Institute of Central Europe
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Drone coalition: Latvia’s ambitions to boost security and international image

The international initiative to provide Ukraine with unmanned aerial systems, known as the Drone Coalition, was established on 14 February 2024 at the initiative of Latvia and currently comprises 18 countries. Its aim is to provide Ukraine with drones and assistance in training personnel in the use of new technologies. From Latvia’s point of view, the coalition is also an opportunity to strengthen its own defence capabilities, develop domestic businesses based on scientific research, and shape the international image of an innovative state. The International Drone Summit, to be held in Riga on 28 May 2025, will be an opportunity to strengthen this leadership role.

Origins and role of the Drone Coalition. Modern technologies, including unmanned aerial systems, have fundamentally changed the tactics of warfare. Currently, drones are an important element of Ukraine’s military capabilities, both in reconnaissance and strike missions. As a result, a year ago, on Latvia’s initiative, Ukraine, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark and Germany signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a Drone Coalition, committing to invest in drone production, supply Ukraine with equipment and its spare parts, conduct drone tests, train soldiers and introduce other technical solutions. The coalition currently consists of Ukraine, Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Estonia, Italy, New Zealand, Canada, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Germany and Sweden, as well as Latvia and the United Kingdom, which lead the Drone Coalition. On 19 February 2025, Norway joined the group, agreeing to provide nearly €50 million for the development of drone technologies.

The task of the Drone Coalition is to ensure the continuity of transfers of combat drones of various parameters designed in accordance with the requirements of the Ukrainian armed forces, to develop the production of drone systems and to promote secure supply chains for the components of these devices in Western countries.

The total support of all member states of the Drone Coalition for Ukraine in 2024 amounted to €1.8 billion. Latvia provided €20 million at that time and plans to provide the same amount in 2025. Since July 2024, an international fund has also been operating within the coalition, an institution established to purchase drones for Ukraine, with an amount of over €80 million (Latvia allocated €5 million for this purpose). Under contracts signed in January 2025, worth €54 million, the coalition will supply 30,000 drones to Ukraine. Two Latvian companies are also involved in their production, with 12,000 drones worth €17 million to be delivered in the coming months.

The importance of the drone coalition for Latvia. Latvia is considered one of the most innovative countries in Central Europe. Thanks to advanced technologies, it has made significant progress in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, thus gaining a special position in the Drone Coalition. Moreover, this initiative not only strengthened the country’s defence potential, but also opened up new opportunities for local entrepreneurs, the research sector and the defence industry. Participation in the coalition gave Latvia access to knowledge and experience gained during the war in Ukraine, financial resources for technology development, and the opportunity to test and develop cutting-edge drone solutions within the framework of international public procurement. Thanks to them, Latvia can design new equipment and develop its own combat capabilities. In turn, Latvian companies have the opportunity to participate in international tenders and promote their own brands on the global market. For example, last year Latvia organised a hackathon “Drones for Ukraine” and launched the Latvian Drone Capabilities Development Initiative to strengthen the drone potential of the Latvian Armed Forces. In June 2024, a testing ground was also created at the Sēlia military training area, where both domestic and foreign drone manufacturers have the opportunity to conduct tests in the field of technology development using unmanned aerial vehicles. In October 2024, the Latvian company Origin, which specialises in advanced autonomous systems, received €4 million from the European Defence Fund for drone innovation.

Drone diplomacy. The opportunity to confirm Latvia’s leadership in this initiative will be the International Drone Summit in Riga, scheduled for 28 May 2025, with the participation of the Latvian Ministry of Defence and Riga University of Technology. The summit will bring together representatives of the Drone Coalition member states, military experts, scientists, entrepreneurs and leaders of the unmanned aerial vehicle industry to discuss the Coalition’s achievements to date. The Summit also aims to create opportunities for Latvian companies and researchers to establish contacts with foreign partners and to promote the optimal use of research potential in the defence industry. The event will thus provide an additional platform for discussion and indication of future directions of activities, with special emphasis on challenges related to global security and new dimensions of warfare.

Conclusions and forecasts: Latvia’s political efforts to provide technological support to Ukraine have given impetus to the development of the European and Latvian drone industry. This format also promotes an active exchange of information on research and innovation in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles, creating an opportunity for the countries to organise joint projects in the future.

The Drone Coalition strengthens Latvia’s security, as the development of robotics and artificial intelligence can provide – especially for small countries – optimal defence capabilities against asymmetric threats (see “IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 1246). It is also important from the point of view of the development of the drone industry in Latvia, security of supply and strengthening of the national economy.

Latvia is strengthening its role in the drone coalition by continuing its support for Ukraine (last year it delivered almost 5,000 drones to Ukraine), promoting the country’s defence industry, business cooperation and innovation. It also plans to set up a centre of excellence to develop unmanned aerial vehicle technology and find cutting-edge solutions to the threat posed by drones to critical infrastructure. Latvia’s ambition is to develop and promote domestic drone technologies globally and to shape the image of an innovative country.

Estonia: Controversy over changes to local elections law

Local elections will be held in Estonia in October 2025. The Riigikogu (Parliament) is currently considering a draft amendment to the Constitution that would restrict the right to vote in local elections for citizens of Russia, Belarus and/or persons of undetermined citizenship. While the aim of the amendment is to deprive citizens of hostile and aggressive states of the right to vote, the debate on the amendment has a wider dimension as it touches on the stability and quality of democracy, human rights and freedom of thought and belief.

Political and social context. The right to vote in local elections, based on §156 of the Constitution, is granted not only to citizens of Estonia and the European Union. It also applies to foreigners residing in Estonia on the basis of a permanent residence permit, who have reached the age of 16 on the day of the election and have their permanent residence in a given municipality (this right does not apply to parliamentary elections). The category of foreigners includes mainly citizens of Russia and persons of indeterminate nationality with permanent residence in Estonia. Their presence in the country is historically conditioned and results from the complex migration policy of the Soviet Union. The vast majority of persons with undetermined citizenship are Russian-speaking. After Estonia regained its independence, it was important for all persons permanently residing in the territory of a given municipality to participate in local elections so that any disputes and dissatisfactions could be resolved through a representative assembly and not in the form of protests and demonstrations. This right is a practical expression of the concept of a political community whose members can take decisions on local matters.

Currently, people of undetermined citizenship make up 4.5% of the Estonian population and Russian citizens – 5%, i.e. about 62.000 and 70.000 people respectively (Statistics Estonia, 2024). In the last local elections in 2021, only about 40% of eligible voters from the two above-mentioned groups participated.

Draft constitutional amendment. At the end of October 2024, a group of MPs representing three coalition parties – the Estonian Reform Party (RE), the Social Democratic Party (SDE) and Estonia 200 – submitted a draft constitutional amendment to parliament, which aims to restrict the right to vote in local elections for citizens of aggressor states. The bill would grant the right to vote to citizens of states that share democratic values and have security interests similar to those of the Estonian state, as well as to people living in Estonia who have no citizenship and owe no allegiance to any state.

