Institute of Central Europe
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New normality in the “Baltic Bubble” (Dominik Wilczewski)

Crossing borders without restrictions. On May 15, 2020, decisions regarding the lifting of restrictions on passenger traffic for inhabitants of the Baltic States entered into force. Citizens and residents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania may cross internal borders without being obliged to quarantine for two weeks, as long as they have not been outside the Baltic States within the last 14 days, have not been subjected to isolation with someone who has tested positive to coronavirus, and do not reveal symptoms of respiratory infection. On the same day in Riga, the Foreign Ministers of Estonia – Urmas Reinsalu, Latvia – Edgars Rinkēvičs, and Lithuania – Linas Linkevičius, have signed a memorandum of understanding providing closer coordination of activities as well as consultation and exchange of information on the organisation of the movement of persons across the internal borders.

The decisions were officially justified, among others, by the progress in stopping the spread of the virus in all the three countries and the need to restore regular passenger traffic (by road, rail, sea, and air). The announcement of lifting the restrictions was also an opportunity to emphasise the role and importance of close cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These activities aim to minimise the economic and social effects of restrictions and ensure the free movement of persons. At the same time, representatives of the authorities of the Baltic States said that full opening without adequate security measures could increase the spread of the virus. Coordination of activities is therefore intended to ensure proper control.

Successes in the fight against coronavirus. The Baltic States are relatively doing well in fighting the SARS-CoV-2 virus pandemic. At first, Estonia found itself in the most difficult situation, where the disease began to spread quickly on the island of Saaremaa, leading to its complete closure. However, data from recent weeks show that in all three countries it was possible to “flatten the curve” of the disease. Since the beginning of May, the daily increase in new cases has generally remained low – e.g. in Estonia it did not exceed 0.5 percent, while in Latvia and Lithuania it was usually not more than 1 percent. The least number of cases have been registered so far in Latvia (1,009) followed by Lithuania (1,547) and Estonia (1,784) which translated to respectively: 534.94, 568.27 and 1,334.85 per 1 million inhabitants (as of May 19). Since the outbreak, 64 people have died in Estonia, 59 in Lithuania, and 19 in Latvia.

At this point it is difficult to identify specific factors or measures that have decided that the Baltic states managed to gain control, to a certain degree, over the spread of the virus. Factors of particular importance include low population density that facilitates social distancing (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are among the countries with the lowest population density in the entire EU), quick decision-making in introducing restrictions in the organisation of public life (although of varying intensity in particular countries), and the discipline of societies in obeying these restrictions. The high number of tests should also be noted; as of May 17th 228,726 tests have been carried out in Lithuania, 88,405 in Latvia, and 70,189 in Estonia. In the case of Lithuania, this gives it the 3rd highest result per 1 million inhabitants on an EU-wide scale.

The Baltic region is the first in the EU to open its internal borders. The decisions of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian authorities aroused great interest in foreign media and relatively positive international public opinion reactions. The media has popularised the term “Baltic travel bubble” that is also used by politicians. As emphasised by representatives of the Baltic states, their decisions are in accordance with the guidelines of the European Commission. On May 13th, the European Commission (EC) recommended that the Member States may gradually abolish border controls in a coordinated manner. The Commission also noted that such decisions should be taken by neighbouring countries with similar epidemic severity.

A road-map into the new normality. The implementation of multi-stage plans for the gradual abolition of restrictions related to the Covid-19 pandemic has already begun in all Baltic States. In Lithuania, the state of quarantine was extended to May 31st, although the first mitigation decisions were introduced on April 23rd and 27th allowing, among others, the restoration of retail trade, reopening of particular services such as hairdressing salons, and the reopening of outdoor dining places and cultural facilities, as long as security measures are provided. A gradual opening for the following institutions is also planned: kindergartens (from May 18th), primary schools (from May 25th), and secondary schools (from May 30th). From May 18th, it is also possible to service inside dining places and organise small public events in the open air. The new order allows the gathering of up to 5 people.

On April 28th, the Estonian government adopted a plan concerning the lifting of the restrictions. It was developed through consultations with parliamentary groups and non-governmental organisations. The epidemic has been divided into three phases: escalation, stabilisation, and normalisation. According to the government’s plan, Estonia has reached a stabilisation phase. In line with current regulations, wearing protective masks is only recommended and not mandatory. At the same time, the ban on gathering in groups of more than 2 people and the two-metre social distancing order was maintained. On the other hand, the opening of hotels, restaurants and shopping centres, museums and exhibition halls, playgrounds and outdoor sports facilities was allowed. From May 15th, it is possible to organise public events for people staying in cars. On May 14th, the Tallinn-Helsinki ferry was re-launched for migrant workers.

Restrictions introduced in Latvia were relatively mild compared to their Lithuanian and Estonian counterparts. On May 7th, the government announced the extension of the state of emergency until June 9th. At the same time, some mitigated restrictions were announced. From May 12th, it is possible to gather in groups of up to 25 people while keeping a two-meter distance and to organise indoor public events. Further, the gradual opening of museums, libraries, and cultural institutions have been allowed assuming they are compliant with sanitary regulations. Shopping centres can also open during weekends while gastronomic establishments can be open from 7 AM-12 PM. Covering the nose and mouth is compulsory only when using public transport. Decisions on lifting restrictions are to be taken based on the assessment of the epidemiological situation, the burden on the healthcare system, the situation in other countries, and on the basis of security issues, social attitudes, and control over public events.

Conclusions. The situation related to the Covid-19 pandemic in the Baltic countries allows for cautious optimism while the authorities can credibly argue that they have managed to maintain control over the spread of the disease. A significant burden on healthcare systems in individual countries was also avoided. Indication of specific actions and decisions that enabled achieving such a state will require additional analyses in the long run, but it can already be said that the “flattening of the curve” of the disease is the result of early decisions to introduce restrictions (see “IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 152).

The international political dimension of the decision to open the internal borders should be considered as a separate issue. It became an opportunity to emphasise the cultural closeness of the societies of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and to focus on what seems to be truly important. Simultaneously, it revealed the readiness and the ability to closely coordinate actions in the face of the serious challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic. Referring to the guidelines of the European Commission and the announcement by the prime minister of Lithuania concerning the possibility for Poland and Finland to join the “Baltic travel bubble”, will help refute possible allegations of isolation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the rest of the EU. At the same time the success of the “Baltic bubble” can serve as a good example for other Member States who are planning to introduce similar solutions.

New Foreign Policy of Slovakia: Strengthening Transatlantic Orientation and Active Regional Cooperation (Łukasz Lewkowicz)

The transatlantic anchor of Slovakia. Unquestioned pillars of Slovakia’s security and defence policy referred to in the program include NATO membership and strong transatlantic ties. Slovakia strives to actively promote strategic and mutually beneficial relations between the EU and the US. The Slovak authorities declare to support the development of military capabilities under the EU’s common security and defence policy. According to the Slovaks, the Union cannot fulfil its ambitions to become a major player in the international arena without its own armed forces. Attention is also paid to the growing hybrid threats, which manifest themselves as a need to strengthen the prevention capabilities of states at the national and international levels.

The US is recognised in the program as one of Slovakia’s “key ally” due to its unique military capabilities that are crucial in terms of collective defence and which the European allies do not possess. Slovakia declares the participation of its armed forces in foreign military missions and operations, provided that it is in accordance with international law and its security policy. The government assumes to have stable and predictable defence spending, striving to reach 2% of the GDP by 2024. Within the planned military expenses at least 20% is to be allocated to armaments and research, that will be in line with NATO and EU criteria. It is also assumed that the expenditure on defence research will gradually increase to 1% of the defence budget.

Objectives of the European policy of Slovakia. The document shows some pessimism regarding the state of European integration. According to the authors of the program, the EU is currently undergoing the most difficult period since its creation. They draw attention to the crisis that has been going on for a decade, as well as to Brexit and the lack of necessary reforms. It results in mistrust of the EU institutions, reduced impact of the EU in the world as well as in the increase of internal tensions. It is emphasised that the EU is facing the need to complete projects underpinning European integration, in particular the single market, economic and monetary union, and a parallel response to climate change, digitisation, automation, migration pressures, and demographic change. The current situation triggered by the global COVID-19 pandemic is another test for the EU.

