The Security and Resilience of Central European States in the 21st Century

Issue editor:

ISSN: 1732-1395

e-ISSN: 2719-2911

Publisher: Instytut Europy Środkowej

Edition: Lublin 2024

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1

Articles

Article

Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and the shadow of genocide in Ukraine

Views count: 29
This concise paper examines Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and its implications for Western democracies. Divided into four sections – The Importance of Ukraine for the International Position of the Russian Federation, The Context of Russia’s Relations with the European Union, The Russian Federation’s Revisionism in the International Arena, and Genocide as an Element of Russia’s Imperial Policy – the analysis highlights the ongoing full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine, which has escalated in the past two years as part of a decade of Kremlin-driven aggression. This conflict reflects Vladimir Putin’s ambition to restore Russian imperial influence, focusing on regaining control over its periphery in Eastern Europe through military intervention. The paper argues that Russia’s actions threaten not only Ukraine but also European stability and democracy. Integrating Ukraine into the European Union is identified as essential for enhancing regional security and countering Russian expansionism. By addressing Russia’s imperialistic goals and emphasising the need to support Ukraine, this paper calls for a unified Western response to safeguard a secure and democratic Europe.
T. Stępniewski, Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and the shadow of genocide in Ukraine, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 22 (2024), z. 1, s. 7-15, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1.1
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Article

NATO’s actions on the impact of climate change on security

Views count: 38
Incorporating the threat of climate change into the security architecture redefines the role of the military and broadens its remit to include responsibilities related to ensuring climate security. In many countries, the military’s involvement in the fight against climate change is seen as essential. The aim of this research is to present the activities of the army in the face of climate change and their impact on the security of NATO countries, as the military’s energy transition is currently one of the key challenges for allied armies. Four diagnostic features were included in the study: adaptation to new environmental conditions, sustainability and zero-carbon, knowledge development and training activities, and partnership cooperation. The diversity of climate strategies in selected allied countries was examined through a comparative analysis and critique of strategic documents on climate change issues and defence energy transition (e.g. army climate strategies and civilian climate strategies). The study will outline the role that the military is slowly beginning to play in the energy transition process. The results may contribute to the discussion on energy transition in NATO armies, as this process is still highly controversial, with not all defence professionals agreeing on the army becoming eco-friendly, and contribute to the wider debate on low-carbon military operations.
E. Kochanek, K. Pietrzyk-Wiszowaty, NATO’s actions on the impact of climate change on security, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 22 (2024), z. 1, s. 17-43, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1.2
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Work begins on the first Solar Carport at Army Headquarters, https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2021/08/the-first-solar-carport-at-army-headquarters/.

Article

Cyber deterrence policies of the Baltic states in the years 2016–2023

Views count: 39
Since spring 2014, political decision-makers and analysts have been engaged in a lively debate on the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and its neighbours. Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania quickly became the focus of international attention. The article examines the evolution of the cybersecurity environment within the context of cyber deterrence policy. The main objective of the work is to identify the strategies adopted by small states when their security assurances are challenged by a powerful neighbour. An analysis of documents and cybersecurity concepts can serve as an explanation of the deterrence policies of the Baltic states.
M. Górka, Cyber deterrence policies of the Baltic states in the years 2016–2023, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 22 (2024), z. 1, s. 45-66, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1.3
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Article

The long shadow of the Great Wall. Trade dependencies of V4’s countries on Chin

Views count: 40
This paper delves into the topic of trade interdependencies, which represent a crucial aspect of economic security policy. The increasing influence of China, coupled with its aspirations for global dominance, in addition to the challenge posed to the established liberal world order and the distribution of power, prompts us to explore the feasibility of utilising existing relationships as a means of economic coercion. Therefore, the research methodology employed in this study integrates complexities inherent in the realm of international political economy of trade and international economics. The study focuses on the trade relations of the Visegrád Group, drawing on data from the OECD, the International Trade Centre, and Eurostat, with a specific emphasis on trade in value added and gross trade, while examining the repercussions of Chinese imports. The findings suggest a modest yet rising dependence of V4 economies on China, particularly evident in the machinery, electrical, and electronics industries, which could potentially disrupt supply chains within the region and with Germany, their primary trade partner. This underscores the necessity for devising strategies at the European Union level and within the Visegrád Group to accurately pinpoint vulnerabilities and diversify existing trade ties.
B. Michalski, The long shadow of the Great Wall. Trade dependencies of V4’s countries on China, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 22 (2024), z. 1, s. 67-85, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1.4
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Article

Energy security policy of Poland and Hungary in the context of the Russian Federation war with Ukraine. A comparative analysis

Views count: 45
The 2022 conflict between Russia and Ukraine highlighted the extent to which European Union member states rely on Russian energy resources. This article aims to conduct a comparative analysis of the energy security policies of Poland and Hungary during the energy crisis in Europe caused by the war in Ukraine between 2022 and 2023. To achieve the research purpose mentioned above, the following research questions were formulated: 1. What stance did Hungary and Poland take regarding the EU’s proposal for sanctions against the Russian Federation in the field of energy raw materials? 2. What actions did the governments of Hungary and Poland take to reduce their dependence on Russian energy raw materials? The following methods were used in the research: decision-making method, comparative method, analysis of the foundational research and statistical method. The analysis showed that the Polish government’s policy was focused on reducing its reliance on Russian energy imports and the need to find an alternative to eastern suppliers. The pro-Russian government of Hungary, on the other hand, was opposed to abandoning Russian energy resources and lacked a developed plan to shift away from them.
M. Kamola-Cieślik, N. Akyesilmen, Energy security policy of Poland and Hungary in the context of the Russian Federation war with Ukraine. A comparative analysis, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 22 (2024), z. 1, s. 87-104, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1.5
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Article

