Institute of Central Europe
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[Zdjęcie: Litewski "żywy łańcuch" w proteście przeciwko wynikom wyborów na Białorusi; INTS KALNINS/Reuters/Forum]

The international role of Lithuania towards the crisis in Belarus

Initiator of activities and an example for the international community. Lithuania has become the most active state for supporting democratic processes in Belarus. It was the first state in Central Europe to recognize the threat of governmental violence against protesters and took active measures at the regional and European levels (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 235). Lithuania initiated the process of including the situation in Belarus into the UN Human Rights Council’s agenda, and President Gitanas Nausėda called on the UN Secretary-General António Guterres to draw attention to the scale of the problem of human rights violations. In recent weeks, Lithuania has also been one of the most involved member states within the EU – it called for solidarity with Belarus and proposed establishing an EU fund to help victims of repression in Belarus.

Due to the absence of an adequate response from the EU, on August 18, the Lithuanian Seimas adopted a resolution refusing to recognize Alexander Lukashenko as the legitimate leader of the Republic of Belarus and called on the European Commission and the member states of the EU and NATO, not to recognize the result of the presidential elections in Belarus and to impose sanctions on its officials. There was a cross-party consensus to solve the issue.

The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has submitted a list of 118 Belarusian officials responsible for the falsification of the electoral process and the use of violence against demonstrators. Finally, the so-called President Lukashenko‘s blacklist was approved jointly by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and contained 30 names of people banned from entering the Baltic states, including the President of Belarus – Alexander Lukashenko, his son – Viktor, the Minister of Internal Affairs and deputy ministers, as well as the Members of the Central Election Commission. In response to Lithuania’s actions, President Lukashenko announced to take retaliatory sanctions, and Russia accused Lithuania of destabilizing the situation and violating Belarus’ sovereignty.

About 50,000 Lithuanian inhabitants united in brotherhood and empathy towards Belarus standing from Vilnius towards the Belarusian border, following the model of the “Baltic chain” of August 23, 1989. Several hundred Latvians and Estonians, and many social organizations around the world, also joined the demonstration. Vilnius University has offered free studies and scholarships to Belarusian students coming to Lithuania as a gesture of solidarity.

However, there was a thorn in Lithuania’s side. A few politicians representing the Polish minority in Lithuania, namely, the member of the political party of AWPL-ZChR, Zbignev Jedinskij, and the leader of the party, Valdemar Tomaševski, have stated that the Belarusian police “defends the constitution” and the categorical voice of the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius towards the Belarusian authorities prevents dialogue.

Lithuanian political identity and common heritage. Vilnius has already become a direction for representatives of the Belarusian opposition seeking asylum and a center for democratic opposition leaders from Eastern European countries. Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, the leader of the opposition in Belarus, arrived in Lithuania shortly after the presidential elections while several dozen protesters took advantage of the facilitation of border-crossing procedures and came to Lithuania “for humanitarian purposes” (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 235). As early as 2004, the liberal European Humanities University moved to Vilnius, as did many Belarusian non-governmental organizations. The international forum of Konstantinas Kalinauskas was established in the city as a platform to discuss the democratic future of Belarus.

The promotion of democratic values and the support of post-Soviet nations seeking their sovereignty seem to be a part of Lithuanian political identity. Security issues are also of significance; for Lithuania, the liberal regime in Belarus and the weak Belarusian-Russian relations could improve its security perception. Moreover, from a long-term perspective, Belarus may share Lithuania’s counteraction against Russia. The geographical proximity, historical experiences, cultural similarities, and social ties determine Lithuania’s commitment and constitute the principles of its foreign policy towards Belarus.

The experiences of the Soviet regime empower Lithuania to support Belarusians at the international level, demanding free and fair elections. According to Lithuanian public opinion Belarus’ current situation resembles Lithuanians’ aspirations for freedom in the late 1980s, when the independence processes were initiated. As a result, Lithuania was the first Soviet republic to declare independence.

The common heritage – the legacy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – may, in fact, be both a stimulus and a barrier to further cooperation. Interestingly, apart from the white-red-white flag, the protesters have adopted the symbol of Pogon (Pahonia), which both the Belarusian People’s Republic and modern Belarus (1991-1995) used previously. It was also a symbol of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania where the official language was Ruthenian until the late 17th century. From the Lithuanian conservatives’ point of view, this is a reason to raise concerns about Belarusian attempts to appropriate the Lithuanian heritage.

Bilateral relations frozen. Despite the relatively friendly attitude toward Belarus at the beginning of Dalia Grybauskaitė’s first term of her presidency, bilateral relations have remained tense for years. Political dialogue at the highest level was suspended due to the close cooperation between Belarus and Russia. Lithuania blocked the framework agreement between Belarus and the EU and severely criticized the Zapad-2017 military exercise, accusing both Belarus and Russia of threatening its sovereignty and national security.

Currently, it is the Astravets nuclear power plant in Belarus, the construction of which began in 2013, that is the biggest obstacle undermining the bilateral relations. Despite strenuous efforts, Lithuania did not manage to block the investment, which caused mutual misunderstanding between the Baltic states. President Gitanas Nausėda, who announced the resumption of dialogue with Belarus, was supposed to give a new impetus to the bilateral relations, especially as a consequence of the change of the US and EU policy towards this country and the deterioration of relations between Belarus and Russia. The Lithuanian “red lines” refer to security matters (including the Astravets nuclear power plant) and respect for human rights while they define the Lithuanian raison d’état. The greater openness of economic and cultural cooperation, and intensive social communication, would however, establish additional rapprochement opportunities between Lithuania and Belarus.

Conclusions. Lithuania’s hitherto efforts have been aimed at drawing the international community’s attention and exerting pressure on it to take more decisive action on the Belarus problem. In the Lithuanian case, the state’s small territory and weak potential seem to be an advantage for its relationship with the Belarusian society. Because of its consistency and determination, Lithuania was recognized by the international community as a reliable partner. As a result this recognition has increased and its political position.

Lithuania’s activity is based both on global interests, such as the promotion of democratic principles and peaceful settlement of international disputes, and on security perception and national interests. The effectiveness of its foreign policy resulted from the political decisions and practical measures. Lithuania was among the greatest supporters and initiators of sanctions against Belarusian officials. Although it is important from the point of view of mutual solidarity, the decision to impose the sanctions will not stimulate the process of stabilization of the post-election situation in the country. Only the EU joint commitment could be more painful for the Belarusian authoritarian authorities. While a decision regarding sanctions has been made on the European level, it will take longer to coordinate the details and finally delay the EU’s response. In practice, quick response of medical and social assistance towards oppositionists coming to Lithuania, and, in the longer term, support for Belarusian students in Lithuania, seems to be particularly important.

Without a doubt, Lithuania’s reaction toward the independence aspirations of the Belarusians is positive despite the statements of some politicians representing the Polish minority in Lithuania, which are contrary to the Lithuanian raison d’état. Moreover, they are against the principal interests of the Polish minority in the country (such as minority and human rights protection), suggesting that the minority supports the Belarusian authoritarian regime. It seems these statements sought to gain the support of the Russian-speaking citizens in Lithuania in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections (October 11/25). As a consequence, however, the AWPL-ZChR tactics may strengthen the stereotype of Poles in Lithuania as Kremlin supporters.

Norway in the United Nations Security Council 2021-2022: “talented strategist” or “running young fox”? (Damian Szacawa)

Pink socks with golden hearts – an effective promotional campaign. Norway received 130 votes during the competition with Ireland (128 votes) and Canada (108 votes) for one of the two seats reserved for the Western European and Others Group. It became one of five states – along with India, Ireland, Kenya, and Mexico – elected on June 17-18 by the UN General Assembly to the UNSC. The two-year term of office of these states will start on January 1, 2021, and last until the end of December 2022. The competition between the candidates was even, but – what is worth emphasizing – was conducted in the spirit of fair play and included various activities. For example, Norway, organized a study visit (Oslo and Tromsø) for the UN ambassadors, the theme of which was the protection of seas and oceans and climate change, whereas Ireland and Canada organized concerts of U2 and Céline Dion.

