What significance do the outcomes of the NATO Summit in Ankara hold for European security and the future of transatlantic relations? We are publishing the first article in our new series, “Expert Voices”, based on discussions held during closed expert seminars organised by the Institute of Central Europe. This paper, prepared on the basis of a seminar held on 9 July 2026, leading Polish experts analyse the results of the summit and their strategic implications.
NATO FOLLOWING THE ANKARA SUMMIT (PDF)
15.07.2026
Dr Marek Stefan
Strategy&Future, Układ Sił
There is no doubt that the process of Europe’s strategic deprioritisation in American strategy is underway and will continue, which will result in reduced US commitment to NATO activity and a decreased American military presence on the continent. Even if American forces ultimately remain in Poland at their current or similar levels, it is already clear that, overall, the number of US troops will decrease across Europe in the future.
The central issue discussed within NATO relates to the Allies’ approach to the US, whose policy towards its European partners has not only been unpredictable, but also repeatedly aggressive and, at times, destructive. Donald Trump’s administration has positioned America on a road to what may be reffered to as “predatory great-power politics”. The current presidency has authored the epitaph for the liberal, “benign” hegemony of the US. Trump’s policies – marked by economic protectionism, the coercion of allies and partners through tariff threats, the possible annexation of Greenland, and repeating suggestions of abandoning NATO allies – have contributed to increased polarisation within the Alliance.
On the one hand, countries such as Poland, the UK, and even Germany seek to maintain American engagement in NATO. To achieve this, they have sought, among other measures, to strengthen military and industrial ties with the US through a number of defence procurement contracts. The approach exhibited by London, Berlin, and, above all, Warsaw may be described as one of “anchoring” American interests in Europe.
On the other hand, countries such as Canada, Spain, and France advocate for securing the greatest possible autonomy from the US – not only because America itself encourages its allies to be more self-reliant, but above all due to the necessity to adapt to the increasingly unpredictable and aggressive posture of a “predatory” America.
The Trump administration’s strategy towards Europe can be reduced to two key elements. First, to limit the conventional US military presence on the continent. Second, to preserve strategic control and political influence over its allies through continued participation in NATO’s extended deterrence framework and increased arms sales.
As Professor David Blagden of the University of Exeter aptly observes, “This is one of the longest-standing tensions in American hegemony: the preference for allies to relieve the burden on the United States (which implies building greater power of their own), while simultaneously wanting them to remain fully subordinate to US strategy (which implies complete dependence on American power).” Blagden also underlines that the deprioritisation of Europe is understandable from the perspective of strategic logic. It stems from Washington’s need to manage limited resources in a situation of “overstretch” of US military forces and assets across Eurasia. At the same time, however, he argues that this process is being distorted by the current US administration’s “arrogant nationalism”.
In some respects, NATO under the Trump presidency is beginning to resemble the ancient Delian League following the transferral of the alliance treasury from the island of Delos to Athens – a development widely regarded as marking the birth of the Athenian Empire. Athens’ allies, whose contributions were effectively appropriated by the League’s leading power, were outraged. Yet they were too weak to challenge Athenian dominance. Several decades later, during the Peleponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta, many of Athens’ long-standing allies turned against it and allied themselves with Sparta, contributing to the downfall of Athenian power. America’s conduct towards its allies – not just within NATO – echoes troubling parallels with those distant historical events. Will the US follow the path of ancient Athens? What consequences will arise from the pursuit of predatory great-power politics by the US? Only time will tell.
Dr Paweł Kusiak
Department of International Relations, Polish Naval Academy
Increasingly, NATO can no longer be described as a unified “community of values” composed exclusively of democratic states with similar political cultures. Strategic differences continue to grow, especially with regard to relations with Russia, policy towards China, the sharing of defence burdens, and varying understandings of national interests. This does not imply that democratic values have entirely lost their importance. However, they are no longer the main binding force of the Alliance. NATO is becoming, above all, a security organisation in which states cooperate because they share a specific strategic interest: deterring adversaries and reducing the risk of war. The Alliance remains a structure based on the consensus of sovereign states; therefore, the clash of specific national interests is not pathological but rather a natural feature of its functioning.
NATO 3.0 and Poland
Poland should closely analyse the concept of “NATO 3.0” promoted under the Donald Trump administration. Its key premise is the transfer of primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defence to the European Allies, while the US reallocates resources to other strategic priorities. Poland should not limit itself to the role of implementing American expectations, but should seek to play an active role in shaping the Alliance’s new model. The foundation of Polish leadership may include high levels of defence spending, ongoing military modernisation, its location on NATO’s eastern flank, its experience in dealing with Russia, and its role as a logistical hub for support to Ukraine. This policy should be complemented by the development of strategic partnerships within Europe. Poland’s natural partners include the Baltic and Nordic states, Romania, and the UK.
