Institute of Central Europe
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Slovakia: prospects for natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan

The Russian-Ukrainian war has initiated a strategic shift in Slovakia, moving away from the reliance on natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation. In this new geopolitical context, Slovakia’s challenge lies in securing alternative sources of this commodity, rather than in developing infrastructure, which has already been established over the years and currently facilitates the importation of natural gas from various directions. A significant milestone will be the expiration of the Russian-Ukrainian transit agreement at the beginning of 2025. Consequently, the government in Bratislava is actively engageded in negotiations to secure natural gas imports from Azerbaijan, among other potential suppliers.

Importance of natural gas in the economy. In Slovakia, the demand for natural gas is approximately 5 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year, with domestic production accounting for a mere 1% of this total. Prior to the onset of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, nearly all of Slovakia’s imported natural gas was supplied by the Russian Federation under a contract valid until 2028. This heavy dependency, coupled with a lack of immediate alternative supply options, has compelled Slovakia to pay for this commodity in Russian rubles, in accordance with a mechanism implemented in 2022. Natural gas is vital to Slovakia’s economy, serving multiple sectors. It accounts for 40% of household energy consumption and is crucial for industrial use (27%), including electricity and heat generation. Furthermore, Slovakia plays a significant role as a transit country, facilitating the supply of natural gas from the Russian Federation to Czechia and subsequently to other Western European countries. In 2019, approximately 92% of the natural gas transported through Slovakia was in transit, generating substantial revenue. However, in 2023, transit volumes decreased to around 17 bcm, two-thirds less than in 2022, reflecting ongoing geopolitical and market shifts. The war has significantly reduced natural gas transit through Slovakia, as many companies from European Union countries have voluntarily ceased importing natural gas from Russia or have refused to comply with the obligation to settle transactions in rubles. Concurrently, Russia has halted natural gas supplies through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline (destroyed in September 2022) and the Yamal-Europe pipeline, while also reducing shipments through Ukraine. Instead, Russia now increasingly relies on the TurkStream pipeline for its exports. Further reductions in transit via Ukraine and Slovakia are anticipated due to several factors. The current Russian-Ukrainian transit agreement is set to expire at the end of December 2024. Additionally, the potential introduction of sanctions on the import of natural gas from Russia by land and sea – which is possible in the next sanctions package – could further impact transit volumes.

Existing infrastructure connections. Slovakia possesses robust infrastructure for importing natural gas from multiple directions, an expansion largely driven by the natural gas crisis in 2009, when Russian-Ukrainian tensions led to the suspension of supplies to many EU countries. Since then, Slovakia has established reverse flow connections in all directions: with Czechia at the Lanžhot point (2010), Austria at the Baumgarten point (2011), Hungary at the Veľké Zlievce point (2015), and Ukraine at the Budince point (2016). Additionally, interconnectors were built with Hungary (2015) and Poland (2022). In the current geopolitical situation, Slovakia can import natural gas from the east, south, and north. Key sources include regasification terminals on Krk Island in Croatia and terminals in Greece, as well as terminals in Świnoujście, Poland, and Klaipėda, Lithuania. Thus, the infrastructure now supports natural gas imports from all neighbouring countries. A particularly significant development was the commissioning of the Poland-Slovakia interconnector in August 2022, which facilitates natural gas supplies from Poland and Lithuania, including from their LNG terminals. This pipeline, part of the North-South Gas Corridor, enhances supply security by ensuring diversification and serving as a backup in case of disruptions in existing contracts. (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 655).

Azerbaijan as a new energy partner. Natural gas imports to Slovakia are secured through several contracts. In the past, the dominant contract was with Russia’s Gazprom. However, since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as part of the diversification process, the energy company SPP (Slovenský plynárenský priemysel a.s.) has also concluded contracts with BP (until 2024) and ExxonMobil, Shell, ENI and RWE (also until 2024). In the future, the lack of transit of Russian natural gas through Ukrainian territory – which is already practically a foregone conclusion, given the position of the government in Kiev and the lack of Russian-Ukrainian talks on the extension of the 2019 agreement – will negatively affect Slovakia’s energy security level (the need for alternative supplies). Under these circumstances, the government in Bratislava began talks with Azerbaijan. In May 2024, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico travelled to Baku to discuss potential natural gas supplies from this direction via existing infrastructure. In this arrangement, two supply options could be considered. The first is to use the reverse on the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline, which is already used to supply natural gas to Bulgaria, among others, as well as Moldova (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 1124). The second is the use of Russian infrastructure. In this case, Azerbaijan would supply natural gas to Russia, and then route it through Ukraine to Slovakia. Taking into account the lack of transit starting in 2025, using this direction does not seem plausible. Nevertheless, interestingly, according to Prime Minister Fico, “the next steps towards securing supplies will depend on talks between companies from Russia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan on prices and terms of supply”[1]. Thus, according to the Slovak government, potential natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan are contingent on reaching an agreement with Russia.