The bill passed its first reading in November. The second reading is scheduled for the end of February this year and the third for the end of March, but it is still uncertain whether and to what extent the bill will be adopted. The position of the opposition parties is mixed. The Centre Party rejects the bill outright. On the other hand, Isamaa and the Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) argue that people who have permanent residence in Estonia but are not citizens of any country (‘people with undetermined citizenship’ or so-called ‘grey passport’ holders[1]) should also be deprived of the right to vote.

For its part, one of the coalition partners – the SDE – insists on retaining the right to vote for residents with ‘grey passports’. However, the party would prefer solutions at the level of an ordinary law rather than constitutional amendments. An alternative solution proposed by the SDE would make the right to vote dependent on a declaration of loyalty to the Estonian state and condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In certain situations, the security services could also remove from the electoral rolls people who pose a threat to Estonia’s stability and independence.

Initially, RE and Estonia 200 wanted to disenfranchise people with ‘grey passports’. However, in January this year, all parties in the ruling coalition agreed to amend the constitution only in relation to citizens of Russia and Belarus, leaving the right to vote for people with undefined citizenship, which SDE had advocated. In order for the amendment to go through, the coalition parties need the support of the opposition (together the coalition has 66 votes; a 2/3 majority of the Riigikogu, i.e. 68 votes, is needed to pass the law).

Restriction of the right to vote and the question of the quality of democracy and freedom of conscience. Controversies over the disenfranchisement of certain groups of people have opened up a wider debate that directly concerns the state of democracy in Estonia. Firstly, it was decided that the fundamental rights enshrined in the Basic Law cannot be restricted either by the obligation to submit a declaration of loyalty or by drawing up a list of states and persons to whom this restriction applies. In this respect, a constitutional amendment is required to give greater legitimacy to decisions. The Constitution can be amended in three ways (§163) – by an adopted law: 1) as a result of a referendum; 2) by two successive Riigikogu Assemblies (in the first and the next term of the Seimas, the members of the Riigikogu must vote in favour of the amendment). 3) Urgent procedure (the draft constitutional amendment is discussed in three readings, with at least three months between the first and second readings and at least one month between the second and third readings). This requirement strengthens the stability of the political system and requires careful consideration of changes so that they are not rushed and reflect the broader political consensus over time.

Secondly, it was considered that the declaration of loyalty proposed by the SDE is a very questionable mechanism that is dangerous for the stability and durability of the democratic principles of the state because it interferes with the human right to freedom of conscience. This raises the question of whether interference in the internal space of an individual’s beliefs is ethically and legally justified. Moreover, in democratic states it seems controversial to deprive an entire social group of rights on the basis of a certain characteristic (citizenship of an enemy state or lack of Estonian citizenship) rather than on the basis of individual behaviour.

Conclusions. Although none of the parties mentioned the intention to amend the Constitution in their election programmes for 2023, this issue was included in the agenda of the Riigikogu in the second half of 2024, when the deputies of the Fatherland and EKRE initiated a discussion on the disenfranchisement of citizens of hostile states – Russia and Belarus.

One of the main arguments for the need to change the constitution is the security issue. According to the Estonian services, the ‘grey passport’ holders and Russian citizens in Estonia pose a threat to state security, as Russia is trying to recruit them for actions against Estonia. The majority of Estonians also support changes to the electoral law. Research by the Institute of Social Studies (spring 2024) showed that 63% of respondents are in favour of depriving citizens of third countries of the right to vote in local elections, regardless of whether they are citizens of Russia or other countries (74% among ethnic Estonians and 12% among people of other nationalities). Interestingly, when asked whether Ukrainian citizens who have been living in Estonia for a long time should have the right to vote in local elections, 31% of respondents were in favour, while 60% were against (Norstat, autumn 2024).

Another argument is the question of support for the Kremlin’s policies. Citizens without citizenship and Russian citizens living in Estonia make up a significant percentage of those who do not condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Supporters of the amendment point out that in the 30 years since Estonia regained its independence, these people have had many opportunities to take advantage of the naturalisation process and obtain Estonian citizenship. However, obtaining Estonian citizenship requires knowledge of the state language, which is very difficult for the older generations. In addition, Estonian law prohibits the granting of citizenship to former Soviet soldiers and their families. Russian institutions also often make it difficult to submit appropriate applications for renunciation of citizenship (e.g. by initiating a criminal case in Russia, which excludes renunciation of citizenship, requiring additional explanations when submitting documents, or submitting an application on the territory of Russia).

At the same time, political attitudes do not always coincide with the issue of citizenship. Integration monitoring (2023) shows that 58% of Russian-speaking residents of Estonia are fully or partially integrated (they have a good knowledge of the state language and trust state institutions), and 22% of them have Russian citizenship. Therefore, depriving them of the right to vote could mean a loss of loyalty and reduced support for the authorities.

Political arguments and the desire of certain parties to maximise their electoral results are equally important. The Centre Party, which has been winning ‘Russian votes’ for years, would lose the most by restricting the voting rights of citizens of Russia and Belarus. At the same time, the position of Isamaa and the Reform Party would increase.

[1] The term is derived from the colour of the travel document issued to them for international travel.

[Photo INTS KALNINS / Reuters / Forum]

New dimensions of Polish-Lithuanian cooperation: advanced technologies for security and innovative economy

The new Lithuanian government announces the continuation of the strategic partnership with Poland to ensure regional security. In the context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war and the US presidential elections, this relationship could become even closer. In the coming years, the areas of Polish-Lithuanian cooperation will be expanded to include the innovative defence industry and the application of modern technologies in the economy.

New technologies for security. In the coming years, security will remain the most important area of cooperation between Poland and Lithuania (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 1074). The countries continue to strengthen their national defence capabilities – plans for 2025 include PLN 186.6 billion (EUR 43.32 billion; 4.7% of GDP) for Poland and EUR 2.5 billion (3.03% of GDP) for Lithuania.

Regardless of the configuration of the domestic political scene, the intensification of relations between Vilnius, Warsaw and Kyiv will be maintained. Lithuania’s assistance to the struggling Ukraine has amounted to 1.64% of GDP (in the case of Poland, 0.65% of GDP; Kiel Institute), and Vilnius has pledged to continue this assistance at the level of 0.25% of GDP per year. Lithuania and Poland have also signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine: Lithuania – in June, and Poland – in July 2024. The agreements provide for regular strategic dialogue meetings on issues related to Ukraine’s defence, as well as military, humanitarian and financial assistance, strengthening Ukraine’s economic and energy stability and social resilience, and supporting Ukraine’s aspirations for NATO and European Union membership.

The Ukrainian-Lithuanian Defence Industry Forum was held in Kyiv in September, which resulted in the signing of a Memorandum on Defence Cooperation. Lithuania and Ukraine pledge to cooperate in the production of drones (land and sea) and electronic warfare systems (based on the detection, jamming and defence of threats in communication systems), as well as to develop the production capacity of ammunition, explosives and missiles in both countries and to invest in defence research. Lithuania also undertakes to give Ukraine priority in the purchase of Lithuanian products, components and defence materials. In 2025, the construction of a Ukrainian RDX explosives factory is to begin in Lithuania, using new technologies that allow for fast detonation and high explosive power. During the Polish-Lithuanian Defence Business Forum, attended by the presidents of Poland and Lithuania, the two countries signed a memorandum on industrial cooperation in the field of cybersecurity. Since 2023, Poland, along with the US, Ukraine and Georgia, has been a member of the Regional Cyber Defence Centre in Lithuania, which was established in 2021 and focuses on the analysis of threats in cyberspace.

