Institute of Central Europe
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Hungarian Prime Minister’s first visit to Kyiv since the outbreak of war

On 2 July 2024, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán paid an official visit to Kyiv for the first time in 12 years. It was also the first time since the outbreak of the full-scale war with Russia, where high-level government talks were held. The visit also included a meeting between V. Orbán and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. They primarily discussed the issues of potential peace talks with Russia, the Hungarian national minority in the Transcarpathian region, and cooperation at the European Union (EU) level, which is directly related to Hungary’s presidency of the Council of the EU, which began on 1 July  2024.

Hungarian visits to Ukraine after the outbreak of full-scale war. Unlike their counterparts from other EU and North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) countries, Hungarian representatives diplomatically isolated Ukraine while maintaining relations with Belarus or Russia. There were a few episodes that were exceptions; in August 2023, then-Hungarian President Katalin Novák paid tribute in Bucha and took part in the Crimean Platform, during which she stressed that “the territorial integrity of Ukraine is indisputable,” and Hungary expressed its solidarity through humanitarian aid and participation in Ukrainian grain exports. In January 2024, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó met in the city of Uzhhorod with his counterpart Dmytro Kuleba and the head of the Ukrainian President’s Chancellery Andriy Yermak. During the talks, the Hungarian side stressed the importance of the still unresolved issue of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine while noting the progress in this area, which has brought Ukraine closer to pre-accession negotiations with the EU. Prime Minister V. Orbán has met with V. Zelensky only on the occasion of joint events at the EU or UN since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine. On 1 July  2024, Hungary began its six-month presidency of the Council of the EU, and in its program, declared the continuation of the EU’’s adopted policy towards Ukraine (“IEŚ Commentaries” no. 1154).

Course of the meeting. The bilateral conversation between the Hungarian PM and the Ukrainian president took place behind closed doors, and the entire visit was kept secret from the media. The departure of V. Orbán to Kyiv was only announced a day before the scheduled visit. According to Ukrainian sources, the main topic of the talks was the issue of reaching a ceasefire and creating a peace plan acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia. However, it is difficult to resolve whether this was not wishful thinking on the Ukrainian side. Prime Minister V. Orbán had already made it clear after the meeting that he had urged President V. Zelensky to reverse the steps of the peace plan so that a ceasefire would be established first and peace talks would follow. At the joint meeting of representatives of the two governments, energy issues and food security in the region were discussed, and the topic of the Hungarian minority, which has negatively affected Hungarian-Ukrainian relations for years, was raised. The series of meetings concluded with a ten-minute press conference in which V. Orbán favourably assessed the Ukrainian president’s “efforts for peace,”[1] contradicting the Hungarian government’s previous narrative that blamed both Ukraine and NATO for escalating the war and introducing a “war hysteria” (“IEŚ Commentaries” no. 1138). The Ukrainian president thanked V. Orbán for signing off on the June summit conclusions for peace in Ukraine and stressed the importance of “fundamental issues for both countries that can form the basis of an international agreement, especially the situation of the Hungarian minority and the opening of a Ukrainian school in Hungary.”

As the Russian Foreign Ministry reported the same day, “on the initiative of the Hungarian side,” a telephone conversation was held between P. Szijjártó and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov regarding “the Ukrainian crisis (…) and ensuring the rights of all national minorities living in Ukraine.”[2] It is interesting to note that the conversation was not reported by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, and the information posted on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website was quickly removed. It is possible, therefore, that the conversation may have been of a technical nature and concerned the planned visit of representatives of the Hungarian government to Moscow and that the Russian side intentionally created the impression that the talks with Ukraine were being consulted at the Russian-Hungarian level.