The program shows a willingness to reform the EU. In European policy, the Slovak government sets itself the following objectives: strengthening the perception of the European agenda as part of the national policies; the development of the EU internal market; emphasis on creating high-quality European legislation; strict compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; compliance with EU law by the European institutions and the Member States; avoiding administrative and regulatory burdens for Slovak companies; more efficient work of the European institutions (e.g. one seat of the European Parliament); and, maintaining an institutional balance between the Member States, the European Parliament and the European Commission (for instance by rejecting the concept of Spitzenkandidat as the chairman of the Commission). In addition, Slovakia wants to increase the weight of its voice in the EU by creating the so-called thematic coalitions on specific European policy issues and strives to uphold the functioning of the rule of law at the national and EU levels.

The implementation of Slovakia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation is facilitated by the experience of the new Foreign Minister Ivan Korčok. During 28 years of work in diplomacy, he served as, among others, the Permanent Representative to the EU and as an Ambassador to the US. In addition, during 2016-2017 he was the government’s representative for the Slovak presidency of the Council of the European Union. In 2003, however, he was appointed as the head of the Slovak delegation for accession talks with NATO.

Revival of regional cooperation. The new program shows great interest in the development of cooperation in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, both on a bilateral and multilateral level. The further development of relations with neighbours is to be the priority of Slovakia’s foreign policy. The document highlights the “above-standard” relations with the Czech Republic and the “proven cooperation” with Poland, Hungary, and Austria. The Slovak authorities declare that they will continue to support Ukraine’s transformation and its aspirations for European integration. In addition, the Slovak authorities do not accept violations of the territorial integrity of their state. However, the program does not specify who the aggressor is.

In the program, V4 is considered to be the most important format of regional cooperation, which is why Slovakia is willing to remain an active member of this organisation. However, the main condition to belong to the Group is to have an effective pursuit of Slovakia’s interests and to increase Slovakia’s role in shaping EU policy. The document lacks reference to other regional cooperation formats in which Slovakia is more or less actively involved. There is no mention of the Initiative of the Three Seas (TSI), the Slavkovsky Triangle, or the Bucharest Nine. The document only contains an enigmatic record about the development of “partnership with other regional groups”.

Slovakia wants to participate in the development of EU cooperation with the Eastern Partnership states after 2020. Cooperation with the Western Balkan states is also to remain an important area of Slovakia’s foreign policy. Slovakia declares its support to the efforts to meet the agreed criteria for EU membership. According to the Slovaks, the enlargement of the Union is an important tool for maintaining stability and promoting the region’s interests. In this matter, there is also room for cooperation between the current government and former Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák, who is now the EU’s special representative for the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. At the same time, the European Parliament has appointed expert and politician Vladimír Bilčík as the new rapporteur for Serbia.

Noteworthy are the plans for the development of cross-border infrastructure included in the program. For nearly three decades, underdeveloped communication routes have formed an important barrier to the evolution of Polish-Slovak relations. Therefore, the new government program envisages continuing the construction of the D3 highway in the Kysúce region towards the Polish border. In addition, it is planned to prepare the construction of the R4 express road from Prešov to Poland, which is part of the Via Carpatia transport corridor. In this project, the northern Prešov beltway is a priority for the Slovak authorities. Depending on the number of financial resources available, the expansion of the R4 route northwards to the Slovak-Polish border will also be continued. Over the border of the Orava River, the authorities are to focus on building the R3 expressway.

Conclusions for Poland. An analysis of the new government program indicates that Slovakia’s key foreign policy priorities remain unchanged. Like the previous government, the current Slovak authorities declare an active strategic membership of the EU and NATO, as well as cooperation with neighbouring states, as their strategic goals. A novelty in the document is that the security of the state is based on Slovak-American relations. Regional cooperation under V4 has been appreciated. However, it must constitute a part of Slovakia’s European policy. Unlike the preceding program of 2016, the current document does not mention Germany, which the previous government had identified as a key EU Member State and as Slovakia’s strategic political and economic partner. It provokes consideration that, at present, Germany remains the most important trade partner of Slovakia and the promoter of the principles of multilateralism in international politics that are so crucial for the current government. Russia is also not mentioned in the document as Slovakia’s potential partner. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was criticised only in a rather enigmatic way, which is undoubtedly a nod at the US. The problem of economic diplomacy has been practically disregarded. Poland was referred to twice in the program, which indicates a possible new opening in mutual relations, especially in the area of development of the cross-border infrastructure. The challenge is the lack of information on how Slovakia is involved in the TSI, which is a strategic project of Polish foreign policy. The new TSI summit in Tallinn, which will probably take place this autumn, will test the new government’s policy in this respect. The document also lacks information on plans for diversification of oil and natural gas supplies to Slovakia.

Consequences of COVID-19 Pandemic in Croatia and Call for Reforms (Jan Muś)

Scale of Recession. Croatia, alongside many other states, expects an incoming recession. The general lockdown, which was introduced at the end of March, and will last at least until June, has consequences for the economy. Equally severe is the economic decline in Germany, Italy, and Slovenia, which are three of Croatia’s most important trade partners, with 37.5 per cent of the exports and 40.8 per cent of the imports in 2019, according to the State Statistical Office in Croatia. Slovenia, Italy, and Germany belong, alongside the Netherlands, Austria, Hungary, France, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Luxemburg to the top 10 largest investors in Croatia. Their combined investments equal to over 82 per cent of the overall FDIs in the state economy. Croatia’s level of dependency on the Western world is even deeper due to tourism that constitutes an important part of the country’s economy (between 15 and 20 per cent of the GDP).

Therefore, this year will be exceptionally bad for Croatia. And so, the GDP, which in the previous year rose by 2.9 per cent, this year, according to the estimates by the IMF, sharply fell by 9 per cent, while it is estimated to rise again by 4.6 per cent in 2021. The current account balance will decline by 4 per cent this year and the unemployment rate will increase from 7.8 per cent to 11.5 per cent. However, the scale of the crisis enables the ruling elite to introduce long-awaited steps towards the modernisation of the economy, which would correspond to the general socio-economic trends in the EU.

Reset of the Economy. The reaction of the government to the virus generally reflected the measures undertaken by the majority of governments and central banks in Europe. The economic stimulus package during the pandemic consisted of a mixture of tax exemptions and moratoriums, supplements for wages as well as state guarantees to the bank loans provided to entrepreneurs. The Croatian National Bank together with the European Central Bank established a swap line and regularly intervened to stabilise the Croatian Kuna and to ensure the liquidity of the economy. On the 27th of April, the government began the gradual liberalisation of the anti-pandemic measures and the re-vitalisation of the economy. This relative reset of the economic policy provides Andrej Plenković with an opportunity to reset the economic priorities and change the flow of the public finances.

Neither the incoming parliamentary elections nor the expected victory of the incumbent prime minister or even the opposition’s (Social Democratic Party) take over power, will change the fact that reforms are required and expected by important interest groups. The latter include entrepreneurs organised within the Croatian Economic Chamber, the Croatian-German Industrial and Economic Chamber, and the Croatian Association of Employers. Moreover, additional sources of funding for reforms will be available from the European Union. Such funding relates in particular to green technologies and innovations.

In general, there are two major scenarios available, both of which affect two significant vectors of Croatia’s economic policy. The first relates to the development of the modern economy, as per the guidelines provided by the EU Green Deal. The second relates to the re-cultivation of agriculture, especially in the Slavonian region. The first scenario involves an increase in public spending with the ultimate aim of stimulating specific branches of the economy. The second scenario aims to focus on releasing the private sector from payment of certain taxes and bureaucratic burdens and, therefore, to enable the development of some branches of the economy.

The Green Deal and the Green Funds. The Croatian government has already expressed its support for the Green Deal. Zagreb, while being aware of the necessity to adjust the Croatian economy to 21st century requirements, sees the Green Deal as an opportunity to access new funds that will enable the transformation of the economy, technological progress, and innovative solutions that would satisfy environmental and economic requirements. The Green Deal could be relatively easily combined with the stimulus packages prepared to counter the negative economic effects of COVID-19. As such, the Croatian government would not only have the programme but also the funds assisting to transform the country’s economy.

The Green Deal also enables Croatia to overcome a significant obstacle caused by the country’s small size. Croatia is not able to compete with countries like Hungary or Poland in terms of mass production, not only because they are considerably bigger but also because they have joined the EU much earlier. This head-start allowed them to absorb EU funds into their economy and to adjust production to the requirements of Western consumers. The transition from the relatively obscure Croatian industry into the digital one would be an answer to the challenges of the modern, globalised world. The access to skilled workforce, the proximity to the Western markets, and the good economic relations with Austria, Germany, and Italy could provide additional incentives for the digitalisation and development of green technologies.

