Institute of Central Europe
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Nuclear deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank

Since 2014, the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have concentrated their efforts on securing the so-called eastern flank. These efforts have thus far lacked elements of nuclear deterrence. However, the inability to effectively influence NATO has led to an increase in the use of ‘nuclear blackmail’ by Russia. Considering these circumstances, it is becoming increasingly legitimate to debate the necessity of extending nuclear deterrence initiatives to the eastern flank states.

Strategic context. Since 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been pursuing a strategy of deepening the militarisation of its eastern flank, based on a combination of collective, bilateral, and individual actions. This strategy is both adaptive and evolutionary, having undergone successive phases of reassurance, deterrence, and deterrence and defence. To date, NATO’s efforts on the eastern flank have primarily been oriented towards conventional deterrence. This represents a significant departure from the Alliance’s approach during the Cold War when nuclear capabilities were a central component of the strategy against the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons had been deployed in the ‘frontline’ area, on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, as early as 1958. Nuclear deterrence efforts were primarily reliant on the United States’ nuclear capabilities, which had been progressively deployed in Western Europe since the mid-1950s under the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower. Furthermore, the threat of a nuclear strike from the USSR also had a political and psychological impact. Consequently, in addition to balancing strictly military capabilities, NATO undertook doctrinal measures to neutralise this threat during the Cold War. This strategy was pursued from the earliest days of the Alliance. The initial Strategic Concept, approved in December 1949, i.e., less than four months after the first Soviet atomic test explosion, identified the primary task of ensuring the ability to carry out rapid strategic bombing by all possible means and all weapons without exception. In subsequent decades, NATO adopted successive nuclear doctrines, adapting its approach to accommodate the evolving security landscape[1]. With the dissolution of the bipolar world order, the Alliance, as part of the New Strategic Concept 1991, opted to maintain a limited nuclear capability in Europe, not as a means of deterrence per se, but rather to ‘protect the peace and prevent war or any kind of coercion’.

Following the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, the debate surrounding the necessity of incorporating nuclear capabilities into the concept of deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank was occasional and was primarily confined to discussions among analysts and experts, rather than politicians[2]. The factor that transformed the political discourse was the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In response to this event, at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO approved a new Strategic Concept on which the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy has since been based. In its overt part, the provisions did not represent a significant departure from previous assumptions; indeed, they were similar to those set forth in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué[3]. However, they should be regarded as marking a turning point in the ongoing debate about NATO’s nuclear capabilities and the “nuclear adaptation” of the Alliance. The 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius revealed a notable increase in the frequency of the adjective ‘nuclear’ in the communiqué, with its appearance occurring as many as 62 times. This represents the highest frequency of its appearance in any declaration or communiqué since the 2014 NATO summit in Newport and is more than twice as often as in the Strategic Concept 2022.

In assuming that nuclear capabilities are more of a political and psychological weapon, communication treatments are of great importance[4]. The manner in which the debate is conducted and the narrative and strategic communication created have a significant impact on the ability to persuade one’s own societies of nuclear deterrence capabilities and the ineffectiveness of an adversary’s nuclear deterrence efforts. These capabilities then contribute to maintaining support for a policy of confrontation with Russia and are part of building resilience to the psychological actions of this adversary.

Russia’s nuclear doctrine. Russia was engaged in what has been characterised as ‘nuclear blackmail’ against NATO countries even before the annexation of Crimea. In 2009, Russia conducted a nuclear attack exercise on Warsaw as part of the Zapad 2009 military manoeuvres. Subsequently, it threatened to permanently deploy nuclear-capable Iskander missile systems in the Kaliningrad region. The current Russian nuclear doctrine is founded upon a presidential decree entitled “Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.”[5] The doctrine’s primary premise is a statement on the defensive nature of nuclear weapons, although the scenario of their use does not have to be caused exclusively by a nuclear attack from an adversary. The doctrine delineates a number of scenarios in which Russia would be justified in launching a nuclear attack. Such instances include attacks on governmental and military critical infrastructure that would result in the collapse of Russia’s nuclear retaliation capabilities, or aggression by conventional means that poses a threat to the state’s existence. These provisions give rise to interpretative ambiguities, which serve to exacerbate the psychological impact of another assumption attributed to Russian nuclear doctrine, namely ‘escalation for de-escalation’ and the limited use of nuclear weapons[6]. From this perspective, a ‘limited’ nuclear strike is designed to deter the adversary from pursuing the next stage of the escalation ladder, thereby preventing further military action (such as military support for Ukraine). These assumptions have a significant impact on societies and political elites in European countries, and the primary objective for NATO is to neutralise this psychological effect through military and political (doctrinal) means.