Hungarian minority in Ukraine. One of the main factors responsible for the dynamics of Hungary’s relations with its neighbours is the more than two million-strong Hungarian minority in neighbouring countries. Its presence is a result of the unfavourable settlements of World War I and the Treaty of Trianon from Hungary’s perspective. The Hungarian minority in Ukraine is relatively less numerous than that living in, for example, Romania (according to the 2001 census, about 150,000 ethnic Hungarians lived in Ukraine), but remains geographically concentrated in the Transcarpathian region. From Hungary’s perspective, however, it is important not because of its numbers. Hungary’s foreign policy is guided by the assumption that it cannot allow any manifestation of discrimination against the Hungarian minority in any of its neighbouring countries, as this could risk demands for concessions or similar practices (e.g., less liberal policies toward minorities) from other neighbours. A major issue in Hungarian-Ukrainian relations has been the restriction of access to Hungarian-language education for second-level elementary school students in Ukraine.[3] The Hungarian state, circumventing Ukrainian law, has begun subsidizing private Hungarian schools in the Transcarpathian region from the state budget. In late 2023, Ukraine made significant changes to the law on minorities, which liberalized these issues for students receiving education in one of the official languages of the EU. This was due to conditions imposed on Ukraine by the European Commission. These changes led, among other things, to the establishment of a negotiating framework by the Council of the European Union (with Hungary’s consent) and the initiation of EU accession negotiations with Ukraine. From Hungary’s perspective, legal changes regarding the rights of national minorities in Ukraine were a prerequisite for developing relations with Ukraine at the highest level.

It should also be remembered that national minorities are not only a serious demographic resource in Hungarian politics but also a tool for influencing neighbouring countries. The country currently has about 9.6 million citizens with a downward trend. The process of integration of immigrants is difficult, and the ideal solution to increase the population is to reach out to “Hungarian” citizens from neighbouring countries. Moreover, during the second government of V. Orbán in 2010, there was a policy of granting Hungarian passports to ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries. This also contributed to building an electoral base for Fidesz. During the last parliamentary elections in 2022, 94% of citizens “from outside the country’s borders whose address is not in Hungary” voted for Fidesz.[4]

Ceasefire. At a conference after the meeting, V. Orbán announced that “the rules of international diplomacy are slow and complicated.” Accordingly, he asked the Ukrainian president to consider “reversing the order of the process and speeding up peace negotiations through a quick ceasefire within a certain timeframe that will give peace negotiations a chance.”[5] V. Orbán addressed the Ukrainian people, saying: “peace is a very important issue. The war you are living in has a very intense impact on the security of Europe.” He also stressed his gratitude for V. Zelensky’s sincere response on the issue. It is not clear from the published reports what the Ukrainian president’s response was or what position he presented on the ceasefire, but according to the Ukrainian government’s position, in the current situation, a ceasefire would only give Russia time to strengthen its defences in the occupied territories and expand its offensive potential. Hungary, however, is pursuing a different policy toward aid than its NATO partners, not transferring armaments and limiting itself to humanitarian support, training Ukrainian battlefield medics on its territory, and selling diesel fuel to Ukraine.

Conclusions

  • Two important factors influenced the organization of the visit. First – the liberalization of the rights of national minorities, including the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, and second – the dual role of V. Orbán, who is now also the leader of the country holding the EU Council presidency. The visit to Kyiv on the second day after assuming the presidency is intended to showcase V. Orbán as a causal politician. In this way, the prime minister wants to rebuild Hungary’s image and prove that the government not only talks about peace but also takes concrete initiatives to achieve it. However, the formula of “reversing the order” of the peace plan is unacceptable to the Ukrainian side as long as the defensive lines are not broken by Russia and as long as the West is interested in supporting Ukraine militarily. In the long term, V. Orbán’s actions are dangerous for Ukraine – it only strengthens Russia, whose military and political goals have not been realized.
  • The visit to Kyiv is a signal that the government of V. Orbán is ready to adopt a pragmatic stance toward Ukraine if the conditions set by Prime Minister Orbán are met, as was the case with Sweden’s accession to NATO (“IEŚ Commentaries” no. 1073). Hungary’s policy remains multi-vectorial and aimed at immediate benefits, as exemplified by the consultations between the Russian and Hungarian foreign ministers on the day of V. Orbán’s visit to Kyiv.
  • In the context of the visit, it is worth mentioning that the Russian-Ukrainian contract for the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine ends in 2024. Hungary is interested in continuing to receive/purchase Russian gas despite political promises to diversify supply sources. The US elections will also take place in the fall, with the Hungarian government strongly supporting Donald Trump, believing that the Republicans will bring about a change in Western policy toward the war and “bring peace to Ukraine” (“IEŚ Commentaries” no. 1081). They will be an important caesura for Hungary’s foreign policy.