Agriculture. There is, however, another branch of the Croatian economy that requires special attention from the Croatian decision-makers, namely, agriculture. In particular, Slavonia, which is in the north-eastern region of Croatia, represents an important part of the national electoral body and remains politically frustrated, as has been shown during the past presidential elections. The Slavonian voters are ever more eager to support the anti-systemic Miroslav Škoro, who has won most of the votes in this region. For Plenković, as for many other leaders before him, the rural areas remain unpleasant, difficult, and uncomfortable issues to deal with, as they contradict the imagined Croatian push towards the West and modernity. Left unchecked, however, these rural areas are capable of creating dangerous political turmoil.

And yet, as many as 60% of the respondents of public opinion polls conducted by the Agency Ipsos Puls believe that the Croatian food industry must be the first strategic determinant of the Croatian economy in the future. Moreover, the Croatian food industry is already a strategic economic branch. It creates 3.2 per cent of the domestic GDP as well as 3.6 per cent of the employment. Food and beverages make up as much as 25 per cent in the total of the GDP of the processing industry and over 10 per cent of total exports of the manufacturing industry. In spite of that, the domestic production of milk and meat decreases while the import of these goods increases. Additionally, Croatia itself, as a relatively small market, does not have enough demand to stimulate the concentration of small-size (average just above 10 ha) farms.

The current response to the problem should soon be addressed by the Plenković government in a Strategy for Agriculture. For now, however, it is clear that it combines the following four general elements:

  1. increasing the productivity and resilience of agricultural production,
  2. enhancing the competitiveness of the agri-food system,
  3. restoring the rural economy and improving the living conditions in rural areas, and
  4. encouraging agri-food innovation.

Although the question of agricultural reform has long been disputed and awaited, the expected shortages in food production after COVID-19 might actually help the Croatian authorities to resolve the issue.

Conclusions: Programme for Reform. While the choice of the Prime Minister (incumbent or the future) as to the choice of the directions of domestic reforms remains unclear, the availability of the EU funds will legitimise keeping the overgrown Croatian administration on board. Adopted by the Government on the 30th of April, the national reform programme for the coming two years is focused on the modernisation of the economy according to the principle of sustainability. The programme can be interpreted as a confirmation of Croatia’s support for the EU Green Deal and its support for the development of the agriculture industry. On the same day, the Government adopted the Plan for Administrative Relief by digitalisation of some bureaucratic procedures, which is intended to unburden the economy by 686 million HRK (or over 90 million EUR).

The increase of Croatia’s public debt in the eve of joining the Eurozone will result in limiting public spending. This contradicts the idea of increasing investments and the development of agriculture and green technologies. It is therefore likely that the government in Croatia will tighten its domestic fiscal policy and the collection of taxes while, on the other hand, it will increase the absorption of European funds.

“Magna Hungaria” and “the Treaty of Trianon” in the Hungarian politics of memory: an outline of the issue (Agata Tatarenko)

The film by László Nemes titled Napszállta (Sunset) premiered in Poland on 5 April 2019. The action of the film takes place in 1913. A young milliner, Irisz Leiter (Juli Jakab) arrives in Budapest with the hopes of discovering family history associated with a millinery bearing her surname. The significance of the work by the Hungarian director goes beyond the movie’s plot. Nemes himself frequently argued that the film pertains to the twilight of the civilization and contains references to the present day. Set in historical reality, the film became the starting point in the discussion regarding Hungarian cultural memory and how the 1867-1914 period, the “golden age”, functions in the memory. The period concludes with WWI and the Treaty of Trianon, universally referred to as a “national tragedy”. Even though not directly, the film discusses this particular issue.

Magna Hungaria in the cultural memory and politics of memory in Hungary. In the pre-WWI period, Hungary was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Budapest was booming and could go head to head with Vienna. Ever since the 1867 Austro-Hungarian agreement, the position of Hungary in the Habsburg Empire grew steadily. Despite the fact that the Austro-Hungarian period was a de facto time when Hungary surrendered its independence – or at least a part of it – the period is reminisced with an idealized nostalgia. This is acknowledged in the way the image of Franz Joseph (remembered as a congenial old man loved by the people) is maintained in the cultural memory of Hungarians (and not only them).

The period between 1867 and 1914 is remembered by Hungarians as the time of development and progress, as Nagy-Magyarország, i.e. Magna Hungaria (Great Hungary). The term is also used at present. It is employed by irredentist movements postulating the return to the pre-WWI shape of the Hungarian boundary. It also emerges in Fidesz political discourse, especially in the statements of Viktor Orbán, who has been systematically attempting to rekindle the myth of Magna Hungaria, e.g. during the annual visit to Băile Tușnad (Hun. Tusnádfürdő), a spa town in Romanian Transylvania. This serves the regional politics and supports Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine.

The Magna Hungaria myth László Nemes deals with is popular not only in the Hungarian politics of memory, but also functions in Hungarian collective consciousness. The map of the pre-1920 Hungarian territory is a universally known and recognized symbol in Hungary. It is featured not only on post stamps but also on bumper stickers and t-shirts.

The Treaty of Trianon in the Hungarian politics of memory. Hungarian “golden age” was interrupted by WWI and the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, remembered in Hungarian cultural politics as a “national tragedy”. As a consequence of the treaty, the territory of Magna Hungaria was divided among five countries: Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Austria, and Poland. This resulted in the decrease of the Hungarian population from 21 to 8 million. Estimates vary, but approx. 2-3.5 million people of Hungarian nationality found themselves outside the Hungarian boundary. The date of the treaty, 4 June 1920, became a national day of mourning. On that day, national flags flew at half-staff, and remained so until 1938. Schools prayed for the return to the pre-Trianon state of affairs. Simultaneously with these symbolic gestures, the Hungarian parliament passed laws applying to e.g. Transylvania. The revision of the Trianon provisions became the main objective of Hungarian politics in the interwar period.

At present, the governing party continues the tradition of depicting Trianon as a national trauma, as one of the greatest tragedies which befell the Hungarian nation in the 20th century, and as a source of suffering of the nation, including the part of it which landed outside the country’s boundary. This final element is currently a reference point for actions to the benefit of the Hungarian diaspora. Trianon is also featured in a more general narration present in the Hungarian politics of memory – the narration concerning a nation experiencing the yoke of external oppression.

The fact that the attitude of Fidesz towards Trianon evolved over time is noteworthy. In 1990, when György Szabad, the chairman of the National Assembly of Hungary, turned to delegates to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the treaty, members of Fidesz walked out of the chamber to express their opposition. This proves that Fidesz uses historical issues instrumentally and subordinates these to its political agenda.

Such an approach supplies the Hungarian government with symbolic arguments in regional foreign politics. This is valid for e.g. the Act on Hungarian Nationality. On 26 May 2010, the Hungarian parliament adopted the act allowing Hungarians residing abroad permanently to apply for Hungarian citizenship in a simplified procedure. The regulations came into force on 1 January 2011. The Trianon narration, systematically used in the Fidesz political discourse, offered historical legitimization for the introduction of the law.

Trianon in the symbolic space of Budapest. In order to consolidate the position of the Treaty of Trianon in Hungarian cultural politics, the event was commemorated symbolically on the map of Budapest. In June 2008, Trianon Memorial Park was opened in the southern part of the capital city. The park commemorates the territory lost in the aftermath of the treaty of June 1920. The central position in the park is occupied by a bell which strikes daily at 16:32 – the time when the document was signed.

On the other hand, on 11 April 2019, The Steindl Imre Program company introduced the project for the Memorial of National Unity (Nemzeti összetartozás emlékhelye). The memorial commemorates the Treaty of Trianon. The monument will be situated at Alkotmány Street, next to the building of the Hungarian parliament. According to the authors of the project, it will not constitute a monument but a site of national memory, and will simultaneously offer a functional transformation of space: a 100-meter long, 4-meter wide ramp dipping from Kossuth Square to Alkotmány Street. Both sides of the ramp will be inscribed with 12 thousand names of historical locations. The locations will include the names of places separated from the homeland as a result of the treaty, and those remaining within the Hungarian boundary – this is to symbolize the unity of the nation. The memorial will be topped with a granite block containing an eternal flame. The project will be unveiled in 2020, on 4 June, to commemorate the centennial of the treaty. The day was also established as the Day of National Unity by the Hungarian parliament in 2010.

