Further complications with regard to the agreement on a border treaty between Estonia and Russia (Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik)
Background to the border dispute. The border dispute between Estonia and Russia concerns mainly the interpretation of the Tartu Peace Treaty, signed on 2th February 1920 between Estonia and Russia, ending the Estonian-Bolshevik War. Under the treaty, Russia recognised the independence and sovereignty of the Estonian state, leaving within the borders of Estonia, among others, Ivangorod (Leningrad Oblast) and Pechorsky District (Pskov Oblast). After 1940, they were incorporated into the USSR and now belong to Russia. According to Estonia, the Treaty of Tartu is still in force and the border line currently in place between Estonia and Russia is not final.
Discussions on the border agreement between Estonia and Russia date back to the early 1990s, when this issue became one of the four most important topics in Estonian-Russian relations, along with the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia, social and humanitarian issues and trade relations. Negotiations were difficult because Estonia invoked the Treaty of Tartu, which was unacceptable to the Russian side. However, in view of the efforts to join NATO and the need to regulate border issues, Estonia’s position became more flexible. As a result, the first technical agreement was concluded in 1996 (without reference to the Tartu Peace Treaty, the so-called border agreement without a political preamble), on the basis of which the work on determining the provisions of the future border agreement was continued. Subsequently, in 2005 the then Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov signed a treaty on land and sea borders between Estonia and Russia. However, during the ratification procedure, the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) made a provision in the preamble referring to the 1920 treaty. Russia saw these actions as a gateway to future territorial claims on the part of Estonia and withdrew its signature from the draft treaties, despite the fact that Estonia repeatedly denied the existence of territorial claims against Russia.
Negotiations on the establishment of the border were resumed in 2012, when, at the request of Russia, a provision on the absence of mutual territorial claims was added to the border treaties. Once again, in 2014, the documents were signed by the Estonian and Russian foreign ministers, but the final ratification of the treaties by both the Riigikogu and the Russian State Duma did not take place, mainly due to the deteriorating relations between the states.
The divergent positions of Estonia and Russia on the border agreement are an important element shaping the relations between the two countries. In May 2018, Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid announced that she was ready to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin when Russia ratifies the Estonian-Russian border agreement. However, in April 2019, she decided to visit Moscow (Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik, Prezydent Estonii rozmawiała w Moskwie o stosunkach dwustronnych, “ICE Comments”, No. 23/2019), mainly because she sought Russia’s support in her efforts to secure a mandate for Estonia as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2020-2021. Ratification of border treaties was therefore an important, but not absolute, factor affecting bilateral relations. In addition, the compromise reached by political parties in Estonia was based on the conviction that it is in Estonia’s interest to establish a border between states without territorial claims on both sides. A clearly defined and delimited border was seen as an important factor in strengthening security. From Estonia’s point of view, the reference to Article 2 of the Tartu Peace Treaty – respecting Estonia’s sovereignty and independence – did not imply territorial claims against Russia. However, recent statements by politicians from the Estonian Conservative People’s Party, part of a government coalition, have led to a gap between the coalition partners on this issue and caused severe criticism from Russia.
An unpredictable coalition partner – EKRE. In an interview for the RIA Novosti agency on 18th November, the director of the Second European Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Belyaev, said that the process of ratifying border treaties in Russia depended on abandoning territorial demands by Estonia. In a response to Belyaev’s comments, on 19th November, the President of the Estonian Parliament, a member of EKRE, Henn Põlluaas, declared that Russia was in possession of the illegal takeover of 5% of Estonia’s territory and compared Russia’s actions towards Estonia with the annexation and occupation of the Crimea. Põlluaas’s statement on the border agreement triggered a violent reaction from the Kremlin and the State Duma. The Russian Embassy in Tallinn has written on Twitter that the 1920 Treaty is a historical document, so it is not relevant at the moment. In its comment on the establishment of the Estonian-Russian border in accordance with the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation accused Estonia of provocation and territorial claims against Russia. The spokeswoman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, announced that the 1920 treaty and other international agreements, including those of 1920-1940 with Russia, and then the USSR, were terminated on 6th August 1940, after Estonia’s accession to the Soviet Union. Thus, the issue of establishing a Russian-Estonian border is closed to Russia.
While the emotional reaction of the Russian side, resulting from a different historical interpretation, was predictable, the categorical position of EKRE triggered a lively debate on the political scene in Estonia. This dispute revealed differences between political parties in their approach to border agreements.
According to EKRE leader Mart Helme, the ratification of the border agreement depends on Russia’s recognition of the Treaty of Tartu. Similarly, foreign minister Urmas Reinsalu (Isamaa) ruled out the possibility of the border treaty being ratified by the Riigikogu in the near future. He stressed that Estonia should not resign from the Tartu Peace Treaty in the name of the ratification of the border agreement with Russia. However, Isamaa is divided over the border treaty. The opposition Reform Party represents a more moderate approach. Its member, Marko Mihkelson, currently Chairman of the Riigikogu Foreign Affairs Committee, is of the opinion that a harsh course towards Russia on the ratification of the border agreement is not in Estonia’s interest, as territorial claims against Russia may weaken Estonia’s position in NATO. In addition, the discussion was exacerbated by the statement by EKRE’s MP, Ruuben Kaalep, that the coalition talks between his party, the Centre Party and Isamaa, which led to the formation of the current coalition, included an agreement on the lack of support for the ratification of the border treaty. In response, Urmas Reinsalu and Enn Eesmaa (Centre Party) denied that the coalition agreement would include a treaty issue.