Poland and Lithuania have already started joint investments in the defence industry and this direction will continue in the coming years. In July, the two countries announced a joint purchase of Piorun mobile short-range air defence systems. In addition, in November the Lithuanian Innovation Agency launched an international programme of scientific research and experimental development work aimed at helping domestic defence companies implement projects with partners in Poland. During the aforementioned Polish-Lithuanian Defence Business Forum, it was also agreed to establish a technology laboratory, which will provide a bilateral platform for inter-institutional cooperation in the field of defence innovation.

Poland and Lithuania, together with the other Baltic states, Finland and Norway, also announced the creation of a so-called ‘drone wall’, which will use unmanned aerial vehicles to protect the external borders of the states. Strengthening air defence is one of the most important defence tasks for Lithuania. The latest programme of the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, the so-called Lithuanian Drone Ecosystem, includes the financing of drone operator courses, the creation of a register of drone operators, incentives for Lithuanian drone manufacturers and the creation of drone clubs.

Innovative economy. In the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the economy has become an integral part of both countries’ security. Poland and Lithuania are dynamically developing technological ecosystems, characterised by innovation and the broad impact of innovation on the socio-economic sphere. Poland and Lithuania ranked 39th and 35th, respectively, among 133 economies included in the Global Innovation Index 2024. In turn, according to the European Innovation Scoreboard 2024 report, Lithuania showed the highest growth rate in the innovation ecosystem – with a value of 3.7 percentage points. It is also a European leader in the financial technology sector (in terms of licensed FinTech companies; Bank of Lithuania, 2023), as well as a significant country in terms of virtual asset services, with 270 companies operating in this field, including companies related to online banking, digital payments, crypto-assets and financial software. In addition, Lithuania has the second fastest growing start-up ecosystem in Central and Eastern Europe, with more than 1.000 start-ups (Dealroom, 2023). The most advanced solutions currently used by the defence sector in Lithuania include photonics, engineering technologies and ICT products. Lithuanian defence industry products, such as electro-optical and laser systems and anti-drone systems (RSI Europe, Brolis), are exported to NATO countries – Germany, France, the UK and the US – as well as to Israel and Ukraine. In this context, a specific response to economic and geopolitical challenges is the Lithuanian Innovation Space – an institution opened on 9 October 2024 at the Lithuanian Embassy in Warsaw, which aims to facilitate cooperation between representatives of Lithuanian business and science. An important dimension of this will be the joint acquisition of EU funds for the development of innovation, scientific research and entrepreneurship.

Conclusions and forecasts. The revaluation of Polish-Lithuanian bilateral relations observed in recent years is, on the one hand, a response to geopolitical threats in the region and, on the other, the result of a more pragmatic approach on both sides and the implementation of concrete initiatives. The growth of mutual trust is having an impact on the intensification and expansion of areas of regional cooperation. In addition to existing projects – political, economic, energy, cultural – Poland and Lithuania are initiating activities in the fields of defence, development of new technologies and scientific exchange. The aim of the cooperation is to increase deterrence capabilities, shape the resilience of critical infrastructure and neutralise threats in cyberspace posed by Russia and Belarus.

The announced foreign policy of the new US President, Donald Trump, and his declaration to reduce US involvement in Europe may paradoxically strengthen the dimension of Polish-Lithuanian bilateral relations and dynamise regional projects in the field of security and innovation, while at the same time serving to create partnerships necessary for the reconstruction of Ukraine. It is therefore expected that Poland and Lithuania will increase the competitiveness of their own defence industries and support their development by attracting new investments and using innovative solutions and new technologies. The establishment of the Lithuanian Innovation Space in Warsaw is therefore an important step in building the position of Poland and Lithuania in the field of innovation and technology and expanding the areas of strategic cooperation in the region.

The focus on defence and economic projects may distract decision-makers from the issue of the Polish minority in Lithuania. The development of education, the original spelling of surnames and the formation of objective and professional Polish-language media in Lithuania should continue to be the subject of interest and dialogue between the two countries in bilateral relations.

Russia’s Triumph

Donald Trump’s phone call with Vladimir Putin was in fact a success for Russia. There are many indications that the Trump administration’s policy will lead to rejecting all of Ukraine’s expectations while taking into account Russia’s demands. Such actions by Washington weaken the cohesion of the West and deepen transatlantic tensions, while Russia gains legitimacy for aggression, strengthens its international position and, as a result, will probably sharpen its demands.

Ahead of the annual Munich Security Conference (scheduled for February 14-16, 2025), visits by senior US officials were expected in Europe, also in the context of talks on Ukraine. Given the divergent and changing signals coming from Washington, these expectations were accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty. On February 12, Donald Trump announced that he had a telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin, which would result in the immediate commencement of peace negotiations. On the same day, during a visit to Brussels, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth ruled out Ukraine’s membership in NATO and declared that US forces would not participate in any peacekeeping operations in Ukraine, and that European countries would be responsible for this, but not within NATO (this would therefore mean excluding Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and de facto dismantling the alliance’s collective defense mechanism).

In Europe, the main reaction was to the conversation between Trump and Putin. European leaders stressed that both Ukraine and Europe must participate in any peace talks. The Ukrainian authorities reacted with restraint, realizing that the fate of the war, as well as the functioning and survival of Ukraine, depended to a large extent on the attitude of the United States (which had already demanded access to Ukrainian raw materials worth $500 billion in exchange for continued support).

Commentary

At the moment, it is too early to draw long-term conclusions, and it is also far from the negotiations announced by Trump that would lead to a ceasefire or an end to the war. Nevertheless, the actions taken by the United States against Russia and Ukraine fundamentally change the situation and the balance of power.

They confirm Trump’s aversion to multilateral cooperation and deepen the “transatlantic gap” between the US and Europe, thereby weakening Western cohesion – contradicting Trump’s earlier claims about the need to act “together” while confirming concerns about the lack of a strategic and predictable course for US foreign policy. This is a very worrying signal for Europe, especially the states of Central Europe, including Poland – against which Russia is already making threats. Above all, however, it is terrible news for Ukraine. Trump’s election was accompanied by certain hopes and expectations in Ukraine (IEŚ Commentaries, no. 1277), but when the day after taking office as president he froze (in an atmosphere of manipulation and lies that resonated worldwide) American development aid, including for Ukraine, these hopes began to give way to growing concerns.

Russia, on the other hand, has found itself in its most favorable situation in three years thanks to the actions of the Trump administration. Until now, a potential peace process had been prevented by the extremely divergent expectations of both sides. Ukraine demanded a return to the borders from before the annexation of Crimea and security guarantees, primarily NATO membership – these expectations were rejected by Trump. Russia demanded (at least) recognition of its territorial gains in Ukraine and its neutral status – Trump granted these demands. In this way, the Kremlin can announce to the Russian public its victory, which Putin needs in the face of the deteriorating domestic situation in Russia. Externally, regardless of the further development of the situation, Russia will escalate its demands and impose increasingly harsh conditions, assuming that it has found itself in a favorable negotiating position.