Conclusions

  • Azerbaijan’s significance to the energy security of European Union countries has grown markedly following the onset of Russia’s full-scale war with Ukraine in 2022 (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 937). Under an agreement with the European Commission, Azerbaijan has committed to increasing its natural gas exports to EU countries to 20 bcm per year by 2027. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s total natural gas exports rose by 5.3%, with a 3.5% increase to Europe, reaching 11.8 bcm against a planned 12 bcm for 2024. Currently, Azerbaijan exports natural gas to eight EU countries, and Slovakia is set to become the ninth. Political-level discussions have laid the groundwork for this cooperation, and according to the Slovak government, only technical issues remain to be resolved.
  • There are contradictory signals in statements and information available after Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico’s visit to Baku. The 2023 Solidarity Ring (STRING) agreement provides for the use of existing infrastructure in Central European countries to increase natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan to countries in the region. Under these conditions, it would be natural to use the reverse on the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline due to the existing technical capabilities. However, Prime Minister Fico’s statements that Russia would be involved in the talks on importing natural gas to Slovakia undermine the purpose of using this export channel.
  • For Slovakia, its transit location means that maintaining natural gas supplies is extremely important in terms of both ensuring energy security and budget revenues. Accordingly, the Bratislava government is in talks with European partners (including Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy, etc.) to either maintain natural gas supplies from Russia (unlikely given the end of the transit agreement) or to secure them from Azerbaijan as well (supplies of 5-10 bcm per year are mentioned). The chances of greater availability of natural gas from Azerbaijan will only increase if the Trans-Balkan pipeline is used. Recent events in Slovakia, i.e., the assassination of Prime Minister Robert Fico (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 1126), should not affect energy policy or efforts to increase the security and availability of natural gas in the region, including sfrom Azerbaijan.

[1] B. Gedeon, Slovakia moves ahead to receive gas from Azerbaijan through Ukraine, 17 May 2024, https://ceenergynews.com/oil-gas/slovakia-moves-ahead-to-receive-gas-from-azerbaijan-through-ukraine/ [23 May 2024].

The Blue Economy in Poland and the Baltic States

The blue economy is a concept of sustainable use of marine, ocean, and coastal resources aimed at supporting economic development while caring for the environment. In Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, this part of the economy generates over 5 billion EURof annual value added and employs over 200,000 workers. The blue economy also plays an important role in achieving the goals of the European Green Deal, in line with the idea of Putting the Blue into the Green.

The blue economy includes economic activities related to marine, ocean, and coastal resources, regardless of whether they are undertaken directly in the marine environment or on land. In European Union statistics, they are presented as seven sectors: marine living resources, marine non-living resources, shipbuilding and repair, coastal tourism, port activities, maritime transport, and offshore wind energy[1].

According to the latest data from the EU Blue Economy Observatory[2], available for 2020, the blue economy in the European Union generated a total value added[3] of 129 billion EUR, employing 3.34 million people. It is worth emphasising that compared to the previous year, the value added decreased by 30% and related employment by 26%. These declines were the result of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly on the coastal tourism and maritime transport sectors. Thus, the value added generated by the blue economy in 2020 accounted for 1.1% of the EU’s total value added (1.5% in 2019), and employment in this area corresponded to 1.8% of total employment in the Union (2.4% in 2019).

The Blue Economy in Poland and the Baltic States – value added. Within the blue economy in 2020, over 12 thousand enterprises operated in Poland, 1,100 each in Estonia and Latvia, while 900 operated in Lithuania. These enterprises generated value added in the analysed year amounting to: in Poland – 3.2 billion EUR, in Estonia and Lithuania – 0.8 billion EUR each, and in Latvia – 0.5 billion EUR. Although Poland achieved the highest value added, the share of the blue economy in the total national value added was the highest in Estonia, where it amounted to 3.3%, while in Lithuania, it was 1.6%, in Latvia – 1.5%, and in Poland – 0.7%. In terms of the share of the blue economy in the value added of the national economy, Estonia also took a high fourth place among all EU countries (second only to Denmark, Croatia, and Malta). In this ranking, Latvia was sixth, Lithuania seventh, and Poland twentieth.

An analysis of the structure of value added in the blue economy indicates that in Poland, the largest contribution was made by enterprises conducting activities related to marine living resources and port activities (0.9 billion EUR each). In Estonia and Latvia, coastal tourism and port activities dominated in this respect (approx. 0.1-0.2 billion EUR each). On the other hand, in Lithuania, the highest value added was generated by enterprises conducting activities related to marine living resources and shipbuilding and repair activities (approx. 0.2 billion EUR each).

The Blue Economy in Poland and the Baltic states – employment. The blue economy in Poland and the Baltic States not only generates significant value added but also plays an important role in the labour market, offering employment in sectors related to the use of marine and coastal resources. In 2020, 142,000 people worked in these sectors in Poland, 29,000 each in Estonia and Latvia, and 27,000 in Lithuania. As with value added, the highest share of employment in the blue economy sector was recorded in Poland but in relation to the total number of employed, first place is occupied by Estonia – 4.8%, followed by Latvia – 3.4%, Lithuania – 2.1%, and Poland – 0.9%.