NATO’s nuclear sharing programme. Considering the de facto absence of nuclear proliferation capabilities, the sole means of providing the eastern flank states with a nuclear umbrella is to include them in the capabilities of allied nuclear states, either through unilateral engagement (e.g., bomber overflights) or collective action such as a nuclear sharing programme. In NATO, three member states, namely France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, possess the aforementioned capabilities. However, the primary responsibility for collective “nuclear deterrence” falls upon the latter, primarily due to its superior capabilities, although this is also sanctioned by both the tradition of Alliance operations and at the doctrinal level[7].

A programme that involves non-nuclear NATO states in practical nuclear deterrence activities, and thus confers certain benefits upon them while simultaneously imposing obligations and responsibilities, is nuclear sharing. To date, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Turkey have participated in this programme. As a result, B-61 nuclear bombs, which are owned and controlled by the US Armed Forces, have been deployed on the territory of these countries. In turn, the air forces of participating states are permitted to carry and use them using certified dual-capable aircraft (DCA) in their possession[8].

Thus far, the eastern flank states have not participated in the programme. However, Russia’s increasingly assertive policy and use of nuclear blackmail are making the deficit of the ‘nuclear umbrella’ on the eastern flank increasingly noticeable. Poland, the country with the greatest potential in the region, indicated its intention to “actively participate in shaping the North Atlantic Alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy” as early as the 2020 National Security Strategy (NSS). The publication of the NSS coincided with an ongoing debate in the Bundestag regarding Germany’s potential withdrawal from its nuclear sharing programme, which prompted critical and arguably opinion-probing comments from the US ambassadors to Germany[9] and Poland[10]. This marked one of the first instances in which the subject of incorporating Central and Eastern European countries into the programme was addressed at the political level. Nevertheless, it was not until mid-2023 that the Polish government unequivocally expressed its willingness to participate in the programme. Representatives of other countries in the region did not issue similar statements. In the event that a decision is taken to transfer nuclear capabilities to the Eastern Flank, the optimal solution in terms of extending responsibility would be to include more than one state in the region in the programme.

An additional method for conveying a nuclear deterrence message to Russia could be the implementation of nuclear arsenal exercises within the airspace of NATO’s eastern flank countries. On an annual basis, NATO enhances its nuclear capabilities in the Steadfast Noon exercise; however, thus far, these have been conducted over the Mediterranean[11].

The military capabilities of the countries on NATO’s eastern flank. It is essential that nuclear-sharing states possess the capability to deploy dual-purpose aircraft[12]. The recent acquisitions of military hardware by states in the region have considerably augmented this capacity, particularly in the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, which are on the verge of becoming operators of the fifth-generation F-35 fighter aircraft (‘IEŚ Commentaries’, no. 1066). In March 2024, the F-35 fighter jets were certified and officially recognised as capable of combat use of B-61 bombs. It is also imperative that countries participating in nuclear sharing possess conventional capabilities, as this allows them for example to secure storage bases or escort aircraft with suspended nuclear payloads.

Conclusions. The strategy of securing the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which had been in place since 2014, did not include a nuclear deterrence component. The outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine, the robust involvement of Western states in support of Ukraine, and the limited efficacy of Russia’s influence on them have prompted Russia to intensify its nuclear deterrence efforts. The principal objective for NATO member states is to challenge the assumptions underpinning Russia’s nuclear doctrine. It is crucial to recognise that nuclear deterrence is a multifaceted concept, encompassing various levels, including military capability, communication and narrative, political as well as psychological and cognitive aspects. An effective neutralisation of Russia’s deterrence strategy must take all of these factors into account. However, this does not necessitate the inclusion of the eastern flank states in the nuclear sharing programme. It is important to consider that Russia’s potential use of nuclear weapons is largely influenced by structural factors. A controlled nuclear strike, even against Ukraine, could lead the international community to perceive that the only means of ensuring national security is to possess a nuclear arsenal, which could subsequently contribute to the proliferation of such weapons. This is an unfavourable outcome for any nuclear power in the present circumstances.

[1] Massive Retaliation Doctrine; Flexible Response Doctrine; or Mutually Assured Destruction.

[2] See, e.g., article: https://www.csis.org/analysis/natos-nuclear-policy-part-revitalized-deterrence-strategy.

[3] For example, the provision for the inclusion of nuclear capabilities in the resources for the implementation of defence and deterrence missions, or the crucial importance of US nuclear capabilities for the defence of the Alliance.