Opportunities for Estonian-Russian cooperation at the local level. The strong position of EKRE on the border agreement with Russia is not shared by the coalition partners: the Isamaa and the Centre Party. The president of the latter, the current Prime Minister of Estonia, Jüri Ratas, is of the opinion that although different interpretations of the Tartu Peace Treaty by Estonia and Russia make it impossible to implement the border agreement, it is necessary to take into account the actual situation and strive to regulate this issue. It thus confirms that Estonia is ready for a partial compromise in its relations with Russia. As the 100th anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty approaches, the territorial friction is likely to reappear, possibly due to the controversial EKRE. It is not expected, however, that the position of EKRE, not always shared by the coalition partners, will be the reason for the collapse of the government coalition in Estonia – the lack of an alternative to the Centre Party means the need to tolerate an unpredictable partner.
Despite the currently cold relations between Estonia and Russia and the lack of agreement on both sides to return to ratification negotiations, the Estonian government is basing its foreign policy towards Russia on the tactics of small steps and concluding agreements where they do not threaten Estonian interests. Currently, joint infrastructure projects are being implemented in border regions. An opportunity to improve mutual trust, i.e. to normalise relations and return to negotiations on a border agreement between Estonia and Russia, may therefore be the extension of cross-border cooperation.
Trans. Bartłomiej Czuwara
„Jedan od pet miliona”: protesty społeczne w Serbii
Okupacje, dekomunizacja i walka o niepodległość w polityce historycznej państw bałtyckich
100 days of Volodymyr Zelensky’s presidency: foreign affairs (Hanna Bazhenova)
General picture. The initial 100 days of Volodymyr Zelensky’s term offered no clarification as to the strategic course of the new president’s domestic policy. At the same time, during his opening visit to Brussels, and subsequent ones to Paris and Berlin, Zelensky openly confirmed the steadiness of Ukraine’s plans regarding the country’s NATO and EU membership. Fears of a significant part of the Ukrainian public regarding the change of the political vector towards Russia did not materialize. In international relations, Zelensky is also attempting to follow in the steps of Petro Poroshenko, the former president. However, the lack of political experience of the new president, along with the shortage of qualified diplomats, are clearly visible. A decisive break away from the cadres of the former government resulted in the heads of key embassies in Europe and the USA being recalled. In addition, the conflict with Pavlo Klimkin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, paralyzed the operations of the ministry. In the course of the initial 100 days of the presidency, Zelensky made five official visits: to Belgium, France, Germany, Canada and Turkey. In Kiev, the president met with the prime ministers of Moldova and Israel.
Initial foreign trips. Volodymyr Zelensky made his opening visit to Brussels. On 4 and 5 June, he met with Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, and Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General. Zelensky’s statements concerning Ukraine’s foreign affairs did not differ considerably from the pre-election ones. However, they became more specific. The president highlighted he strongly supported the pro-European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the country. Brussels was also the location of the meeting between Zelensky and Andrzej Duda, the President of Poland. Both politicians stated they were open to an active cooperation in Polish-Ukrainian relations.
Between 17 and 18 June, Volodymyr Zelensky made one-day trips to Paris and Berlin. He met with Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, Gérard Larcher, the President of the Senate of France, Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the leader of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany, and the representatives of German and French businesses. The main objectives of these visits were the following: establishment of a personal relationship with strategic partners (Zelensky has already had a meeting with Macron in April but sought to strengthen the relationship), consolidation of hitherto Ukrainian foreign affairs, and delineation of directions for cooperation. The need for sanctions against Russia being enforced and the Minsk agreements executed was also acknowledged. In addition, the restart of talks in the Normandy format was announced. However, the issue of the format’s expansion was not raised. Macron expressed France’s readiness to organize the meeting of the Normandy Four leaders. Moreover, the exchange of prisoners and Ukraine’s negative attitude towards Nord Stream 2 were also discussed. One of the main outcomes of Zelensky’s visits was the green light to hold a meeting of foreign policy advisers to the leaders of Ukraine, France, Germany and Russia (states involved in the Normandy format).
The trip to Turkey. The visit of the new president of Ukraine to Ankara took place on 7 and 8 August. Zelensky and Recep Erdoğan discussed the boost of commercial exchange from 4 to 10 billion dollars (which was not a novelty considering the agreement developed by the former three presidents of Ukraine) and the development of a long overdue free trade zone. In addition, stronger opportunities for cooperation in terms of investments, development of roads and ports, as well as in IT, military, technological, and tourist sectors were debated on. Whether the two presidents succeed in signing the free trade agreement will only become known in October this year at the session of the Ukraine-Turkey High-Level Strategic Council. According to initial information, the session will take place in Kiev and will be chaired by the presidents of Ukraine and Turkey. Apart from these issues, the official trip to Ankara offered the field for the discussion of the situation of Crimean Tatars and the release of political prisoners by Russian Federation. Volodymyr Zelensky mentioned these matters during his meeting with the diaspora of Crimean Tatars in Turkey. Ukrainian president is expecting Recep Erdoğan’s support in negotiations with Russia.