In addition, an analysis of the employment structure in the blue economy sector indicates that in Poland, the largest number of people were employed in activities related to marine living resources (39,700 people). This value accounts for 7% of all those employed in this sector in the EU, which puts Poland in fifth place (behind Spain, Italy, France, and Germany). The next largest employment was recorded in coastal tourism (39,000 people), port activities (31,200 people), and shipbuilding and repair activities (27,700 people). In both Estonia and Latvia, the largest employment was recorded in coastal tourism (16,500 people and 14,700 people, respectively). On the other hand, in Lithuania, shipbuilding activities (8,600 people) and activities related to marine living resources (8,200 people) dominated.

Conclusions and perspectives

  • The concept of the blue economy is of key importance for the European Union in the context of achieving the objectives of the European Green Deal, in line with the idea from one of the European Commission’s communications – Putting the Blue into the Green[4]. This includes achieving climate neutrality goals primarily through the development of offshore renewable energy, the decarbonisation of maritime transport and the greening of ports as well as the transition to a circular economy, due to the updating of standards for the design of fishing gear, ship recycling and the decommissioning of offshore platforms, and actions to reduce plastic pollution.
  • In the European Union, the transition to a sustainable blue economy is supported by the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and the BlueInvest Fund. According to the European Commission’s position, taking investments in this area into account in national recovery and resilience plans and national operational programs concerning EU funds until 2027 is crucial for the success of this process. In Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, where the blue economy contributes to generating significant value added and employment, a strategic approach to this sector is particularly important. It is also worth noting that among the analysed countries, Estonia stands out with the highest share of the blue economy in both the total national value added and total employment.
  • Moreover, in the analysed countries, an increase in the importance of the blue economy can be expected, especially in Poland. Firstly, this is indicated by a clear improvement in the performance of Polish seaports. According to Action Forum data, in total in 2022, 133.2 million tons of cargo were transhipped among them (an increase of 17.8% compared to the previous year), and in the first half of 2023 – – 74.2 million tons (an increase of 20.5% compared to the first half of the previous year). As a result, in the ranking of the ten largest Baltic ports in 2022, as many as three were Polish, including the port of Gdańsk in second place, Szczecin-Świnoujście in sixth place, and Gdynia in ninth place (of the Baltic countries, the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda is seventh and the Estonian port of Tallinn is tenth). Secondly, shipbuilding activities are also developing. An example is the Miecznik Program, which is the result of a partnership between Poland and Great Britain under which three frigates for the Navy will be built in Polish shipyards, equipped with modern radar, artillery, and missile systems. Thirdly, the importance of offshore wind energy is also growing in the entire Baltic Sea region. In the case of Poland, an example may be the investments of the Danish company Vestas, a leader in the production of wind turbines, which is opening two factories in Szczecin – the first in the second half of 2024, and the second planned for 2026. After launching both productions, the Danish company will employ approx. 2,500 people.
  • In the shadow of the Russian-Ukrainian war, however, one cannot forget about the threats in the Baltic Sea area, both of a military and unconventional nature, which pose challenges to the political, economic, social, and ecological security of the countries of this region.

[1] The analysis for Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia covers six sectors – excluding offshore wind energy due to a lack of source data.

[2] EU Blue Economy Observatory, Sustainable Blue Economy https://blue-economy-observatory.ec.europa.eu/, date accessed: 16.05.2024.

[3] The analysis used the gross value added (GVA) indicator, calculated as the difference between output and intermediate consumption.

[4] Putting the Blue into the Green, https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/publications/putting-blue-green_en, date accessed: 16.05.2024.

Moldova: potential problems with electricity availability in 2025

Moldova finds itself in a unique situation regarding electricity availability, which is sourced almost entirely from its breakaway region of Transnistria (which is not recognised by the majority of the international community). Energy is supplied from the Cuciurgani-Moldavskaya GRES (MGRES) power plant, which does not pay for natural gas from the Russian Federation. The planned termination of the Russian-Ukrainian transit agreement for the transportation of natural gas in 2025 could have adverse effects on the availability of electricity in Moldova and pose a threat to the country’s energy security.

Specifics of electricity supply. The provision of electricity in Moldova operates through two main channels: domestic generation and external sourcing. Domestically, electricity is produced by two thermal power plants in Chișinău, one thermal power plant in Bălți, eight smaller thermal power plants situated across the country, and a hydroelectric power plant in Costești. Collectively, these facilities can meet up to approximately 20% of the nation’s energy demands (although in 2022, this figure stood at around 18%). In terms of energy sources, the primary contributors are natural gas and renewables such as solar, wind, and hydropower. Externally, Moldova imports electricity from various sources, including Transnistria’s Cuciurgani-Moldavskaya GRES (MGRES) power plant, under the ownership of the Russian company Inter-RAO. Additionally, imports are sourced from Romania and occasionally Ukraine. These external supply arrangements accounted for approximately 82% of domestic energy needs in 2022. Simultaneously, sourcing from Transnistria remains the most cost-effective option, whereas procuring electricity from Romania comes at a higher cost. Consequently, imports from Romania complement the domestic supply. While electricity has been imported from Ukraine in the past, the uncertainty arises from Russian attacks on electricity installations in Ukraine, rendering this import direction unpredictable. Concerning Transnistria, the MGRES power plant does not pay for natural gas from the Russian Federation via Ukrainian territory. Instead, it utilizes the generated electricity for the needs of the separatist territory and sells it to the Republic of Moldova at prices lower than the market rate.