[4] In fact, the issue is not the use of nuclear weapons, but the persuasion of an adversary that you are prepared to use them, thereby minimising escalation.

[5] See http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/IluTKhAiabLzOBjIfBSvu4q3bcl7AXd7.pdf.

[6] Strike of relatively low-wrap power.

[7] This is also mentioned in the Strategic Concept 2022. However, the potential involvement of France, which is emphasising its regional ambitions, and the United Kingdom, which is deeply involved in the region in the context of the war in Ukraine, should not be categorically excluded. However, France’s willingness and capabilities in this regard are minimised by its non-participation in the Nuclear Planning Group. De facto, this means that the French arsenal is outside the NATO framework. France’s allied credibility is also affected by historical experience and the specific treatment of NATO’s nuclear capabilities and doctrines under Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s.

[8] However, its use must be preceded by a decision of the Nuclear Planning Group and approved by the US President and the UK Prime Minister.

[9] See https://twitter.com/USAmbPoland/status/1261322198008111104.

[10] See https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic-comments/2023/polands-bid-to-participate-in-nato-nuclear-sharing/.

[11] It should be noted that the situation remains ambiguous. If NATO countries assume that Russian nuclear blackmail has no real cover and is merely a pretext for a threat, then a build-up of nuclear capabilities on the eastern flank would be a de facto admission that this threat does exist and that the blackmailing is effective.

[12] So far, the nuclear-sharing countries have included F-16s, F-15Es, and Panavia 200s.

Europa Bałtycka

Sweden’s Security Policy: Operationalising Its Role in NATO

Upon joining NATO in March 2024, Sweden embarked on the process of integrating into the Alliance’s missions (including deterrence and defence) and embedding within NATO’s political and military structures. The centre-right coalition government led by Ulf Kristersson has significantly raised defence spending, reaching 2.14% of GDP in 2024. Over the next few years, priorities will include further modernising the armed forces, developing new military technologies, and strengthening defensive readiness against potential threats from Russia.

Experiences from the first half year in NATO. Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024 (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 1075) marked the achievement of one of the four main goals of Prime Minister Kristersson’s centre-right cabinet, formed in October 2022 (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 723). In the first months following NATO accession, Sweden intensified its military cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) and the European Arctic. The Swedish Armed Forces took part in NATO’s main manoeuvres, organised under the umbrella exercise Steadfast Defender 24 (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 1048). Immediate Response 24, conducted in April and May in the northern part of the country (Norrbotten), tested the host nation’s preparedness to support U.S. forces moving from Norway to Finland (including protecting and escorting troops and route traffic control). The exercises aimed to confirm Sweden’s role in ensuring transit route security to defend Finland and the Baltic states. Swedish forces also participated in the 53rd edition of the NATO military exercise BALTOPS 24 (Baltic Operations 2024) in June 2024 to enhance interoperability among the armed forces of twenty NATO countries across various maritime, air, and land operations. These exercises included submarine search and destruction, mine warfare capability development, and amphibious operations.

Sweden’s Contribution to NATO in 2025. According to a draft bill dated October 3, 2024 (subject to parliamentary approval by the Riksdag), Sweden’s land, air, and naval forces may be deployed within the Alliance’s deterrence and defence framework[1]. Following the January 2024 announcements, Sweden will contribute a mechanised battalion in 2025 to NATO’s Multinational Brigade in Latvia (MNBG Latvia). This battalion will be part of a semi-annual rotation with Danish forces within a brigade framework led by Canada. Sweden’s contribution will comprise around 600 soldiers and officers, potentially increasing to 1,000 if needed. This unit will also be operational in other Baltic states and Poland.

Sweden will also contribute to NATO’s air surveillance and incident response system (NATO Air Policing), which involves participation in NATO’s integrated air and missile defence. The Swedish Air Force, primarily Blekinge Wing F17 stationed in Ronneby, will operate from Swedish and allied territories, including rotational deployments in the Baltic states as part of the Baltic Air Policing mission. Sweden’s air surveillance contribution will involve eight fighter jets, which can scale up to one squadron (16 fighters) if required.

Sweden will also participate in NATO’s naval forces – Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One (SNMCMG1) – primarily operating in the northern part of the SACEUR’s geographic area of responsibility, including the Baltic Sea. Sweden’s baseline contribution will consist of one warship with demining and maritime surveillance capabilities, which can be increased to three ships if necessary. Swedish personnel will also participate in the newly established NATO Commander Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic), headquartered in Rostock, Germany, operationally subordinate to NATO’s Joint Force Command in Northwood, U.K. CTF Baltic comprises up to 180 personnel during peacetime, but this can increase to 240 personnel in times of crisis. The staff comes from 13 countries (all NATO members from the BSR, along with France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). Its tasks include fostering cooperation among allied fleets in the BSR, planning maritime exercises and operations, and commanding NATO-assigned naval forces during peace, crisis, and war.