Zelensky’s meeting with Turkish entrepreneurs during a business forum in Istanbul pertained primarily to image-related matters. The president highlighted that Ukraine will seek to improve the business climate, that the land market will be opened shortly, and that gambling will be legalized in five-star hotels on the Black Sea coast. Apart from that, he discussed the issues of privatization, combating corruption and smuggling, promised the development of telecommunications sector and 5G technologies, and the introduction of principles for competition on energy markets. The president is seeking to boost the GDP to 5-7%. These statements by Zelensky were practically the first specifics regarding his domestic policy. They stimulated lively discussions in Ukraine. However, the matters mentioned by the president hardly offer a general economic strategy.
Relations with Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, was one of the first foreign leaders to pay Zelensky a visit in Kiev. The visit took place on 19 and 20 August. The visit was notable due to the fact that is has been twenty years since an Israeli politician of such a high rank visited the country. The meeting offered space for the discussion pertaining to the free trade zone between the countries and to the development of an agreement concerning pensions. In addition, four documents were signed, e.g. “The agreement on the teaching of the Hebrew language at universities in Ukraine, and the teaching of Ukrainian language at universities in Israel”, and “A program for the cooperation in education, culture, the youth, and sports between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the government of Israel for 2019-2022”. In the future, similar initiatives are to encompass agriculture and IT. During the visit, Netanyahu paid homage to Jews murdered in Babi Yar during WWII.
Relations with USA. Relations with the United States are among the priorities of Zelensky’s foreign affairs. According to information from Vadym Prystaiko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the president will visit the United States on 23 September. He will take part in a session of the UN General Assembly where he will meet with Donald Trump.
It is noteworthy that the administration of the American president is cautious as far as contacts with Zelensky are concerned due to his relations with an oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi, who is being prosecuted in American courts for money laundering. The existence of a relationship between the president and the oligarch seems to be corroborated by the fact that the administration of the Ukrainian president is headed by Kolomoyskyi’s lawyer – Andriy Bohdan. Shortly after Bohdan took the position, USA observed he was an objectionable person in the orbit of the Ukrainian president. This, however, had no impact upon Zelensky’s decision. Apart from the above, the Servant of the People party includes at least thirty delegates with ties to Kolomoyskyi.
Relations with the Russian Federation and the conflict in Donbas. The relationship between Ukraine and Russia has become troubled since 2014. However, the character of the relation has changed recently. At present, a tangible effort to renew the dialogue between the countries can be observed on the part of Zelensky. His appeal to Vladimir Putin to undertake talks resulted in the wait-and-see strategy applied by the Russian president being lifted. Zelensky has already had two telephone conversations with Putin. At the same time, a ceasefire agreement was reached. Moreover, Ukrainian authorities withdrew their military forces from Stanytsia Luhanska and introduced personal changes in the military command and the trilateral contact group. President Zelensky seeks to end the conflict in Donbas. The results of negotiations and an exchange of prisoners which took place on 7 September may be perceived as certain achievements in the field.
Conclusions. Volodymyr Zelensky’s initial steps in the international arena suggest that, in the priority matters, he continues the politics of Petro Poroshenko. His foreign affairs are pro-West. However, there is no way to be sure whether he becomes pro-European or Pro-American. His visits to strategic international partners prove the interest in the consolidation of ties with the EU. Zelensky proved to be the most active in contacts with the representatives of Germany and the European Commission. The establishment of personal relations between the new president and key foreign leaders can be perceived as an accomplishment of the 100 days’ period. At the same time, Zelensky pursues the development of good relations with neighbors. This can be proved by his visit to Poland on 31 August – 1 September. During a meeting with President Duda, he made concessions concerning the deeply rooted, history-related conflict. The concessions were well received in Poland. He also supported the restart of the workgroup tasked with developing a clean slate in the relations. Ukrainian president characterized the talks as a breakthrough in the relations between the two countries. Zelensky’s visit to Poland, which took place right after the 100 days’ period, became a de facto beginning of his independent foreign relations instead of them being a mere continuation of the politics of his predecessor.
Trans. Tomasz Kuraś
Relikty komunizmu: polityka historyczna wobec materialnego dziedzictwa sowieckiego w Republice Czeskiej
Gazprom’s troubles with completing Nord Stream 2 (Damian Szacawa)
The position of the new Danish government. The election to the parliament in Denmark (Folketinget) took place on 5 June 2019. The center-left Social Democrats (SD) won the race. On 27 June, Mette Frederiksen, heading the party since 2015, formed a minority government supported by other left-wing parties. J. Kofod, 45 years old, took the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Between 1998 and 2014, Kofod was elected to Folketinget as the representative of Bornholm district, and in the previous term (2014-2019) of the European Parliament (EP) chaired the group of Danish Social Democrats and was a Deputy Chairman of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. During the latest EP election (26 May 2019), he was no. 1 on the SD list and successfully pursued re-election. He succeeded in obtaining fourth best result in the election (approx. 190 thousand votes). However, ultimately, he resigned and took the position in M. Frederiksen’s cabinet.