[1] Kijev. Sajtótájékoztató Volodimir Zelenszkij ukrán elnökkel, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xlJX1RrKh8c [3.07.2024].

[2] Statement after telephone consultation, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1960565/ [3.07.2024].

[3] The education law introduced in 2017, which included these reforms, did not target only the Hungarian minority, but was concerned with strengthening the Ukrainian language and weakening access to teaching in the languages of other minorities as well, due to objective conditions – ­ mainly Russian-speaking.

[4] Országgyűlési képviselők választása 2022, Levélszavazás, https://vtr.valasztas.hu/ogy2022/valasztasi-informaciok/levelszavazas?tab=results [4.07.2024].

[5] Kijev. Sajtótájékoztató Volodimir Zelenszkij ukrán elnökkel, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xlJX1RrKh8c [3.07.2024].

The Defence Industry in the Visegrád Countries – Current State and Perspectives

1989-1991: ewolucja ładu w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej

Białoruś wobec regionalnych i globalnych wyzwań geostrategicznych

Lithuania: a new vision for national energy security by 2050

In Lithuania, the government has adopted a new energy security strategy with a vision extending to 2050. The document, known as the National Energy Independence Strategy, is currently awaiting parliamentary approval. This new strategy is expected to enhance energy independence and enable the export of surplus electricity. The energy transition process is anticipated to accelerate economic development and guide Lithuania towards becoming a climate-neutral country. The outlined goals are aligned with those set by the European Commission, aiming to achieve European Union climate neutrality by 2050.

Structure of the energy sector. Since 2009, Lithuania has been a net importer of electricity, a situation brought about by the closure of the second reactor at the Ignalina nuclear power plant. By 2023, the country’s electricity generation capacity allowed it to produce almost 45% of its energy needs from renewable energy sources (RES). The largest contributions to this renewable energy come from wind farms, biofuels and waste, hydropower, and solar power. Natural gas also continues to play a significant role in energy generation. The rapid development of RES, coupled with planned investments, suggests that Lithuania will be able to meet all of its energy needs through domestic production by 2027[1]. In terms of electricity consumption, the industrial sector accounts for the largest share at 33%, followed by the services sector at 32%, and the residential sector at 26%. Over the past few years, there has been a notable increase in electricity demand from both the industrial and service sectors. Looking forward, energy consumption is expected to rise in the transportation sector, primarily due to the electrification of the vehicle fleet, which currently stands at just 1%[2].

Lithuania, like the other Baltic states, participates in the international Nord Pool exchange, where it buys and sells electricity alongside various players from Northern and Central European countries. However, the flow of energy is limited by transmission capacity. Currently, Lithuania has electricity connections with the Russian Federation, Latvia, and Sweden via the undersea power cable NordBalt, and also with Poland through the onshore line LitPol Link. The entire regional market operates under a market coupling mechanism, which determines the direction of energy flow based on the lower price (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 512).

New assumptions and expectations. According to the provisions (article 9) of the Energy Law (Lietuvos Respublikos energetikos įstatymas)[3], the Ministry of Energy is required to update the National Energy Independence Strategy at least every five years. The document currently under review was first presented in March 2024 at the Seimas Economic Committee. In May 2024, it received government approval and is now expected to be debated and adopted by parliament.

The presumed goal of achieving climate neutrality in Lithuania will necessitate radical reforms and changes to the energy system, including a shift away from fossil fuels (mainly natural gas and crude oil) towards zero-carbon energy sources. In the coming years, as is currently the case, the energy mix is expected to be dominated by renewable energy sources (RES). In the context of developing modern industries, the government plans to initiate the production of hydrogen, synthetic fuels, and ammonia, among other initiatives, as well as expand electricity generation and storage capacity.

Demand for energy is expected to increase sixfold, from the current level of about 12.6 TWh to 74 TWh by 2050, with the largest consumption projected to come from hydrogen production (35.5 TWh), followed by the industrial sector (12.6 TWh) and transportation (6.3 TWh). The supply side will be bolstered by the development of the wind power sector, generating electricity both onshore (targeting 28.1 TWh) and in the Baltic Sea (18.8 TWh). Solar power is also expected to play a significant role, contributing 9.5 TWh. According to the new strategy, the development of the nuclear power sector (11.2 TWh) is being considered, primarily through fourth-generation small modular reactors (SMRs). The Ministry of Energy has previously announced that a political decision on the construction of SMRs should be made by 2028, with the first reactors potentially becoming operational by 2038.

