This concise paper explores the intricate relationship between the dynamics of the European Union and Russia’s interests in Europe, emphasizing the advantages perceived by Russia in a weakened EU. The paper is comprised of three sections: firstly, it examines the collapse of the Soviet Union and its impact on newly independent states, establishing the geopolitical landscape. The subsequent section traces Russia’s foreign policy leading to the 2022 conflict with Ukraine, with a focus on Ukraine’s pivotal role as a geopolitical flashpoint. The final section explores the dynamics of the Russia- Ukraine war, specifically addressing the European Union’s role in security. The paper concludes by addressing the 2022 escalation, marked by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, highlighting the imperative of understanding Ukraine’s status as a geopolitical flashpoint. Overall, the paper contributes to a nuanced comprehension of the evolving geopolitical landscape, its implications for regional stability, and international relations.
T. Stępniewski, The evolution of the European Union’s eastern neighbourhood since the Russia-Ukraine war, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 7-18, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.1
The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the humanitarian components of the latest Russian-Ukrainian war, which is qualified by its authors as a hybrid war. In principle, it is about the ideological basis, historical and religious mythology, and the information support of Russia’s revanchist policy in Ukraine, which the current Russian regime uses in its armed aggression against Ukraine. The authors convincingly and argumentatively prove that non-military instruments in Russia’s war against Ukraine are subordinated to a single goal – the restoration of the Russian empire and its international political influence. In order to achieve this goal, the Putin regime uses all the means available to it, including the spread of pseudo-historical myths and fakes that justify the expansionist policy of the Kremlin in Ukraine and in the countries of the post-Soviet space. Using a widely sourced base, the authors of the article refute the most common Russian pseudo-historical narratives.
W. Baluk, M. Doroshko, B. Cherkas, Humanitarian components of Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine from 2014-2022, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 19-40, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.2
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This article analyses the war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine in the light of Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilisations. In his text, Huntington stated, “If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low”. After the full-scale aggression of Russia against Ukraine, it is clearly visible that Huntington was completely wrong. This does not, however, falsify Huntington's entire concept, which nevertheless requires modification in the form of a new delimitation and naming of civilisations – there is no “Slavic-Orthodox civilisation”, but rather a “Eurasian civilisation”. These corrections, based on Oskar Halecki’s research, lead to the conclusion that Huntington’s theory is applicable in the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, with Ukraine being a Huntingtonian “torn country” that has decided to finally leave the Eurasian civilisation, while Russia is trying to prevent it.
P. Ukielski, The clash of civilizations in Ukraine, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 41-58, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.3
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The aim of this article was to portray the complexity of the crisis/war in Ukraine, an event that has shaken Europe more than any other since World War II. The complexity of the crisis could be located in the involvement of external powers (Russia, US, NATO, EU, Turkey, etc.). Zbigniew Brzezinski throws light on the geopolitical significance of Ukraine in the context of the tendency of great powers to secure dominance in Eurasia. Brzezinski assigned Ukraine as a “pivotal” figure on the “Eurasian chessboard” due to its vital geostrategic position, major resources, access to the Black Sea, and importance for Russian strategic interests. In terms of a realist perspective and geopolitical thoughts, Brzezinski’s writings still represent a valuable asset in the analysis of the current crisis in Ukraine.
T. Olejarz, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s perspective on the geostrategic and geopolitical importance of Ukraine, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 59-73,
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.4
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In recent years, we have seen a wide range of forms of armed conflict, varying in scale, intensity, complexity, and duration, blurring the lines between war and peace. These and other conditions were the reason for undertaking research aimed at identifying scenarios for the development of the international security situation and scenarios for the use of the Polish Armed Forces in relation to threats of a military nature in our country’s neighbourhood, in the region, and across the world. With this in mind, while conducting research on the above-mentioned issues, the article focused attention on a research problem which took the form of a question: How does the development of military threats and potential armed conflicts, including the one in Ukraine, affect the shaping of state security? The hypothesis took the form of an assumption that military threats and, consequently, armed conflicts are one of the main determinants of shaping state security. In the face of the threat of an armed conflict, states take actions to ensure their security, in particular, political, organisational, and modernisation activities, and above all, to increase their defence potential in view of war. The research was conducted in military universities, and the general population (N) included research and teaching staff. The research tool was a questionnaire posted on the MS Teams online platform, which is also used to educate students at military universities.