Moreover, Russia has achieved several goals thanks to the attitude of the Trump administration:

  • it de facto gained legitimacy for its aggression against Ukraine – in the rhetoric of the US President, both Russia and Ukraine are responsible for the war;
  • it will be able to position itself as the side that wants peace – if Ukraine rejects the dictate and wants to continue fighting, it will be accused of seeking to continue bloodshed and of unwillingness to make peace;
  • it has emerged from international isolation, which will be perceived both in Russia and in the world as a sign of the West’s capitulation in the Ukraine matter – and will automatically strengthen worldwide anti-Western and authoritarian forces;
  • any peace negotiations are to be held between Russia and the United States, bypassing other entities (states and international institutions), but above all Ukraine itself – this is the realization of the concept of a concert of powers pushed by Russia and confirmation of Russia’s “regaining” its “rightful” international position;
  • Ukraine has been objectified, which fits into the Russian narrative that denies Ukraine’s sovereignty and its right to self-determination.

[Photo KEVIN LAMARQUE / Reuters / Forum]

Donald Trump, the 47th President of the USA – Ukraine’s fears and hopes

Donald Trump, as the 47th president of the United States, raises both fears and hopes in Ukraine. Although Kyiv was skeptical about Trump’s previous term, disappointment with Joe Biden’s policies has led to greater openness towards the new US leadership. Ukrainians expect that Trump, attached to his image as a strong leader, will take more decisive action against Russia. At the same time, his ambiguous declarations, volatility in decisions and a possible rapprochement with the Kremlin are causing concern. As a result, Ukraine is forced to balance between hope for further support and fear of a potential “trading away” of its interests.

The king is dead, long live the king. In 2020, Ukraine welcomed Joe Biden’s election victory with optimism and high expectations, and Donald Trump’s departure with relief. Officially, the Ukrainian authorities took a reserved stance towards the American elections, but Trump’s previous presidency (2017-2021) was assessed as unfavorable from the point of view of Ukraine’s interests. Therefore, Joe Biden’s victory was welcomed with great expectations (‘IEŚ Commentaries’, No. 315). The 2024 US elections were also accompanied by Ukrainian concerns that Trump does not understand Russia and the motives behind its actions, and that he may deprive Ukraine of support for his own short-term benefits. At the same time, disappointment with the Biden administration’s policy was becoming increasingly visible, which, according to both the Ukrainian authorities and Ukrainian society, supported their fight against Russian aggression in a conservative manner, de facto preventing Ukraine from taking the initiative, additionally imposing restrictions, e.g. on attacking targets on Russian territory. This disappointment grew as, towards the end of Biden’s term, his administration representatives publicly emphasized, for their own image and political purposes, that they had greatly supported Ukraine and contributed to the imposition of sanctions on Russia, while blaming the Ukrainian side exclusively for any failures. In Kyiv, opinions emerged that Kamala Harris’ victory would in fact be merely a continuation of Biden’s policy, and in addition, in the face of a confrontation with Congress – and such a situation had already caused months of stalemate in the context of support for Ukraine. In turn, Trump as president would have the power to make decisions and act – although his intentions regarding Ukraine remained unknown. As a result, the authorities in Kyiv have been reserved in commenting on American statements about Ukraine, trying to send signals about their readiness to cooperate with Trump as well – this was one of the goals of Volodymyr Zelensky’s “victory plan” presented in October 2024 (it mentioned, among other things, Ukrainian raw material resources as a kind of “bait” for Trump).

Compared to the 2020 elections, the stakes have also changed: back then, it was about Ukraine’s international image and the state of U.S.-Ukrainian relations; now, the stakes are the issue of ending a protracted, devastating war. Ukrainians are also aware that the United States is a strategic partner of Ukraine, crucial to its future (especially as disappointment with Europe is also growing). The US elections and all of Trump’s statements were therefore followed very closely on the Dnieper. Significantly, Ukrainians are less skeptical of Trump than many Europeans. 37% of them believe that this is a good choice for the US (10% think otherwise), 33% that he will have a positive impact on the situation in the world (18% disagree), and 26% that it is also a good choice for Ukraine (20% disagree)[1].

The political and social situation in Ukraine. Society remains divided and increasingly diverse in its assessments of the future and the situation in the country. In December 2024, 45% of Ukrainians said that Trump could bring an end to the war (14% had the opposite opinion), but 40% had no opinion or believed that nothing would change. In turn, only 23% indicated that a possible agreement with Russia would be beneficial for Ukraine – 31% thought the opposite, and the rest did not form a clear opinion. The deterioration of moods is also evidenced by the fact that since 2022, the percentage of Ukrainians willing to make territorial concessions to Russia has increased from 10% to 32%, and already 52% of respondents want the war to end as soon as possible through negotiations. It is worth emphasising that in public discourse there is practically no more talk of “victory” or “1991 borders” – the debate is dominated by the economic situation, political and corruption scandals, or the energy crisis. However, the majority of Ukrainian citizens (45%) still believe that 2025 will be better than 2024 (27% say worse). Another side effect of the US elections is the activation of the Ukrainian opposition, which puts Zelensky in a difficult situation: concessions to Trump (and Russia) will expose him to accusations of treason, while a tough stance will expose him to accusations of ruining relations with a strategic ally. There is also more and more criticism towards the authorities and discussions about the possible holding of elections, which have been suspended due to martial law (the last ones were held in 2019).

Concerns. In the opinion of both the authorities and the Ukrainian public, Donald Trump does not understand either the origins and nature of Russia’s aggression or that Ukraine is fighting for survival. The fact that he has repeatedly opposed (as did his entourage) further aid for Ukraine is worrying. The situation is complicated by Trump’s tangled relations with Zelensky. The Ukrainian president’s visit to the US in November 2024 turned out to be a failure, and Zelensky was not invited to Trump’s inauguration. The prevailing belief is that the United States will focus primarily on domestic policy, which will not be beneficial for Ukraine. There are also concerns about Trump’s volatility, for example in relation to personnel decisions, which is important because the 47th US president’s entourage is assessed much worse in Ukraine than he himself (Pete Hegseth, Elon Musk and Keith Kellogg, for example, raise great concerns). Since both Trump and his circle remain ambiguous and often express contradictory opinions on the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war, this creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and waiting. Trump’s reluctance to multilateral international cooperation is noticeable, hence the fear that he will focus on bilateral relations – including with Russia. This in turn could lead to an American-Russian agreement (without Ukraine’s participation), thanks to which Moscow would obtain, for example, a reduction in sanctions and use such an arrangement as a tactical pause to rebuild its economic and military potential in order to attack Ukraine again. It is clear in Ukraine that Vladimir Putin’s goal is to eliminate or subordinate Ukrainian statehood – in the opinion of Ukrainians, Russia is currently not willing to engage in any talks. The Kremlin assumes that it has both a military advantage (slowly but steadily pushing Ukrainian forces back) and a political advantage (over the wavering Western coalition). As a result, the end of the war will depend not on Washington’s decision, but on Moscow’s.