Norway has been elected four times as a non-permanent member of the UNSC (the last time was 2001-2002) so far. Its campaign for the UNSC for 2021-2022 informally began in 2007 and was officially launched in New York in June 2018 by Crown Prince Haakon and Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide. An experienced ambassador to the United Nations, Mona Juul, also played an important role in promoting Norway’s candidacy, supervising diplomatic efforts and organizing meetings and receptions at her residence. Ambassador Mona Juul is well known in the UN structures – she was the Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the UN (2005-2010), and earlier, together with her husband Terje Rød-Larsen, she was involved in facilitating secret negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization which culminated with the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993.

During the promotional campaign, the Prime Minister of Norway Erna Solberg, took part, i.e., in the African Union Summit (February 2019) and paid official visits to 15 states in the Caribbean region, while Ine Eriksen Søreide held nearly 120 bilateral meetings. Norway’s diplomatic missions around the world were also involved in the campaign. As pink color was chosen as a symbol (which was supposed to emphasize the importance of women, albeit without a clear indication of a feminist foreign policy agenda, e.g., in Sweden), one of the most visible elements corresponding with it were pink socks with golden hearts worn by Norwegian diplomats. Officially, the total expenditure of Norway’s MFA on the promotion of Norway’s candidacy until 2019 amounted to almost NOK 29.5 million (approx. EUR 2.8 million). However, this amount did not include activities undertaken by retired Norwegian diplomats and the huge budgetary allocation to ODA (according to the OECD data, Norway has been allocating at least 0.7% of its GDP for this purpose every year since 1976, and in 2019 it was over 1% of GDP, i.e., USD 4.67 billion)[1].

Norway’s priorities in the UN Security Council. Since the time of Norway’s previous membership in the UNSC, non-permanent members’ capabilities have not changed significantly and remain relatively small compared to the five permanent members with veto rights. Taking into account the assumptions of Norway’s foreign and security policy adopted in April 2017, the United Nations plays a leading role in global efforts to promote international peace and security, the protection of human rights, and the Sustainable Development Goals. In early 2018, the Norwegian government indicated the reasons for applying for a non-permanent seat, including protection of Norway’s global interests, involvement in peace-building efforts and dispute resolution, and supporting the UN as a key multilateral structure that governs the international order. Norway’s experience in conducting peace talks and managing UN peacekeeping operations has also been indicated many times – despite the fact that the country is inhabited by only 5.3 million citizens, over 42,000 Norwegians have served in UN-led peace operations since 1949. It also provides the fifth largest financial contribution to the UN operational activities for development (2018), and Norwegians are the sixth largest group of UN officials working in this area. The chance to increase Norway’s influence on global politics and gaining a higher prestige in the UN structures are also not without significance.

Norway’s priorities are related to its current foreign policy. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly emphasized that international cooperation based on international law is a necessary condition for stability and security in the world, which is currently a field of competition between three great powers (the US, China and Russia). Therefore, compliance with international law, which is the basis of Norway’s activities in the UNSC, is of prime importance. Other priorities are also reflected in the current Norwegian foreign policy, including:

  • peace diplomacy – Norway has significant experience in this area and has built a recognizable brand over the years, actively participating, i.e., in the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts in South Sudan, Colombia, the Philippines, or in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
  • inclusion of women – a more active role of women in the UN peacekeeping missions increases the likelihood of reaching an agreement that takes into account the specific needs of women in conflict areas;
  • protection of civilians – the greatest emphasis is put on preventing and combating conflict-related sexual violence; in line with Norwegian foreign policy these actions should be based on human rights and humanitarian law;
  • climate change and security – Norway intends to draw the attention of other members of the UNSC to the potential links between climate change and threats to international security.

Global challenges – the main concern of political parties. Norwegian political parties had different attitudes toward the campaign. It was naturally supported by the ruling Conservative Party (H, Høyre). However, representatives of other parties’ paid attention to the potential problems associated with Norway’s election as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Audun Lysbakken, leader of the Socialist Left Party (SV, Sosialistisk Venstreparti), wondered if Norway would be able to pursue an independent policy in the UNSC and thus oppose major powers, including the US. Critical statements were also made by representatives of the Progress Party (FrP, Fremskrittspartiet), which was a part of the government coalition until January 2020. Christian Tybring-Gjedde (deputy chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense at Storting) stressed the need to implement the promises made by the government during the campaign. In his opinion, it would be difficult due to the disparities between the US, Russia, and China; it will also mean that costs will increase – both financial and those linked to a possible loss of credibility. This position was also shared by the FrP Vice-President Sylvi Listhaug (Minister of Petroleum and Energy until January 2020, former Minister of Justice, Public Security and Immigration), who emphasized that Norway is a small state that should look after its own interests. Meanwhile, participation in the work of the UNSC might be problematic and, e.g., may impede the implementation of Norway’s interests at the High North within the context of cooperation with Russia and China (see more in “IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 130).

All the Norwegian civil servants shaping the state’s strategy and policy in the UNSC are aware of other challenges. This will include, i.e.,: uncertainty regarding the results of the US presidential election (re-election of President Donald Trump would be highly problematic for Norway due to the current US policy towards international organizations); the rivalry between the US, China, and Russia; and, finally, the need to intensify international efforts to combat climate change in the face of the growing economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Norway’s previous term of office was preceded by numerous expectations. Although Norwegians made a good impression on the Western diplomats, demonstrating their experience and proper knowledge, they did not manage to achieve the assumed political favors. The international media devoted little attention to Norway, and in the domestic public opinion prevailed a belief of unspecified priorities (causes of wars and conflicts, involvement in Africa, and strengthening the UN’s ability to plan and conduct peacekeeping operations based on the Brahimi report). There are various reasons for this state of affairs that should be attributed to both external and internal factors. In the context of external factors, we may note the change of the global political agenda after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the need to maneuver between the interests of permanent members of the UNSC. Relating to the internal factors, we can direct our attention to the hardly measurable priorities, the unrealistic expectations accompanying the election of Norway, and the weak communication with the media, who were not very interested in Norway’s success but instead focused on terrorism and the situation in the Middle East.

Conclusions. The history of the UN Security Council to-date shows that the influence of small states (up to 10 million inhabitants) on its activities is limited. It largely depends on two groups of qualitative factors. Firstly, on existing competences in knowledge, launching operations, and diplomatic leadership and coalition-building skills. Secondly, the state’s image in the international arena is crucial, with particular emphasis on the expected neutrality or reputation of the promoter of certain norms and solutions in specific areas of international policy.

The current challenges indicate that focusing on fewer priorities and using the state’s strengths can be a better alternative. Estonia did so for digital solutions (see “IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 202); also, Sweden used this strategy for cooling the conflict in Syria. Due to the current structural changes in international politics, Norwegian diplomatic abilities, coalition-building skills, and the image of a consistent partner alone may not be sufficient to play the role of a strategist and small states’ representative. There is a risk that Norway will be a “young fox” running between the powers, trying to mediate between them but yet unable to prevent their competition.

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[1] OECD, Net ODA,https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm [24.07.2020].

“Back on track”: the Polish Presidency of the Visegrad Group in the shadow of a pandemic (Łukasz Lewkowicz)

Presidency priorities. The slogan of the current presidency is Back on track. The program for 2020-2021 has identified four strategic goals: “Strong V4 in a strong Europe”, which is to coordinate the policies of the V4 states in the EU; “Return to Normal”, associated with combating the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences; “People-to-people” for integration and internal coherence of the V4, and “Digital V4”, aimed at developing V4 collaboration in the digital sector. The Polish Presidency is also jubilee: in June this year, the 20th anniversary of the launch of the International Visegrad Fund (IVF) was celebrated, and in February 2021, the 30th anniversary of the V4 will be celebrated.