Additionally, Sweden actively engages in crisis response activities (including cyber defence and counter-disinformation) and strengthening partnerships to enhance Arctic defence capabilities. These initiatives include the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), and collaborations with other allies (such as air operations with the U.S. as part of the Bomber Task Force). Sweden’s peacetime contributions to these operations and activities encompass up to 200 soldiers and officers, up to three warships, and up to eight fighter aircraft. During a joint session of the Finnish and Swedish governments held in Stockholm on 16 September 2024, Swedish Defence Minister Pål Johnson announced the intention to assume the role of framework nation for the establishment of NATO’s Forward Land Forces (FLF) in Finland from 2026, thereby deepening existing bilateral cooperation (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 464).

New Total Defence Bill 2025-2030. The increasing military expenditure is a crucial factor enabling Sweden’s swift integration into NATO structures. Between 2020 and 2024, Sweden’s annual defence budget doubled, exceeding the targets outlined in the security strategy for 2021-2025 set in December 2020 (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 300). Current spending, at SEK 125.5 billion (2.14% of GDP), was achieved in the spring of 2024, despite initially being planned for 2028. According to the draft Total Defence Bill for the period 2025-2030 presented mid-October, this spending is projected to reach 2.6% of GDP by 2028[2]. This signifies a substantial enhancement of total defence, with an additional SEK 170 billion allocated for military defence and SEK 37.5 billion for strengthening civil defence by 2030.

These resources will allow Sweden’s armed forces to align gradually with its international obligations arising from NATO membership. The number of conscripts will increase from 8,000 to 10,000 annually by 2030, reaching approximately 12,000 between 2032 and 2035. Further efforts will focus on restoring divisional-level capabilities (in line with NATO operational planning). In addition to the already initiated process of rebuilding command capacities at this level, this includes establishing two artillery battalions, an additional rocket artillery unit, an electronic warfare battalion, an intelligence battalion, an engineering battalion, and an armoured transport battalion.

Between 2025 and 2027, additional infantry fighting vehicles (CV9035 MkIIIC), ordered from BAE Systems in May 2024, will be delivered. Modernisation of Stridsvagn 122 (Leopard 2) tanks by KMV will continue, with deliveries as Stridsvagn123A starting in 2026. The acquisition will include loitering munition systems (LMS, armed drones), reconnaissance drones, anti-aircraft artillery, and Archer artillery systems. Investments in the Navy encompass the modification of Visby-class corvettes (program initiated in 2021, with the first modernised ships to be delivered in 2026) and the construction of four new Luleå-class surface combat ships, significantly enhancing air defence capabilities. Additionally, construction of two A26-class submarines ordered for the Swedish Royal Navy in 2015 is underway at Saab Kockums in Karlskrona. HMS Blekinge will enter service in 2027, with the second submarine, HMS Skane, expected in 2028. Sweden’s air force is also being reinforced – the introduction of JAS Gripen 39E fighters will begin at the end of 2024 and continue from 2025 to 2030. An additional 12 Black Hawk HK16 utility helicopters (Sikorsky UH-60M Black Hawk) will also be purchased.

Conclusions

  • Sweden’s accession to NATO has necessitated an acceleration of armaments, requiring substantial financial resources and raising concerns about pressures on the state budget. It remains unclear where the additional funds will originate, given that other areas such as the justice system, migration policy, and healthcare also require investment (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 1220). Furthermore, Sweden continues its financial support for Ukraine; in June and September 2024, two new aid packages amounting to SEK 13.3 billion and SEK 4.6 billion, respectively, were approved, including providing ammunition and armoured and transport vehicles. This brings Sweden’s total support for Ukraine to approximately SEK 57.4 billion since February 2022. Part of the latest package will be used to acquire spare parts for modernising JAS 39 C/D Gripen aircraft, which, if decided, could later be transferred to Ukraine. Additionally, to ensure long-term stability, Sweden has established a three-year military support framework for Ukraine, totalling SEK 75 billion for 2024–2026, amounting to SEK 25 billion annually.
  • Meeting the demands of the current geopolitical situation requires addressing defence deficiencies from previous years (primarily pre-2014), especially concerning land forces. Declarations by Swedish government officials regarding the country’s role as a reliable and credible ally must be backed by a rapid restoration of military capabilities. With Sweden’s membership in NATO and the EU, its geographical proximity (operating in the Baltic Sea basin), and a shared view on Russian revisionism and the threats posed by the Russian Federation, a strengthening partnership between Poland and Sweden could become a stabilising factor in the Baltic Sea region.
  • Cooperation with Sweden (and other NATO countries in Northern Europe) is increasingly vital due to the growing significance of maritime transport for the Polish economy and existing and planned energy investments. These initiatives align with the Polish naval command (POLMARFOR) establishment, set to assume command of CTF Baltic in 2028, and the ongoing debate surrounding Poland’s northern policy and the Baltic’s role in Poland’s new National Security Strategy.