Potential scenarios for securing energy supplies. Over the years, the supply of electricity from Transnistria has been a crucial aspect of political discourse and a significant factor impacting Moldova’s energy security. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022 injected uncertainty into natural gas supplies for Moldova and its breakaway region. Currently, the transportation of commodities from Russia to Transnistria (managed by the Moldovagaz company) is facilitated through Ukrainian territory, where a five-year Russian-Ukrainian natural gas transit agreement remains in effect. However, the corresponding Russian-Ukrainian transit agreement, signed in 2019, is set to expire by the end of 2024. In this context, numerous uncertainties loom over the availability of natural gas for MGRES power plants. Regarding the supply of natural gas to the Republic of Moldova, it is overseen mostly by the state-owned energy company Energocom[1]. This entity has the capability to import natural gas from various directions via existing pipelines, including from the north (Ukraine) and south (Romania, including LNG supplies from Greece). Given these circumstances, four scenarios for developments from 2025 can be discerned. The first scenario involves the continuation of natural gas supplies via the Ukrainian route. However, recent indications from Kiev suggest that this option is practically unattainable. Ukraine has signalled its unwillingness to renew its transit agreement with the Russian Federation, citing its refusal to financially support the aggressor. Furthermore, in this scenario, Ukraine is unlikely to grant Gazprom access to the TurkStream/Balkan Stream pipeline or allow reverse flow through the Trans-Balkan pipeline to supply natural gas to the MGRES from the south. This is due to the intricacies of the existing natural gas infrastructure, which necessitates the transit of commodities through Ukrainian territory (at the Isaccea-Orlovka point) before reaching Moldova from the south. The second scenario involves Moldovagaz purchasing natural gas from Energocom for MGRES, sourced from southern directions. In this scenario, Energocom would decide both the source of the natural gas and the purchase price. This approach would grant Moldova greater influence over Transnistria and effectively result in Chisinau determining the functioning of the separatist region. However, financially, this would present challenges for both Moldova (resulting in higher electricity prices) and Transnistria (diminishing the competitiveness of the separatist region). The third scenario entails halting natural gas supplies from Ukraine to Transnistria, thereby rendering the MGRES power plant inoperative. This scenario would precipitate numerous economic and humanitarian challenges because the collapse of Transnistria will be triggered by the cancellation of the electricity trading contract with the official government, triggering a humanitarian crisis. This type of “accelerated” integration of Moldova with Transnistria is not the most favourable solution for either side, and its materialization in this form is rather unlikely. At the same time, Moldova would have to purchase more expensive electricity from Romania and ensure supplies to Transnistria as well. The fourth scenario involves importing Russian natural gas through the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines, and via the Romanian transmission system, to deliver it to Moldova at the Ungheni Interconnection Point. This route would not be affected by Ukrainian approvals. This scenario seems to be the best solution. Nevertheless, the government in Chisinau still hopes that from 2025, the situation will be stable and somehow the transit of natural gas through Ukrainian territory will be maintained. Such a solution for Moldova’s energy security seems to be the most beneficial.

Problems and prospects for the energy system. At present, efforts are underway at the regulatory and investment levels to address the current challenges in ensuring Moldova’s energy security. The existing power grid connections with neighbouring countries encompass over a dozen high-voltage lines of varying capacities: one with Romania (at 400 kV voltage, serving MGRES), seven lines with Ukraine (at 330 kV voltage), as well as eleven lines with Ukraine (at 110 kV voltage) and three lines with Romania (at 110 kV voltage). For years, Moldova has been synchronized with the Integrated Power System/Unified Power System of Russia (IPS/UPS), headquartered in Moscow, which covers the majority of post-Soviet states. However, in March 2022, Moldova (in collaboration with Ukraine) synchronized its electricity grid with the European Continental System (CESA). This synchronization enables electricity supplies from European Union countries. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the power grid (at 400 kV) facilitating energy supplies from Romania to Moldova is routed through Transnistria before reaching the Republic of Moldova. At present, there is no direct high-power line linking Moldova with Romania. To address this issue, the construction of the Chisinau-Vulcanesti power line (at 400 kV) is underway and expected to be completed by the end of 2025, with an estimated cost of approximately 27 million EUR. Additionally, in March 2024, a loan agreement between Moldova and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was approved for the construction of another high-voltage (400 kV) line with Romania, known as the Bălți-Suceava interconnection. The completion of the first connection will enhance Moldova’s electricity system’s independence from Transnistria, thereby bolstering energy security.