In the past, J. Kofod frequently criticized the politics of the previous Prime Minister, Lars L. Rasmussen, as well as the European Commission’s (EC) attitude towards Gazprom. He voiced his criticism both during his term in the EP as well as when discussing the development of Nord Stream 1 (NS1) in 2009, during the first term of L. L. Rasmussen’s cabinet. He frequently emphasized that Russia employs its energy resources to manipulate and exert pressure upon other states during international diplomatic crises. As a consequence, he postulated in the EP that EU member states become more independent from Russia’s energy resources and decline to participate in the development of NS2 which will have implications for energy and security dimensions and will exert an adverse impact upon European cooperation.
Withdrawal of the oldest proposal. A day after the new government was sworn-in, i.e. on 28 June, Nord Stream 2 AG withdrew its first proposal submitted to the DEA on 3 April 2017. The proposal pertained to the permission for the development of two transit gas pipelines across the territorial sea and continental shelf belonging to Denmark, located south-east of Bornholm (Alternative 1). The new lines were to be parallel to NS1 completed in 2012.
In accordance with Danish regulations, in July-September 2017, the DEA held public consultations pertaining to the environmental impact of the route. The responses were not the exclusive requirement for the permission to be granted. This was due to the fact that a new law came into force in Denmark on 1 January 2018. The law states that prior to the DEA permission, any investment located on Danish territorial waters must be officially accepted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry assesses the project against Danish international policy and national security and defense. The law was adopted in October 2017 on the initiative of the previous PM of Denmark, L. L. Rasmussen. The law emerged as the aftermath of the Danish dissatisfaction with the EC’s attitude. The Commission avoided offering straightforward answers to strong doubts and anxieties voiced by a group of states from East-Central Europe and Denmark. These pertained to the conformity of NS2 with EU legislation, especially with regard to the energy union, whose one of the fundamental objectives is to reduce the EU’s dependence upon Russian gas supply.
Proceeding with submitted proposals. Due to the withdrawal of the first proposal, the prospective decision of Danish authorities will become the sole responsibility of the Minister of Climate, Energy and Utilities (Dan Jørgensen), the DEA’s superior. Nord Stream 2 AG has maintained two alternative proposals. The first was submitted on 10 August 2018. It pertains to the permission for developing approx. 175 km of transit gas pipeline across the continental shelf in the Danish exclusive economic zone located north-east of Bornholm (Alternative 2). Public consultations concerning this route were completed towards the end of 2018. However, the final decision has not been made since Danes prefer the south-east by-pass of Bornholm. They justify their position by arguing that an initial assessment of the south-easterly route indicated significantly lower impact on maritime routes, fishing grounds and Natura 2000 nature protection areas. Moreover, the route was also labeled as optimal during the development of NS1. However, it had to be altered due to the unregulated status of maritime territories claimed by both Denmark and Poland.
On 19 November 2018, in Brussels, Poland and Denmark signed an agreement delimiting the maritime boundary of the Baltic territories in question. Denmark was granted 80% of the territory (approx. 2.88 thousand km2). As a consequence, the international legal barrier was lifted. In March 2019, the DEA requested Alternative 3 to be developed. Nord Stream 2 AG voiced their disappointment with such state of affairs. However, they swiftly (15 April) submitted the proposal. It contains two alternative routes drawn across the continental shelf located in the Danish exclusive economic zone south-east of Bornholm.
At present, the DEA is evaluating both alternatives. In mid-July, in his interview with Interfax news agency, Viktor Zubkov, the chairman of the board of directors of Gazprom, announced he expected the final decision to be presented in October 2019. He believes that this would enable the project to be completed by the end of the year. However, a DEA spokesperson commented it would be impossible to offer a binding deadline for the Agency’s work to be completed due to the complexity of the matter and lack of knowledge as to any reservations expressed by local stakeholders (including the representatives of local businesses and fishermen). In addition, in accordance with the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention), Denmark must hold consultations and consider opinions of other countries. The consultations are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment and Food of Denmark. On 8 May, the ministry delivered the documentation submitted by Nord Stream 2 AG to 8 countries (Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Germany, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Sweden). The countries were requested to offer their opinions on the matter with the deadline set on 17 July. However, the deadline may be extended on the motion of the parties involved. At present, the DEA is analyzing information it received.