[1] Regeringens proposition 2024/25:22, Svenskt bidrag till Natos avskräckning och försvar under 2025, https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/2da70083785446d580ff54f01c8c6d8c/svenskt-bidrag-till-natos-avskrackning-och-forsvar-under-2025-prop.20242522

[2] Sveriges Riksdag, Totalförsvaret 2025–2030, Proposition 2024/25:34, 14 October 2024, https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/proposition/totalforsvaret-2025-2030_hc0334/

NATO defence ministers meet their Indo-Pacific counterparts. Towards a global alliance?

In October 2024, the very first meeting of NATO and Indo-Pacific defence ministers took place. The event reflected the deepening practical cooperation between the partners from the two poles of Eurasia, which was intensified by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Despite the geographical distance between the two areas, their security systems are more interconnected than before, not least because of the threats posed by the emerging coalition of authoritarian states. This raises questions about the prospects for a global alliance.

A meeting of North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) defence ministers was held in Brussels on 17-18 October 2024. This meeting was distinctive in that it was the first occasion on which defence ministers from countries in the Indo-Pacific region were in attendance; Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and New Zealand – collectively referred to as the AP4. In accordance with tradition, a representative of the European Union was also in attendance at the meeting. Additionally, a meeting of participating ministers from the Global Coalition against Daesh/ISIS[1] format countries was convened during the summit. On the first day of the NATO Defence Ministers’ Summit, a NATO-Ukraine Council session was also held, attended by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenski and Defence Minister Rustem Umierov.

The impact of the war in Ukraine on the security situation in the Indo-Pacific region. The escalation of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 has resulted in the conflict acquiring an increasingly international dimension. The limited scale of the 2014-2022 conflict enabled Russia to conduct a hybrid campaign in the Donbas and maintain control of Crimea based solely on its own capabilities. However, the February 2022 aggression demonstrated the considerable constraints of the Russian Federation’s military capabilities in waging a large-scale war against a state actor. This has compelled Russia to provide subsidies for itself in terms of both technology and manpower. Russia has been importing a number of different kinds of munitions and weapon systems or parts for such weapons from China, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). Furthermore, most recently it has also been reportesd to have been supplementing its military capabilities with soldiers from North Korea. The difficulty of waging war in Ukraine is also evidenced by the reallocation of the majority of Russia’s military manufacturing capacity to the needs of its domestic armed forces. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russian-produced arms exports in 2023 declined by over 50% compared to the previous year. Furthermore, during the years preceding the war (2019-2022), these exports were already markedly lower than during the preceding period (2014-2018), during which Russia accounted for over 20% of global arms exports[2].

The war in Ukraine is accelerating the processes involved in the formation of cooperative relationships between authoritarian states. This is becoming increasingly significant, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, where China and North Korea represent Russia’s primary partners. This collaboration is evidenced not only by military assistance to Russia but also by increased Russian energy exports to China. In 2023, Russian oil exports to China increased by 24% compared to the previous year, making Russia the primary supplier of this resource to China. In turn, in 2025, Russia’s intention is to utilise the full capacity of the Power of Siberia pipeline and increase gas shipments to China to 38 billion cubic metres per year. This is in addition to the alliance treaty with North Korea, which was signed in June 2024 by President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. On 14 October 2024, the Russian-Korean agreement was submitted to the Duma of the Russian Federation for ratification. In addition to mutual security guarantees in the event of an attack, the treaty also provides for cooperation in the field of ‘peaceful nuclear energy’ or space technology. Furthermore, North Korea is interested in acquiring the technical expertise required to enhance the capabilities of its arms industry, including the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ICBMs.