According to the Energy Ministry’s assessment, the current energy transition will result in the creation of an additional 140,000 jobs by 2050. The benefits to Lithuania’s economy could reach as high as EUR 6.3 billion, which is approximately 11% of Lithuania’s GDP as of 2021. Besides achieving energy neutrality and self-sufficiency, it is anticipated that Lithuania will be able to export surplus electricity to Central European countries, including Germany.

Conclusions

  • Lithuania has been a net importer of electricity since 2009, mainly due to the closure of the Ignalina nuclear power plant. According to the new strategy, the government is placing significant emphasis on domestic generation capacity, not only to reform the energy sector but also to leverage new, promising technologies, primarily hydrogen. Interestingly, this new strategy projects that the largest energy demand will come from hydrogen production, which is expected to be nearly three times that of the industrial sector. However, considering existing and future generation capacities, Lithuania could achieve climate neutrality in the coming years without necessarily investing in hydrogen technology.
  • Lithuania is confronted with several challenges, with the most critical being the development of domestic generation capacity, particularly in renewable energy sources (RES), to meet the expected substantial increase in energy demand leading up to 2050. This effort aims to lessen dependence on electricity imports. Additionally, expanding domestic transmission capacity and maintaining as well as enhancing electricity import capacity is crucial. These efforts are supported by ongoing work towards synchronizing Lithuania’s electricity systems with Poland and other European Union countries, with completion anticipated by February 2025.
  • The National Energy Independence Strategy, crafted by the Ministry of Energy and subsequently endorsed by the government, is notably ambitious. Crucially, it relies not only on established methods of generating electricity like solar and wind energy but also on nascent technologies that are still in their early developmental stages. Given this context, there may be delays in the implementation and application of certain solutions.
  • The new National Energy Independence Strategy necessitates substantial financial resources, and its effective implementation will hinge on several factors. These include capital contributions from companies, both domestic and international, support from the national budget, and project funding from the European Commission. Similar to other Central European countries, the energy transition is expected to incur significant costs.
  • The document was approved by the government ahead of the European Parliament elections, with its assumptions known well in advance. Considering the outcomes of the June elections in Europe, the direction of the new European Commission’s climate policy will be crucial in determining whether specific sub-targets toward climate neutrality will be maintained or revised. Nevertheless, it is expected that certain projects such as the construction of wind farms in the Baltic Sea, and support for the expansion of solar and wind energy, will continue regardless of any adjustments made to the goals of the European Commission.

[1] Lietuvos Respublikos Energeticos Ministerija, Energetinės nepriklausomybės link: pirmą kartą per 15 metų paros elektros gamyba viršijo poreikį, 12.03.2024, https://enmin.lrv.lt/lt/naujienos/energetines-nepriklausomybes-link-pirma-karta-per-15-metu-paros-elektros-gamyba-virsijo-poreiki/ [19.06.2024].

[2] International Energy Agency, Lithuania 2021. Energy Policy Review, https://www.iea.org/reports/lithuania-2021 [18.06.2024].

[3] Lietuvos Respublikos energetikos įstatymas, 2002, https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.167899 [19.06.2024].

Finland’s response to the Russian Federation’s provocations regarding the change of maritime borders in the Baltic Sea

On 22 May 2024, the Russian Federation presented a draft that could lead to the revision of the internal waters boundary in the Baltic Sea. Despite its removal from the agenda of the legislative work of the Russian Duma, the proposal has nevertheless caused considerable concern among neighbouring states due to the potential revision of bilateral and multilateral agreements regulating the division of maritime areas in the Baltic Sea. It is important to consider the actions of the Russian Federation in the context of the numerous provocations in the Baltic Sea region that have been undertaken by the country following the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The responses of the Finnish authorities to date have been carefully calibrated.