Russia’s battle for remembrance. Memory laws in Vladimir Putin’s Russia exemplified by the Russo-Ukrainian war

Views count: 41
This paper focuses on memory laws in V. Putin’s Russia, emphasising the Russo-Ukrainian war (2014 – present). The aim was to interpret legal acts regulating the interpretation of the war in the context of V. Putin’s politics of history. Additionally, parallels between legal acts regulating the interpretation of World War II and the Russo-Ukrainian war were highlighted. The primary research method is qualitative content analysis (legal acts, exit polls, etc.), supplemented by comparative analysis. I assume that V. Putin’s Russia is a memory authoritarian regime that recreates the Soviet memory regime surrounding World War II and uses memory on a unique global scale.
D. Moskwa, Russia’s battle for remembrance. Memory laws in Vladimir Putin’s Russia exemplified by the Russo-Ukrainian war, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 22 (2024), z. 1, s. 105-121, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1.6
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Article

Nuclear energy in the countries of the Three Seas Initiative under the new security architecture and climate policy

Views count: 31
The article presents an analysis of the approach to nuclear energy and prospects for development in the countries that are members of the Three Seas Initiative. The author presents an analysis of the demographic and economic potential of the region in the context of a convergent history, conditioning the current infrastructural deficiencies compared to Western and Northern Europe. The paper employs a comparative analysis of the energy policies of the Initiative countries, concluding that the solution to the decarbonisation of the region is the development of nuclear energy potential and cooperation – due to its emission-free nature and guarantee of stable electricity production, together with the development of renewable energy sources. Such solutions guarantee significant progress towards decarbonisation and the achievement of international and EU climate targets, while ensuring energy security. The energy policy analysis is contextualised in the conditions of the new security architecture in Europe related to Russia’s war in Ukraine.
M. Skuza, Nuclear energy in the countries of the Three Seas Initiative under the new security architecture and climate policy, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 22 (2024), z. 1, s. 123-140, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1.7
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Article

How can energy resilience be strengthened in Central and Eastern European states?

Views count: 38
The energy crisis resulting from Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine in 2022 is seen by the European Union as an opportunity to accelerate the energy transition and strengthen energy resilience. Energy resilience is particularly important for Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which are highly dependent on imports of energy resources and which possess significant potential for the development of energy based on renewable sources. The article presents an analysis of the energy resilience of CEE countries in the context of the challenges related to the energy crisis, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the EU’s ambitious climate goals. The aim of the analysis is to identify the factors that contribute to strengthening or weakening the energy resilience of these countries. The results of the study confirm the thesis that the process of strengthening the energy resilience of CEE countries is progressing, but too slowly and unevenly. The most serious problems for these countries are the increase in the share of energy from renewable sources, the modernisation and expansion of the old electricity grid, the lack of decentralisation of the energy system, and insufficient cross-border cooperation in the field of energy exchange. The findings can help to understand the political, technological and economic challenges faced by CEE countries in their energy systems.
U. Kurczewska, How can energy resilience be strengthened in Central and Eastern European states?, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 22 (2024), z. 1, s. 141-157, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1.8
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Article

Albania’s counter-terrorism policy in the face of evolving terrorist threats

Views count: 32
This topic explores the dynamic landscape of terrorist threats in Albania and delves into the country’s counter-terrorism policies. Analysing the evolving nature of these threats, the discussion will focus on Albania’s strategic initiatives, cooperation, and existing institutions. By analysing the multifaceted dimensions of Albania’s counter-terrorism efforts, this study aims to shed light on the country’s commitment to protecting its citizens and contributing to global security. The aim of the article is to analyse the terrorist threat in Albania and the anti-terrorist policy pursued. Two research methods were used in the article, i.e. the institutional-legal method and the content analysis method. Both methods allowed the analysis of selected normative acts and the selection of institutions dedicated to the fight against terrorism. With the use of a selected content analysis relating to the developing situation in Albania in recent years, the author indicates the reasons for the occurrence of possible terrorist threats and evaluates whether Albania is a country with a low terrorist threat.
L. Wojnicz, Albania’s counter-terrorism policy in the face of evolving terrorist threats, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 22 (2024), z. 1, s. 159-174, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1.9
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Article

Brazylia wobec agresji Federacji Rosyjskiej na Ukrainę

Views count: 36
The article presents research results regarding Brazils policy and position towards the annexation of Crimea, the conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine, and the full-scale aggression in 2022. The legal basis of Brazil’s relations with the Russian Federation is discussed as well as their development in recent years, including multilateral cooperation within BRICS. The article also presents an analysis of the conditions and premises of Brazil’s policy towards the war in Ukraine, which has a cautious, inconsistent, and ambivalent position in this respect. During the research, the historical method, content analysis method, comparative method, and systemic method were used.
P. Bajor, Brazylia wobec agresji Federacji Rosyjskiej na Ukrainę, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 22 (2024), z. 1, s. 175-185, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2024.1.10

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