The economy overshadowed by the pandemic. The biggest challenge for the Polish Presidency is maintaining a common position on the assumptions of the European Instrument for Reconstruction (EIR) and the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the years 2021-2027. It is primarily about favorable provisions regarding the cohesion policy and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). A coherent V4 policy will also be necessary to use funds still available under the cohesion policy for 2014-2020. In the context of crises caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the coordination of V4 cooperation in the field of health protection and research will be of particular importance. Climate policy remains a key challenge for the EU and has a huge impact on other European policies. The European Green Deal communication presented by the European Commission will require coordinated economic and environmental actions. It is also a big challenge to jointly deal with problems caused by drought and dwindling water resources. Efforts to increase the internal cohesion of the V4 will continue in all non-political areas in which the member states will have common interests. In the economic sphere, the area of interest will remain, among others, broadly understood infrastructure connections (road, rail, energy). Brexit remains a challenge for the EU, especially in the economic sphere (e.g., the need to negotiate a new trade agreement). During the Polish Presidency, further coordination of the activities and positions of the V4 in the area of negotiations with the United Kingdom and their consistent presence on the EU forum will be carried out.

Perspective digital agenda. The pandemic and its economic consequences have shown the need to support the EU’s digitization and innovation policy. With the emergence of new technologies in areas such as artificial intelligence, the Internet, quantum computers, and cybersecurity, it becomes crucial to consider the opportunities and challenges that these tools bring. The Polish Presidency’s task is to develop a clear, acceptable, and practical framework for digital policy, both at the multilateral and EU level. The willingness to further support the digitization of public and private institutions in the region is also underlined. During the Polish V4 presidency, it is assumed that more attention will be paid to the issues of automation and robotization of employment and remote work. Taking into account the EU policy in the field of digital education, it will be necessary to exchange experiences within the V4 related to the necessity of transition to distance learning and its consequences for education systems. From this perspective, the Presidency will focus on counteracting digital exclusion.

Active international cooperation. During the Polish Presidency, the V4 intends to remain active in external policy, both on the EU forum and the V4+ formula. Maintaining close transatlantic cooperation is essential for the security of the region. The Polish Presidency pays special attention to regional cooperation under the Three Seas Initiative (TSI), a platform combining the V4, the EU, and transatlantic cooperation.

Migration policy remains an important element on the EU agenda. Currently, work on a new Pact on Migration and Asylum is starting in the EU Council, as well as further work on reforming the asylum system. During the presidency, it will be necessary to maintain the uniform activity of the V4 in this area, so as to effectively prevent the introduction of solutions contrary to the common position of the V4 states, particularly regarding the forced relocation of migrants.

The V4 declares further coordinated support for processes and actions for the enlargement of the EU, including support for the pro-integration aspirations of the Western Balkan states. In this context, an important task for the V4 is to exchange experiences with the WB states on the accession process and the first years of membership, and encourage them to implement the necessary internal reforms. The V4 also announces the implementation of the agreed technical assistance for the Western Balkans Fund via the IVF.

The eastern neighbors of the EU also remain important for the new presidency. The dynamically developing situation in Ukraine and Belarus is of key importance here. The Polish presidency aims to promote further and expand the V4’s cooperation with the Eastern Partnership states, which should be treated as the most important long-term priority of the grouping. The Polish Presidency also declares that it will take into account the economic aspects of cooperation between the V4 and the EaP. For this reason, the V4 assumes further support for the implementation of the EU’s association agreements, including those constituting their integral part of the agreements on the creation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

The social dimension. During the Polish Presidency, support will be given to multidimensional contacts between the societies of the V4 states as well as the promotion and dissemination of the culture and history of Central European states. The International Visegrad Fund and its numerous support instruments (grants, scholarship programs, etc.) play a crucial role in this task. The IVF’s goal is to support cooperation between the V4 states and their joint representation in third states. It is realized through the financial support of activities in the field of promotion and development: cultural cooperation, scientific and educational activities, youth exchange, cross-border cooperation, and tourism. The cooperation of Central European think tanks within the Think Visegrad (TV) platform is also expected to become more dynamic. In this context, it is planned to organize a conference midway through the presidency. The experience exchange program run by TV under the Civil Service Mobility Program (CSMP) is to be continued. V4 analytical cooperation will take place within the V4 Energy Think Tank platform.

Chances and challenges facing the Polish Presidency. Conclusions for Poland. The V4 should be considered a proven format for regional cooperation, to which all member states agree. Currently, the EU remains the natural playing field for the V4. Through joint actions and building broader thematic coalitions in the V4+ format, it is possible to force decisions that are beneficial to them on the EU forum (e.g., during budget negotiations). Strong and lasting coalitions also allow for equal negotiations with stronger partners from the EU. Thanks to the Group’s involvement in the European Neighborhood Policy, it has a chance to co-create the European foreign policy. The states of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership remain an essential area of V4 activity. The common position on the forced relocation of migrants shows that the group has a chance to participate more actively in shaping the EU’s migration and asylum policy. The member states are also united by the will to reform the EU in depth and their opposition to the creation of a two-speed Europe.

The greatest challenge facing the V4 is the lack of a common strategy towards the Russian Federation. Hungary is in favor of lifting the sanctions and for political and energy cooperation with Russia. Some politicians in the Czechia and Slovakia believe that there is currently no direct threat from Russia; therefore, they criticize the maintenance of the sanctions and take an ambiguous stance on the construction of Nord Stream 2. Another vital factor causing conflicts in the V4 is the separate national interests of individual states. An example may be, among others, the summit in Jerusalem in 2019. Initially, the meeting was to be canceled due to Poland’s absence but, eventually, there were bilateral meetings between the prime ministers of Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, and Israel. In the past, a media campaign against Polish food was carried out in the Czechia and Slovakia. It is also worth noting the negative reception of the V4 in Western Europe. The jubilee presidency may provide an opportunity to conduct an effective campaign promoting Visegrad cooperation in the EU and the world.

(zdjęcie: president.gov.ua)

Ukraine and NATO – a turbulent relationship

In June 2020, Ukraine joined Georgia, Finland, Sweden, Australia and Jordan in the small group of countries that have been granted the status of members of the NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners Program. This means closer cooperation between NATO and Ukraine and is an important political signal to Ukraine, Russia and the alliance’s member states. However, this does not guarantee Ukraine’s imminent membership in NATO.

Development of cooperation. Ukraine began working with NATO shortly after declaring independence. As early as 1991, it joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (transformed in 1997 into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), a platform for NATO cooperation with partner countries. In 1994, Ukraine became the first country to participate in the Partnership for Peace program. In 1997, the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine was signed and the NATO-Ukraine Commission was established. In the same year in Kyiv, the NATO Information and Documentation Center was launched – the first such center in a partner country – and the NATO Liaison Office was established. Meanwhile, Ukraine is represented at the headquarters of the alliance in Brussels.

Ukraine has participated in almost every alliance military operation: in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq (training mission), and in naval operations. Ukrainian soldiers take part in NATO military exercises, and soldiers from NATO countries practice on Ukrainian training grounds. Ukraine, once again as the first partner country, became part of the NATO Response Force (NRF), cooperating in the fields of maritime operations, strategic air transport, medical assistance and specialized protection against weapons of mass destruction. Ukraine also undertakes military cooperation with individual NATO member states; for example, the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade.

However, in the context of the overall functioning of Ukraine’s defense system, this wide cooperation has produced quite limited results, related only to specific activities. The general weakness of the Ukrainian armed forces was clearly demonstrated by the events in Crimea and Donbas, especially in the initial phase of the conflict. In consequence, when cooperating with Ukraine, the alliance now places emphasis on supporting the development of the capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces, their professionalization and the development of interoperability.

Moreover, in order to strengthen the Ukrainian defense sector, the alliance provides, through the Trust Funds established for this purpose, financial, technical and substantive assistance in a number of fields. These include reforms to the defense sector and to civil and democratic control over the armed forces (hence anti-corruption programs and training); military education; and consultancy on standardization, logistics, communication and command procedures. Many of these activities are carried out under the Partnership for Peace program.

Enhanced Opportunities. NATO has repeatedly and at various levels expressed its unequivocal support for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. After 2014, there was a considerable intensification of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. This was also reflected in the formal dimension: the NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications Partnership Roadmap was adopted in 2015, and the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine at the Warsaw summit in 2016. Earlier, at the Welsh summit in Newport in 2014, based on the assumption that interoperability is crucial to the effectiveness of NATO’s cooperation with partners, the Partnership Interoperability Initiative was launched. Extended Opportunities Partner status is part of this and it provides opportunities for deepened cooperation. This status is certainly a success for Ukraine and a tribute to its efforts. However, it is not a guarantee, or even an announcement, of membership in NATO. In October 2019, during his visit to Kyiv, Jens Stoltenberg noted that “NATO’s door remains open,” but that “the road to membership is not easy.” The unprecedented scale of cooperation has not eliminated numerous problems that hinder the rapprochement between NATO and Ukraine.