The background. On 22 May 2024, a document containing a proposal to correct the area of Russia’s internal marine waters was made available on the federal portal for legislative drafts of the Russian Federation. According to the document, Russia intends to update the coordinates of the points marking the state border in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, in the vicinity of the Russian islands of Gogland (Suursaari), Sommers (Someri), Rodsher (Ruusker), Malyi Tjuters (Säyvö), and Vigrund. Additionally, near the cape of the northern entrance to the Narva River as well as the southern Baltic, in the vicinity of the cities of Baltiysk and Zielenogradsk in the Kaliningrad region. The draft put forward by the Russian Defence Ministry contained imprecise wording, which has led to uncertainty as to whether the authors intended to clarify the maritime boundaries or to revise them. The draft was soon removed from the portal because, as Yevgeny Fyodorov, a State Duma deputy, explained, it needed fine-tuning. This was because it did not include the text of the document and an annexe with a new list of coordinates of points marking the state border.

Nonetheless, in the media space of the countries bordering Russia, the document was presented as a project to expand the area of internal marine waters at the expense of Finland and Lithuania. The ambiguities of interpretation are also compounded by the fact that, although the authors of the project indicated the need to align the border with the current coastline, the document itself was made public almost simultaneously with the announcement of the launch of tactical nuclear weapons exercises. These, in turn, are purportedly aimed at preparing personnel for the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons and responding to what the Russian Defence Ministry has termed “provocative statements and threats by individual Western officials.”

International law and the Baltic Sea boundary change project. The division of the boundaries of the waters under the jurisdiction of the Baltic Sea states is mainly regulated by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and bilateral international agreements. The Baltic Sea, due to its small size, is a specific body of water. The coastal states’ zones (territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) overlap, necessitating additional negotiations, cooperation in resolving disputes, and the regulation of maritime boundaries through international agreements. In the context of the relations between the states of the region and Russia, some of the agreements on the division of maritime zones were signed while the Soviet Union was still in existence. Examples of such agreements include the one between the People’s Republic of Poland and the USSR on the delimitation of the territorial sea (territorial waters), the economic zone, the marine fisheries zone, and the continental shelf in the Baltic Sea, which was drawn up on 17 July 1985 in Moscow. The territorial sea (also known as territorial waters), the economic zone, the marine fisheries zone, and the continental shelf in the Baltic Sea were delineated on 17 July 1985 in Moscow, and the Finnish-Russian Agreement of 20 May 1965. However, the maritime borders between Lithuania and Estonia and the Russian Federation were only established after the two countries regained their independence. This occurred in 1997 and 2005, respectively. It is noteworthy that the Estonian-Russian agreement has not yet been ratified by Russia (see IEŚ Commentaries, no. 84). Given the current state of relations between the two countries, it is unlikely that ratification will occur in the near future.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants states certain rights and imposes obligations on them. Its main intention is to divide the maritime space of states with access to the sea into three categories of areas. The first category is internal waters[1], for which the state has full sovereignty and to which the right of third countries to innocent passage does not apply. The baseline is used to delineate the territorial sea, which extends up to 12 nautical miles in width. This is the second category of maritime areas. The third category, the exclusive economic zones (EEZs), extends up to 200 miles in width, beyond which is the open sea.

As with any other coastal state, Russia is obliged to demarcate the baseline. In accordance with international custom, this should be done in consultation with its neighbours, particularly in the case of overlapping areas that may give rise to conflicts of interest. The delimitation of the EEZ should be carried out on the basis of peaceful dispute resolution methods and the course of the boundary should coincide with the median line (drawn on the basis of equal distances from points on the coasts of the disputing countries). Over time, the maritime boundaries thus delineated may require adjustment due to objective geographical factors such as a change in the coastline. In accordance with UNCLOS, signatories, including Russia, are required to publish maps or coordinates of the boundaries of internal territorial waters and deposit them with the UN Secretary-General. Given the peculiarities of the operation of the Russian Federation, namely regular conduct contrary to international law, the legal nature of Russia’s current actions raises legitimate questions. Consequently, the analysis of these actions should not be based solely on questions of substance and compliance with international law.