As indicated above, the circumstances in question have a direct impact on the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s growing assertiveness and North Korea’s provocative actions present a threat to the stability of the so-called first and second chain of islands, where the United States remains the main guarantor of security – as it is for most NATO members. The war in Ukraine provides a clear illustration of the intricate complexities inherent within the global security structure, as well as the interconnectivity between the security situation in Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific region. In this context, it is important to highlight that the dilemma faced by the US administration prior to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, namely whether to prioritize involvement in the Indo-Pacific region at the expense of Europe, is not a binary, all-or-nothing proposition[3]. It is evident that the two security regimes are closely related and, under the prevailing circumstances, it is not feasible to ensure the stability of one at the expense of the other. This naturally gives rise to the necessity for cooperation between the states of the two regions. This issue has been acknowledged by the AP4 states, which are also demonstrably supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia for the sake of its security.

CountryFinancial assistanceHumanitarian assistanceMilitary assistanceTotal% GDP
Australia0.000.110.730.840.06
Japan7.931.020.069.010.20
New Zealand0.000.030.020.050.03
South Korea0.470.300.010.780.05
Estonia0.010.060.570.641.85
Finland0.150.142.192.480.90
France0.800.603.184.580.17
The Netherlands0.720.585.146.440.68
Germany1.413.0510.6315.090.38
Poland0.890.403.234.520.72
The Czech Republic0.000.051.241.290.50
United States25.002.9356.8084.730.39
Taiwan0.000.030.000.030.00
Turkey0.000.000.070.070.01
United Kingdom3.410.859.4213.680.47
The above table presents the volume of AP4 aid to Ukraine in billions of euros and as a percentage of the country’s GDP for the period between 24 January 2022 and 31 August 2024. This is compared to the aid volumes and percentages for the other selected countries. The data presented here are the result of an original compilation by the author based on the Ukraine Support Tracker, which is maintained by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/). It should be noted that the data are to be regarded as indicative, as a portion of the data remains classified, and for some countries, there may be reasonable doubts about the methodology used to acquire the data.

AP4 cooperation with NATO to date. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has served as the impetus for NATO’s collaboration with the AP4 and since the full-scale invasion, AP4 leaders have attended successive NATO summits, namely those held in Madrid (2022), Vilnius (2023), and Washington (2024). It should be noted, however, that similar meetings at the level of foreign ministers have already been held since 2020, and that cooperation has also been pursued through meetings with the NATO Military Committee.

Furthermore, the significance of NATO’s collaboration with the AP4 has been articulated in the Alliance’s own documentation[4]. While the challenges posed by North Korea and China were already identified in summit declarations and communiqués from previous years[5], the Indo-Pacific region was only explicitly identified as an area of interest for NATO in the 2022 Strategic Concept. In the same year, NATO and the AP4 also adopted the “Agenda for Tackling Shared Security Challenges”. Each AP4 member country also signed “Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes” with NATO, which set forth, among other things, strategic objectives for cooperation.

Towards a Global Alliance? The October summit, which was attended by defence ministers from both NATO and the AP4 countries, has resulted in the strengthening of relations between the two parties to an even greater extent. Meetings of this nature are typically more technical in nature and serve to elaborate on the practical cooperation on which a political decision was taken at an earlier North Atlantic Council meeting. This indicates a clear intention on the part of the countries in question to enhance interoperability, integrate supply chains, and reinforce the manufacturing capacity and cooperation of their respective defence industries. The interdependence between Europe and the AP4 states in the second and third dimensions is exemplified by the involvement of Korean arms manufacturers in Europe (IEŚ Policy Papers 7/2023). A further dimension of cooperation is the joint support of Ukraine, which for partners from such distant areas requires, among other things, the coordination of logistical efforts. In this context, it should be noted that during the summit, Australia’s Minister for Defence Industry and Capability Delivery, Pat Conroy, announced the transfer of 49 M1A1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine.

The internationalisation of security processes in Eurasia has given rise to the necessity for cooperation between partners from its two geographically peripheral regions. The levels of cooperation between NATO and the AP4 states are being expanded, and beyond the mere issuance of political declarations, tangible cooperation initiatives are being actualised. The meeting of defence ministers is a clear manifestation of this. It seems reasonable to posit that cooperation at the practical level will continue in the foreseeable future. This may encompass such areas as the sealing and coordination of sanctions regimes, the strengthening of interoperability, the promotion of arms industry cooperation, and the fostering of intelligence cooperation. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether NATO and AP4 states will opt to elevate the nature of their cooperation to a classically understood alliance, including mutual security guarantees. At this juncture, there is minimal evidence to suggest this will occur, and the primary reference point for the relevant actors in their security policies will likely remain the US as an additional bonding element between the two regions.