Ukrainian problems. In the 1990s, the young Ukrainian state tried to settle down, adapt to the post-Cold War turbulence and find its place in the new security environment and the international arena. In the field of foreign and security policy, the so-called multi-vector attitude was chosen; taking into account the degree of Russification and Sovietization of Ukraine’s political elite and the general situation of the state, this was not a surprise. Despite this ambivalence, as early as 2002, President Leonid Kuchma declared that Ukraine would strive to join NATO. After 2004’s Orange Revolution, President Viktor Yushchenko reaffirmed this declaration, and in 2008 Ukraine applied for a Membership Action Plan, which usually leads to a country’s admission to NATO. Despite the safeguard that the decision to join any military alliance would be made only after a nationwide referendum, there was a violent political dispute in Ukraine anyway, and the MAP, which was ultimately not granted to Ukraine, became one of the axes of the Ukrainian political discourse. In 2010, the new president, Viktor Yanukovych, announced that NATO membership was out of the question for Ukraine and there were no plans for it. But four years later, his successor, Petro Poroshenko, rejected the concept of non-aligned status; and after the parliamentary elections, the new government declared NATO accession to be a priority. In 2017, this was confirmed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and then by another president, Volodymyr Zelensky. In 2018 the constitution was amended to reflect this. The political swings and the nature of Ukraine’s political culture have also meant that the numerous cooperation programs with NATO have not been treated as strategic opportunities for the Ukrainian state, but as elements of current politics and immediate benefits. This is also noticeable at the level of individual behavior: often cooperation and joint ventures with NATO are treated primarily as opportunities to gain tangible profit.

For much of this period, the key problem remained the very low public support for the idea of Ukraine joining NATO, despite the declarations and actions of the authorities. Until 2014, the level of support fluctuated between 15% and 40% of the population, while opponents constituted 33–70%. However, at any given moment there were always more opponents than supporters. Only in May 2014 did the number of Ukrainians supporting joining NATO finally for the first time exceed the number of opponents. According to a survey by the Razumkov Center in January 2020, 49.8% of Ukrainians would like their country to join NATO, while 29.8% are opposed. These results vary considerably by region; for example, in the western part of Ukraine, the number of NATO enthusiasts exceeds 70% (opponents are 10%), while in the east the numbers are less than 25% and almost 60%, respectively. This is due to the many historically shaped differences between different parts of Ukraine, but also to the mental heritage of the Cold War and the Soviet Union: to this day, NATO is more often associated with “threats” than with “defense.”

NATO problems. The character of NATO’s decision-making process – constant consultations and seeking consensus among member states – makes it difficult for the alliance to make decisions on key issues; especially since the most important ones, such as admitting new members, require unanimity. Ukraine experienced this in 2008, when the Bucharest NATO summit, contrary to its announcements, did not grant MAP to Ukraine and Georgia due to divergent positions among allies. NATO’s relations with Ukraine are also influenced by the relations of individual alliance members with Ukraine. Recently, this has been illustrated by the attitude of Hungary, which blocked the tightening of NATO cooperation with Ukraine because of Ukrainian laws on education and language, which, in the opinion of Hungary, infringe the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. There are also vivid fears among many member states regarding what they see as the uncertain political, social and economic situation of Ukraine, and thus its wobbly credibility. In this context, there have already been serious crises in NATO-Ukraine relations; for example, the Georgiy Gongadze murder and the scandal concerning the sale of Ukrainian weapons to Iraq.

The attitudes of NATO members are also influenced by the firm stance of Russia, which consistently and firmly opposes Ukraine’s possible accession to NATO – and many of these states do not consider threats emanating from Russia as a priority. Some NATO members are even in favor of “pragmatism” and the normalization of relations with Russia. It is worth noting that since 2001, Ukraine has repeatedly sought NATO support in the face of growing pressure from Russia: the alliance did not respond to these signals, apparently completely trivializing a threat on its eastern flank, and even saw Russia as its strategic partner in the east. At present, Ukraine is still an “indirect victim” of the alliance’s basic dilemma: who/what is the most important threat and what is the identity of the alliance in a rapidly changing environment? This also applies to other dilemmas generated by the disparate interests and political visions of individual member states, deepening divergence between the European members of the alliance and the United States, and the belief (justified in most cases) that the larger the organization, the less cohesive it will be.

Uncertain future. Strategically, NATO and Ukraine have similar interests, and NATO also unequivocally supports Ukraine; condemning the annexation of Crimea and aggression in Donbas, stressing the necessity of implementing the Minsk agreements, and so on. In real terms, however, in the military dimension, Ukraine has not received significant aid so far. Granting EOP status is an important symbolic gesture, but it is not an engagement or a promise of marriage.

Ukraine’s political course in foreign policy is unlikely to change. It was confirmed recently by the new security strategy of Ukraine adopted September 14, 2020, and the declaration of President Zelensky who, when signing the law on intelligence on October 21, 2020, stated that this was another step towards integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO’s course will not change either: the alliance is aware of the geopolitical importance of Ukraine. According to experts, an independent and sovereign Ukraine remains a key factor in Euro-Atlantic security, and NATO must strongly support the transatlantic aspirations of both Ukraine and Georgia. However, for the same reasons, Russia’s attitude will not change either, so let us not expect any imminent enlargement of the alliance. A further condition is the stabilization of the situation in Ukraine, which means that as long as the conflict in Donbas continues, there is no real prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership. On the other hand, the alliance still has problems with its own identity, cohesion and the lack of a new strategic concept. The current one was adopted a decade ago, in a completely different security environment: before the war in Syria, the rise of Daesh, the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas.

New hopes for enhanced cooperation within the reformed Council of the Baltic Sea States (Damian Szacawa)

Virtual meeting. In the BSR states, the situation concerning the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic was in large part under control in the second half of May. However, despite the introduction of subsequent stages of loosening restrictions in individual countries, including first permits to cross borders between Baltic Republics (more on this subject: “IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 191), conditions were still far from normal. For this reason, the meeting of foreign ministers, initially planned in a traditional form on Bornholm, took place in cyberspace (the decision to change the format of the meeting was made in the first half of April). Thanks to this virtual meeting the full participation of all 11 of the Baltic Sea Region’s Foreign Ministers (including Germany and the Russian Federation) as well as the Secretary General of the EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS) was possible. The main task of the ending Danish Presidency (July 2019 – June 2020) was to complete the CBSS reform process based on previous arrangements between its Member States (more on this subject: “IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 53).

Reformed CBSS is still desired... The Danish Foreign Minister, Jeppe Kofod, opening the videoconference, stressed Denmark’s commitment to resuming political dialogue within the CBSS (established on the initiative of the Foreign Ministers of Denmark and Germany). In his opinion, the CBSS added value to the development of the BSR derives from, inter alia, the importance of intergovernmental dialogue and practical cooperation between all states in the region. The representatives of other states expressed in a similar vein, highlighting the need to maintain a flexible format of regional political dialogue that would complement other activities. In addition, Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ina Marie Eriksen Søreide, drew attention to strengthening multilateralism through various institutions of regional cooperation. Thus, she referred to the campaign promoting Norway’s candidature for the UN Security Council 2021-2022 as a non-permanent member. The CBSS can add value to regional cooperation by facilitating mutual understanding, building trust and stability, and promoting direct contacts between communities, which was emphasized in a statement by Helga Schmid (EEAS). The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergei Lavrov, was also positive on the possibility of cooperation under the CBSS. He called on other MFAs to “re-open” cross-border dialogue. Member States agreed on the content of the main implementing documents defining the future scope of the CBSS as well as the competences of the CBSS Permanent International Secretariat in Stockholm. Therefore, the two-year reform process of the organization, initiated by Sweden in June 2018 was completed.

