Agresja Rosji na Ukrainę – podzwonne dla realizmu politycznego

Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine: a nell for political realism

Abstract: The article focuses on analyzing Russia’s policy towards Ukraine from the perspective of political realism, highlighting the limitations of this approach. After the annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, political realism gained popularity but fails to account for subjective and immaterial factors such as ideology and strategic culture. It is difficult to accept the reductionist view of realists who attribute Russia’s aggression to a rational response to NATO’s expansion, without analyzing the historical, cultural, and emotional motives behind Moscow’s actions. The article argues that Russia’s war against Ukraine is not solely based on geopolitical calculations but stems from ideological and imperial ambitions to dominate Ukraine. It must be emphasized that realist analyses are increasingly inadequate in the face of dynamic international realities and multidimensional conflicts, necessitating more complex and interdisciplinary theoretical approaches.

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