[1] The Global Coalition against Daesh/ISIS was established in 2014 by 12 countries and currently comprises 87 member states, in addition to six countries with observer status.

[2] P. D. Wezeman (et al.), Trends in international arms transfers, 2023, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2024, https://www.sipri.org/ sites/default/files/2024-03/fs_2403_at_2023.pdf.

[3] In the analytical and expert community, the US pivot to the Pacific was interpreted as an unequivocal declaration of US withdrawal from its role as guarantor of security in Europe.

[4] It is noteworthy that some of these countries have contributed to NATO-led operations in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force; Resolute Support Mission) and in the Gulf of Aden (Operation Ocean Shield).

[5] Even prior to the annexation of Crimea, the North Korea issue was a topic of concern for NATO. However, it was only at the 2019 London Summit that China was identified as a potential challenge.

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Two Years of Ulf Kristersson’s Government in Sweden: A Shift in Migration Policy and the Fight Against Crime

The minority coalition government of Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, in power in Sweden since October 2022, has faced significant challenges over the past two years, particularly in tackling organised crime. The policies introduced so far – such as stricter immigration laws and a reduction in refugee intake – have contributed to improving security but have also led to a decline in support for smaller centre-right parties, namely the Christian Democrats and the Liberals.

The Tidö Agreement, signed in October 2022, serves as the foundation for the functioning of Kristersson’s minority centre-right coalition (comprising the Moderates, Christian Democrats, and Liberals, holding a total of 103 seats in the 349-member parliament), which is supported by the Sweden Democrats (SD). The agreement outlines cooperation in seven areas, with significant attention given to changes in immigration and integration policies, including tightening immigration regulations and combating organised crime (see more: “IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 723).

A New Paradigm in Migration Policy. One of the critical areas of the Tidö Agreement was the introduction of significant changes in migration policy, covering new regulations for citizenship, work permits, and permanent residency. As of 1 October 2024, the rules for acquiring Swedish citizenship through the so-called “notification” (anmälan) process have been revised. For young individuals (aged 15 to 21), new requirements regarding “good conduct” have been introduced[1]. Meanwhile, citizens of Nordic countries will now submit registration applications to the Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) instead of the regional administrative board. Migration Minister Johan Forssell has also announced new regulations, including mandatory language and cultural tests for those applying for citizenship. If implemented, applicants must demonstrate Swedish language proficiency at the A2/B1 level and basic knowledge of Swedish societal principles. The government also plans to extend the required residency period in Sweden from 5 to 8 years before applying for citizenship. Other proposed reforms (such as the requirement for applicants to be financially self-sufficient, the possibility of revoking citizenship after serious crimes that threaten the system, and tightening family reunification regulations) are currently under government inquiry or in the consultation phase.

The government has also reduced the number of immigrants being accepted and introduced stricter rules for granting asylum, mirroring Danish solutions (see more: “IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 411). In the first half of 2024, Sweden recorded a negative migration balance for the first time in 50 years, with 44,100 emigrants, nearly double the previous years’ figures. The increase in emigration primarily concerns individuals born in Sweden (11,200, +16% year-on-year), India (2,800, +171% y/y), and Iraq (2,000, +99% y/y) but also Poland (1,400, +96% y/y)[2]. This has coincided with a decrease in asylum applications, with around 7,300 registered by the end of September 2024 (a 25% drop compared to the same period the previous year), and forecasts for 2024 indicate that this will be the lowest figure since 1997[3]. Furthermore, in the coming years, the government plans to allocate significant funds to stimulate voluntary repatriation for individuals who have not integrated into Swedish society (known as the repatriation grant). This involves increasing the grant for return migration in 2026 to 350,000 SEK per person (currently only 10,000 SEK). Such a substantial increase is contrary to recommendations from an inquiry concluded in August 2024 and has been strongly criticised by the Liberals.

As part of the broader strategy to tighten migration policy, the government also raised the threshold for the minimum salary required to obtain a work permit to 80% of the median wage (from June 2024, it stands at 28,480 SEK per month). The regulations, which took effect on 1 November 2023, led to a nearly 50% drop in approved work permits in the first half of 2024 compared to the same period in the previous year. Although the changes aimed to reduce the number of lower-skilled workers, they have also affected highly skilled professionals, with a 30% decrease among IT specialists.