…mainly in the areas of non-military threats to international security… The traditional area of cooperation between states within the CBSS is linked with non-military security challenges that are focused on the economic (including energy), ecological and social levels. They define issues of expert groups and task forces complementing the regional political cooperation with a sectoral dimension. While cooperating in these areas, states must not forget about military threats, as emphasized by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Jacek Czaputowicz, who pointed to military incidents, expanded military capabilities in the Kaliningrad Oblast or hybrid actions (disinformation, cyber-attacks and hostile rhetoric). Within the context of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, regional cooperation in crisis management has also become particularly important. Urmas Reinsalu, Estonia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that the current crisis highlighted the need for increased regional cooperation on civil protection, as well as that it gives impetus to digitization in the region. The COVID-19 pandemic was also included in other foreign ministers’ statements, e.g. Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson (Iceland) pointed out its potential negative effects on children and adolescents. Therefore, the extension of mandates of the existing working structures – the Expert Group on Children at Risk and the Task Force against Trafficking in Human Beings – should be seen positively, especially since effects of their past operations are appreciated beyond the BSR. Finally, Edgars Rinkēvičs (Latvia) emphasized that although the long-term priorities of the CBSS (regional identity, sustainable and prosperous region, safe and secure region) are still valid, they should be supplemented by new areas, e.g. cooperation in scientific research.

…but several challenges remain for the Council. An essential element of the CBSS reform is to increase its flexibility and pragmatism. Meetings at the level of the heads of state and government (the so-called Summits) will be organized only if the weight of the decision would require it (after the annexation of Crimea, Member States suspended the organization of the Summits in an alternating cycle with ministerial meetings). In the light of new arrangements, the importance of the CBSS Permanent Secretariat in Stockholm will also increase. Its tasks have been extended, inter alia, by the possibility of initiating activities, promoting objectives and implementing priorities agreed upon by the Council (after approval of the Committee of Senior Officials). Therefore, it will be crucial to use regional synergies and conduct a structural dialogue with other cooperation formats in Northern Europe (mainly regional intergovernmental councils – the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council). The new Director General will also have an important role after the term of office of Ambassador Maira Mora expires at the end of August 2020.

The BSR does not operate in isolation from cooperation within the EU, that’s why the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Pekka Haavisto, referring to the European Green Deal, pointed to the necessity to strengthen the cooperation efforts in relation to the circular economy, climate change and sustainable development. These should be a driving force of economic recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic. Linas Linkevičius, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, also spoke in the same vein. Moreover, he briefly introduced future activities of Lithuania, which will take over the CBSS presidency in July 2020, and said that they will be focused on sustainable development, ‘green’ industry and ecological tourism in the BSR. Altogether, these issues will become particularly important to relaunch the regional economy and strengthen the resilience in crisis situations. There is so much to gain on this level, thanks to the synergy effect from cooperation with other organizations, which was emphasized by the German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas. He referred particularly to Germany’s two-year chairmanship of the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), which begins on July 1st. Additionally, H. Maas noted the involvement of young people in the political affairs of the region, which was also emphasized by Ann Linde, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, as well as Urmas Reinsalu.

Conclusions. For the first time since the annexation of Crimea, the CBSS ministerial meeting was held, attended by foreign ministers of all the CBSS Member States, including S. Lavrov and H. Maas. Representatives of the Member States welcomed the CBSS reform which was completed during the Danish presidency and stressed its importance for regional dialogue. Political cooperation will complement the practical dimension but will be based on a more flexible and pragmatic formula, taking into account the current state of relations. The CBSS Secretariat will gain more significance, the tasks of which are not only related to project implementation within the EU Strategy for the BSR, but also to facilitate and initiate intergovernmental dialogue in the region.

“We didn’t write the past, the future is in our hands”: a new Slovak-Hungarian opening in the shadow of Trianon (Łukasz Lewkowicz)

Complicated Slovak-Hungarian relations. Since the establishment of independent Slovakia in 1993, Hungary has been regarded as an important political partner in the region of Central Europe. An additional factor in mutual relations is the nearly half-million, politically well-organized Hungarian minority living in a compact area in southern Slovakia. From the beginning, the fear of the Slovak authorities was raised by autonomous or even revisionist tendencies from Hungary. In the past, they were fueled by Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, who had, in the 1990s, limited the possibility of using national minority languages in offices, or by the leader of the Slovak National Party (SNS) Ján Slota, who co-ruled Slovakia during 2006-2010. The introduction by the government of Viktor Orbán to facilitate the granting of additional Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries had caused negative reactions on the Slovak side. At that time, Slovakia had adopted a law withdrawing Slovak citizenship if it another citizenship was granted. After the Social Democrats victory in the 2012 parliamentary election, the Hungarian question was postponed. During 2016-2020, the Hungarian party Most-Híd formed the coalition government. There is currently no party in the Slovak parliament representing Slovak Hungarians.

“Proven” cooperation with Hungary. In previous years, Igor Matovič – still as an opposition politician – considered Viktor Orbán as an “enemy” and actively protested in the Slovak parliament against allowing the Hungarian minority the possibility of dual citizenship. After the parliamentary elections in 2020, there was a significant change in this policy’s approach to Slovak-Hungarian relations. The new government program for 2020-2024 highlighted “proven cooperation” with Hungary. The Visegrad Group (V4), in which both countries cooperate on a multilateral level, was recognized as the most important regional format of Slovakia. The Slovak authorities have also announced the preparation and adoption of a law on national minorities, an amendment to the law on state language, and the creation of a special office for national minorities.

On June 2nd, two days until the 100th anniversary of the Trianon Treaty, Slovak Foreign Minister Ivan Korčok paid an official visit to Budapest. During the meeting, he assessed Slovak-Hungarian relations as very good. According to Korčok, the Treaty on Good Neighborhood and Friendly Cooperation, signed 25 years ago, contains everything that is currently needed to develop mutual relations. During the meeting, talks were held on joint infrastructure and energy projects, the COVID-19 pandemic and the opening of borders, as well as the Slovak Act on National Minorities. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Péter Szijjártó, listed specific projects that will be completed in the coming years: the Danube bridge is to be commissioned by the end of summer between the border cities of Komárom and Komárn, in turn, and by 2022 six new border crossings are planned to be opened, including three new bridges on the Ipola River. By 2024, the capacity of gas connections is to be increased, and by the end of this year a common electric network will also be connected. The heads of diplomacy of both countries openly talked about Trianon. Korčok expressed the opinion that Slovaks and Hungarians, like all Europeans, have very complex historical experiences. In his opinion, an event that is a failure for some can be a victory for others, and what is a trauma for some can be the beginning of freedom for others. He emphasized that in the context of Trianon, the beginning of June will be a time of “empathy”.

Prime Minister in Budapest. Hungary was also chosen as the target of the second official foreign visit of Prime Minister Matovič, which took place on June 12th (the Czech Republic has been traditionally the target of the first visit). During the meeting with Prime Minister Orban, Matovič stressed that he wanted to equalize Hungarians’ rights in Slovakia. To this end, announcements from the government program regarding national minorities are to be implemented. The prime minister of Slovakia described Hungarians not only as neighbors but also as “close friends”. He spoke about the shared history of both nations and announced the preparation of a Slovak-Hungarian history textbook (in the past, Prime Ministers Robert Fico and Ferenc Gyurcsány had also planned to publish a joint textbook for which a working group was created in 2007 but which failed to produce any results). The issue of the anniversary of Trianon was not included in the agenda of the visit. The topic appeared during a press conference after the meeting of both government delegations. A reporter from the Slovakian private television TA3 asked Orbán what he meant during the Trianon anniversary speech in which he spoke about the harm of Hungary and the impending victory of the country. The Hungarian Prime Minister replied that the Hungarian and Slovak perception of Trianon would never be the same because the Hungarians are the last nation of the old Asian steppe world that no one in the world understands. He added, however, that one should look to the future and focus on cooperation with neighbors. The Prime Minister of Hungary mentioned that Slovakia is the third most important economic partner of this country, and he also encouraged Slovak entrepreneurs to invest in Hungary. Slovak politicians emphasized that the meeting was held in a friendly atmosphere.