Finland’s calm reaction. The Finnish government and president demonstrated a measured response to media reports concerning potential Russian plans to alter maritime borders in the Baltic Sea. Finnish President Alexander Stubb emphasised that Russian Federation authorities had not contacted Finnish representatives regarding the matter. In contrast, the chairs of the parliamentary committees on foreign affairs (Kimmo Kiljunen) and defence (Jukka Kopra) highlighted a number of ambiguities. These included whether Russia’s announced plans were limited to internal maritime waters or would affect maritime areas under Finnish jurisdiction.

In turn, Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen linked the Russian side’s actions to hybrid operations, which are designed to divert attention, probe reactions, and attempt to create tension within Finland. At the same time, she noted that it is difficult to speak of provocation at this stage, as the course of the maritime borders is being checked in accordance with the 1965 agreement (supplemented by additional agreements in 1967, 1980, and 1985) as well as the possible adjustment of the course of the border. Furthermore, it announced a review of the points delimiting the external boundary of Finland’s internal waters between 1995 and 2024, as defined in Foreign Ministerial Decree No. 993 of 31 July 1995.

Conclusions

  • The Russian draft project to alter the border may be purely technical in nature. The current coordinates of the points marking the baseline were agreed upon based on nautical navigation charts created in the mid-20th century. Nevertheless, the manner in which this project has been handled (lack of information provided to neighbouring countries) and the subsequent actions indicate that there are other intentions behind it.
  • The present actions of the Russian Federation may be regarded as part of its ‘lawfare’, defined as a type of warfare that employs the instrumentality of law as a means of attaining military objectives. Consequently, it may be considered a component of Russian hybrid warfare, which employs both military and non-military instruments (see, e.g., IEŚ Commentaries, no. 1043). In this context, the primary function of the Russian Federation’s legal actions in the Baltic Sea basin is to provide a legal basis and justification for its efforts to defend Russia’s interests in Northern Europe. This is also a continuation of Russia’s previous actions, which also include undermining the recognition of the independence of the Baltic States. These actions are aimed at condemning the Baltic States for their active anti-Russian foreign policy, discrediting them internationally, and increasing the fears and anxieties of their inhabitants (see IEŚ Commentaries, no. 633).
  • Should Russia’s actions result in a change to the state border, this would have implications for the external borders of the EU and NATO. This would lead to further internationalisation of the dispute and the necessity for other member states to react and oppose the unilateral changes. In line with international maritime diplomacy practice, this opposition could take the form of verbal protests accompanied by a demonstration of force, as demonstrated by the implementation of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP).

[1] The delineation of internal waters is typically based on the lowest water level along the coast. However, there are exceptions to this rule, including the waters of ports, bays with an entrance no wider than 24 nautical miles, river deltas, and so-called historic bays. In these and other cases, internal waters are delineated by drawing a straight baseline, the length of which does not exceed 12 nautical miles for countries with access to the sea.

LCEF 2024. Panel 4: The EU’s geopolitical turn towards the Western Balkans. Myth or reality?

LUBLIN CENTRAL EUROPE FORUM 2024: Reshaping Central Europe: Building a More Sustainable Future, 20-21 maja 2024 

PANEL 4: The EU’s geopolitical turn towards the Western Balkans. Myth or reality? 

PANELISTS – Jovana Marović, Member of Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG) and former Montenegrin Minister for European Affairs, Montenegro 

– Judita Krasniqi, International Business College Mitrovica, Kosovo 

– Miloš Petrović, Research Fellow, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Serbia 

MODERATORS – Agata Domachowska, Institute of Central Europe, Poland, Spasimir Domaradzki, Institute of Central Europe, Poland

LCEF 2024. Panel 2: Shaping Central Europe: Regional cooperation formats and their future

LUBLIN CENTRAL EUROPE FORUM 2024: Reshaping Central Europe: Building a More Sustainable Future / 20-21 maja 2024 

PANEL 2: Shaping Central Europe: Regional cooperation formats and their future 

PANELISTS – Szczepan Czarnecki, Institute of Central Europe, Poland 

– Karolina Gawron-Tabor, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland 

– Péter Marton, Corvinus University, Hungary 

MODERATOR Agata Tatarenko, Institute of Central Europe, Poland

LCEF 2024. Panel 1: Poland and Romania: Partners in strengthening regional resilience with special focus on Moldova

