Russian disinformation and propaganda before and after the invasion of Ukraine

Rosyjska dezinformacja i propaganda przed i po inwazji na Ukrainę

ORCID: Oleksii Polegkyi:

Pages: 91-107

Edition: Lublin 2023


Citation method: O. Polegkyi, Russian disinformation and propaganda before and after the invasion of Ukraine, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 91-107, DOI:

Abstract: : Disinformation and propaganda are key aspects of Russia’s war strategy as it uses the information environment to justify its actions in international politics, both domestically and abroad, and to coerce audiences into unwittingly supporting its actions. Russia, leading up to and throughout the conflict with Ukraine, brought the full scope of its propaganda apparatus to bear, leveraging overt and covert capabilities on both media and disinformation tools to justify the invasion and [attempt to] destroy international support for Ukraine. What kind of instruments, methods, and narratives has Russia used before and after its invasion of Ukraine? The spread of disinformation by the Russian Federation prior to and after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 as well as the actions taken in response by Ukraine, allied governments, and civil and international organizations provide an important perspective as well as lessons on how to counteract disinformation and propagandistic narratives.


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