Currently, there are several members of Hungarian nationality in the Ordinary People and Independent Personalities party (OĽaNO), and Prime Minister Matovič is also building relations with Hungarian politicians who are outside parliament. For example, József Berényi, deputy chairman of the local government in Trnava and former chairman of the SMK, was a member of the government delegation in Budapest. Berényi, in the second government of Mikuláš Dzurinda, served as the secretary of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while as chairman of the SMK he cooperated closely with Hungarian Fidesz. Berényi is described by Matovič as a friend.

Non-consulted Hungarian autonomy project. On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Trianon and the Hungarian Day of National Unity celebrated on June 4th, Igor Matovič organized an informal meeting at Bratislava Castle on June 2nd under the slogan We did not write the past, the future is in our hands (Minulosť sme nepísali, budúcnosť je v našich rukách) with 100 representatives of Hungarian minorities. Politicians, local government officials, teachers, scientists, and people of culture participated. The originator of the event was the mentioned József Berényi. An incident occurred during the meeting. SMK representatives, without prior consultation, submitted to the Prime Minister a Memorandum of the Hungarian community, which contained a demand for Hungarians’ autonomy in southern Slovakia. The signatories of the document referred to the Memorandum of the Slovak Nation, adopted in Martin in 1861 by Slovak political activists. 160 years ago, the memorandum required, among others, the recognition of the Slovaks as an independent political nation within Hungary, the creation of the Upper Hungarian Slovakia or Slovak Area, which would be managed by the Slovaks through their elected representatives, as well as the requirement to use the Slovak language in offices, courts, and schools. Similar solutions were found in the 2020 document. The signatories considered which solutions are necessary for maintaining and developing the Hungarian national minority. They called for the recognition of the Hungarian national community as “state-forming” in the preamble of the Slovak constitution and they demanded the free use of Hungarian national symbols “in every area of life.” The SMK called for the Hungarian language to become an equal language in areas inhabited by the Hungarian minority and for Hungarian cultural institutions and schools to receive more help. The authors of the document assured that “the boundaries of public administration should take into account existing natural regions” and they demanded more support for the economy in southern Slovakia. The memorandum states that Slovak-Hungarians could acquire the Hungarian citizenship without losing its Slovak counterpart. The religious aspect was also mentioned, for example, the SMK politicians asked the Slovak government to support the Hungarian Catholic community’s request to create a separate archdiocese. In addition, Zsolt Simon, chairman of the Hungarian Forum (MF), postulated in the social media the demand to change the preamble to the constitution from “We, the Slovak nation” to “We, citizens of the Slovak Republic”. The SMK’s proposal was criticized by the government coalition, but also by the Most-Híd. It was considered that reporting such far-reaching demands in the current economic situation (fighting a pandemic) is not recommended. In addition, attention was paid to the February election result, which indicated that the SMK did not represent the position of the entire Hungarian minority.

Conclusions. The situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and, as a consequence, the relations with Hungary constitute an important element of the internal and foreign policy of the government of Igor Matovič. Visits of influential Slovak politicians to Budapest in the recent weeks show that Hungary is perceived as a strategic partner for Slovakia. There is a desire to divert attention from controversial historical issues (Trianon) in favor of cooperation within the V4 and the Euro-Atlantic structures. The government coalition declares its desire to complete the work on the act on national minorities as soon as possible, which should be treated mainly as a nod to the Hungarians living in southern Slovakia. The extension of minority languages is also under consideration. Undoubtedly, the inclusion of this law in the government’s program is caused by the desire to win the votes of the Hungarian minority in the future, but it is also aimed at counteracting Hungarian autonomous aspirations. A widely criticized memorandum should be considered mainly as the desire for attention from the currently marginal SMK.

Another tension in Romanian-Hungarian relations (Agata Tatarenko)

In the region of Central Europe, history plays a special role, which was clearly demonstrated by the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. This uneasiness can be observed in the area of bilateral relations and it is particularly clear in the case of Hungary and Romania. (The anxieties in the region can be observed in the context of bilateral relations and they are particularly clear in the case of Hungary and Romania).

The source of tension in the Hungarian-Romanian relations lies in Transylvania (Rumanian Transilvania or Ardeal, Hungarian Erdély). The past of this historical land is extremely complex – over the centuries it was under Hungarian, Saxon, Turkish and Habsburg rule. After the creation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1867, Transylvania became part of the Holy Crown of St. Stefan and, therefore, belonged to the Hungarian part of the dualistic monarchy. After the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, following its defeat in the First World War and under international regulations on June 4th, 1920 in the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles, Transylvania, and parts of Krishana, Maramures and Banat were granted to Romania. The revision of the Trianon Treaty was the main goal of Hungary’s foreign policy in the interwar period and was instrumental in bringing this country closer to the Third Reich. As a result of the second Viennese arbitration on August 30th, 1940, Hungary received land that had been lost to Romania after the World War I. However, following the World War II and as a result of the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaties, this area was returned to Romania. Currently, the majority of Transylvania’s population is Romanian, but it is also inhabited by numerous ethnic and national groups, including Saxon (German), Roma, Hungarian and Slavic. It is because of the Székely Land (Romanian Ținutul Secuiesc, Hungarian Székelyföld) which is inhabited by a Hungarian-speaking ethnic group, traditionally called Székelys, that we now observe a cooling in Romanian-Hungarian relations.

Székelys or the Hungarian minority? According to the 2011 census, in Rumania live 1,227,673 people declared themselves as Hungarians, mainly in Transylvania (i.e. about 6.5% of the population of the whole country). This number is steadily decreasing. Detailed research shows that 49.41% of the population with the same identity in Romania live in Székely Land[1]. In turn, according to data from 2002, only 532 people from the 650,000 of the population of this area defined themselves as Székelys, with a choice of identification as Hungarians. In comparison, in the 1990s it was about 1000 people[2] who identified as Székelys. The area of Székely Land is of particular interest to Hungary; for example, this is demonstrated by the fact that Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, during the summer regularly resides in the spa town of Băile Tușnad (Hungarian Tusnádfürdő). In his speeches and informal talks, Viktor Orbán often raises controversial issues that underpin his political program. The reasons for this may derive not only from caring for the good of the Hungarian minority outside of Hungary, but also from the fact that since 2011 the Hungarian diaspora has acquired electoral rights. The large Hungarian minority in Romania may, therefore, have an impact on the outcome of the Hungarian elections.

Székely Land autonomy project. The territories inhabited by Székelys after World War II in 1952-1968 constituted the Hungarian Autonomous District (Romanian Regiunea Autonomă Maghiară, Hungarian Magyar Autonóm Tartomány). The unit was established under the Constitution of the Romanian People’s Republic of 1952. In practice, it did not have any special rights; however, the idea of re-establishing the autonomous region, systematically returned to the public debate in Romania and Hungary (e.g. in 2003, 2015, 2018). The last time was in 2019, that resulted in a bill which, during the pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, became the subject of heated debate.

On April 23rd, 2020, the Romanian Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of parliament) dealt with a bill that would create an autonomous region in Romania, covering the districts of Covasna, Harghita and part of the district of Mureş. The deadline for consideration of the document by the Chamber of Deputies was March 25th, 2020. Due to procedural omissions, the project was approved by “silent approval”, and thus passed without voting. According to Romanian law, the bill must also be approved by the senate. At the meeting, which took place on April 29th, 2020, following a two-hour debate, 126 out of 135 senators voted against the document.

The autonomous region proposed in the act would have its own president, whose term of office would last for four years and Hungarian would be the official language. Further, the document proposed the free use of “symbols of the Hungarian people” and an autonomous status would be granted to the region after approval in a local referendum. At the same time, the lifting of autonomy would also be adopted following a referendum.

The initiator of the document was the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Romanian Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România, UDMR, Hungarian Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, RMDSZ). The organization was established on December 25th, 1989 and since then it has been taking part in the elections in Romania at the local, national and European level. It enjoys stable support of around 6%, which corresponds to the percentage of the Hungarian minority in the Romanian population. The grouping has created several controversies since its inception; in February 1990, in Târgu Mureș (Hungarian Marosvásárhely), in response to the creation of UDMR, the far-right nationalist Romanian Hearth Union (Romanian Uniunea Vatra Românească) was established. In March the same year, riots took place in the city with the participation of Hungarians who came to celebrate the anniversary of the anti-Habsburg uprising in Transylvania in 1848. Five people were killed and about 300 were injured.