Conclusions

  • The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has markedly altered the threat perception in Moldova, particularly in the energy realm. Currently, the situation is stable, but from 2025 onwards, with the conclusion of the Russian-Ukrainian transit agreement, the challenge will be to ensure the availability of natural gas for MGRES power plants, and consequently, the electricity supply to Moldova.
  • Regarding natural gas availability, the measures implemented mostly by state-owned Energocom have yielded favourable outcomes for Moldova. However, the operation of the MGRES power plant remains a significant challenge. Several scenarios have been proposed to secure the supply of natural gas to the power plant, yet only one is deemed optimal at present (Moldovagaz imports natural gas from Gazprom in the southern direction via Romania).
  • Irrespective of the potential scenarios, it is anticipated that electricity prices for end-users in Moldova will continue to rise. Consequently, escalating prices may impact the approval ratings of President Mai Sandu, who is seeking re-election (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 1037), as well as the broader pro-Western camp.

[1] Recently, a stock exchange for natural gas was launched in Moldova, and many large enterprises have started to register and acquire natural gas through it. As a result, various companies have won tenders. Other private companies and suppliers are also importing natural gas from the European market. Nevertheless, Energocom is the biggest.

[Zdj. domena publiczna]

Dziesięć lat wojny – zmieniająca się Ukraina

The 2024 NATO Summit: Priorities for Transatlantic Security

Imports of commodities and petroleum products from the US to Poland and the Baltic States

The Russian Federation’s aggression toward Ukraine has led Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to cease the importation of commodities and petroleum products from Russia. This has resulted in a gap that has been filled by imports from other sources, including the United States of America. Collaboration with the US influences energy security and holds political significance due to the nation’s growing presence in the region. In the new wartime context, the energy significance of the US for Poland and the Baltic States primarily pertains to the supply of diesel and natural gas. Imports of crude oil are less significant due to the particular grades available on the international market from this country.

The role of the US in crude oil supplies to Poland and the Baltic States. The US stands as one of the world’s largest crude oil producers. Until 1975, the export of domestically produced crude oil was prohibited, as the nation was a net importer of the commodity. It wasn’t until the appearance of technological advancements around 2005, which involved the adoption of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques, that crude oil production surged, prompting a restructuring of the domestic energy sector. Consequently, the ban on crude oil exports was lifted in 2015, enabling refineries across the globe, including those in Central European nations, to access American crude oil. The volume of imports over the years has been shaped by the characteristics of various crude oil grades available in the international market from the US, such as Eagle Ford or Bakken, among others. These grades are typically lighter with a lower sulphur content, yielding more gasoline fractions rather than diesel. The physicochemical characteristics of these particular grades have long deterred refineries in Poland and Lithuania from importing them (there are no refineries operating in the other Baltic States). Instead, these plants have focused on maximising the import of commodities predominately suitable for diesel production (including Urals from Russia). This strategy aims to optimise the utilisation of existing refining facilities and to produce high-margin petroleum products, with diesel being in higher demand than gasoline in Europe. Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, refineries in Plock, Gdansk, and Mažeikiai only sporadically purchased cargoes from the US. However, as a result of the war in Ukraine, the gap left by Russian crude oil has been filled with supplies from the US as well. Consequently, there was a significant surge in US crude oil imports to refineries in Poland (up to 34 times) and Lithuania (7 times) in 2023 compared to 2021. During the same period, the proportion of US crude oil supplies to Poland in the total sea import basket rose from 0.3% to 5%. Meanwhile, for Lithuania, the share increased from 3% in 2021 to 20% in 2023.

Petroleum product imports to Poland and the Baltic States. The Russian Federation was one of the major exporters of diesel to European markets, accounting for approximately 40% of sea deliveries to European Union countries. The conflict in Ukraine prompted Poland and the Baltic States to alter their diesel supply routes. Although sanctions on sea deliveries of petroleum products were not imposed until February 2023, Lithuania and Estonia had already unilaterally halted imports of petroleum products from Russia by 2022. Subsequently, diesel supplies from Russia to Poland and Latvia ceased in 2023. As a consequence of the Ukrainian conflict, diesel shipments from the US also extended their reach to this part of Europe. In 2021, neither Poland nor the other Baltic States imported diesel from the US, but there was a notable increase in shipments by 2022-2023. By 2023, imports from this direction to Poland had surged sevenfold, with the share in total supplies rising from 2% to 9%. In 2022, the Baltic States had no supply from this direction, but by 2023, it already constituted 21% of imports to Lithuania, 14% to Latvia, and 3% to Estonia. Depending on the development of petroleum product availability on the international market, influenced by seasonal maintenance work at refineries worldwide (in spring or autumn), as well as potential attacks by Ukraine’s armed forces on refineries in the Russian Federation, it is anticipated that the Baltic States will continue to import diesel from the US. Simultaneously, ongoing modernisation work at the Mažeikiai refinery (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 458) may also intermittently affect petroleum product availability on the regional market, necessitating increased imports, including from the US.

Availability of US natural gas in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. For many years, the Russian Federation has been the largest supplier of natural gas to European Union countries, holding a share of about 37% in 2021. This supply was facilitated through various channels, including pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments by sea. However, the conflict in Ukraine has led to a decrease in the share of supplies from this direction to approximately 9% in 2022. Nonetheless, it rebounded in 2023 to around 15%, owing to the absence of sanctions on LNG natural gas supplies from Russia. Consequently, there was a notable increase in sea-based deliveries from Russia to countries such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal in 2023.