M. Kopczewski, Armed conflicts and state security through the prism of the war in Ukraine, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 75-89, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.5
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: Disinformation and propaganda are key aspects of Russia’s war strategy as it uses the information environment to justify its actions in international politics, both domestically and abroad, and to coerce audiences into unwittingly supporting its actions. Russia, leading up to and throughout the conflict with Ukraine, brought the full scope of its propaganda apparatus to bear, leveraging overt and covert capabilities on both media and disinformation tools to justify the invasion and [attempt to] destroy international support for Ukraine. What kind of instruments, methods, and narratives has Russia used before and after its invasion of Ukraine? The spread of disinformation by the Russian Federation prior to and after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 as well as the actions taken in response by Ukraine, allied governments, and civil and international organizations provide an important perspective as well as lessons on how to counteract disinformation and propagandistic narratives.
O. Polegkyi, Russian disinformation and propaganda before and after the invasion of Ukraine, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 91-107, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.6
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Celem artykułu jest zbadanie wpływu, jaki wojna na Ukrainie wywiera na politykę wschodnią Unii Europejskiej. W tym celu konieczne jest najpierw wskazanie miejsca, jakie polityka ta zajmuje w całokształcie aktywności międzynarodowej UE, a także tego, jakie są jej cechy charakterystyczne, główne cele oraz części składowe, czyli partnerstwo strategiczne z Rosją i Partnerstwo Wschodnie (PW). Zasadnicza część artykułu zawiera analizę, która – uwzględniając implikacje wynikające z wojny na Ukrainie – ma za zadanie uzasadnić trzy hipotezy badawcze. Dotyczą one kolejno: całkowitego fiaska partnerstwa strategicznego z Rosją, następnie poważnego kryzysu PW i wreszcie możliwości osiągnięcia przez politykę wschodnią sukcesu w formie akcesji Ukrainy do UE. Jak wskazano w zakończeniu, zapewniłoby to Unii Europejskiej na stałe silną pozycję na wschodzie Europy.
O. Barburska, Failure, crisis, or renewal? The Eastern policy of the European Union and the war in Ukraine, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 109-124,
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.7
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Ukraine has played an extremely important role in ensuring the energy security of Central European countries over the years, mainly due to its position as a transit state. Past energy crises (2006, 2009) have affected the perception of the country in Europe and led to Russian-German energy projects that reduce the level of regional security (e.g., Nord Stream 1, Nord Stream 2). In Poland, various political parties (Law and Justice, Civic Platform, the Left Party, Polish People’s Party) have referred differently to regional cooperation and the function Ukraine might offer in this type of process. In this context, the aim of the article was to analyse the political thought of selected Polish parliamentary parties regarding the importance of Ukraine in ensuring the energy security of Central European countries during Russia’s armed attack on Ukraine in 2022. The starting point of the analyses was the general thesis that political parties in Poland treated Ukraine as a key state in efforts to limit the negatively perceived energy policy of the Russian Federation in the region.
M. Paszkowski, The importance of Ukraine in the process of ensuring the energy security of Central European countries in the political thought of Polish political parties during
the Russian-Ukrainian war. Selected issues, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 125-138, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.8
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The article analyses and evaluates Polish-American cooperation in support of Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale aggression in 2022. It answers the question regarding the importance of Polish-American cooperation in supporting the Ukrainian state and society. It assumes that Polish-American cooperation plays a key role in the areas of military and non-military assistance for Ukraine and Ukrainians. Both countries are among the main donors of military equipment to Ukraine, which is delivered via the territory of Poland. In addition, they put great pressure on European countries to increase military support to Ukraine. Polish-American cooperation in non-military areas is also of great importance. Poland’s aid for Ukrainian refugees is crucial, and the US is involved in its delivery and financing. The US, in turn, is of paramount importance in imposing sanctions on Russia to force it to stop its aggression and in providing economic assistance to Ukraine. Poland participates in the sanctions system and strives to make them as severe as possible. Another area of Polish-American cooperation is LNG trade, which allows Poland, and potentially also other CEE countries, including Ukraine, to secure natural gas supplies after abandoning imports from Russia. During the research, interviews with American scientists and experts were conducted, and the method of analysing the content of text sources was used.
Ł. Jureńczyk, Polish-American cooperation to support Ukraine after Russian aggression in 2022, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 139-154, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.9
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The article explores Turkey’s ambitions to assume a proactive role as a mediator in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Positioned as a middle power striving to enhance its global standing, Turkey has dedicated itself to striking a delicate balance between Russia and Ukraine in its foreign policy. This is exemplified by Ankara’s engagement in an ambiguous cooperative rivalry with Russia while strengthening its partnership with Ukraine, including military cooperation in the Black Sea Region. Given these circumstances, Turkey sees itself as naturally inclined to act as a facilitator in brokering a ceasefire and bringing about peace between the two conflicting parties. Some successes have already been achieved, with the grain initiative being a primary example thereof.