The symbolism of the memorial and its location – the ramp, inclining towards the building of the Hungarian parliament – are a perfect embodiment of the fundamental premises of Fidesz’s present politics of memory. First of all, the historical suffering of the Hungarian nation is supposed to constitute a modern source of revival. Secondly, the Hungarian nation experienced oppression brought about by other countries. The grievance will be compensated thanks to the present ruling elite.

Conclusions. Magna Hungaria and the „tragedy in Trianon” constitute significant elements of Viktor Orbán’s party’s political discourse. The two terms are rooted in Hungarian cultural memory and symbolic space. They are flexible and susceptible to manipulation – the events are attractive for the public (on the one hand, the compelling “golden age”, Hungarian belle époque, and on the other hand, national trauma) but cannot be verified by the tales of the living witnesses to these events. The politics of memory pursued by Fidesz by means of these terms has several fundamental objectives. Primarily, it legitimizes Fidesz and its actions historically, especially in terms of the regional politics and provisions pertaining to the situation of Hungarian minorities in East-Central Europe. Slightly less directly, it exerts an impact upon the anti-immigration politics of Viktor Orbán by diverting attention to the condition of Hungarian diaspora. In addition, it brings to memory the injustice experienced by the Hungarian nation brought about by other countries, as well as the memory associated with external threats. As a consequence, it is well within the “martial rhetoric” employed by Viktor Orbán.

Trans. Tomasz Kuraś

Croatian-Polish cooperation for implementing the European Green Deal (Ana-Maria Boromisa)

The European Green Deal has been designed as the EU’s new growth strategy. Its aim is to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50% by 2030 and achieve climate neutrality by 2050. The European Green Deal should enable inclusive transformation and requires at least €1 trillion investment until 2030.

Based on the proposed 2021-2027 multi-annual EU budget and extrapolated by 2030, the EU budget could provide around €503 billion for the European Green Deal. This should trigger national co-financing of approximately €114 billion. To achieve this, additional financing from the member states and private actors is needed.

The range and the scale of necessary funding vary among the regions. A profound economic and social transformation is imperative in regions where jobs depend on fossil fuels (including coal, lignite, peat, and oil shale) or carbon-intensive industrial processes emitting greenhouse-gases. The European Commission preliminary identified such regions in every member state, including two in Croatia (Sisak-Moslavina and Istria county) and six in Poland (Silesia, Wielkopolska, Lower Silesia, Łódzkie, Lubelskie, and Malopolska). A Just Transition Mechanism should provide tailored financial and practical support in transforming the regions with the most significant challenges regarding the transition to a low carbon economy. The Just Transition Mechanism will be available to all member states, focusing on the most affected regions. It will mobilise around €143 billion by 2030 (at least €100 billion of investments throughout 2021-2027) from three sources:

(i) the Just Transition Fund, which will be equipped with fresh funds of €7.5 billion from the EU budget and will come on top of the Commission’s 2018 proposal for the long-term budget. The €7.5 billion should be complemented with resources from the cohesion policy funds and from national co-financing (up to a total of €30-50 billion).

(ii) a dedicated just transition scheme provided by the EU budget through the new InvestEU Programme, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and others. InvestEU will dedicate at least 30% of mobilised investments to climate and environment-related projects (about €45 billion of sustainable investments in the regions most affected by the transition challenges).

(iii) Public sector loans (provided by the EIB).

The Just Transition Mechanism will finance projects ranging from the creation of new workplaces, through support to companies, job search and re-skilling assistance for job-seekers who have lost their employment due to the transition, as well as the renovation of buildings and investments in renewable energy, district heating networks, and sustainable transport.

The Green Deal has been set as a priority of the 2021-2027 EU multiannual financial framework. While the negotiations on the long-term EU budget have been quite advanced, the coming German Presidency to the Council of the EU will be a coronavirus presidency. The Commission plans to adopt a multiannual financial framework proposal to accommodate new measures that reflect the current situation and outlook. While the EU budget will have to reflect on the impact of this crisis and the scale of the challenges lying ahead, the economic recovery (and thus the EU’s growth strategy which is the Green New Deal) will play a central role in the new multiannual financial framework.

Prioritising and sequencing measures is challenging. On the one hand, there is the position that it is not the time for green ideas and that the economies and societies should recover first. On the other hand, the current challenges can be regarded as the perfect time to start implementing a third – “clean” – industrial revolution. Full integration of the Covid-19 recovery stimulus packages and the Green New Deal can accelerate the transition and facilitate job creation.

The aggregate amount of member states’ discretionary fiscal measures amounted to 3% of the EU’s GDP by 10th April. Liquidity support for sectors facing disruptions and companies facing liquidity shortages, consisting of public guarantee schemes and deferred tax payments, exceed 16% of the EU’s GDP. The green component of the coronavirus economic stimulus packages should be significantly increased by channelling funds into the shovel-ready Green Deal measures. Investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy are labour-rich and, therefore, they could trigger immediate economic response to the pandemic, focusing the prevention of job losses. Such measures provide opportunities to boost innovation and industrial transition and they could restart Europe by fostering resilience. In the regions where jobs depend on fossil fuels or carbon-intensive industries, a new industrial strategy together with the Just Transition Mechanism, can provide opportunities for economic recovery, green and digital transformation, and increased competitiveness. This requires:

  • productive investments in SMEs, including start-ups, leading to economic diversification and reconversion, investments in research and innovation activities, and fostering the transfer of advanced technologies;
  • investments in the deployment of technology and infrastructures for affordable clean energy and in greenhouse gas emission reduction;
  • investments in enhancing the circular economy;
  • upskilling and reskilling of workers.

This is ambitious. Implementation requires cooperation, transfer of knowledge, and solidarity. There is a challenge that regions will compete for EU funds rather than co-operate, which is an understandable reaction. Nonetheless, the Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated that rapid and radical changes are possible. Thus, the inclusive transformation towards a resource-efficient and competitive economy with zero net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050 and the decoupling of economic growth from resource use is possible. Interlacing the coronavirus crisis mitigation measures with the European Green Deal could enhance the impact of both.

The content of this IEŚ Commentaries reflects only the views of its author and should not be associated with the official position of the Institute of Central Europe in Lublin.

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* Ana-Maria Boromisa – Institute for Development and International Relations, Zagreb, Croatia.

Removal of the Statue of Marshal Ivan Konev in Prague: a crisis in Czech-Russian relations (Agata Tatarenko)

The monument to Ivan Stepanovich Konev, Soviet military commander and marshal of the Soviet Union, located on Prague’s International Brigade Square (náměstí Interbrigády, Prague 6, Bubeneč), was unveiled on May 9, 1980, on the 35th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia. It is located in the same district as the Embassy of the Russian Federation and not far from the Hotel International Prague, the largest Stalinist architecture building in Prague, built in 1952-1954 – and thus in a space with a large symbolic load. The date of foundation of the monument to Marshal Konev needs to be underlined. Its creation was not the result of the “spontaneous reaction of the Czechoslovak people”, such as the monument to the liberation of Prague by the Red Army in Smichov – the later famous “pink tank”.[1]

Disputes around the monument to Marshal Konev. The first voices calling for the removal of the monument appeared already in the early 1990s on the wave of decommunization of public space in the Czech Republic. This problem was systematically resurfacing in Czech newspapers and during meetings of the Prague 6 local authorities. The statue had its supporters and opponents. In 2018, despite numerous public objections, the memorial was restored. Three tables have been added, in Czech, English and Russian. On each of them, the inscription read among others that Marshal Konev commanded the Soviet Ground Forces which suppressed the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, and that in 1968 he personally backed the intelligence surveillance preceding the invasions of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact into Czechoslovakia. This last sentence in particular (in the original: V roce 1968 osobně zaštítil zpravodajský průzkum před vpádem vojsk Varšavské smlouvy do Československa) caused numerous protests, mainly from Russia. The embassy of the Russian Federation in Prague, citing information from the archives of the Russian Ministry of Defence, said the record was false because Marshal Konev ended his command function in the armed forces of the Soviet Union in April 1963 due to his age (in 1968 he was 71 years old). It is worth adding that, according to some Czech historians, Konev’s role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 could not be decisive and was rather of a secondary nature.