It should be emphasized that the UDMR is not currently the only representative of interests of the Hungarian minority in Romania, while this party is increasingly being criticized. There is a noticeable increase in support for the Romanian Hungarian Civic Party (Hungarian Magyar Polgári Párt, Romanian Partidul Civic Maghiar).

Reactions in Romania. Romanian President Klaus Iohannis (National Liberal Party, PNL) referred rather harshly to the bill on autonomy. He accused the opposition Social Democratic Party (PSD) of plotting with UDMR to hand over Transylvania to Hungary. The words of the President of Romania did not go unnoticed by Hungary. Péter Szijjártó, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, stated that Iohannis’s statement was an incitement to hatred and asked the Romanian leader to show more respect to Hungarians living in Romania. In turn, the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, in a radio interview given a day later, refrained from further comments stating that he is waiting for the situation to clear up.

The statement by President Iohannis, which was also published on his fanpage, was criticized by the National Anti-Discrimination Council (Romanian Consiliul Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării, CNCD) – a Romanian government’s agency founded in 2001 which is politically independent and responsible for applying Romanian and EU anti-discrimination rules as well as for the management of the national anti-discrimination plan. On May 20th, 2020, the CNCD described the statement of the President of Romania as an act of discrimination violating the right to dignity on the basis of ethnic or national origin and imposed a penalty of the amount of RON 5000 (over EUR 1000) upon Iohannis.

100th Anniversary of the Trianon Treaty in Romania. On May 13, 2020, the Romanian Chamber of Deputies passed a law that establishes June 4th, which is the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, as a national holiday for Romania. The project, for which Senator Titus Corlăţean (PSD) was one of the main initiators, provides for the possibility of organizing cultural, educational and scientific events at national and local levels to raise awareness about the Trianon Treaty and its significance. In turn, the Romanian public television could broadcast educational programs and films related to the subject of the Treaty while on that day the Romanian flag would be raised. According to Corlăţean and other parliamentarians who voted in favor of the bill, the project is not directed “against anyone”. Instead, its purpose is to commemorate the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the fact that the borders of Great Romania have been accepted internationally. Despite these assurances, Hungarian Foreign Minister and representatives of the Hungarian media and critically assessed this initiative. President Klaus Iohannis did not sign the document and asked for a constitutional check on the Trianon Day law.

Summary. The Trianon Treaty is a special plash point in the history of Romania and Hungary. June 4th, has been characterised by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, as “the darkest day of our national history”, but for Romanians, this date marks the rise of Greater Romania. For this reason, anniversary celebrations in Romania and Hungary will have a completely different character. It should be emphasized that Hungarian and Romanian decision-makers, as well as Hungarian and Romanian societies, are particularly sensitive to issues related to the Trianon Treaty.

Common history has often been a source of tension between Hungary and Romania. In such cases, there was the usual exchange of diplomatic courtesies, which, however, did not translate into cooperation, in the field of energy or the economy (Hungary is the fourth most important export destination for Romania, after Germany, Italy and France and the third import destination). Nevertheless, on May 26th, 2020, the Romanian and Hungarian foreign ministers Bogdan Aurescu and Péter Szijjártó at a joint press conference on the occasion of the Hungarian official’s visit to Romania, argued that Romanian-Hungarian relations are doing well.

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[1] Rezultate definitive ale Recensământului Populaţiei şi al Locuinţelor, 2011, http://www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/REZULTATE-DEFINITIVE-RPL_2011.pdf [21.05.2020].

[2] Notă metodologică. Recensământul Populaţiei şi al Locuinţelor s-a efectuat în perioada 18-27 martie 2002 pe baza Hotărârii Guvernului României nr. 680/2001 şi a Hotărârii Guvernului României nr. 504/2001, potrivit principiului liberei declaraţii a persoanelo, 2002, https://insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol4/notavol4.pdf [21.05.2020].

Historical controversy complicates the relations of Bulgaria and North Macedonia once again (Jan Muś)

History dispute. During the summit of the European Union – Western Balkans (see “IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 185) on 6 May, 2020, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov drew attention to the dispute between the two countries regarding the historical and cultural heritage. He confirmed the Bulgarian support for the European integration of North Macedonia, but he also pointed out that the Skopje authorities should adjust to the Treaty of Friendship between Macedonia and Bulgaria of August 2017. Borisov suggested that Sofia may block the accession negotiations of North Macedonia. Such statements addressing Macedonians were a call to work out an agreement between the two countries on the interpretation of the history that divides them. This means that after a very short period of time, the Macedonian issue returns to the bargaining table.

The Bulgarian side recognizes the Macedonian nation as a purely political concept, which is culturally part of the Bulgarian circle. According to the Bulgarian interpretation, due to political events in the 1940s, Josip Broz Tito successfully created a separate Macedonian nation. The official position of modern Bulgaria has never undermined the political and, therefore, national separateness of Macedonians. However, Sofia claims that the cultural, ethnic, linguistic and, generally, historical roots of the Macedonian people remain Bulgarian. In other words, the genuine, though artificial Macedonian nationality, actually derives from Bulgarian heritage. The Macedonian position is different. Adopted by earlier governments and supported, in particular, by the opposition, namely, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – the Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), assumes the separation of the Macedonian ethnicity and culture from its Bulgarian equivalent. According to this logic, the Macedonian ethnos existed in these lands before its Bulgarian counterpart. Some of the leaders of the Macedonian left associated with the presidential camp speak openly about the Bulgarian roots of the Macedonian people, emphasising, however, the cultural or linguistic separateness of Macedonians.

The Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation, which was signed on August 1, 2017, and entered into force on February 14, 2018, was a step towards the normalisation of relations enabling the growth of economic and cultural exchange or political dialogue between leaders of states. It was designed as a tool to help Bulgaria find an ally in the Western Balkans and North Macedonia to see an ally in the European Union. Along with the Treaty, the Bulgarian side prepared a list of demands on Skopje, on which it made its support for Macedonian membership aspirations in the EU conditional. First of all, Bulgaria insisted that the Macedonian authorities give up all claims regarding the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, remove the term “Bulgarian fascist occupier” from all World War II memorial sites, and begin the lustration process against former informers of the secret police in Yugoslavia, who allegedly harmed Bulgarians in post-war Macedonia. Bulgaria also suggested that the Macedonian side avoid using the term ‘Macedonian language’ during the accession talks, and instead use the term ‘official language of the Republic of Northern Macedonia’, thereby confirming its claim that Macedonian is only a Bulgarian dialect. Apart from the issue of language, the most disputes aroused by the character of the Internal Revolutionary Macedonian Organisation operating at the turn of the 20th century and the national identity of Goce Delcev. Declev is the hero of both countries from the time of the struggle for liberation from the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. In 2018, under the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness, a joint commission made up of Bulgarian and Macedonian historians, was set up to settle disputes about a shared past. However, the issue of Delcev’s nationality and the Macedonian language classification remained a matter of dispute, which is currently used by the Bulgarian side.

National opposition. The factor that plays a vital role in the Bulgarian-Macedonian dispute over the historical heritage issue is the pressure by the political opposition in both countries. The Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation, leaves the issue of protecting national minorities in the sphere of each of the host countries. This means that none of the countries shall interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. It also strengthens the status quo regarding the recognition of minorities in both countries, i.e. the existence of the Bulgarian minority in Macedonia and the issue of non-recognition, and, therefore, the lack of protection for the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. Thus, the agreement caused much criticism in Bulgaria and North Macedonia. The main opposition parties, the VMRO-DPMNE in Macedonia and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), accused the then government leaders – Boyko Borisov in Bulgaria and Zoran Zaev in Northern Macedonia, of abandoning their compatriots abroad. Moreover, especially in North Macedonia, there have been claims that such a treaty undermines the national identity of Macedonians. It was pointed out that the Macedonian part paid a higher political price for signing of the Treaty, agreeing to a number of concessions to Bulgaria. The Macedonian Parliament ratified the Treaty by a majority of only 61 out of 120 members.