Hopes. Russia reacted unenthusiastically to Trump’s election victory – unlike in 2016. This raises hopes in Ukraine – first of all, that the new US president’s policy towards Russia will be the antithesis of Biden’s policy, which has become increasingly cautious and moderate over time. Trump does not care about Ukraine, but he does care about his own image as a strong, dominant leader. Ukraine therefore hopes that the United States under his leadership will be more willing to conduct policy from a ‘position of strength’ – also towards Russia. Showing weakness in relations with Russia would not only seriously damage America’s image, but also send a signal to China, which is the main strategic rival of the US and a kind of obsession for Trump. Hence the hope that the United States will continue to help Ukraine in order to force Putin to recognize the superiority of Donald Trump. It is recalled, often citing American media and opinions, that during Trump’s first presidential term, the Americans began to supply Ukraine with weapons and did not shy away from confrontation with Russia in Syria. It is also emphasized that Trump’s plans to increase fossil fuel extraction may prove to be an important instrument of pressure on Russia and its economy. In addition, elections to the US Congress will be held in 2026. Trump needs a spectacular success to strengthen the position of the Republicans before the elections – the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war may be useful in this context, if the US president can be convinced of it.

Conclusions. Donald Trump’s statements about Ukraine and Russia have stirred up a lot of controversy and emotion – the US president criticizes both Putin and Zelensky, fails to see the essence of Russian aggression, and formulates many, often contradictory, opinions and declarations regarding his plans to end the war. However, Kyiv is cautious in formulating its assessments and expectations, realizing that Putin will not talk to Ukraine and that its fate largely depends on the current US president. Therefore, one should be prepared for various scenarios, considering the fact that the development of US-Russian relations is difficult to predict. There are also more and more voices saying that the Russian-Ukrainian war is not a priority for the US and that Ukraine must come to terms with this fact. There are also no illusions that the war will end quickly, that it will be possible to regain territories seized by Russia, or that Ukraine will be accepted into NATO in the foreseeable future. There is a growing conviction, however, that before any talks between Trump and Putin, the Ukrainian authorities should start a dialogue with the US president. There is hope that US military and economic aid for Ukraine will not be suspended – however, this will not be unconditional and Ukraine must convince Donald Trump why it is important and why supporting it is in the interests of both the United States and the president himself.

[1] The data in the text come from research by the European Council on Foreign Relations, the Gallup Institute, the ‘Rating’ Sociological Group and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.

[Photo Zuma Press / Forum]

Russia’s Cognitive Actions Targeting Poland Through the Use of Migrants from the Post-Soviet Area

In their hybrid actions against Poland, Russian intelligence services have been known to carry out various acts of sabotage. Due to the increase in immigration to Poland of the population from the post-Soviet area, it has become a potential asset for the Russian services in their cognitive activities. These activities are aimed at creating specific mental processes, attitudes and behaviours among Polish society that are in line with Russia’s objectives.

Russia’s cognitive activities in the context of its strategic objectives in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia’s strategic objective in relation to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is to expand its political influence within the region to the greatest extent possible. In terms of international security, this objective is pursued by means of a number of initiatives, including the attempts to expel Anglo-Saxon influence from the region, to halt regional integration processes and to replace them with its own political projects; to minimise Western support for Ukraine; and to fuel regional bilateral conflicts in accordance with the divide et impera concept. The historical imperial presence of Russia in the region has led to its perception as mostly an undesirable actor, thereby limiting its available instruments of influence. The available tools for building influence in the region are therefore limited to the following: (1) pressure using military force; (2) dependence on imports of energy resources; (3) corrupting elites; and (4) the use of active measures. Each of these instruments possesses the capacity to exert a cognitive influence[1], though it is the use of active measures that remains predominantly associated with the manipulation of the cognitive capacity of specific social groups.

Migration and Russia’s cognitive impact capacity. Alongside the economic development of the CEE countries, there has been an evolution and change in the migration tendency in some of them, from emigration to immigration states. This phenomenon has been further exacerbated by external factors, most notably the outbreak of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war and the subsequent wave of refugees it has generated. In the case of Poland, the number of foreigners residing in the country, although difficult to precisely calculate, is estimated to range from approximately 2.5 million to as many as 4 million. The majority of these individuals are citizens of Ukraine, followed by Belarus, with recent years also witnessing an increase in migration from Moldova and Georgia. The presence of a significant population of migrants from the post-Soviet space in Poland, and more broadly in the CEE countries, has enabled Russia and Belarus to exploit them as assets in cognitive activities. This trend has gained considerable momentum in recent years. The efforts to counter these activities have been hindered by several factors, including the liberalisation of border controls, which has been prompted by the coordinated entry procedures associated with the initial phase of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as the operational dynamics of the Schengen area. New forms of employment are also not without influence. These all served to allocate Russian and Belarusian intelligence assets in Poland and to influence susceptible individuals.

Russia’s modus operandi towards the migrants from the post-Soviet area. Russian intelligence typically engages with individuals from the post-Soviet region residing in Poland primarily through social media platforms popular among Russian-speaking communities, such as VKontakte and Telegram, where these individuals often seek employment. Additionally, interactions are facilitated through personal contacts. Russian intelligence typically engage with the residing in Poland population from the post-Soviet area primarily via social media platforms popular in the Russian-speaking space, such as VKontakte or Telegram, where they often seek financial gain, in addition to utilising personal contacts. A pivotal resource from a Russian intelligence perspective in this context is the prevalence of the Russian language. These individuals are tasked with performing simple income-generating activities and, after fostering deeper relationships, engaging in various acts of sabotage. Payment for these services is often made in cryptocurrencies, a practice that facilitates the concealment of both the actions and the individual or entity responsible for their initiation. Notably, the commission of these actions is primarily conducted within the online domain, obviating the need for direct physical interaction. In more sophisticated instances, the establishment of networks of saboteurs is also observed. These acts of sabotage are then used to create information, which is subsequently distributed. In this way, the validity of specific theses can be ‘proven’ and a narrative created that influences the cognitive abilities of the public/target group in line with Russia’s objectives.

Case Studies. Several incidents of this nature have occurred in Poland in recent years. For instance, in August 2023, an incident took place on the Vistula Boulevards in Warsaw, where a group of Polish individuals was assaulted by unidentified persons for refusing to say the slogan “Glory to Ukraine – Glory to Heroes,” a phrase associated with the Ukrainian nationalism. Both the slogan and the flag visible in the recording were seemingly intended to imply that the perpetrators were of Ukrainian origin. The incident was recorded and subsequently shared online by various profiles that attributed the perpetrators to Ukrainians, disregarding the information provided by the Warsaw Police Headquarters that the aggressors were Georgian citizens.

