The eurozone crisis, apart from revealing serious institutional weaknesses in the structural design of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), has also highlighted the limits of the EU and its member-states to act efficiently, swiftly, and comprehensively to address the problems at hand. A number of vicious feedback effects that the crisis fuelled resulted in unwelcome political and economic developments spreading beyond the eurozone. The objective of this paper is to shed some light on the causes and the ways of addressing the crisis in the euro area. Against this background, the diverse correlated implications of the eurozone crisis for the EU member-states, for the EU institutions, and possibly for the future of the EU itself are discussed.
The spill-over of the global fi nancial crisis has uncovered the weaknesses in the governance of the EMU. As one of the most open economies in Europe, Hungary has suffered from the ups and downs of the global and European crisis and its mismanagement. Domestic policy blunders have complicated the situation. This paper examines how Hungary has withstood the ups and downs of the eurozone crisis. It also addresses the questions of whether the country has converged with or diverged from the EMU membership, whether joining the EMU is still a good idea for Hungary, and whether the measures to ward off the crisis have actually helped to face the challenge of growth.
The Polish economy responded to the global fi nancial crisis differently than the remaining economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Although it lost some growth impetus, the positive growth rates were maintained during the crisis, thus rendering Poland, next to Australia, a rare case among the OECD countries. Why? By means of addressing this question, the specifi cities of four economies, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic are examined and the roots behind the variability of their responses to the crisis are identifi ed. It is argued that the variability of responses to the crisis can be explained by reference to the differences in the transformation strategies employed in each of these countries, which resulted in different levels of development, openness, and competitiveness. This influences respective economies’ responses to shocks such as the eurozone crisis and helps to explain the reasons behind Poland’s sustained growth.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the impact of the eurozone crisis on the Lithuanian economy and on Lithuania’s bid to adopt the euro. Similarly to other Baltic states, Lithuania was affected not only by the crisis in the euro area, but also by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. In order to preserve the public finance stability, austerity measures were introduced and Lithuania did not have to resort to the IMF’s assistance. Today, Lithuania’s economy is on a path to recovery. In this context the question of the Lithuanian dilemma towards the introduction of the euro is discussed. Due to the eurozone crisis as well as due to the necessity for the eurozone member-states to contribute to financial assistance schemes for the European South, there is no particular political will to introduce the euro at the moment. Nevertheless, the euro remains the best warranty of financial and economic stability in Lithuania.
This paper examines the policy of the European Union towards Ukraine. The 2004 and 2007 eastward enlargement of the EU created a new quality in the EU’s relations with its eastern partners. Another major change in the EU’s approach toward its eastern neighbourhood followed the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2003-2004). The evolution of the EU’s external policy gave rise to three basic dimensions of the ENP: the southern, the northern and the eastern one. Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to answer the following questions: What is the EU’s role in Eastern Europe? Does this region matter to the EU at the time of crisis in the eurozone? How does the crisis in the eurozone translate into the EU’s relations with Ukraine?