Poland and the Baltic States boast two regasification terminals capable of receiving natural gas in the form of LNG – located in Świnoujście (Poland) and Klaipeda (Lithuania). These countries were significant importers of natural gas from the Russian Federation prior to the conflict, thereby being partially reliant on this source. These imports were facilitated both by land and by sea routes. However, the conflict in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the natural gas market in these nations, necessitating the cessation of natural gas supplies (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 587). Consequently, this gap was filled with supplies from alternative sources, including natural gas imports from the US. In 2022, there was a notable surge in crude supplies from the US to Poland by approximately 120% compared to 2021, while supplies to Lithuania increased by 130%. Notably, in May 2022, the first-ever deliveries of LNG from the US to Poland via the Klaipeda LNG terminal occurred, facilitated by imports via the GIPL pipeline linking the two countries.

In 2023, as the market situation stabilised, there was a decline in natural gas demand in the Baltic States (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 1071). During this period, imports of LNG to Poland increased by 13%, while imports to Lithuania decreased by 25%. The high liquidity of the natural gas market allows tankers from various countries to dock in the Baltics, with the security of supply primarily influenced by long-term contracts between suppliers and customers. In Poland, ORLEN (formerly PGNiG) has entered into numerous natural gas import contracts over the years. Conversely, supplies to the Baltic States via the Klaipeda LNG terminal are primarily based on short-term (spot) contracts.

Conclusions

  • The US stands as one of the largest producers and exporters of crude oil globally. The availability of this crude oil in Poland and Lithuania is primarily influenced by the types of grades traded, as crude oil from the US is predominantly supplied for blending with crude oil from other sources. This notably includes supplies from Saudi Arabia (which accounted for 36% of total imports in 2023 to Poland and 39% to Lithuania) and Norway (representing 33% of imports to Poland and 18% to Lithuania in 2023). Consequently, shipments from the US will not dominate future supplies but will rather serve a complementary role.
  • In the aftermath of the diesel shortage resulting from sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation following its aggression toward Ukraine, alternative suppliers, including the US, stepped in to fill the gap. Poland and Latvia’s decision to cease importing this product by sea from Russia as late as 2023 underscores the significant role Russia has historically played in the energy market of regional countries, highlighting the challenges associated with shifting supply directions. The availability of diesel from the US in Poland and the Baltic States may further increase due to the anticipated lower availability of petroleum products from Russia on the global market, a consequence of potential attacks on refineries by Ukraine.
  • Due to the available import capacities, LNG supplies from the US were exclusively received by Poland (Świnoujście) and Lithuania (Klaipeda). However, it’s worth noting that other Baltic States also indirectly benefited from these natural gas supplies. The impact of these supplies from the US on the energy security of countries in the region has varied. Nonetheless, for these nations, imports of natural gas from the US represent a significant factor in enhancing both energy security and mutual political and business relations.

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Gagauzia – a Russian destabilisation tool

The authorities of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia display openly pro-Russian attitudes and seek to deepen relations with the Russian Federation. Protests are organised during the visits of representatives of the authorities of the Republic of Moldova to the region. Gagauzia, controlled by the Ilan Șor political group, has become the most important Russian tool used to destabilise the situation in Moldova.

Bashkan travels to Moscow. The Bashkan of the Gagauz Autonomy, Yevgeniya Guțul, has visited Russia twice in the past six weeks (the Bashkan is the Autonomy’s most important representative and as well as head of government). On her first visit, she met with Federation Council President Valentina Matviyenko (1 March 2024) and took part in the World Youth Festival in Sochi, during which she had a brief conversation with President Vladimir Putin (6 March 2024). During her second visit, there was another meeting with Matviyenko and the signing of an agreement between the Gagauzian authorities and Promviazbank was announced (9 March 2024). This is a Russian state-owned bank with strong links to the military sector, which was subject to Western sanctions immediately following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Under this agreement, residents of Gagauzia are to be given the opportunity to open bank accounts that will be used to transfer financial allowances to pensioners and budget employees from the Autonomy. It was announced that these allowances would be financed by ‘partners from Russia’. Starting from 1 May 2024, 20,000 pensioners and 5,000 budget sphere employees are to be covered by this form of assistance. Guțul also asked Gazprom to sell gas to Autonomy customers at a lower price. During her visits, she was accompanied by the president of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia (PAG), Dmitry Konstantinov.

At her first meeting with the president of the Russian Federation Council, Guțul complained that Russian supporters were being persecuted in Moldova. During her second visit, she announced that the Autonomy would declare independence in the event of a merger between Moldova and Romania, and said that if Moldovan troops were introduced into Gagauzia, she would “ask for help from everyone, including the Russian Federation”.

The topic of Gagauzia has been widely covered by Russian propaganda in recent times. Putin’s meeting with Guțul was reported by the Kremlin’s press service, the issue of Moldova and the Autonomy was covered in two extensive analytical pieces by the RIA Novosti agency, and Bashkan herself was a guest on Vladimir Soloviev’s programme. The Russian coverage highlights the difficult situation of the Russian-speaking population and national minorities in Moldova. After Guțul’s first visit to Russia, she met other leaders of pro-Russian forces, including former Moldovan presidents Vladimir Voronin and Igor Dodon.