Progress of work and potential problems concerning NS2. According to the latest data delivered by Nord Stream 2 AG on 3 August, the first, 510 km gas pipeline running across the Swedish exclusive economic zone, was completed. The development of the second line will resume after 1 September and ought to be completed in October. In total, over 1700 km of pipelines were completed on seas controlled by Russia, Finland, Sweden and Germany (the length of a single pipeline is estimated at 1230-1260 km depending upon its route). This amounts to approx. 70% of work. It is likely – but not certain – that, the permission for the development of the pipeline across seas controlled by Denmark to be granted in October 2019, endangers the deadline for the completion of the project (the end of 2019). According to calculations by Gazprom, a pipe-laying vessel is capable of laying approx. 3 km of pipeline a day in the Baltic Sea (obviously depending on weather conditions, sea depth, and structure of seabed). Depending upon the DEA’s final decision regarding the course of the route, the Danish section of the pipeline will total between 147 and 175 km. This means that the project will take approx. 100-115 days to complete. It ought to be noted that autumn and winter usually bring heavier seas in the Baltic when compared with spring and summer period. Pipe-laying is also rendered difficult by the existing installations – the route of NS2 crosses power and communications cables (in 6 or 2 locations depending on Alternative 2 or 3) and also the twin NS1. Depending on the selected alternative, additional works will be necessary. They will entail deepening works (after the pipeline has been completed on the seabed) extending to approx. 4 or 14.5 km (Alternative 3 or 2).
Conclusions. The withdrawal of the first proposal suggests that the prospective decision on the permission (or denial) will be made exclusively by the DEA’s administration. The position of Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who opposed NS2 on several occasions, will have no sway in the assessment of proposals concerning gas pipelines running across the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. This simplifies the procedure. Gazprom is expecting the permission to be granted in October. However, no conclusive deadlines were offered. As a consequence, it is highly likely that NS2 will not be completed on schedule, i.e. by the end of 2019. In order to maintain the supply of gas in Europe, Gazprom will be forced to extend the transit agreement with Ukraine, which expires at the end of the year. Hitherto trilateral negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the EC were inconclusive. Further talks are likely to be held in the second half of September. The situation is exacerbated by the conflict between the EC and Nord Stream 2 AG pertaining to the natural gas directive (2019/692). The latest development of the situation witnessed the company’s motion to the European Court of Justice submitted on 25 July. The company demands the incomplete NS2 to be excluded from anti-monopoly regulations. Additional complications are possible due to the USA’s Senate pending legislation concerning sanctions against enterprises or natural persons involved in the development of NS2.
Trans. Tomasz Kuraś
Estonia’s climate policy in light of the European Union’s 2050 climate neutrality (Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik)
Oil shale is a type of sedimentary rock containing high volumes of bitumen. The substance is processed to obtain liquid hydrocarbons, the so-called shale oil, whose chemical composition, properties and application resemble those of crude oil. Estonia is the largest processor of oil shale worldwide (70% of global oil shale extraction). The shale is processed to generate 90% of Estonia’s electric energy. This makes the country the least dependent upon imported fuels when compared with the remaining EU member states.
Estonia’s objective in the climate policy is to be a competitive economy with low CO2 emission. There exist ambitious plans in the country to shift to low-carbon economy in the long-term perspective. This entails a three-stage reduction of greenhouse gasses (GHG): by 70% up to 2030, by 72% up to 2040, and ultimately by 80% up to 2050, all in relation to the 1990 level. Moreover, in accordance with the National Development Plan of the Energy Sector, the share of renewable energy sources in the domestic energy consumption and production is to be increased to 50% by 2030.
Estonia supports the EU’s climate policy, as well as any action towards reducing GHG emission and implementing environment-friendly technologies. However, during the latest European Council summit (20 June 2019), Estonia, much like Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, opposed the EU 2050 climate neutrality strategy. Despite objections towards the original regulations, the country would be willing to adopt less strict terms. Estonia is in favor of the pursuit of climate neutrality (the “pursuit” of neutrality denotes that the term “achievement of neutrality” has not been established yet). However, the country’s decisions are determined by the European Commission’s position, as well as by domestic research results. The analysis commissioned by the Office of Government, on initiative of the Ministry of Environment, is to be completed by October. The analysis will include propositions pertaining to the opportunities and solutions to be applied in the shift to climate-neutral economy.
Climate, economic and social challenges. The reduction of dependence upon oil shale as an electric power resource constitutes a fundamental environmental, economic and social challenge. The shale presents the greatest source of high CO2 emission in Estonia. The country is the second largest CO2 per capita emitter in the EU (14 t CO2/per capita.; EU average amounts to 7 t CO2/per capita). It is also characterized by the highest emission index among the EU’s economies (GHG Intensity of Economy). According to November 2018 estimates by the Viru Keeia Group (VKG), an Estonian energy company, the reduction in the oil shale extraction would result in an increase in the price of electric energy. In addition, it would lead to the decline in tax payments and Estonia’s export revenue which currently amounts to approx. 100-150 million EUR. The decline in the competitiveness of oil-shale-based energy, in relation to the one imported from Russia due to Estonia’s climate-related obligations, is already visible. Moreover, significant social cost is associated with the extraction of oil shale. The largest oil-shale-fired power plant is located in the north-eastern region of the country (Ida-Viru). Russian-speaking citizens compose 77% of the region’s population. They are under the most significant threat of poverty and unemployment. Strong air, soil and water pollution has been observed in the region for years. In addition, the citizens suffer from respiratory and circulatory conditions. On the other hand, any cuts in the extraction may result in the disappearance of approx. 13 thousand jobs in the region and extensive costs associated with the reorganization of employment in the energy sector. In face of international obligations concerning climate change and environment protection, oil-shale-based energy production may be reduced, and stronger attention devoted to the development of alternative energy sources.