However, pragrmatic cooperation with Germany and France is equally necessary. The objective should be the creation of a strong European pillar within NATO – one that is capable of acting with a limited US presence while remaining firmly anchored in transatlantic relations.
US withdrawal from Europe: Consequences for Poland
Poland should seek to minimise the pace of reductions in American military presence in Europe as much as possible. Particular emphasis should be placed on preserving those US capabilities that European states are not yet able to replace rapidly: intelligence, missile defence, command and control, strategic transport, long-range strike capabilities, and nuclear deterrence. This objective should be supported through investments in infrastructure, weapons storage facilities, joint command structures, and durable mechanisms for the rotational deployment of forces. With regard to nuclear deterrence, Poland should participate in the French concept of forward deterrence and actively advocate expanding NATO’s nuclear sharing programme to include both Poland and Finland.
Dr hab. Paweł Turczyński, prof. UWr
Institute of European Studies, University of Wrocław
Without its strongest member, NATO possesses only limited capacity to deter potential aggressors. The course of the Russo-Ukrainian war also illustrates the critical importance of US capabilities, particularly in the spheres of intelligence, surveillance, communications, and strategic support. European Allies are increasing their defence spending and consolidating their armaments programmes, but the most immediate effects are primarily visible in the quantity of weapons being produced. The development and deployment of technologically advanced systems comparable to those of the US with require not only substantial investment but also years of effort. Until then – and likely for decades rather than years – Europe will remain dependendent on US support for its own security and for the credibility of the security guarantees it extends to other states.
NATO and the war in Ukraine
The situation of Ukraine is of great importance to NATO, though it represents somewhat of a paradox. Ukraine will not fall; it will continue to receive sufficient support to continue fighting, though not enough to secure a decisive victory. The war is therefore likely to continue for years, and it remains unclear what the eventual peace settlement may entail. This is significant because, even if carried out successfully, the war continues to exhaust Ukraine. The fighting is taking place on Ukrainian territory, a substantial part of which remains under Russian control – and which Russia will seek to legitimise as permanently annexed. If peace negotiations fail to bring about a lasting settlement and only lead to a provisional ceasefire, as occurred between 2014 and 2022, several consequences may arise. First, Ukraine’s reconstruction will be extremely costly and slow due to the high risk facing potential investors. Second, Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and NATO will likely remain a challenge. Third, a state with a war-weakened economy that is simultaneously required to maintain a powerful military for its protection – and to cultivate a form of “military ethos” – may develop in a more authoritarian direction or even towards military rule, as illustrated by the example of Turkey. At the same time, Ukraine may seek to leverage the military capabilities it has developed during the war by offering security assistance to other states in the region, thereby compensating for its economic weakness with military strength.
The Polish dimension
Poland’s role in the emerging security framework is likely to be twofold. On the one hand, it will remain a key logistical and political hub for Ukraine’s defence against Russia. On the other hand, it will continue to be a target of hybrid attacks and various forms of sub-threshold activity designed to undermine security. In this context, it is vital to pursue forms of military modernisation that can deliver rapid results – such as air and missile defence capabilities – while also contributing to long-term economic development, particularly in the field of advanced technologies. One promising avenue lies in participation in international defence initiatives, whether they be American, European, regional, or potentially Ukrainian.
NATO and Iran’s nuclear programme
The reference included in the Ankara NATO declaration regarding the indamissibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is understandable in light of US involvement in the issue and the concerns of neighbouring Turkey. However, it may prove difficult fo implement in practice. Air strikes can weaken Iran’s scientific and technological infrastructure, but Iran could receive assistance in this field from Russia or China at any time. For this reason, such a categorical commitement by the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance entails a degree of strategic risk.
Dr hab. Kamil Zajączkowski
Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw
Russia’s increasing aggressiveness may encourage it to exploit Europe’s weakness in the nuclear domain. At the same time, signals suggesting a possible reduction in America’s commitment to European defence may incentivise Russia to employ nuclear coercion. Conversely, the creation by Europe and the European Union of a fully independent, autonomous, and US-alternative nuclear security system currently seems highly improbable, if not impossible. This is due to both institutiona limitations – particularly shortcoming in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy – and from practical obstacles related to the costs and time required to develop such capabilities. Both France and the UK possess nuclear arsenals that are smaller than Russia’s and maintain only limited stocks of tactical nuclear weapons. Even a substantial expansion of these aresenals, combined with the development of broader European nuclear capabilities, would not resolve the problem of the strategic imbalance vis-à-vis Russia. In this context, the most realistic solution is to strengthen Europe’s capabilities – including nuclear capabilities – as one of the pillars of NATO. This would entail the further development of the French and British nuclear programmes in a European framework and the advancement of the concept of a European deterrence component within NATO (“NATO Europe Deterrent”). At the same time, Europe is expanding and strengthening its conventional military capabilities, which represent a key element of nuclear deterrence in the broader sense. Nuclear capabilities alone, without sufficient conventional forces, do not provide the same level of deterrent effect. This process is consistent with the concept of “NATO 3.0” promoted by the current US administration: an Alliance in which European NATO members, with Germany playing a leading role, assume primary responsibility for conventional defence. Such a strengthened European pillar of NATO would serve as an ideal complement to the US nuclear umbrella while substantially reinforcing Europe’s security architecture and its broader system of security governance.