In 2015-2020 the monument to Marshal Konev was the subject of many discussions at local, national and international levels. It also aroused numerous social controversies. Local activists have repeatedly collected signatures on a petition to remove the monument. In response, counter-movements arose about leaving the monument on Prague Square. The monument was often covered with pink or red paint. In response to these activities, consideration was given to moving the monument to the garden at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Prague or placing it in a museum, e.g. the Prague City Museum. Czech president Miloš Zeman spoke many times in favor of leaving this commemoration in place, particularly emphasizing this before his visit to Russia in 2017.

The dispute over the memorial intensified in the second half of 2019. Representatives of almost all political parties in the Czech Republic, including in particular the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), were involved. In an official statement issued on August 30, 2019, the party demanded that the memorial be preserved. Despite numerous protests, including on the Russian side, on September 12, 2019, the local government of Prague 6 decided to remove the Konev’s statue. At the same time, it was planned to fund another memorial related to the liberation of Prague in the same place. In turn, KSČM vice-chairman Petr Šimůnek applied to enter the Konev monument in the Czech monument register, which would allow its original location to be preserved. The Czech Ministry of Culture rejected this proposal. It was considered that the statue did not meet the requirements, namely “it is not an outstanding work of art.” The decision to remove the monument was met with a sharp reaction from Russia, both from the representatives of the authorities and the Russian media.

Removal of the statue. Despite the decision of Prague authorities, the memorial remained intact for several months. It was not until the morning of April 3, 2020 that the statue of Marshal Konev was removed. In the future, the monument will become part of the collection of the Museum of Memory of the 20th Century to be built in Prague. So far, it has not been decided exactly where the institution will be based. Currently, it is active only on social media. The donation was not commented on by the official profile of the museum.

Removal of the sculpture was met with a positive response from a significant part of Czech society. There were also some humorous references to the COVID-19 pandemic situation. Ondřej Kolář (TOP 09), Mayor of Prague 6, commented on his social media profile that the statue of Konev was removed because “it did not have a mask, and the rules apply to everyone the same” (in the Czech Republic, the obligation to wear masks or other covering the mouth was introduced for all persons moving in public space).

The actions of local authorities were criticized by the President of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman, who described them as unjustified, especially in quarantine conditions. Václav Klaus also expressed a similar opinion. The removal of the statue was also critically assessed by representatives of KSČM. It was pointed out that the monument was destroyed in circumstances that prevented any form of protest. The Prague 6 administration replied to these allegations that the dismantling of the monument was planned long before the SARS-Cov-2 virus pandemic.

Reaction from Russia. The removal of the monument was strongly criticized by Russia. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the actions of the Czech authorities “fighting the symbols of victory over Nazism”, while Vladimir Medinsky, the former minister of Russian culture referred to them as “sacrilege”. In an official comment posted on the website of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Prague, the whole action was unequivocally condemned and described as “an act of vandalism”. It was considered that this step constituted a direct violation of the 1993 agreement on friendly relations and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic (Smlouva o přátelství a spolupráci s Ruskem[2]), under which the Czech and Russian authorities were to cooperate in the field of protection of cultural and artistic heritage of their countries and provide care, maintenance and access to military graves and monuments in the territory of each party (Articles 18 and 21). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, the dismantling of the monument to Marshal Konev does not violate the provisions of said contract.

Two days after the removal of the monument, on April 5, 2020, a group of masked people threw smoke bombs at the Czech Embassy in Moscow. In addition, an inscription in Russian was placed on the embassy fence: “Stop fascism”. On April 6, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic announced in an official note that Russia, as a country receiving Czech representation in its territory, is obliged to protect such representation. The Czech authorities also hoped that similar incidents would not occur in the future. The letter was left without an official response from Russia. The non-registered political party “Other Russia” (Другая Россия) responded to the letter on its website. The removal of the monument was described there as “part of the overall strategy of European countries to revise the result of World War II” and as “a denial of the merits of the Soviet people in the fight against Nazism, whereby the Czech authorities themselves are entering the path to justify Nazism”.[3]

On April 10, 2020, on the website of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (Следственный комитет Российской Федерации), information appeared that a criminal case was initiated in the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation due to a crime under Part 3 of Art. 354.1 of the Penal Code (profanation of symbols of the military glory of Russia, committed in public). The case concerns the dismantling of the Konev monument in Prague.[4]

Conclusions. The lack of official response from the Russian authorities regarding the attack on the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Prague indicates a deepening crisis in Czech-Russian reactions in which Prague’s local government is involved. It is worth recalling that, according to the decision of the local authorities, on February 27, 2020 the ceremony of naming the city square after Boris Nemtsov took place near the Embassy of the Russian Federation, located in the Bubeneč district of Prague. The removal of the monument to Marshal Konev shows the continuation of the critical policy towards Russia implemented by the Czech opposition parties, such as the Czech Pirate Party or TOP 9. Andrej Babiš has yet to refer to the dismantling of the Konev monument, indicating his desire to maintain distance in Czech-Russian relations. The Czech prime minister is guided by moderate criticism in relations with Russia, which results not only from his views on foreign policy, but also from some kind of power alliance with President Zeman, known for his pro-Russian sympathies. Paradoxically, the ongoing COVID-19 epidemic favors the political juggling characteristic of Babiš. It can therefore be assumed that the joint history of the Czech Republic and Russia is a cause of a greater conflict, including on the internal political scene on the Vltava River.

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[1] See more A. Tatarenko, Relikty komunizmu: polityka historyczna wobec materialnego dziedzictwa sowieckiego w Republice Czeskiej, Prace IEŚ, nr 1 (1/2019), https://ies.lublin.pl/pub/publikacje/prace/ies-prace-1-1-2019.pdf.

[2] Smlouva o přátelství a spolupráci s Ruskem. Sdělení č. 99/1996 Sb., https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1996-99?fbclid=IwAR08chS0vlkuEb84fQqEOMkiBvOBWeeG0WT_PmtP7lWFVRDyPjEkW2ySR3A [09-04-2020].

[3] Нацболы атаковали посольство Чехии в Москве, https://drugoros.ru/novosti/azwkgm7m [09-04-2020].

[4] Возбуждено уголовное дело о сносе памятника Маршалу Коневу в Праге, https://sledcom.ru/news/item/1454798/ [10-04-2020].

COVID-19 and the digitalization of Central Europe (Marlena Gołębiowska)

Distance yes, but not in cyberspace. The coronavirus pandemic, more precisely: the measures taken by states to prevent further spread of COVID-19 constitute an unprecedented shock to the global economy, in terms of scale and specificity. Forcing people to keep social distance causes serious, not to say catastrophic, economic consequences. However, it has become apparent how immediately and efficiently human activity has been transferred – where possible – to cyberspace.

Estonia, known for good e-government practices, has allowed to report a child’s birth and give them a name without leaving home since 19 March[1]. The National Theatre in Prague offers live dancing classes conducted online by Czech ballet masters. In Romania, medical mobile platforms are launching online consultations for patients with chronic diseases or mild conditions. Many similar examples from the countries of Central Europe can be identified. Today millions of people work, study, enjoy additional activities – including sports – shop, visit museums or participate in concerts without leaving home.

Experience shows that the pace of digital transformation depends on two groups of factors. On the one hand, this is a broad institutional issue including informal cultural norms and habits. On the other hand, there are tangible constraints, such as the availability of relevant infrastructure. The current crisis has a chance to have a positive impact particularly on the former.

Change of habits. One of the biggest barriers to implementing innovations – including digital ones – is resistance to change. In order to do so, an external stimulus is sometimes needed that will disrupt current habits, the status quo, and will bring “forced experimentation”. Researchers from the universities of Oxford and Cambridge took up this issue[2]. They looked at the strikes of the London Underground workers of 2014, which blocked some lines and caused travel chaos. It seemed that for commuters who were going to work at that time, no good would come of it. However, it turned out that 5% of passengers who had been forced to use other alternative routes stuck to them after the strikes because they were more efficient – allowing them to reach their destination faster. The definitive cost-benefit statement showed that the time saved in the long term exceeded the time lost by commuters during the strike.