LUBLIN CENTRAL EUROPE FORUM 2024: Reshaping Central Europe: Building a More Sustainable Future / 20-21 maja 2024 21 maja 2024

INTRODUCTION Tomasz Stępniewski, Deputy Director at the Institute of Central Europe 

PANEL 1: Poland and Romania: Partners in strengthening regional resilience with special focus on Moldova

KEYNOTE SPEAKER Mihai Popsoi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, Moldova (online) 

PANELISTS Alexandru Andronic, Euro-Atlantic Resilience Center in Bucharest, Romania 

Cristian Emilian Ghiță, Euro-Atlantic Resilience Center in Bucharest, Romania

Tomasz Horbowski, Solidarity Fund PL, Poland 

MODERATOR Piotr Oleksy, Institute of Central Europe, Poland

The West’s military aid for Ukraine – crisis management in lieu of strategy

Unlocking the aid package for Ukraine by the United States will stabilize the front line and halt Russian advances, but it will not lead to a breakthrough in the war nor to Ukraine regaining the strategic initiative. Western support is scattered, unsystematic and often driven by ad hoc political considerations. Taking into account Russia’s resources and actions, aid for Ukraine should be long-term and strategic – its current nature and formula will not have a decisive impact on the course of the war.

Consequences of delaying military support for Ukraine. Starting in the fall of 2023, both the situation of Ukrainian forces on the front and the ability to defend Ukraine against Russian air attacks have slowly but systematically deteriorated. A significant reason for this was the suspension of US military aid. At the same time, European states were unable to compensate for the lack of this support, especially in the field of ammunition production; – for example, none of the so-called “munitions initiatives” were fully implemented.

The deepening shortages of weapons and ammunition made it easier for Russia to switch to offensive operations. For almost eight months, Ukraine was deprived of American supplies, which enabled Russia to occupy further towns and areas, despite significant losses, without fear of a Ukrainian counterattack. In turn, the deficit of air defence allowed Russia to continue attacks on civilian objects and critical infrastructure. Moscow seems to have also become convinced that it has regained the initiative, and all of its disinformation and propaganda activities aimed at discouraging the West from supporting Ukraine are working. However, in response to the unblocking of American aid, Russia intensified its activities on the front in order to advance as much as possible before weapons and ammunition reach Ukrainian units, as well as to destabilize the entire Ukrainian defence line (Kharkiv, which has been under intense fire since the beginning of the year, has become the target of intensified attacks, among others).

Unblocking the aid package restored credibility to the United States and improved morale in Ukraine, but the consequences of the many-month delay are so serious that Ukrainian reactions were far from enthusiastic. Acknowledgment and gratitude to the US were widely accompanied by many voices of bitterness, as well as sharp criticism of the Republican members of Congress, which blocked the adoption of the package.

Problematic support. Without external help, Ukraine will not be able to effectively defend itself against Russian aggression, and 95% of strictly military aid comes from Western countries. Even though this aid was evenly distributed between Europe and the United States (until the adoption of the most recent US aid package), with Europe being the leader in terms of humanitarian and financial aid, American support is crucial. Until recently, it was (and now is again), systematic and predictable – on 24 May 2024, President Joe Biden approved the 58th tranche (since August 2021) of military aid for Ukraine. Therefore, blocking support for Ukraine by the Republican Party, led by Donald Trump, had serious consequences for the course of the war. Ultimately, Trump himself took a more reserved position, realizing that 60% of voters in swing states (those states that may decide the final result of the presidential election) support US aid to Ukraine. The approval of the package was also influenced by the dynamics of changes in the international environment, Russia’s growing self-confidence, and pressure from the American army and intelligence, as well as NATO allies.

Help from Europe is dispersed. The actions of the European Union – focused largely on humanitarian and financial support undertaken at various levels, such as meetings of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council – depend on the will of individual member states. These, in turn, operate primarily on the basis of their own independent initiatives of various types – examples include Great Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic or France. The effectiveness of these initiatives, for many reasons, varies. For example, the German plan to acquire air defence systems for Ukraine was met with little support.