Significance of renewable energy sources. The exploitation of renewable energy is perceived as a critical element of the EU’s energy policy. It reduces the dependence upon resources imported externally, curbs CO2 emission and separates the cost of energy production from petroleum prices. The significance of renewable energy has been on a steady rise in Estonia. At present, wind energy, and biomass and waste products (41% and 56% respectively) have the greatest share in renewable energy in the country. According to Eurostat, the share of renewable energy in Estonia’s domestic gross consumption in 2015 amounted to 28% and exceeded the EU average (17%). As a consequence, the country ranked among 11 who were able to meet the scheduled 2020 national thresholds for renewable energy in the energy mix. In addition, strong dynamics can be observed with regard to the share of renewable energy in the production of electricity. While in 2010 Estonia produced 10.4% of electricity from renewable sources, in 2017 the share almost doubled to amount to 18%. Still, it is significantly lower than the share in Latvia (52% owing to hydroelectric power plants) and below the EU average (28%).
Conclusions. Estonia does not question the necessity of changes in the energy sector which emerge from the EU’s energy policy. However, severe dependence upon the high-CO2-emission oil shale in energy production results in the fact that the political, economic and social costs of adaptation may be high. While politicians are in accord as to the general course of Estonia’s climate policy, methods and instruments remain to be decided upon. So far, no political consensus has emerged, and climate policy was not a pressing subject prior to the latest elections to Estonian parliament- Riigikog (3 March). The Estonian Reform Party favors a swift reduction in the oil shale extraction and abandonment of the resource in energy production by 2040. On the other hand, the Estonian Centre Party, being at the helm along with its coalition partners, draws attention to high social cost of restructuring in the mining sector and the necessity of importing electric energy from Russia. The populist EKRE debate on the development of an atomic power plant in the country. Estonia remains a natural ally of Poland in the EU in the matters such as the maintenance of structural funds, development of a uniform market of electronic services, and the development of infrastructural projects enhancing energy security. It seems that until Estonia pursues radical decisions concerning the reduction of CO2 emission, and consequently, lowers the extraction of oil shale, both countries will present a similar position regarding the issue of climate neutrality.
Economic cooperation between Belarus and China – the pursuit of independence from Russia (Roman Romantsov)
China’s position in the Belarussian economy. Belarus established diplomatic relations with China in 1992. Since that time, China has become one of the key trade and investments partners of Belarus. The first visit of Xi Jinping to the country occurred in 2010. He also visited Belarus in 2015 as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. Apart from growing trade (dominated by import from China), whose volume amounted to approx. 3 billion dollars in the past few years, a boost of Chinese investments in the Belarussian economy is visible. According to the Belarussian Embassy in China, 35 agreements of various character have been signed with state banks – China Exim Bank and China Development Bank. This enabled Belarus to obtain 9 billion dollars’ worth of credits. Recently, Chinese direct investments (non-credit based) soared: in 2015 these amounted to 77.7 million dollars, and in 2018 to 112.2 million dollars. Joint companies in the Great Stone Industrial Park near Minsk constitute approx. 43% of Chinese investments. Such a structure proves that Lukashenko offers China extensive opportunities for the development of innovative technologies in the Belarussian economy.
The impact of cooperation for Belarus. By consolidating cooperation with China, Lukashenko aims to attract new investments in the economy of the country. On the one hand, Chinese investments will boost Belarussian economy. On the other hand, they will somewhat limit the country’s dependence upon Russia with regard to the mechanical engineering and hi-tech sectors. Lukashenko seeks to introduce Belarussian products to China. Belarus has been exporting chemical (potassium nitrate), agricultural and dairy products. However, the export of these to China offers limited independence from the Russian market, which still remains a priority one for Lukashenko. The following constitute chief barriers for maintaining Belarussian products on the Chinese market: strong competition of equivalent products from other countries – primarily from Russia and USA, and swift and cheap supply of goods from Belarus to China. Significant distance between the countries (the distance from Minsk to Beijing amounts to 6400 km, time difference is 5 hours), as well as maintaining control over railway and road transit routes between Russia and Kazakhstan pose difficulties for the distribution of goods. As a consequence, Lukashenko has been strongly invested in the Chinese initiative of the Belt and Road (One Belt – One Road). He is also expecting logistics support from Xi Jinping. In terms of geography, the initiative spans considerable territory. It extends from Western Europe to South Asia, South-East Asia and Africa. It also encompasses the post-Soviet states. Several fields of cooperation are scheduled in the framework of the initiative, primarily in international trade and infrastructural projects. Politically speaking, by demonstrating the pursuit of consolidation of cooperation with China, Lukashenko sends a clear signal to the Russian Federation that in the event of further Belarus – Russia crises, he can count on allies. However, this may be of little significance if the country remains completely dependent upon Russia with regard to the energy sector.