Yevgeniya Guțul won the election of the Bashkhan of Gagauzia, the second round of which took place on 14 May 2023, as a representative of the Șor Party. The politician emphasises her close relations with the fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor, whom she describes as the leader of her political camp (“IEE Commentaries”, no. 940). Șor himself has recently been in Russia and has made no secret of the fact that his political activities are financed thanks to the support of his Russian partners.

President and Prime Minister visit Gagauzia. On 28 March 2024, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Dorin Recean, met with entrepreneurs from the Gagauz Autonomy in the village of Congaz. His visit was accompanied by a street protest, organised by supporters of Guțul and Șor. On the same day, an interview with the Minister of Infrastructure, Andrei Spînu, was due to air on local television. However, its progress was interrupted by Dmitry Konstantinov, who unexpectedly appeared in the studio and stated that he also wanted to take part in the programme. The Minister of Infrastructure refused to take part in the discussion with the PNB chairman due to his cooperation with the ‘Șor criminal group’. Both politicians had previously accused each other of lying about the value of state investments in the Autonomy.

On 29 March 2024, the President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, travelled to the construction site of a new power line connecting the town of Vulcănești, located in Gagauzia, with Chisinau. A protest was also organised along her route, forcing the head of state to take a different route. On the other hand, on 10 March 2024, Maia Sandu met with local mayors, as well as students of the State University of Komrat. The discussion focused on the development of cities, the possibility of external financial assistance, and the issue of changes to the operation of courts in the region. Protesters gathered in front of the university building. In all of the cases mentioned, the demonstrators demanded the resignation of the president and the government as well as the restoration of the broadcasting of Russian TV channels, and opposed the reduction of the Autonomy’s powers by the central authorities.

Conclusions. Yevgeniya Guțul’s brief conversation with Vladimir Putin was the first meeting between a Moldovan politician and official and the Russian president since the country’s invasion of Ukraine. The actions and statements of the Bashkan of Gagauzia make her the most radically pro-Russian actor on the Moldovan political scene. At the same time, there is no doubt that the Kremlin is currently betting on Guțul and Ilan Șor, who is her political patron and sponsor. Similar cooperation – including meetings with the most important people in Russia and contracts with the state bank – cannot be counted on by other political forces in Moldova at present. Guțul’s statements have reverberated much more widely in Russian propaganda than the Transnistrian Congress of the All-Levels Deputies and its pleas for support (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 1072). In Moldova, Guțul’s meetings with former presidents were widely reported. Until recently, they were not taken seriously, were seen as an artificial political product of the Șor, and were ridiculed due to their many awkward moments and Guțul’s problems with formulating statements. Many commentators interpreted these meetings as a signal that Bashkan of Gagauzia had now become the leader of pro-Russian forces.

Guțul’s numerous statements are provocative and manipulative, and her promises are hardly credible or difficult to interpret clearly; for example: the right for Gagauzia to declare independence in the event of Moldova’s loss of sovereignty is part of the 1994 agreement that created the Autonomy. Raising this topic in the Russian media was only intended to attract attention. Statements concerning the presence of the Moldovan military in Gagauzia are completely detached from reality. The Autonomy is an integral part of the state and there have long been military bases there. Announcements of receiving cheaper gas from Gazprom have been repeated for months, but it is difficult to imagine a way of realising them. In contrast, making a deal with a bank subject to Western sanctions, which Moldova has also joined, is pure provocation. Importantly, this bank uses the Russian MIR payment card system, which is not supported by Moldovan banks. This means that using the money in private accounts will require online transactions or cash withdrawals in Transnistria. Both forms will be quite cumbersome for the main target group of this scheme, which is pensioners.

The Moldovan ruling camp has consistently avoided any contact with Yevgeniya Gutul, treating her as a representative of a criminal group. Maia Sandu has so far not appointed her as a member of the government of the Republic of Moldova, despite the law indicating so. The new Bashkan has found the support of the majority of deputies of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia. As a result, the central authority is in a state of dispute with this institution as well (individual deputies of the PNA, in opposition to

Since the collapse of the USSR, the Gagauz Autonomy’s relations with the central authority have developed along a spectrum of cold but constructive distance and clear conflict. The society of the region is particularly sensitive to issues of dignity and recognition of its political rights. The Șor political group has thus succeeded in inserting anti-government and pro-Russian activity into the existing identity dispute. The central authorities find themselves in a situation where maintaining a consistent stance towards the Șor group further fuels tensions in relations with Gagauzia and leads to the consolidation of the local community around Guțul. The president and the government are attempting to counter this by developing relationships with local community organisations as well as town and village authorities. These actions, however right, are reactive in nature. If they are part of a larger strategy towards the region, it has been implemented rather late.