In January 2024, the Internal Security Agency (ABW) detained an individual bearing a Ukrainian passport who was allegedly preparing acts of sabotage in relation to an attempt to initiate fires in proximity to critical infrastructure facilities in Wrocław. In October 2024, a series of acts of vandalism were perpetrated by two unidentified young males in the same city. These acts involved the spraying of inscriptions such as ‘Our Father Bandera’ and ‘Glory to UPA’, and the painting of red and black flags on various objects[2]. Two of these acts were directed towards objects that were of particular concern to specific social groups. This included the Monument-mausoleum of the murdered Polish population in the South-Eastern Borderlands by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the mural of Wrocław dedicated to Roman Zieliński (see Pic. 1; Pic. 2), the unofficial leader of the football fan community in Wrocław and author of the publication “How I fell in love with Adolf Hitler”. It is noteworthy that these two sites are geographically distant from each other and situated in less prominent areas of the city. This suggests that the perpetrators either possessed a clear awareness of the specific sites they were targeting, or were deliberately instructed to devastate particular locations to radicalise certain social groups, such as football fans’ communities. This objective was partially achieved.

In Poland, there is also evidence of Russian services coordinating organised criminal activity or locating ‘professional criminals’ on its territory with a view to destabilising the social situation. In recent years, there has been a problem with the proportional overrepresentation of Georgian citizens in criminal statistics, although it is difficult to estimate how many of the criminal acts are activities inspired by Russian services.

Conclusions. Drawing upon the aforementioned considerations and the case studies, it is evident that a subset of immigrants from the post-Soviet region residing in Poland are susceptible to the influence of Russian and potentially Belarusian intelligence services. This trend has seen a marked intensification in recent years, thereby posing a substantial challenge to state security. Acts of sabotage, such as those delineated above, are characterised by their cost-effectiveness and the ability to obscure the responsibility of the initiators. These acts of sabotage are intended to generate specific content, subsequently serving as a tool in cognitive warfare. The primary objective is to instigate particular mental processes, attitudes and behaviours among the Polish public that align with Russia’s strategic aims. These may encompass, for instance, the undermining of the credibility and trust in state institutions or the effectiveness of its services in combating crime and ensuring public safety. This, in turn, engenders a sense of insecurity, disrupts the social structure, fosters radicalisation, or incites calls for self-righteousness. Acts of sabotage serve to exacerbate national tensions and are meticulously designed to diminish support for the policy of supporting Ukraine and Ukrainians. In this context, the ‘Volhynian crime issue’ remains a potent catalyst. In extreme cases, the objective of these actions is to intimidate specific social groups, such as those supporting opposition movements in Belarus or Russia, or those engaged in the fight against disinformation and the analysis of Russian actions.

The nature of these acts, which are difficult to track at the commission/inspiration stage, poses significant challenges in terms of prevention. Consequently, in certain instances, it is more effective to address the consequences of these acts in the cognitive domain, that is, in the human mind. A further challenge arises from the fact that, in certain instances, these activities are merely inspired by external actors, such as the Russian intelligence services, or emerge as a consequence of other processes, such as radicalisation, or are perpetrated by individuals who are essentially ‘useful idiots’.

Picture 1
Picture 2

[1] Cognitive actions are defined as activities that are designed to influence the perception and cognitive abilities of a target group, with the objective of eliciting a specific response. These actions can be carried out either against the whole population or only against a specific group of it. They involve the long-term reduction of perception, critical thinking, cognitive processes and analysis using a variety of information methods. In this model, appropriately presented information becomes a tool in what has been termed the ‘battle for people’s minds’. Nevertheless, it is crucial to emphasise that these activities remain subordinate to overarching strategic objectives.

[2] All the inscriptions were associated with the symbols of the Ukrainian nationalism.

Why does everyone win from the elimination of land border controls in Southeastern Europe?

The full Schengen area accession of Bulgaria and Romania will move Southeastern Europe closer to the center of Europe. Bulgarians and Romanians deserve to have the full status of European citizens in spite of competing geopolitical visions for their region. Even if the “fortress” mindset is strong in the region, the fall of the border is a huge success for the mentality of openness and the empowerment of the citizens as conditions for greater synchronization and people’s agency.

The proposal for elimination of land borders control in Southeastern Europe

Following Bulgaria and Romania accession to the Schengen area on 31 March 2024, but with border controls on the land borders, the proposal for elimination of border controls between Greece, Bulgaria and Romania was considered by some people in Sofia and Bucharest as an option that could exercise pressure for the full admission of Bulgaria and Romania to Schengen area. It was however an option, which the political elites in Sofia and Bucharest showed reluctance to adopt, because they didn’t have a lot of trust in each other, were not accustomed to co-operate (e.g. to manage movement of people and goods without border controls) and were skeptical even of the legal possibility to do it. Importantly, the European Commission did not reject the proposal on legal grounds, preferring instead to remain ambiguous as the Commission.

It might seem counterintuitive, but the fact that the proposal was rejected in January-February 2024 consecutively by the Bulgarian prime minister Nikolay Denkov[1] and the Romanian European commissioner Adina Vălean[2] showed that there was certain support for it among the population, as high-ranking politicians wouldn’t have bothered to counter it, as if it was irrelevant.

Following the 22 November 2024 meeting in Budapest of the internal ministers of Austria, Hungary, Romanian and Bulgaria, as well as the EU commissioner for home affairs Ylva Johansson, a political agreement was reached, which lead to Austria’s acceptance that Bulgaria and Romania join Schengen through their terrestrial borders, while strengthening the controls on the Bulgarian-Turkish border by a joint group of 100 border guards from Austria, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The joint document’s political will was adopted into a decision by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the EU on 12 December 2024. It outlined the lifting of any border controls on Bulgarian-Greek borders on 1 January 2025, while the controls on the Bulgarian-Romanian and Romanian-Hungarian borders would remain for at least 6 months, but would be applied on the basis of risk assessment and on random basis.

That already constitutes a significant reduction in the border control, which is expected to be limited to a small number of cases to a part of the trucks and vehicles from outside of the Schengen area. At the same time, in the transitional period of six months it is expected that places for fiscal and other truck verification will be established within a perimeter of 20-30 km away from the border inside the territory of Bulgaria and Romania.

Bulgaria and Romania completed the technical conditions for entering the Schengen area in 2011. Their painful waiting on the road to full Schengen area accession lasted for much more than a decade, because of the lack of political will to accept them among the older members. But even as they are now side by side with the older members of the free movement space, the proposal for a Bulgarian-Romanian mini-Schengen had its role to play at the level of people and elites in Southeastern Europe, as it was a proposal for the countries’ self-determination. And it is curious to study to what extent its hypotheses for greater citizen empowerment via cross-border and regional action could now create real effect on the ground in Southeastern Europe.

Essence of the proposal and arguments in its support

In 2011, an anonymousRomanian political scientist (“The Rational Idealist”) working for UNDP formulated the proposal for Bulgarian-Romanian Mini-Schengen Zone[3] on his blog for the first time. He claimed that such an initiative would be a win-win situation for everyone, as it would allow the two countries to take a pro-active position against the lack of political will for their acceptance into the Schengen area (it appeared only in December 2023, when the agreement between Austria, Bulgaria and Romania allowed for a conditional entrance) and to prove they can manage free borders.