The Economist recently referred to these studies[3], noting some analogy to the current situation, stating that the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic poses a much greater challenge than the strike of transport workers. However, the “forced experiment” that we are currently experiencing can potentially also permanently change certain trends in business organization and public administration. These include, among others, implementation on a much larger scale of remote work and e-services than before. In some cases, this may prove much more efficient, just as alternative routes were for London Underground travellers. So far, in terms of the proportion of remote workers and the implementation of e-services, most of the Central European countries have clearly lagged behind the developed countries of Western Europe. Moreover, northern countries had a much greater flexibility of work, whereas the south had less. For example, among Central European countries, the highest percentage of people who at least once worked remotely in 2018 is 22% in Estonia and 16% in Latvia, while the lowest is in Kosovo and Romania – 4% (in Poland 12%). Similar differences exist in e-services: 80% of Estonian residents have used e-government at least once in the last 12 months, while in Romania only12% have (Poland – 40%)[4].

Infrastructure. The pace of digital transformation is also highly dependent on the above-mentioned relevant infrastructure. The current crisis has emerged at a certain “state” point in its development, thus giving different response possibilities for both businesses and public administrations. Differences between the countries of Central Europe in this area are very significant. This is demonstrated by the selected Eurostat data[5] from (extreme values are presented, i.e. for the country with the highest regional and lowest indicator):

  • 90% of households in Estonia have internet access, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina 72% (in Poland – 87%),
  • 83% of households in Estonia have a fixed broadband connection, 58% in Bulgaria (62% in Poland),
  • 68% of the Estonian residents made online purchases in the last 12 months, Montenegro – 16% (in Poland – 54%),
  • 81% of Estonian residents use internet banking, Montenegro – 3% (Polish – 47%),
  • 29% of non-financial enterprises in the Czech Republic conduct e-commerce sales – e-commerce, in Bulgaria – 7% (in Poland – 14%),
  • 83% of non-financial enterprises in the Czech Republic have a website, in Bulgaria – 47% (in Poland – 70%).

The digital efficiency of the Central European countries, at least those of the European Union, is presented comprehensively by the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) published by the European Commission. According to its latest edition of 2019, Estonia is the most efficient in this regard among the Central European countries, but has only taken 8th place on an EU-wide basis. The other countries and their positions: Lithuania – 14th, Slovenia – 16th, Latvia – 17th, Czech Republic – 18th, Croatia – 20th, Slovakia – 21st, Hungary – 23rd, Poland – 25th, Romania – 27th and finally Bulgaria – 28th against the backdrop of the EU.

Digital single market. The DESI Index is a tool that has been developed to measure the progress of EU countries toward a digital single market. It is a strategy adopted by the EC in 2015, the main objective of which is to remove national restrictions on online transactions. The Digital Single market, as stated in the European Parliament’s documents, is “one of the most promising and challenging areas of progress”. It took initiatives such as General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR) in 2016 and the abolition of roaming charges in 2017.

The main differences in digital efficiency in the Member States have led the EU to take further action including the creation of the next long-term budget for 2021-2027 of the Digital Europe Programme. The programme is expected to start in 2021 and provide funding for projects in five areas: supercomputing, artificial intelligence, cyber security, advanced digital skills and the widespread use of digital technologies across the economy and across all societal groups.

Conclusions. The experience of the crisis that the world is currently facing will also be reflected in the economies of Central Europe. At the same time, the crisis can be a stimulus that will accelerate the pace of needed reforms, lead to a change of thinking and pave the way for digitalization efforts in the coming years.

The explosion of the COVID-19 pandemic has made digital technology more important than ever. The coronavirus crisis has also highlighted its significance. At the company level, implementation of digital solutions is a key factor in market success (and often survival in the current situation). At the level of the economies – especially those that are making up for a lack of development, aspiring to a group of highly developed economies – digital transformation is a prerequisite for bridging the technological gap and is now becoming a key factor in global competitiveness.

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[1] Before that only married couples could do so.

[2] S. Larcom, F. Rauch, T. Willems, The benefits of forced experimentation: striking evidence from the London underground network, „The Quarterly Journal of Economics” 2017, vol. 132, issue 4, s. 2019–2055.

[3] The Economist, Covid-19 is foisting changes on business that could be beneficial, www.economist.com/business/2020/03/05/covid-19-is-foisting-changes-on-business-that-could-be-beneficial [access: 5.04.2020].

[4] Eurostat, Database – Digital economy and society, www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/digital-economy-and-society/data/database [access: 5.04.2020].

[5] Ibidem.

COVID-19 Pandemic in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia (Szczepan Czarnecki, Dominik Héjj, Łukasz Lewkowicz, Agata Tatarenko)

Czechia

As of 13 March 2020, the Czech government approved the declaration of the state of emergency in the whole territory of the Czech Republic for 30 days. On 30 March, the government decided to extend the emergency measure against the spread of the COVID-19. The extraordinary measure from the government following the declaration of the state of emergency, limiting freedom of movement and residence of persons until Tuesday, 24 March 2020, with certain exceptions, will now be extended until 11 April due to developments in the coronavirus pandemic in the Czech Republic.

Government stimulus package to appear soon. The so-called ‘Antivirus’ program includes, e.g. a state contribution to compensate the earnings of various business entities whose economic activity will be jeopardized due to the COVID-19 pandemic in Czechia. Another part of the program is the ‘kurzarbeit’ (eng. ‘short-time working’) which means that the employer shortens the employee’s work time, but keeps their work position. The state will contribute to the employees wages under the condition that the company does not lay off its employees. This Program is intended to, for example, companies that have had operational issues due to reasons such as quarantine of an employee, a fall in demand, a lack of material or temporary closure of operations due to the government shut-down. They may receive a wage allowance of 60% or 80% depending on why their operation has been limited or stopped. Companies will be able to apply for the support from Wednesday, 1 April.

Due to the developments in the coronavirus pandemic in Czechia, the Czech Chamber of Deputies approved a draft amendment to the State Budget Act for 2020. The amendment envisages total revenues of CZK 1,488.3 billion and expenditures of CZK 1,688.3 billion this year. The state budget deficit will be CZK 200 billion compared to planned CZK 40 billion. The main change on the expenditure side of the state budget is an increase in the government budget reserve of CZK 59.3 billion. These funds will be operationally used to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 epidemic and manage of its effects. As part of the necessary austerity measures, the budget of the Ministry of Defense is reduced by CZK 2.9 billion on the expenditure side.

Hungary

On 4 March, the first case of a person with COVID-19 was diagnosed in Hungary. Since then, Hungarian government have been trying to stop a pandemic in Hungary. On 11 March, the government declared a ‘state of danger’ caused by COVID-19.

An anti-crisis program was presented on 18 March, by Viktor Orban. By the end of this year neither private individuals nor companies will have to repay existing loans – payments are suspended. The government have also reduced the APRC to 5% on all loans taken since 19  March this year. By government decision, the hotel, entertainment, sports, cultural and passenger transport industries do not have to pay pension and disability pension contributions at all. For other industries, pension contribution, health insurance have been limited to the minimum. The moratorium will last until 30 June 2020. Taxi drivers have been exempted from having to pay a flat-rate income tax. In the industries mentioned above, the government prevented the termination of lease agreements and changes to the terms of these agreements.

Coronavirus Protection Act. The first period of this extraordinary ‘special legal order’ was forced till 30 March. On this day Hungarian National Assembly passed bill (so called) Coronavirus Protection Act. As a result of this Act, the ‘state of danger’ now is without any time limit. The National Assembly is de facto suspended. During the ‘state of danger’ the government has the right to rule by decree, without National Assembly. It is also forbidden to organize any elections or any referendum at the level of any local government.

The new unlimited power of Prime Minister Orbán was criticized by politics and public opinion in EU. The Minister of Justice of Hungary, Judit Varga, who prepared this bill said that the point of Coronavirus Protection Act it to save Hungarian people. The government also said that The National Assembly may withdraw the authorization to rule by decree before the end of the period of state of danger. In fact, it is not possible, because Fidesz-KDNP have 2/3 majority in the Parliament, which means that National Assembly will not take any steps against the will of the Fidesz-KNPD government.

Slovakia

On 12 March, the Slovak government decided to introduce a state of emergency caused by COVID-19. The first restrictions came into force the day after. Then government at an extraordinary meeting on 15 March, declared to introduce a state of emergency in health care. Since 24 March it is not allowed to leave the house without covered respiratory track, at the same time it was allowed to open places such as haberdashery, garden stores, computer services or notary offices. The Conference of the Episcopate of Slovakia has decided that Easter  holy masses will be celebrated without parishioners. According to the forecasts of the Minister of Health, the peak incidence in Slovakia will take place in July this year.