Boyko Borisov’s current actions are guided by the logic of strengthening his internal political position in Bulgaria. Building the image of a strong regional leader will undoubtedly positively affect the prime minister’s listings in Bulgaria in the short and medium-term. Refreshing the Macedonian issue will also help divert attention from the many internal problems Bulgarians face and the impending consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, appealing to nationalist values carries the risk of perpetuating the conflict rather than staving it off and eventually resolving it.

Bulgarian support for the SDSM aims to force the Macedonian authorities to quickly conclude an agreement with Bulgaria on the interpretation of history. The words of support for the SDSM expressed by individual politicians related to the Bulgarian government can be interpreted as further warning signs addressed at Skopje that the Bulgarian authorities are not afraid of escalating the conflict. The support expressed at such a time will have the opposite effect – it may lead to a decline in political support for the SDSM and a victory in the next elections for the VMRO-DPMNE, a party which is less conciliatory and more conservative, but also with weaker ratings in the European Union. As a consequence, this will expose Northern Macedonia to further slowing down the process of European integration.

Conclusions. The Bulgarian stance on North Macedonia, as expressed at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in May, will not remain indifferent to the process of enlargement and integration of the Western Balkans with the European Union. The threat of the Bulgarian veto and the escalation of the dispute with emotional intensity may also have a negative impact on the progress of accession negotiations between North Macedonia and the European Union. The re-activation of the historical dispute provides another argument for the sceptics about the idea of enlarging the EU to include a “Balkan boiler” and not preparing countries for cooperation and dialogue in the region.

The joint Bulgarian-Macedonian presidency in the Berlin Process (an initiative supporting regional cooperation of the Western Balkan countries and complementing the policy of the enlargement of the European Union) will lose its splendour in connection with Bulgarian activities. Additional claims against Northern Macedonia will harm the pro-European elite of this country. The Berlin Process Summit in Sofia in October 2020 will be a good opportunity to agree upon a common position. The recurring historical dispute between Bulgaria and Northern Macedonia shows how easy it is to escalate conflicts over historical heritage and that it can take years to solve such problems.

State-owned enterprises in the Central and Eastern Europe in the age of the COVID-19 pandemic (Marlena Gołębiowska)

Pre-pandemic situation. Recent decades have brought significant changes to the ownership role of the state in Central and Eastern Europe. This was done most spectacularly in the 1990s, after the fall of the communist regimes. The unprecedented extent of ownership transformation has led, over the decade, to a transition from a state-based economy to an economy with a clearly dominant private sector. Such a diametrically reducing scope of state domination was particularly the case in those countries of Central and Eastern Europe that later joined the European Union.

However, after the turn of the century, especially after the crisis of 2008-2009, the process of “renationalisation” of the economy has slowed down significantly in most countries of the region. There have been several reasons for that. First, in many countries, the social climate around privatisation has been significantly weakened due to the, not always positive, experiences associated with it. This included suspicions of fraud in this area but also reluctance to restructure privatised companies where there were often collective redundancies. Secondly, the economic policy has evolved toward the goal of keeping companies in the sectors considered strategic under the control of the state, especially in energy, petrochemical, banking, and transport. This was accompanied by the growing importance of non-economic objectives imposed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Finally, the financial crisis, which significantly violated the current socio-economic order, has contributed to the evolution of national economic policies towards a more active role of the state.

The result was a halt to the privatisation processes and, in some countries, even a subsequent nationalisation of previously privatised enterprises (e.g. in 2015, after 20 years of privatisation, the Hungarian Budapest Bank became a state bank again, and in Poland the state regained control of the previously privatised bank Pekao SA) or nationalisation from the outset as private enterprises (e.g. in 2016 the largest commercial bank in Ukraine was nationalised – PrivatBank).

It should be added that the range of SOEs in Central and Eastern Europe varies. Their share of the economy, measured by employment participation and/or value-added creation, amounts to around 30% in Belarus, 10-20% in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Poland, and Ukraine, 5-10% in Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Albania, Slovenia, Hungary, and Latvia, and below 5% in Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Macedonia.[1]

The state is coming to the rescue… When the economy is affected by the crisis, the confidence in the reliability of the market-mechanism is often shaken. There is then a social acceptance, and even some expectation, to increase the role of the state in the economy, including the state as owner. This scenario took place in many countries during the already mentioned global financial crisis. In this aspect, the current crisis related to the COVID-19 pandemic is also announced. Governmental interventions, also in terms of ownership, focus, as demonstrated by the recent crisis, on support for the most affected industries.

Currently, airlines are in a challenging situation, facing a loss of liquidity and bankruptcy in two months (10% of all flights were cancelled in early March 2020, compared to 2019, while 40-60% in late March, and 80% in April (!)).States own many of these companies in Europe and have directed their assistance to them, mainly in the form of loan guarantees. These solutions were implemented initially by Nordic countries: the Danish and Swedish governments, with less than 15% of SAS shares (guarantee amount – EUR 274 million) and the Finnish government, with less than 56% of Finnair shares (EUR 600 million). For Central and Eastern European countries, this type of government support can include the Romanian state-owned airline Tarom (EUR 65 million), with 97% of shares. Belavia, which is 100% owned by Belarus, also received aid.

However, some countries are moving forward and are providing assistance through recapitalisation. The Latvian Government announced an investment of up to EUR 250 million in airBaltic’s equity capital, which would increase its shareholding from 80% to 91%. This form of compensation for losses caused by COVID-19 is also planned for, the previously mentioned airline, Finnair. The latter plans to issue shares up to EUR 500 million and the Government, which is now the majority shareholder, announced participation in the offer. The Estonian Government makes the increase in the share capital of the state airlines of Nordica conditional on the merger of Estonian aviation assets (including the redemption of Regional Jet, which is partly owned by LOT’s Polish airlines).

In addition to increasing the shares in SOEs in the aviation industry, ideas are put forward to save private airlines from bankruptcy as well. This was suggested by Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš for the Czech Airlines flagship carrier. The President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenski also spoke about the need to establish a state airline.

…on strict rules. Public aid, targeted on principles such as airlines, can quickly expand to other sectors as the crisis is going to slide. In the European Union, where under normal circumstances the granting of state aid in any form to a single economic operator, leading to distortions of competition in the free market, is, in principle, prohibited, specific conditions have been laid down to enable it to be granted in times of pandemic. These include, for example, the obligation to develop post-crisis exit strategies for large companies that have received significant state aid for recapitalisation or a strict limitation of the remuneration of their management, including a ban on premium payments.

Public aid should be granted only if no other solution is available. International institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, in the context of the current crisis, recall that governments should also regularly check whether there is a material justification (usually in the form of market failure) for the company to be state-owned. Examples of SOEs going beyond the framework of such justifications are the sanatorium in Belarus, the footwear company in Croatia, and the circus in Ukraine.

Conclusions. The final scale of the economic crisis following COVID-19 is not yet known. However, as with the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, it may result in a wave of rescue nationalisation and recapitalisation of SOEs. These should be calculated in order to achieve a specific objective after which the ownership interests of the states will be sold, as recommended by the European Union while recognising the need for a temporary loosening of the rules on state aid. At present, the aim is to prevent the bankruptcy of key transport companies (in the long term, companies from other sectors may also be included).

In Central and Eastern Europe, where the scope of autonomous economic policy pursued at the national level has been strengthened for more than a decade, this pattern may prove difficult to implement. SOEs are often considered as “national champions” of particular importance for national economies, not only economically.

It is sufficient to mention that SOEs open the largest corporate income lists in many countries of the region: Poland – PKN Orlen, Hungary – MOL, Slovenia – Petrol, Ukraine – Naftogas. Moreover, their subsidiaries open lists of the largest companies in other countries. This is the case, for example, in Lithuania, where Orlen Lietuva, a Polish company of PKN Orlen, is the largest company, and in Croatia, where in terms of revenues the leader is INA, with the Hungarian MOL and the Croatian government as the largest shareholders.

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[1] C. J. Richmond, M. D. Benedek, B. Cegar, M. P. Dohlman, M. Hassine, B. Jajko, … & M. J. A. Miniane, Reassessing the Role of State-Owned Enterprises in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, International Monetary Fund, 2019.

Germany and NATO’s Eastern Flank. Conclusions for Poland