The impact of cooperation for China. In light of the trade war with the United States and deteriorating economic relations with the EU, China is actively seeking new partners. The country is clearly aware of the Belarussian trump card – its location on transit routes between the EU and Russia. For that reason, China seeks to anchor their businesses in Belarus with the hope of improved access to the markets of the former USSR as well as Central Europe. The Great Stone China-Belarus Industrial Park constitutes a good example of Chinese engagement in the economy of Belarus. In 2012, Lukashenko signed a decree establishing the park 25 km away from Minsk. Tax exemptions for investors were introduced for the period of 50 years. In addition, critical infrastructure was also developed – an airport and the M-1 Berlin-Moscow international land route are located in the vicinity. New investments amounting to 2 billion dollars, as well as the employment of 120 thousand in production plants located in the park have not materialized so far. The Great Stone Industrial Park occupies 112.5m2. The park includes 56 occupants the majority of whom are Chinese and Chinese-Belarussian companies employing 20-50. The following established their plants in the park: in the electronics sector – Huawei, ZTE, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Corehelm, Shenzhen Junchi Technology, China-Belarus High-Tech Aerospace Research and Development Center, in the Artificial Intelligence sector – ZhuiYi, in the automotive sector – Maz-Fast, Maz-Weichai, Xinzhu Corporation. By investments in the economy of Belarus, China seeks to consolidate its position both in industry and trade in the post-Soviet space and in Central Europe. The production of Chinese companies in Belarus, especially in the high-tech sector, may become competitive to the products of the Russian Federation and the EU. There exist several threats for the delivery of such projects. The currently low production level of Chinese companies in Belarus is associated with restrictions present in the neighboring Russian and EU markets, as well as the competition of plants already in operation on these. For example, the Belarussian-Chinese Maz-Weichai specializing in the production of motors for Belarussian Maz trucks, declared the annual capacity of 10 000 motors. However, in 2017, merely 182 vehicles powered by the Weichai motor were produced. In 2018, the production amounted to 300 vehicles 90% of which were sold in the Russian Federation. In the coming years, the most pressing objective for Chinese-Belarussian companies will be to obtain a significant share of markets in East-Central Europe. The lack of successive development of Chinese companies in Belarus is not synonymous with the failure of China in the economies of Eastern European states. By investing in joint companies in Belarus, China is lying in wait until the markets of the Russian Federation and the EU are open.
Prospective Belarus-China relations. Due to the engagement of Chinese capital in the Belarussian economy, further cooperation between the two states will be possible. China will continue to apply various crediting models in the individual fields of the Belarussian economy, and to establish companies specializing in innovative technologies in the electronics and mechanical engineering sectors. Further development of Chinese-Belarussian companies will be possible if, on the one hand, the relations between Belarus and the EU normalize and the cooperation agreement is signed, and on the other hand, relations with the Russian Federation remain friendly. Due to Belarus becoming open to Chinese investments, Lukashenko will be forced to pursue relatively open foreign politics and to maintain balance in relations with China, the EU and Russia.
Trans. Tomasz Kuraś
The Moldovan “grand chessboard” (Jakub Olchowski)
Internal situation in Moldova. The period of formal diarchy in Moldova emerging from the political turning point which topped at the beginning of June 2019 (see ICE Comments 37/2019), culminated in the step-down of the hitherto authorities and the loss of influence by an oligarch, Vladimir Plahotniuc. On 14 June, the administration of the Democratic Party of Moldova (DPM) resigned and the party announced their transfer to the opposition. Plahotniuc and several others in his orbit left the country. A day after, the Constitutional Court resigned. The court played an inglorious role during the political crisis of 8-9 June by following the political dispositions of Plahotniuc and the DPM (the Venice Commission judged the decisions made by the court had no legal grounds). New authorities were recognized by the European Union, Russia, the United States, and several other countries (e.g. Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, Poland).
The change of power entails neither the immediate stabilization nor improvement of the internal situation in Moldova. This is due to the fact that the state’s dysfunctionality is of systemic character. A specific, pathological political system prevailed over the past years. The system involved the cooperation of principally rivaling political parties – the DPM and the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM). It is noteworthy that the cooperation was based upon informal political and business relations and joint interests, which often verged upon legal and economic grey areas. Officially, the two parties, both to the eyes of the public and external partners, were involved in political rivalry, actually never trusting each other on the whole. However, it was Plahotniuc who occupied the dominant position in the country and subordinated several state institutions and media to his objectives. The convergence of these factors resulted in the fact that since the parliamentary elections of February 2019, the DPM and PSRM have been unable to establish a coalition government. The reason behind this were not only tensions between the parties, but disagreements between their leaders – Plahotniuc and Igor Dodon (the President of Moldova and the leader of PSRM). In June, it became evident that in face of the lack of coalition government (since the February election), a new snap election would ensue. Plahotniuc intended to win the election by e.g. discrediting Dodon and marking him out as a traitor. Recordings which would supposedly prove Dodon’s loyalty towards Russia were to assist in doing so. Ultimately, these were released in the aftermath of the 8-9 June events. However, they had little impact upon the course of events. Despite the above, the PSRM feared the blackmail and attacks of DPM, and a possible defeat in the snap election. This motivated the decision regarding a “provisional political agreement” with the pro-West, reformist ACUM, and the adoption of restrictions regarding previous expectations (concerning appointments to positions). However, the fundamental driver behind the emergence of such an “exotic” coalition as PSRM-ACUM, was the external pressure exerted by Russia, the EU, and the United States. Due to the fact that the coalition is of tactical and provisional character, and that parties included in it will fight for votes in the coming elections (presidential in 2020, and parliamentary in a few/ several months), further changes in the political situation of Moldova ought to be expected (tensions, a rift in the coalition government).
