soviet-Russian historical narrative – used to justify imperial ambitions – and a Ukrainian national narrative aimed at consolidating independence.

More broadly, Russia's war against Ukraine raises fundamental questions about prevailing narratives of the twentieth century. This new great war in Europe did not arise from an inadequate, critical examination of Nazi crimes or collaboration with Nazi Germany and corresponding traditions. Rather, its preconditions include the fact that in Russia, there was no truly critical examination of Soviet history and in particular, the mass crimes of the Stalin era. Contrary to Russian propaganda, Ukraine is not governed by a "Nazi regime". Instead, it is Russia that failed to break with the legacy of the Soviet Union – one of the two major genocidal regimes in 20th-century European history.

References:

Armstrong J.A., *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945,* New York 1955 (subsequent 2nd ed. New York 1963; 3rd ed. Englewood 1990).

Aster H., Potichnyj P.J. (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, Edmonton 1990 (1st ed. 1988).

Avramchuk O., *Rzeczpospolita Uczonych. Powstanie studiów ukraińskich i polsko-ukraiński dialog historyków w Stanach Zjednoczonych, 1939–1991,* Warsaw 2024.

Bal'o M.A. et al., *Reaktsiina sut' ideolohiï i polityky ukraïns'koho burzhuaznoho natsionalizmu. Bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk*, Lviv 1976.

Bal'o M.A. et al., *Reaktsiina sut' ideolohiï i polityky ukraïns'koho burzhuaznoho natsionalizmu. Pokazhchyk literatury za 1976–1985 rr.*, Lviv 1987.

Bilinsky Y., *Methodological Problems and Philosophical Issues in the Study of Jewish-Ukrainian Relations During the Second World War*, [in:] *H. Aster, P.J. Potichnyj (eds.), Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective,* Edmonton 1990, pp. 373–407.

Boshyk Y. (ed.), *Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath*, Edmonton 1986.

Cherednichenko V., *Collaborationists,* Kyiv 1975.

Dean M., *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–1944,* Basingstoke 2000.

Dinnerstein L., *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust,* New York 1982.

Dmytruk K., *Bezbatchenky*, Lviv 1972.

Erlacher T., *Denationalizing Treachery: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Late Soviet Discourse, 1945–1985*, "*Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*" 2013, vol. 2, pp. 289–316.

Faraldo J.M., *An Antifascist Political Identity? On the Cult of Antifascism in the Soviet Union and Post-Socialist Russia*, [in:] H. Garcia et al. (eds.), *Rethinking Antifascism: History, Memory and Politics, 1922 to the Present,* New York, 2016, pp. 202–227.

Friedman Ph., *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation*, "*YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science*" 1958/1959, vol. 12, pp. 259–296 (reprinted in Ph. Friedman, *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust,* New York 1980).

Himka J.P., *The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd*, "*Canadian Slavonic Papers*" 2011, vol. 53, pp. 209–243.

Himka J.P., *The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Ukraine*, [in:] J.P. Himka, J. Michlic (eds.), *Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe*, Lincoln 2013, pp. 626–661.

Himka J.P., *Ukrainian Nationalists and the Holocaust: OUN and UPA's Participation in the Destruction of the Ukrainian Jewry, 1941–1944,* Stuttgart 2021.

Kasianov G., *Memory Crash: The Politics of History in and around Ukraine. 1980s to the 2010s,* Budapest 2022.

Khromeychuk O., *"Undetermined Ukrainians": Post-War Narratives of the Waffen-SS "Galicia" Division,* Bern 2013.
Kuropas M., *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884–1954*, Toronto 1991.
Kuzio T., *Disinformation: Soviet Origins of Contemporary Russian Ukrainophobia*, [in:] O. Bertelsen (ed.), *Russian Active Measures: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow,* Stuttgart, 2021, pp. 137–175.
Markowski D.K., *W cieniu Wołynia. "Antypolska Akcja" OUN i UPA w Galicji Wschodniej 1943–1945,* Cracow 2023.
Marples D., *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*, Budapest 2007.
Martin T., *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*, Ithaca 2001.
McGlynn J., *Memory Makers: The Politics of the Past in Putin's Russia,* London 2022.
McGlynn J., *Russia's War*, Cambridge 2023.
Motyka G., *From the Volhynian Massacre to Operation Vistula: The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict 1943–1947,* Paderborn 2023.
Motyka G., *Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstańczej Armii,* Warsaw 2015.
Patryliak I., *"Vstan' i borys'! Slukhai i vir'…". Ukraïns'ke natsionalistychne pidpillia ta povstans'kyi rukh 1939–1960 rr.*, Lviv 2012.
Piotrowski T. (ed.), *Genocide and Rescue in Wołyń: Recollections of the Ukrainian Nationalist Ethnic Cleansing Campaign Against the Poles During World War II*, Jefferson 2000.
Pohl D., *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944. Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens,* München 1996.
Pohl D., *Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden*, [in:] G. Paul (ed.), *Die Täter der Shoah: Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?,* Göttingen 2002, pp. 205–234.
Portnov A., *The Holocaust in the Public Discourse of Post-Soviet Ukraine*, [in:] J. Fedor et al. (ed.), *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus,* Cham 2017, pp. 347–370.
Potichnyj P.J. (ed.), *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present,* Edmonton 1980.
Prusin A.V., *The 'Second Wave' of Soviet Justice: The 1960s War Crimes Trials*, [in:] N.J.W. Goda (ed.), *Rethinking Holocaust Justice: Essays Across Disciplines*, New York 2018, pp. 129–157.
Prymachenko Ya., *Pivnichnoamerykans'ka istoriohrafiia diial'nosti OUN i UPA*, Kyiv 2010.
Putin V., *Address by the President of the Russian Federation*, 21 February 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828.
Putin V., *Address by the President of the Russian Federation*, 24 February 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843.
Putin V., *On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians*, 12 July 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181.