The Slovak government have announced an anti-crisis package to help entrepreneurs and companies: the state will pay 80% of the employee’s salary in companies whose operations must be stopped. Allowances for sole proprietorships and employees in companies that have experienced a decline in income have been introduced. Monthly bank guarantees in the amount of EUR 500 million were granted, which commercial banks will then transfer to entrepreneurs on favourable terms. 55% of gross salary will be paid to employees quarantined and those on care leave. The employer will postpone the payment of contributions when the income drops by more than 40%. Advances on income tax will be deferred when income drops by more than 40%. Companies that recorded a loss in 2014–2018 and have not yet accounted for it will be able to do so now. It is the largest aid for the economy in the history of Slovakia. It is estimated that it will cost EUR 1 billion per month for direct payments and EUR 500 million for bank guarantees.

The Slovak government have also decided to create a Mutual Assistance Fund that will help the citizens affected by the crisis caused by the COVID-19. The MAF will be funded by coalition deputies, ministers and other people cooperating with the government. Prime Minister Igor Matovič announced on 1 April, that he would give up all his salary for the fund himself. He is also considering a total ‘blackout’ of Slovakia if that is a chance for a quick resolution of the situation caused by COVID-19.

Conclusions

Solutions introduced by the Czech, Hungarian and Slovak authorities in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic can already be assessed as very expensive. At the same time, it is not known whether they will be sufficient to minimize the social costs of the pandemic. It all depends on how long the restrictions will last. Furthermore, the situation of Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and also Poland, where many factories of international concerns are located, will also depend on supply chains. An optimistic note came from some western analysts, American think tanks in particular, that post-communist Central European countries have large experience of overcoming economic crises, which might be very useful in this situation.

Montenegro in the face of COVID-19 pandemic (Agata Domachowska)

It was not until 17th March 2020 that the first case of SARS-CoV-2 was confirmed in Montenegro. As of 3rd April 2020 there were 160 people infected with this virus, and two persons died. The highest number of cases was reported in Podgorica municipality, i.e. the state’s capital (73 cases) and in the neighbouring Tuzi (34 cases). Initially, the number of recorded cases grew the fastest in Tuzi, thus on 24th March the municipality was put in a complete lockdown. The Montenegrin authorities expected a rapid growth in the number of the coronavirus cases in the next two weeks.

Reaction of the authorities. Although the first SARS-CoV-2 case was confirmed in Montenegro not earlier than in the second half of March, the Montenegrin government had already undertaken a number of actions to prepare the state to the crisis. The interdepartmental National Coordination Body for Infectious Diseases (Nacionalno Koordinaciono Tijelo, NKT) responsible for implementing subsequent solutions to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2, decided to establish on 25th March the Crisis Medical Staff. On the following day, the NKT announced coronavirus epidemic posing a nationwide threat. One of the first decisions taken by the government was to close from 16th March kindergartens, schools and institutions of higher education and to organize remote classes instead. Then the quarantine facilities for the citizens were prepared at the premises of the Regional School of Public Administration in Danilovgrad and in the former Zoganj barracks in Ulcinj. Moreover, shopping centres, sports facilities, playgrounds and restaurants got closed. Organization of mass gatherings was prohibited. Aleksandar Bogdanović, the Minister of Culture, announced financial assistance for cultural institutions and the media sector. The government also organized a series of meetings with representatives of retail chains, who confirmed that they had reserves for the next three to four months.

Religious services can only take place without the participation of the congregation, and funerals can be attended only by the closest family. Earlier (13th March), the Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral announced that the prayer marches organized since December 2019 and attended by crowds would stop (see “Komentarze IEŚ”, No. 106). He also asked the public television (RTCG) to broadcast. At the same time, he offered the Church facilities for persons in quarantine.

Initially, the Montenegrin government decided to close selected border crossings and to ban yachts in certain ports. Next, the complete closing of the borders was announced and foreigners were forbidden from entering the country. Air, rail and bus services were also suspended. Under the new restrictive measures, only two adults were allowed to travel in one vehicle. What is more, on 30th March, the government introduced the curfew from Monday to Friday from 7 p.m. to 5 a.m. and from 1 p.m. on Saturday to 5 a.m. on Monday. The ban did not apply to e.g. health service workers, inspections, police, the army, fire brigade, municipal services and the media. Moreover, children under 12 could stay outside their home only if accompanied by an adult.

The Montenegrin authorities also decided to postpone local government election in Tivat, planned for 5th April. Another restriction measure introduced by the government (on 21st March) was publication of a list of people in mandatory 14-day self-isolation. This decision caused controversy in the society. In the opinion of part of opposition and some non-governmental organizations, this solution poses a threat to human rights and freedoms as disclosing the identity of isolated people in Montenegro is unconstitutional and against the personal data protection act. They also claim that the introduced measures have no legal basis in a situation where a state of emergency has not yet been declared. As a result, these circles have been appealing to the government to cease these practices (de facto stigmatizing and discriminatory ones). However, the Montenegrin prime minister Duško Marković says that the list will not be removed, arguing that the health and life of citizens is more important than protecting personal information. Meanwhile, in the Montenegrin media there appears more and more information about individuals detained by the police for violating the self-isolation order or other bans introduced by the government in order to counteract the pandemic.

Economic package. Since the beginning of the crisis, the Montenegrin authorities said that the novel coronavirus will negatively influence the tourist branch, so important for the Montenegrin economy, which will affect the economic growth. To calm down the citizens, on 16th March the President of the Central Bank of Montenegro Radoje Zugić announced that the measures to address the negative effects of the pandemic would be taken quickly. On 19th March, the Montenegrin government presented further solutions to reduce the negative effects of the pandemic, which include:

  • postponing the due date for repaying the loan at the request of citizens and enterprises for a period of 90 days,
  • establishing a new credit line aimed at improving cash flow of entrepreneurs – the beneficiary can receive up to 3 million euros. These funds are for businesses from the medical, tourist, catering, transport, and food industries,
  • providing one-off financial aid of 50 euros to pensioners with the lowest income, as well as to people using other social benefits,
  • postponing by 90 days the due date of rental payment for state-owned properties,
  • suspension of all budget allowances for work in commissions, committees, and other provisional bodies of government administration,
  • limiting and controlling budget expenditure, including freezing of public investments, except those necessary for the functioning of the healthcare system. The budget is to ensure both the protection of citizens’ health and the efficient functioning of the state.

At the same time, the Montenegrin prime minister assured that the government would limit budget expenditure and abolish the payment of allowances to MPs’ salaries. It was also decided that members of the government would pay half of their salary to the NKT account. On 30th March, the prime minister also established a working group to prepare a new package of support measures for entrepreneurs and citizens to minimize the negative effects of the crisis. The NKT chairman, Milutin Simović, hoping to obtain assistance for the Montenegrin state, organized a meeting with ambassadors at which he presented the government’s plan of action regarding the fight against the coronavirus pandemic and the calculation of Montenegro’s estimated quarterly needs of 59 million euros.

To intensify efforts in combat with the pandemic and limit its negative economic effects, the Montenegrin authorities appeal to the other Balkan countries to deepen their regional cooperation. Prime Minister Duško Marković said that Montenegro would make all its ports available to partners from the region to maintain the flow of goods. He also called for solidarity in the face of the global coronavirus pandemic. Moreover, as the head of the state’s government which currently chairs the Central European Initiative (CEI), Marković proposed to organize a regional conference on defence against coronavirus.

Support in the fight against coronavirus. The European Union will provide Montenegro with 3 million euros for necessary and immediate assistance to the health care service and 50 million euros as part of a long-term support program to improve the socio-economic situation of the country, in line with the needs defined by the Montenegrin government. Montenegro has already received limited aid from other countries. China donated five thousand protective masks and one thousand coronavirus tests to Montenegro. Support in the form of one thousand tests was offered by Turkey as well. In turn, the United Arab Emirates sent to Montenegro e.g. 3 tonnes of medical supplies. Moreover, private investors have also been involved in supporting the Montenegrin authorities in the fight against the pandemic (for example, the Greek businessman Petros Stathis at the special request of Prime Minister Marković donated 3.5 thousand tonnes of protective equipment for Montenegrin hospitals). Meanwhile (27th March), the NKT turned to the NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) with a request to provide Montenegro with support in the form of hospital beds, respirators, surgical masks, disinfectants, defibrillators, ECG devices, contactless thermometers etc. The Montenegrin authorities are also hoping for expert and financial assistance from the UN and WHO.