The situation is similar in the case of NATO – in April, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg proposed to establish a 5-year fund of EUR 100 billion for Ukraine, which would be financed by the alliance members in proportion to their GDP. However, considering the unenthusiastic reactions of allies, it is not known whether the fund will be created, when, and in what amount.

Meetings of the Ukraine Defence Consultative Group (the so-called Ramstein format) mainly focus on coordinating aid provided by individual states and do not result in significant or breakthrough decisions. However, they are an opportunity for Ukraine to raise the issue of supplies of weapons and ammunition, as well as the consent of Western countries to use the supplied weapons on Russian territory, on an international forum. At this stage of the war, this consent is an issue of critical importance.

There is also an ongoing discussion about taking over and using the West’s frozen Russian assets, worth USD 300 billion, to support Ukraine. The United States is particularly pressing for this, but it only accounts for USD 5 billion of the total amount – the remaining assets are located in the EU and G7 countries. The US proposes, among other things, that profits (interest) from frozen assets be used to purchase weapons and as loans to Ukraine – Europe is sceptical about these suggestions.

The situation in Russia. Stopping American aid to Ukraine gave Russia a clear military advantage. Moscow’s reaction to the approval of the aid package was predictable: an intensified disinformation and propaganda campaign and further nuclear blackmail (exercises with tactical nuclear weapons “in response to provocative statements and threats against Russia”). However, Russian potential (military, demographic, economic, industrial) invariably exceeds Ukraine’s. The Russians have also learned lessons from the course of the war so far, improved their tactics, and developed mechanisms for evading sanctions. They benefit from external assistance from Iran (drones), North Korea (ammunition) and China (dual-use technologies, e.g. semiconductors). According to estimates, in 2024 Russia’s security expenditure will exceed 7% of GDP (slightly less is planned for 2025 and 2026), which means over 12 trillion rubles (almost USD 140 billion), and at the same time, one-third of all state budget expenditure. It should be noted, however, that these are all expenditures in the sphere of security – approximately 25% of this amount will probably be allocated to direct financing of the war.

The Russian armaments sector currently employs approximately 3 million workers and is able to produce more than Western companies. This also drives internal demand, which stabilizes the economy, at least in the short and medium term. The striving for economic optimization and “tightening the system” is also evidenced by changes – the “newly elected” President Putin left practically the entire previous nomenclature in their positions, replacing only the Minister of National Defense with an economist-technocrat and purging the military bureaucracy personnel under the guise of fighting corruption.

Despite this, the industry cannot keep up with replenishing losses, which forces Russia to reach for equipment from warehouse resources and rely on imports. Combined with the general economic and social situation, this means that, barring unforeseen events, Russia will be able to wage war against Ukraine at its current level of intensity for another two to three years.

Conclusions. Unlocking American aid will stabilize the front line and stop the Russian advance, but it will not fundamentally change the course of the war nor allow Ukraine to regain the strategic initiative. With the current level of Western support and problems with mobilization, Ukraine will not be able to take offensive actions this year.

Russia is also in a difficult position: in the face of sanctions and the need to change markets, it must simultaneously meet its war needs and maintain a relatively stable standard of living in society. It is also unable to achieve any military breakthrough. However, it still maintains the same goals – erasing the Ukrainian state and the subordination of Ukraine (or its vassalization). Therefore, Russia hopes for a deepening of political and social divisions in the West, both within states and in relations between them, and for an increase of political forces reluctant to support Ukraine. Russia is also actively working to destabilize the West socially and politically (e.g. by supporting the so-called “anti-war movements”).

The United States is a special case in this context – the aid package for Ukraine was granted for a year, and – Trump’s election victory may therefore mean the end of American aid. Meanwhile, it is the USA that plays a key role, politically and militarily, in supporting Ukraine’s war effort. Thus, Europe should mobilize and adopt a common plan for long-term assistance to Ukraine – NATO may become a platform, as Stoltenberg suggests (especially in case of the US withdrawal from military support for Ukraine). The current deliveries of weapons and ammunition are actually a form of crisis management and should be replaced by strategic planning. It may prove difficult, given the lack of coordination, uncertainty about the development of the political situation, and constant fears of “escalation”. Meanwhile, taking into account both the economic and social situation of Ukraine and Russia, assistance should be planned for at least the entirety of 2025.