Radchenko Yu., *Dopomizhna politsiia, mistseva administratsiia, SD ta Shoa na ukraïns'ko-rosiisko-bilorus'komy pohranychchi (1941–1943)*, Kyiv 2024.
Rashke R., *Useful Enemies: John Demjanjuk and America's Open-Door Policy for Nazi War Criminals,* New York 2013.
Rossoliński-Liebe G., *Der europäische Faschismus und der ukrainische Nationalismus. Verflechtungen, Annährungen und Wechselbeziehungen*, "*Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*" 2017, vol. 65, pp. 153–169.
Rossoliński-Liebe G., *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult,* Stuttgart 2014.
Rudnytsky I.L., *Polish-Ukrainian Relations: The Burden of History*, [in:] P.J. Potichnyj (ed.), *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present,* Edmonton 1980, pp. 3–31.
Satzewich V., *The Ukrainian Diaspora,* London 2002.
Shekhovtsov A. (ed.), *Russia against Ukraine. Russian Political Mythology and the War on Ukrainian Identity*, Vienna 2025.
Shevel O., *The Politics of Memory in a Divided Society: A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine*, "*Slavic Review*" 2011, vol. 70, pp. 137–164.
Sklokina I., *Trials of Nazi Collaborators in the Context of Soviet Propaganda. Nationality Policy and the Cold War (1960–1980s)*, [in:] P. Black (ed.), *Collaboration in Eastern Europe during the Second World War and the Holocaust*, Vienna 2019, pp. 67–86
Snyder T., *'To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All': The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947*", "*Journal of Cold War Studies"* 1999, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 86–120.
Snyder T., *The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943*, "Past and Present" 2003, vol. 179, pp. 197–234.
Struve K., *Das sowjetische Feindbild des ukrainischen Nationalismus und Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine*, [in:] J. Kähler et al. (eds.), *Der Krieg gegen die Ukraine: Berichte, Positionen, Perspektiven,* Erlangen 2026 (forthcoming).
Struve K., *Deutsche Herrschaft, ukrainischer Nationalismus, antijüdische Gewalt. Der Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine,* Berlin 2015.
Struve K., *Theodor Oberländer and the Nachtigall Battalion in 1959/60: An Entangled History of Propaganda, Politics, and Memory in East and West*, "*Slavic Review*" 2022, vol. 81, pp. 677–700.
Styrkul V., *We accuse: Documentary sketch*, Kyiv 1984.
Subtelny O., *Ukraine: A History,* Toronto 1988.
Symonenko R., *Na utrymanni reaktsiï* (*Ukraïns'kyi burzhuaznyi natsionalizm – voroh miru i suspil'noho prohresu)*, Kyiv 1977.
Symposium: Ukrainians in World War II: Views and Points, "Nationalities Papers" 1982, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1–39.
Szcześniak A.B., Szota W.Z., *Droga do nikąd. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i jej likwidacja w Polsce*, Warsaw 1973.
Tkachenko K., *Rechte Tür Links: Radikale Linke in Deutschland, die Revolution und der Krieg in der Ukraine,* Stuttgart 2023.

Troper H., Weinfeld M., *Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada,* Markham 1988.

Umland A., Yurchuk Y. (eds.), *Special Section: A Debate on Ustashism, Generic Fascism, and the OUN*, "*Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Societies*" 2021, *vol. 7,* no. 1, pp. 111–214.

Umland A., Yurchuk Y. (eds.), *Special Section: A Debate on Ustashism, Generic Fascism, and the OUN*, "*Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Societies*" 2021, *vol. 7,* no. 2, pp. 137–184.

Umland A., Yurchuk Y. (eds.), *Special Section: A Debate on Ustashism, Generic Fascism, and the OUN*, "*Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Societies*" 2023, *vol.* 9, no. 1, pp. 1–28.

Weiss A., *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine During the Holocaust*, [in:] *H. Aster, P.J. Potichnyj (eds.), Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective,* Edmonton 1990, pp. 409–420.

Weiss-Wendt A., *Putin's Russia and the Falsification of History: Reasserting Control over the Past*, London 2021.

Yekelchyk S., *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination,* Toronto 2004.

Zaitsev O., *Fascism or Ustashism? Ukrainian Integral Nationalism in Comparative Perspective, 1920s–1930s*, "*Communist and Post-Communist Studies*" 2015, vol. 48, no. 2–3, pp. 183–193.

Zhegulëv I., *Kak Putin voznenavidel Ukrainu. Rassledovanie o tom, kak rossiiskii prezident prishël k mysli o voine z Ukrainoi*, Vërstka, 25 April 2023, https://verstka.media/kak-putin-pridumal-voynu.