Conclusions. Even before the first case of SARS-CoV-2 infection was confirmed in Montenegro, the government had begun to consistently introduce a series of preventative and protective measures, aimed at preparing the state and the society for the pandemic. After the outbreak, Montenegro – like other states in the region – decided that citizens should self-isolate in order to slow down the spreading of the COVID-19 pandemic. The authorities have also implemented subsequent solutions which are to mitigate the negative influence of the pandemic on the state’s economy. The most afflicted branch has been tourism, which generates approximately 25% of Montenegrin GDP. The citizens have complied with the changes; however, they clearly oppose the government publishing information about persons in mandatory self-isolation. The way in which subsequent changes have been introduced (the government makes decisions without consulting the parliament or the society) has been criticized as well. Due to limited capability of the Montenegrin health service to combat the pandemic (according to health workers, in hospitals there are shortages of equipment, means of personal protection and COVID-19 tests), the government of Montenegro, like other Western Balkan countries, is forced to rely on the help from foreign partners.

The Importance of Establishing a Consultative Council in Minsk from the Point of View of Settling the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Andrzej Szabaciuk)

Minsk agreement background. The President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenski made the desire to regulate the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine one of the key elements of his presidency. Actions undertaken in this direction have not yet brought satisfactory results, primarily due to the attitude of the Russian Federation, which for many years has obstructed the fulfilment of the Minsk agreements. Neither the Norman Format Summit in Paris (9 December, 2019) nor the meeting of the UN Security Council (19 February, 2020) brought a breakthrough in this matter. The discouragement of Western countries with the Ukrainian question was visible during the annual Munich Security Conference. The passivity of European leaders has enabled the Russian Federation to develop a controversial “12 steps” plan, clearly unfavourable to Ukraine (see “IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 126).

Another key factor generating unsuccessful changes – from the Ukrainian point of view – is the internal situation of the state. The inefficiency of the Oleksiy Honcharuk’s government and his unexpected dismissal, the decreasing public support of President Zelensky, and the increasingly visible divisions within the Servant of the People party have deepened the political chaos in Ukraine. The difficult situation has been used by the Russian Federation in an attempt to force solutions that are unfavourable to Ukraine; this is the way we should interpret actions taken by Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who organized a meeting of the delegation of 6 representatives of the Ukrainian party Opposition Platform – For Life – with Russian President Wladimir Putin and head of the Russian State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin on 10 March 2020. It was the first visit of the Verkhovna Rada representatives in the Russian Parliament since the annexation of the Crimea. The participants of the plenary session of the Russian State Duma welcomed the Ukrainian delegation with a standing ovation.

Viktor Medvedchuk calls for greater involvement of the parliaments of Russia and Ukraine, and possibly Germany and France in regulating the Ukrainian crisis. He encouraged Ukraine to adopt unfavourable legal changes, including amendments to the Constitution, which would implement the Minsk protocol and the Normandy Format arrangements in a favourable interpretation for the Kremlin. In Medvedchuk’s opinion, legislative changes shouldn’t be conditioned by any issues regarding the withdrawal of troops, delimitation of the demarcation line or control of specific sections of the Russian-Ukrainian border. The Ukrainian authorities tolerate this anti-state activity of the pro-Russian oligarch and for years have not decided to examine, in detail, his unofficial personal and financial connections with the Russian elite. Moreover, it hasn’t been possible to determine how the Opposition Platform (For Life party) is funded.

Establishment of the Consultative Council. On 11 March 2020, the day after Medvedchuk’s visit in Moscow, the Tripartite Contact Group gathered in Minsk. Except for the representatives of Ukraine OSCE and Russia, the meeting was also attended by the representatives of the presidents of Ukraine and Russia and plenipotentiaries of the self-proclaimed authorities of the separatist republics. The talks result was a confidential agreement that regulated several issues that have been the subject of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations for months. Among other things, an initially agreement was developed on the next round of exchange of prisoners: 40 people detained by separatists and 51 by Ukraine. In addition, by 18 March 2020, the Ukrainian authorities and separatists were obligated to send to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission proposals for possible new sectors where the troops of both sides will be withdrawn. Negotiations on both issues have not yet ended.

The key point of the agreement was the establishment of a Consultative Council whose main task is to support the political settlement of the conflict in the Donbas. The Council should include 20 representatives with voting rights (10 representing Ukraine and 10 on behalf of the Separate Raions of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast (ORDLO), i.e. separatist republics) and representatives of the OSCE, France, Germany, and Russia in an advisory capacity. According to the agreement, the purpose of establishing the Council is to conduct dialogue, consultations and develop proposals for political and legal recommendations for conflict resolution, including the organization of local elections in ORDLO. However, its proposals will not be binding. The Council should have been formed by 25 March – the day before the Tripartite Contact Group meeting. The coronavirus pandemic, which hindered contact with the representatives of Germany and France, and the ambiguous attitude of Ukraine, whose authorities took advantage of the situation and did not sign the text of the agreement, prevented the implementation of the Minsk protocol.

The Minsk meeting on 11 March, was exceptional. For the first time since the establishment of the Tripartite Contact Group in 2014, officials of such a high level participated in the consultations. Deputy head of the administration of the President of Russia Dmitry Kozak is a person with extensive experience in managing frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet area. For many years, he had been involved in the process of regulating the situation of Transnistria – he was one of the architects of ‘federalization’, and later ‘reunification’ of Moldova. Andriy Jermak took the position of head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine in February 2020, after the dismissal of the éminence grise of the presidential office – Andriy Bohdan. Jermak is a trusted politician from President Zełenski’s close circle. In the past, he participated in Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on the exchange of prisoners. Unofficially, we know that the representatives of presidents have negotiated the final version of the document of 11 March. Dmitry Kozak and Andriy Jermak, together with the representatives of the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republic, also countersigned the text of the agreement.

The controversy around the Consultative Council. The subject of the Minsk agreement was initially a secret. However, it leaked out to the Ukrainian media and sparked a nationwide discussion on the new advisory body and its importance. The opposition organized anti-presidential demonstrations and the intellectuals and social activists expressed criticism, seeing in it far-reaching concessions to the Kremlin and a precedent leading to the recognition of self-proclaimed separatist republics in eastern Ukraine. Information about the Minsk meeting also triggered a crisis in the ruling Servant of the People party: about 60 deputies of that party demanded clarification of the role of the representative of President Andriy Jermak during the Minsk discussions, communicating their demands in a coordinated and open manner. The President’s administration had to respond to this request, but refused to provide full information, emphasized that negotiations aren’t finished. These events are unprecedented and may show increasing divisions within the ruling party and weakening of the President’s power.

Conclusions. The protracted negotiations over the settlement of the armed conflict in the Donbas and the increasingly visible weariness of the West by the Ukrainian crisis, combined with the destabilization of social and political life by the coronavirus pandemic, are significantly weakening the negotiating position of the Ukrainian authorities. The Russian Federation and pro-Russian opposition groups in Ukraine are trying to take advantage of this situation. The concepts of Viktor Medvedchuk aimed at reframing the Minsk protocols and Norman arrangements into specific legislative projects beneficial from the Kremlin’s point of view were reflected in the text of the Minsk protocol of 11 March.

The proposed appointment of the Consultative Council is an extremely risky decision. The new advisory body equalizes the negotiating positions of the democratically elected Ukrainian authorities and the self-proclaimed authorities of the separatist republics, granting them 10 votes. Additionally, the Russian Federation loses the status of an aggressor and posing as an arbiter and adviser, which is even more dangerous. It is well known that such moves of the Kremlin preceded the freezing of conflicts in Abkhazia or Transnistria. If Ukraine decides to take such a step, it may make it easier for the Russian authorities to get rid of responsibility for developments in the Donbas and initiate talks on the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions.

Currently, the Ukrainian authorities, hiding behind the coronavirus pandemic, have withdrawn from the plans to establish the Consultative Council, postponing the implementation of the Minsk protocol of 11 March to an undefined future. The scale of social protests and opposition in the ruling camp will probably force President Zełenski to revoke from these plans. However, it will be difficult to make up for the image losses.