The first known formulation of the idea in Bulgarian media appeared in 2014 in an interview with the Romanian NGO trainer Codru Vrabie. In 2019 he explained in another interview that the initiative would increase the economic dynamics and the human interaction between Bulgarians and Romanians[4]. It would have also exerted pressure on EU countries, as it may have shown that the two countries can manage open borders. It was the lack of trust and innovation among politicians that prevented any step towards the Mini-Schengen Zone. Another NGO representative – a Scotsman David Bisset, defined the Mini-Schengen Zone as a tool for Bulgaria and Romania to have self-determination and development with greater reliance on their own resources[5].

Counterarguments

The political elites and the foreign policy experts in Bulgaria and Romania have always been rejecting the idea of the elimination of land border controls or have even avoided to discuss it publicly out of fear that mere talking about it would legitimize it. An argument against it is that the two countries would self-isolate themselves from the Schengen area if they go for an alternative option[6]. After they formally become part of it in March 2024 (without the land borders) and could emit Schengen visas, other arguments were advanced, namely that the elimination of border controls would put a lot of pressure on the Romanian-Hungarian border (Adina Vălean) or that such an initiative is illegal (former Bulgarian prime minister Nikolay Denkov). An unspoken argument against the idea is that Bulgarian and Romanian political elites are not accustomed to work together and have a low level of mutual trust. Therefore, even their joint declaration for strategic partnership from March 2023 is seen by some as insufficiently bold in its ambitions.

The new situation after the agreement between Austria, Bulgaria and Romania in December 2023 and the accession to the Schengen area in March 2024

After Bulgaria and Romania joined the Schengen area following an agreement with Austria in December 2023, the discussed proposal no longer referred to the Bulgarian-Romanian Mini-Schengen Zone. It was renamed “the abolition of land border controls between Greece, Bulgaria and Romania”. It had the support of the transport and tourism sectors in the three countries. Importantly, it was supported by high-level politicians from these countries, such as former European Commissioner and Romanian Prime Minister Dacian Cioloș, who is associated with the French tendency in Romania and the EU[7]. However, if it had been applied, it would have violated the provisions of the agreement with Austria, which provided for the strengthening of border controls on the Bulgarian-Romanian border[8]. At that time – the beginning of 2024 – it seemed that there were two competing visions for the future of Southeastern Europe with regard to Schengen and border controls. The one based on greater synchronization among the people of Southeastern Europe appeared to be in a weaker position.

Conclusions: The future of Southeastern Europe after the full accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen Area

On 1 January 2025, Bulgaria and Romania joined the Schengen area via their land borders, and while some border control will temporary remain, within 6 months it is expected that border control will no longer take place at the current border crossing points, but rather at some place within the countries’ territory at some distance from the border, based on principles that are generally applied in the Schengen area – the so-called risk assessment[9]. The significance of this development is manifold.

The economic dimension of the abolition of land border controls is usually emphasized. Until now, trucks have been queuing up at the EU borders of Bulgaria and Romania, wasting time and money and polluting the environment. An economic boost is expected from the mere fact that these losses will no longer occur.

In addition, Bulgaria and Romania were previously less attractive to foreign investors because investors were aware that the goods they produced in each of the countries would potentially be delayed by days on their way to Western Europe, compared to their potential transportation from full members of the Schengen area.

Importantly, the isolation of Bulgaria and Romania from the Schengen area fueled the feeling that their citizens were “second-class Europeans”. Therefore, full Schengen membership is expected to increase the Europeanization of the region and the pro-EU sentiment in it.

Now, at last, the mini-Schengen proposal for empowering the citizens of Bulgaria and Romania through cross-border interaction could have a reality check. It is a proposal in the European spirit, because usually the countries of the periphery tend to compete to attract the centers of the international relations system to their side, and therefore often ignore or try to separate from each other. If the peripheries begin to co-operate, they will demonstrate the logic of the center and move closer to it in synchrony. This could be the main principle of a real project of change in Southeastern Europe, whose nations have been traditionally too fragmented and convinced of the validity of their individual insular mentality.

In other words, while security and fortress thinking have long been dominant in and with regard to Southeastern Europe, full accession to the Schengen area could be seen as a major victory for the open border vision for the region, based on its synchronization and the gradual building of a greater social capital and trust beyond borders. Now, with the fluidity of borders, the citizens of the region are receiving an influx of energy. If their desires, curiosities and ambitions are to practice relationships and gain new experiences across the ever-weakening borders, we will see win-win developments in the region that would also benefit the EU project.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in the guest commentaries are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or official position of the Institute of Central Europe.

[1] K. Nikolov, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece ‘mini Schengen’ would be illegal, says Denkov, Euractiv, 02.02.2024, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/bulgaria-romania-greece-mini-schengen-would-be-illegal-says-denkov/, visited on 30 December 2024.

[2] C. Turp-Balazs, Why Bulgarian-Romanian hopes for a mini-Schengen were a non-starter, Emerging Europe, 07.02.2024, https://emerging-europe.com/analysis/why-bulgarian-romanian-hopes-for-a-mini-schengen-were-a-non-starter/, visited on 30 December 2024.

[3] Schengen – o idee constructiva pentru Romania si Bulgaria (RO), The Rational Idealist, 21.09.2011, https://rational-idealist.blogspot.com/2011/09/schengen-o-idee-constructiva-pentru.html, visited on 30 December 2024.

[4] V. Mitev, Codru Vrabie: The Romanian-Bulgarian mini-Schengen seems a good idea, The Bridge of Friendship, 29.10.2019, https://friendshipbridge.eu/2019/10/29/vrabie-schengen-en/, visited on 30 December 2024.

[5] V. Mitev, David Bisset: The Bulgarian-Romanian mini-Schengen could boost the two countries’ bargaining power, The Bridge of Friendship, 12.06.2023, https://friendshipbridge.eu/2023/06/12/bisset-3-mini-schengen-en/, visited on 30 December 2024.

[6] Bulgarian former diplomat Bisserka Benisheva is quoted saying this at the article by Petya Minkova. See П. Минкова, Мини-Шенген с Гърция и Румъния става токсичен, 168 часа, 19.09.2024, https://www.168chasa.bg/Article/18921784, visited on 30 December 2024.

[7] V. Mitev, Elimination of border controls between Bulgaria, Romania and Greece is technically complex, The Bridge of Friendship, 01.02.2024, https://friendshipbridge.eu/2024/02/01/simeonova-border-controls-en/, visited on 30 December 2024.

[8] V. Mitev, Council Decision on the full application of the Schengen acquis in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, The Bridge of Friendship, 01.01.2024, https://friendshipbridge.eu/2024/01/01/cm-5950-23-en/, visited on 30 December 2024.

[9] V. Mitev, Dragomir Draganov: Traffic on Friendship Bridge will increase by more than 20% after full Schengen accession, The Bridge of Friendship, 28.12.2024, https://friendshipbridge.eu/2024/12/28/full-schengen-ruse-giurgiu-2024-2025-en/, visited on 30 December 2024.

[Photo Andreea Campeanu / Reuters / Forum]

Cyfryzacja w państwach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej

Poland’s Northern Policy and Nordic-Baltic Cooperation

The Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) represents a dynamic model of regional cooperation that has united the five Nordic and three Baltic states in security, development and solidarity efforts since the 1990s. The evolution of NB8’s areas of cooperation – from supporting the Baltic states’ post-Soviet transition to current priorities like defense policy, cybersecurity, and energy – reflects shifts in Northern Europe’s geopolitical landscape. The role of NB8 states is particularly significant in coordinating responses to Russian threats and providing robust support for Ukraine. Additionally, the new strategic partnership agreement between Poland and Sweden underscores the critical importance of the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) in Poland’s foreign and security policy.

Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8). The Nordic-Baltic cooperation format – NB8 – was established in the early 1990s to foster regional collaboration, bringing together five Nordic and three Baltic states. Initially focused on assisting Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in strengthening their independence, the agenda shifted significantly after the Baltic states joined the EU and NATO. In 2010, NB8 foreign ministers established a Nordic-Baltic “wise men” group to explore ways to enhance cooperation. The resulting Birkavs-Gade Report[1] (August 2010) recommended strengthening collaboration in six areas: foreign policy dialogue, diplomatic representation, civil security (including cybersecurity), defense, energy, and the NB8 brand development.

Since then, NB8 has built a robust cooperation network spanning political, military, economic, and cultural dimensions. These interactions, alongside membership in international organizations such as the United Nations (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 370), EU, NATO, OSCE, World Bank, and regional forums like the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) ( “IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 286), the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), and the Helsinki Commission – HELCOM, necessitate closer coordination. NB8 states regularly discuss current international policy issues and practical cooperation matters, particularly Northern Europe’s security dynamics post-2020 Belarusian presidential elections (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 252) and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 875). Annual coordination (rotating among members) sets the agenda, while high-level meetings and expert consultations (several dozen annually) operate on a consensus-based, informal framework.

In addition to regional cooperation, NB8 has expanded to include so-called partnership formats. One of the most important is the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE), initiated by the United States in 2003. The e-PINE forum is guided by three principles: multilateral engagement, building resilient societies by strengthening democratic institutions and exporting success and best practices. Meetings of foreign ministers of the NB8 and Visegrad Group (“NB8+V4”) countries were also held between 2013 and 2021, initiated by Polish and Swedish Foreign Ministers Radosław Sikorski and Carl Bildt. The latest – the ninth – meeting was held in Finland in September 2021.

Nordic-Baltic Summit. On November 27–28, 2024, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson invited Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to a Nordic-Baltic head of government summit in Harpsund, reflecting Sweden’s 2024 NB8 chairmanship. The Swedish presidency’s priorities included strengthening Nordic-Baltic security cooperation, unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and continuing efforts to further global support for Ukraine and an international world order based on the principles of the UN Charter. In their joint statement, NB8 and Polish leaders committed to intensifying support for Ukraine, countering Russian aggression, and expanding sanctions on the Russian Federation, recognising it as a long-term threat.

All NB8 states, now NATO members, are jointly focused on bolstering the Alliance’s deterrence capabilities in Northern Europe and nullifying Russia’s ability to pose a threat in the region (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 1236). A common awareness and assessment of the situation in the BSR’s immediate vicinity unites the Northern European countries and echoes in the work of regional structures, such as the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM). Sweden’s 2024 NCM presidency prioritised security alongside transforming the Nordic region into the world’s most sustainable and integrated area. In 2025, Finland will emphasise strengthening the resilience of the Nordic states and comprehensive planning for civil crises and hybrid threats (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 1045). In doing so, it refers to the current priorities of the CBSS and the EUSBSR (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 1187), as well as Poland’s proposal to establish a Baltic Sea patrol mission to protect critical infrastructure (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 1043).

New Polish-Swedish Strategic Partnership. Following the Nordic-Baltic Summit, the prime ministers of Sweden, Ulf Kristersson, and Poland, Donald Tusk, signed a new strategic partnership agreement. The document identifies eight areas of bilateral cooperation: security and defense; support for Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership; migration and security of the EU’s external border; trade and investment cooperation; the European single market and competitiveness; energy, climate and environment in the BSR; the rule of law and human rights; and cultural and people-to-people contacts. Security cooperation has intensified following Sweden’s accession to NATO, which has positively impacted the basin’s maritime security (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 1075). This has also enabled the development of bilateral political and economic cooperation. In 2023, Sweden ranked as Poland’s ninth-largest import and eighth-largest export partner within the EU.

The development of cooperation between the two countries is part of the BSR’s growing importance for Poland’s foreign and security policy (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 1023), which also has implications on other dimensions. In 2023, Poland imported about 6.5 bcm of natural gas (about 46% of total imports) via the Swinoujscie LNG terminal, which means that 268 LNG cargoes (currently 326 LNG cargoes) were received from the terminal’s launch in December 2015 until the end of 2023. Considering the 6.3 billion cubic meters (about 44%) received through the Baltic gas pipeline, this allowed for the complete replacement of imports from Russia. Also, seaport data prove that they are increasingly important in European logistics and international trade. In 2023, they handled a record 143.6 million tons (+9.56% compared to 2022, in 2018 it was just over 100 million tons), and revenue to the state budget from VAT, customs and excise duties amounted to PLN 9.27 billion. While intermodal handling at Polish ports declined slightly in 2023 (Baltic Hub in Gdansk – down from 2.07 to 2.05 million TEUs; container terminal in Gdynia – down from 911 to 873.4 thousand TEUs), as a result of the weaker trade and industry, container transshipments increased in the first half of 2024. Polish ports handled just under 1.6 million TEUs, an increase of 8.28% compared to the same period last year.

Conclusions. NB8 cooperation has evolved from its initial support for the Baltic states in strengthening their independence to more comprehensive regional security efforts, including cyber security and defense. Particular emphasis has been placed on coordinating against threats from Russia and supporting Ukraine in the face of aggression, demonstrating the growing importance of this format in building stability in Northern Europe. Traditionally, representatives of the six NB8 countries (except Iceland and Norway) meet before major EU meetings to coordinate common positions on various EU policy issues. The importance of this group, enlarged by Poland, is also due to the timetable for the presidency of the EU Council in 2025, when Poland and, in the second half of the year, Denmark will be in charge.

The signing of a new agreement between Poland and Sweden after the Nordic-Baltic Summit indicates a desire to deepen cooperation in key areas such as security, defence, energy, climate and human rights. At the same time, it shows Poland’s growing role as an important actor in the BSR, both in terms of security policy and the economy.

Denmark will take over the coordination of the NB8’s work in the next year. Although it has not yet presented its priorities, given Denmark’s recent foreign and security policy directions (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 852) and its support for Ukraine, a continuation of the group’s current course is to be expected. Since the outbreak of the war, direct aid to Ukraine has reached about DKK 53.4 billion (about €8.2 billion) in military support (in early December, Denmark transferred a second batch of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine) and about DKK 5.2 billion (about €700 million) in civilian aid. Particular emphasis will be placed on strengthening resilience to hybrid attacks, providing comprehensive support to Ukraine, as well as strengthening EU sanctions on Russia and extending them to the so-called “shadow fleet” (“IEŚ Commentaries”, No. 1042).

[1] NB8 Wise Men Report, August 2010, https://www.stjornarradid.is/media/utanrikisraduneyti-media/media/skyrslur/nb8-wise-men-report.pdf

Marginalised narratives: the challenge of representing national minorities in Central European museums