J. Wódka, Turkey’s mediatory endeavours: Facilitating dialogue in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 155-169, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.10
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The paper presents the methods and means of conducting information policy by the Ukrainian authorities after the outbreak of the full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2022. The analysis is presented in institutional and functional terms using the method of functional analysis, which demonstrated that the information policy of Ukraine during the period of martial law is effective and provides the state (with) information security in terms of military aggression.
R. Rajczyk, Information policy tools as instruments of Ukraine’s information security after Russia’s full-scale invasion, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 171-183, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.11
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The subject of the article is the security of the Republic of Poland and the war in Ukraine in contemporary Polish left-wing thought, represented primarily by the Democratic Left Alliance and the New Left. The security of citizens is the basic determinant of raison d’état and at the same time a key challenge for authorities. The study covered the 21st century because it brought a change in 1) the international system – the Russian Federation questioned the post-Cold War order, 2) lowering the level of security in Central and Eastern Europe, and 3) bringing new challenges for Poland after Russia launched a full-scale war against Ukraine. The cognitive purpose of the article is the assessment of the international environment and threats to Poland made by the Left, as well as the postulated model of security, political and military security, and – in the context of the war in Ukraine – the attitude to the actions of the Polish authorities after 24 February 2022. It should be emphasized that the social democratic movement is a political environment that hopes to take political power in Poland after the expected electoral success in the autumn of 2023. The position of the Left on key matters for state security is interesting not only for researchers but also has a utilitarian meaning.
K. Trembicka, The security of the Republic of Poland and the war in Ukraine in contemporary leftist thinking in Poland, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 209-231, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.13
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The article’s objective is to analyse the process of Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy towards North Macedonia. The author has attempted to present the main conceptual assumptions regarding this process, pointing to the multiplicity of definitions and research directions, and has subsequently highlighted the evolution of Greek foreign policy towards North Macedonia in the context of the Europeanisation of Greek diplomacy. In the conclusions, the author has emphasised that this particular Europeanisation is somewhat sinusoidal and is conditioned upon a number of factors, including the nature of relations between the Greek political elites and the society of that country. The article has also highlighted that Greece has gradually been shaping its image as a Europeanised country with a credible and predictable foreign policy.
A. Adamczyk, The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy towards the Republic of North Macedonia, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 233-249,
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.14
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Currently, immigration issues occupy an important place in the debate on the future of Europe. One of the central themes of this debate is the issue of security. In spite of the functioning of supranational integration structures, individual states still remain a fundamental factor in shaping migration. In many cases, the issue of immigration is subjected to the process of securitization, framing immigration as a threat. It is the speech act that is important in this respect, being a kind of securitizing tool. Since 2015, one can notice elements indicating that the process of securitization of immigration has been present in Poland, too, which, among other things, is a consequence of the change of the ruling party, the immigration crisis that has taken place in Europe, and the migration situation on Poland’s eastern border. The article presents the factors that influence the process of immigration securitization. Additionally, it includes numerous statements from Polish politicians securitizing the problem of immigrants as well as the results of social surveys on attitudes towards immigration. The analysis of the collected material leads to the conclusion that the securitisation of immigration in Poland is not a completed process and that this process concerns a geographically defined group of immigrants.
G. Tutak, J. Gondek, The securitization of immigration in Poland. Social and political contexts, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 21 (2023), z. 1, s. 251-267,
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.15
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The next phase of Russian aggression against Ukraine demonstrated that despite lacking a large military, territorial, population, or raw material potential, Belarus could play a significant role in the project to construct a new regional, continental, and even global security architecture. The purpose of this article is to discuss the problem of repositioning Belarus, which was affected not only by the multidimensional change in Belarusian-Ukrainian relations as a result of the war but also by long-term efforts to elevate Belarusian-EU relations. In this area, the fundamental research question is whether the war in Ukraine, the breach of the so-called Budapest Memorandum and the deepening of the multifaceted Russian-Belarusian integration within the Union State (including the militarisation of Belarus and the allocation of tactical nuclear weapons) will cause the projects for the redefinition of Belarus-EU relations (which are instrumental in reducing the intensity of political turbulence in the region) to disappear from the EU diplomatic agenda for a long time, with a direct negative impact on the future of European security. The article verifies the hypothesis that due to the specificity of the Belarusian authoritarian model, despite the systematically deepening Russian-Belarusian integration and the ever-expanding sanctions policy towards Belarus, (2) due to the shape of Belarusian-Ukrainian relations after 2014 and the periodically satisfactory Belarusian-EU relations, (1) there are still prospects for Belarus to pursue foreign policy diversification and repositioning of the European vector in it.
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