US policy towards Europe
Several broader trends are likely to shape transatlantic relations and the future development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.
First, despite various statements made by President Trump, it seems unlikely that the US will withdraw from the Euro-Atlantic framework. NATO remains the principal anchor of American interests in Europe and a key mechanism for safeguarding those interests.
Second, America’s continued memebrship in NATO does not mean that the Alliance will remain unchanged. Rather, NATO is likely to undergo a process of reconfiguration. On the one hand, this will entail a more limited and selective American role within the Alliance. On the other hand, it will require the remaining NATO members – particularly the European pillar – to assume greater responsibility for collective defence.
Third, the demands of the new US administration for a more equitable distribution of financial and military burdens among NATO member states should be examined from three perspectives. Domestically, Trump promised his electorate a reduction in America’s internaitonal commitments, including their financial costs. From the perspective of the defence industry, the US will seek to ensure that increased defence spending by other NATO members translates into investment in American arms production. Finally, US calls for a redefinition of its role within NATO are also driven by broader geopolitical considerations, particularly strategic competition within the People’s Republic of China.
Fourth, America’s increased engagement in Europe during the Biden administration, prompted by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, does not signify a fundamental shift in US foreign policy priorities. Regardless of who occupies the White House, the Indo-Pacific region and the challenges associated with China’s growing power are likely to remain the primary focus of American strategic attention.
Fifth, this long-term strategic orientation towards Asia – the so-called “pivot to Asia” – does not imply a complete US withdrawal from Europe. However, it does suggest that Washington will increasingly expect its allies, particularly EU member states, to assume greater responsibility for Europe’s defence and security.
Beata Czernaś
Maria Curie-Skłodowska University
The NATO Summit in Ankara clearly demonstrated the profound transformation of Northern Europe’s security architecture. The Nordic region has consolidated its position as a key strategic actor within the Alliance. At the same time, however, the summit exposed fractures in transatlantic unity, compelling member states to reassess existing models of cooperation and to place greater emphasis on regional frameworks, in which Poland plays an important role.
Sweden and Finland unequivocally confirmed their status as mature and fully integrated members of the Alliance. Sweden demonstrated this through the rapid expansion of its defence procurement efforts. Finland, on the other hand, has significantly enhanced NATO’s early-warning capabilities through the establishment of forward presence structures on its territory. In doing so, it has helped shift the Alliance’s defence posture towards dterrence by denial.
These operational advances have been accompanied by political tensions. Considerable concern was generated by the informal pre-summit meeting held in Bergen, organised at the initiative of the US but without Denmark’s participation. In Swedish strategic analyses, the incident was interpreted as a sign of the emergence of a “two-speed NATO” and an attempt to divide the Nordic region politically and strategically. Finalnd adopted a more pragmatic approach. Policymakers in Helsinki have for some time recognised signals that the US is strategically shifting its focus towards the Indo-Pacific. From this perspective, the appropriate response to declining American engagement in
Europe is the intensification of regional defence cooperation, including closer collaboration with Poland. Warsaw, as a key logistical hub for the Baltic states, and Helskinki, as the northern bastion of regional security, are increasingly becoming two compelmentary pillars of the same integrated defence system.
Denmark’s diplomatice position deteriorated following the Ankara Summit. In addition to its marginalisation during the Bergen meeting, public discussion once again focused on US demands for a greater military presence and stronger strategic influence in Greenland. The fact that these demands were voiced at a sumit intended to demonstrate Allied unity should be regarded as a warning sign. These developments are not merely the product of the personal ambitions of the Trump administration. Rather, they reflect fundamental Americal strategic interests shaped by the perception of China as the principal long-term challenge to US power. As long as the was in Ukraine continues and Europe remains dependent on the American security umbrella, Washington is likely to continue exerting pressure on Copenhagen. The situation is futher complicated by domestic considerations. From the perspective of many Greenlanders, Copenhagen’s efforts to maintain close cooperation with the US and preserve its influence within NATO are perceived as manifestations of neo-colonial practices, sometimes described as a form of “military colonialism”.
EXPERT VOICES: NATO FOLLOWING THE ANKARA SUMMIT