Plahotniuc and his significance. The issue of Moldova’s prospective political course remains open. The political crisis in June did not result in a deep and permanent political change. Both the external actors and PSRM-ACUM aimed primarily at the “de-oligarchization” – in this case understood specifically as the removal of Vladimir Plahotniuc and those associated with him. This objective would never materialize if it were not for the intervention of external actors who increasingly viewed Plahotniuc and his party as a problem. From the point of view of the West, especially the EU, Plahotniuc became a factor preventing the modernization and democratization of the country, and by doing so, transforming Moldova into an authoritarian and oligarchic state. To reach this end, he applied pro-West and pro-EU rhetoric, which de facto discredited the West and the ideas of European integration in the eyes of the Moldovan public. At the same time, for a long time, he was able to gain sympathy of western states and institutions by propagating the fear of Russia and seeming as the only guarantor of Moldova’s West-oriented course. As far as Russia is concerned, Plahotniuc became a problem for several reasons. First of all, owing to his influences, he dominated the pro-Russian president Igor Dodon (whose PSRM party was defeated in the latest election. Russia was expecting a victory). Secondly, his influences started reaching out as far as Transnistria, which resulted in several conflicts of interest. Third of all, on numerous occasions, Plahotniuc demonstrated his anti-Russian attitude. This resulted in the expulsion of Russian diplomats, Dmitry Rogozin, the Deputy PM, becoming a persona non grata, and in a motion during the UN forum concerning the withdrawal of Russian forces from Transnistria.
Finally, both the EU and Russia accused Plahotniuc of breaking the law, including criminal offences. Because the EU suspected him of transferring approx. one billion dollars out of the Moldovan bank system, any financial aid to the country was suspended. Russia directly accused the oligarch of being involved in organized crime, smuggling and drug trafficking, money laundering, and even a case of contract killing.
As a consequence, a shared interest between the West and Russia emerged concerning Plahotniuc. In line of the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” proverb, a tactical alliance was opened which resulted in the “de-oligarchization”.
The concert of superpowers. The temporary emergence of shared interests is nothing surprising. However, the broader picture is significant. It is hardly a coincidence that the representatives of the EU, USA and Russia make an ostentatious visit to Kishinev on 3 June, and a few days later a rapid political transformation occurs (after months of a stalemate). It is also hardly a chance occurrence that an oligarch in control of the country agrees to hand over his power and leave the country after a few minutes of conversation with the US ambassador.
The events in Moldova may suggest the emergence of a new stage in the relations between the West and Russia – a phase of understanding, probably limited to Eastern Europe (possibly a part of the post-Soviet space). Even though this area is likely to remain the field of systemic rivalry (norms and values), but simultaneously, in the immediate international relations, will become its object instead of the subject. An open rivalry in the “buffer” Eastern Europe benefits no one because: a) the United States is focused upon its global interests, especially in the context of China and Iran; b) the EU struggles with several internal troubles; c) Russian authorities seek a solution to the leadership crisis and internal problems which cannot be compensated to the public by the “national project”. Therefore, it seems that an agreement, even in the form of the concert of superpowers, which disregards the concerned party, offers the best scenario.
It seems that the Moldovan game has been the most beneficial to Russia, at least in the short-term perspective. Prior to the elections, Dodon and the PSRM, supported by the Federation, are in good political situation. Should they win, Russia will maintain and consolidate its influence in Moldova (the fact that the country is virtually exclusively dependent upon Russian gas is noteworthy). Should they be defeated, a next political crisis is likely to emerge, which will be to the detriment of the country’s integration with the West. However, in the strategic dimension, it was significant to present a new modus operandi to the world, and communicate that nothing in Eastern Europe happens without our part in and acceptance of it, thus cooperation with us seems reasonable for the benefit of all.
Impact upon Eastern and Central Europe. Ukraine ought to view the events in Moldova as a warning – the authorities in Kiev may not necessarily have a say in the way the Donbas issue and the separatist quasi-republics are handled. Due to the growth of Russian influence at the “near border”, President Lukashenko, who seeks to make Belarus more independent from Russia in various aspects, wherever possible, may tighten both the internal policy as well as his politics towards Russia. In addition, all countries of the region received a clear message that in case of a confrontation with Russia, they ought to count primarily upon themselves. Poland, in the context of its relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, Russia, and the United States, but also in light of it position in the EU (and for example the shape of the Eastern Partnership) ought to draw lessons from the situation as well.
Trans. Tomasz Kuraś