Strengthening Sweden’s Internal Security. In response to growing public concerns, Kristersson’s government has taken numerous measures to improve security (see more: “IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 969). As part of the national strategy against organised crime, adopted in February 2024[4], harsher penalties have been introduced for gang members as well as the possibility of deporting individuals involved in criminal activities who do not hold Swedish citizenship. One of the following steps was the proposal to introduce the institution of an anonymous witness, reintroduced in late September 2024. According to Justice Minister Gunnar Strömmer, allowing anonymous testimony during preliminary investigations and criminal trials would enhance the fight against organised crime and help break the so-called code of silence.

Despite these reforms, organised crime remains a significant challenge for the Swedish government. This is the case even though the number of shootings in Sweden has decreased – there were 164 shootings between January and July 2024, the lowest number since 2017 (compared to 227 shootings in the same period in 2023). A similar trend is observed in the number of explosives. In the analysed period of 2024, there were 66 explosions compared to 101 in 2023. However, the distribution of areas most affected by gun violence has changed slightly – while the number of incidents has decreased in Stockholm, no such trend has been observed in other large cities like Malmö, Gothenburg, and Uppsala. A worrying trend is the increasing involvement of younger individuals in shootings (since 2019, the proportion of suspects under the age of 18 has more than doubled). Moreover, the reduction in shootings has been accompanied by a 17% rise in drug-related crimes compared to 2023[5]. In response to the growing crime rates, the government plans to increase justice system spending by 3.46 billion SEK (around 305 million EUR) in 2025. The total justice system budget will rise by 10% year-on-year, reaching 86.7 billion SEK. The new funds will enable improvements in police operational capacity and an increase in the number of detention and prison facilities. Further increases in spending are planned for 2027, with the budget projected to reach 100 billion SEK.

The growing activity of such groups is also raising concerns in neighbouring states (e.g., in early October, three Swedes aged 15 to 20 were arrested in connection with explosions at the Israeli embassy in Copenhagen). Therefore, in addition to domestic measures, Sweden is also engaging in regional cooperation – in Copenhagen on 21 August 2024, the justice ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden announced intensified joint efforts to combat gang violence, particularly involving minors. Plans include joint Swedish-Norwegian police patrols and enhanced information exchange.

Conclusions

  • Faced with high levels of crime, especially involving minors, Prime Minister Kristersson’s government, in cooperation with the Sweden Democrats, is tightening penalties, increasing justice system spending, and expanding cooperation with neighbouring countries. These efforts, aimed at improving internal security, are supported by the Social Democrats in most cases. Public opinion polls from September 2024 indicate that the public is not as concerned about crime as in previous years – 40% of respondents view Sweden as safe (compared to just 30% in 2023). More people also report feeling safer in their municipalities – only a quarter of respondents said they fear injury, compared to one-third in June 2023.
  • However, the legislative process and the implementation of reforms in this area are accompanied by a decline in support for the smaller centre-right parties. According to recent public opinion polls (Indikator Opinion, Verian, and Demoskop), the opposition bloc holds a 6-7 percentage point lead over the ruling centre-right coalition. While the Moderates and Sweden Democrats maintain support levels of around 20%, the smaller parties, namely the Christian Democrats and Liberals, are hovering around the electoral threshold (4%). This precarious position reflects the complicated status of these centre-right parties within the political landscape. This trend was evident before the elections (see more: “IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 688), and currently, voters from these parties continue to shift towards stronger parties. On the opposition side, the Social Democrats dominate, maintaining high support levels of around 33%, while the Left Party and the Greens garner over 7%.
  • Looking ahead to the parliamentary elections in September 2026, the smaller coalition parties’ struggles may threaten Kristersson’s government’s stability and contribute to delays or weakening of the reform process. Further declines in confidence in the ruling coalition may also lead to abandoning unpopular decisions.

[1] For a young person to be eligible to obtain Swedish citizenship, the applicant must not: (1) be reasonably suspected of a crime of a more serious nature; (2) have been convicted of more serious crimes or repeatedly engaged in criminal activities; (3) pose a threat to Sweden’s national security or public safety; and (4) be associated with groups or organisations that commit abuse against other people.

[2] SCB, Lägsta folkökningen under 2000-talet, https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/befolkning/befolkningens-sammansattning/befolkningsstatistik/pong/statistiknyhet/befolkningsstatistik-forsta-halvaret-2024/.

[3] Migrationsverket, Statistik, https://www.migrationsverket.se/Om-Migrationsverket/Statistik/Asyl.html.

[4] Government Offices of Sweden, https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/nationell-strategi-mot-organiserad-brottslighet/.

[5] Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, Anmälda brott första halvåret 2024, https://bra.se/om-bra/nytt-fran-bra/arkiv/nyheter/2024-07-18-anmalda-brott-forsta-halvaret-2024.html.