Russia will use Gagauzia to destabilise the political situation and increase social tension in Moldova. These activities are expected to intensify ahead of the presidential elections and the referendum on European integration. Both votes will take place on 20 October 2024. The Autonomy has always been characterised by pro-Russianism, but we are now facing a new situation. Until recently, local leaders relied on public sympathy towards Russia to pursue their own business and political goals (‘Comments of the IEA’, no. 628). Now an external political force, dependent on the Kremlin, has taken power in the Autonomy.

Nevertheless, interpretations appearing in the Western media comparing Gagauzia to the Donbass and suggesting the possibility of real separatism should now be considered exaggerated. The Autonomy, whose inhabitants make up about 5% of the state’s population, is not territorially compact – it consists of three geographically distinct parts. Its inhabitants do not display radical and anti-Moldovan attitudes (at the level of inter-ethnic relations). It is difficult to imagine local social groups that could pursue such separatism. Importantly, in the immediate neighbourhood, beyond Moldova’s borders, there are no forces that could support it.

The Weimar Triangle: new-old cooperation horizon

The Weimar Triangle, a platform for cooperation between France, Germany, and Poland, is gaining importance as a forum for dialogue on security issues in Europe. The recent meetings of this format show a determination to strengthen trilateral cooperation, including through the extension of activities into new areas such as protection against disinformation or building social ties, among others. Moreover, the prospects for further joint initiatives are opened by the strong mutual economic relations between the countries – via both trade and investment.

Initiative. The Weimar Triangle, or officially the Committee for the Promotion of French-German-Polish Cooperation, was established primarily with the aim of integrating Poland into European and transatlantic structures. From the outset, it was a non-formalised format of regional cooperation, without an extensive organisational apparatus or formal decision-making mechanisms. Cooperation within its framework was based primarily on irregular meetings, most often at the level of foreign ministers and heads of state.

Following the realisation of the key objectives related to Poland’s integration into the EU and NATO, the Weimar Triangle continued its role as a kind of forum for dialogue, albeit used with varying intensity, depending on the current needs and political priorities of the three constituent states. There was a decrease in the activity of this format, especially between 2012 and 2021, when there were no meetings at the highest level (with the exception of an extended-format meeting with the Visegrad Group in 2013). In addition, there were likewise no meetings at the level of foreign ministers between 2017 and 2019.

Mobilisation. Top-level meetings within the Weimar Triangle resumed in early February 2022. In response to the threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the leaders of the member states – French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Polish President Andrzej Duda – met in Berlin to discuss a strategy for de-escalating tensions. Subsequent meetings with the same line-up already took place during the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, successively in Munich and Paris – in February and June 2023. Both focused on strengthening cooperation and coordination in support of Ukraine.

A clear sign of the revival of this format was the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 12 February 2024 in La Celle-Saint-Cloud, France. At that time, the ministers of France, Germany, and Poland – Stéphane Sejourné, Annalena Baerbock, and Radosław Sikorski – explicitly underlined their determination “‘to give a new energy to trilateral cooperation’.” Its key dimension became security issues, with a strong emphasis on combating Russian disinformation, which was considered the greatest and most immediate threat to regional stability, especially in the context of the upcoming European Parliament elections scheduled for June 2024. In response to these challenges, a decision was made to set up a special Weimar programme to warn against foreign disinformation activities.

The foreign ministers’ meeting in La Celle-Saint-Cloud underlined the countries’ desire to also strengthen the social dimension of cooperation within the Weimar Triangle. The initiatives announced, such as the ‘Weimar of Citizens’, the ‘Weimar of Youth’, the ‘Weimar of Excellence’, and the ‘Weimar of Culture’, aim to strengthen civic engagement in shaping cooperation within the countries of the format.

Solidarity with Ukraine was also emphasised once again, pointing to the determination of the Weimar Triangle countries to support its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and European and transatlantic aspirations. The willingness to hold an extended foreign ministers’ meeting in the ‘Weimar + Ukraine’ format was also expressed. The Ukrainian issue was once again the focus of the subsequent extraordinary trilateral meeting, which took place in March 2024 and was attended by French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.

Economy. Franco-German-Polish cooperation is not limited to the political and social spheres, but is also – or perhaps primarily in terms of its intensity – economic in nature. Germany, France, and Poland – the first, second and sixth largest economies in the European Union, respectively – maintain strong trade links:

  • In the Polish economy, Germany is the main destination for both exports (27.8%) and imports (19.8%). In contrast, France ranks third in Polish exports (6.1%) and eighth in imports (3.3%).
  • In the German economy, France is the second export market (7.6%) and the sixth import market (5.1%), while Poland is the fifth export destination (5.8%) and the fourth import destination (6.0%).
  • In the French economy, Germany leads in both exports (13.9%) and imports (12.0%), while Poland ranks tenth in both categories (exports 2.4%, imports 2.0%).

Moreover, an important element of trade between these countries is high- and medium-technology products. For example, Polish exports to Germany are dominated by electrical machinery and equipment, including batteries and accumulators, while exports to France are mainly mechanical machinery and equipment, including automatic data processing machines.

In addition to trade, the countries share equally strong investment ties. Germany and France are among the largest investors in Poland, considering the domicile of the group’s parent company. In 2022, the balance of German investments in Poland amounted to more than PLN 230 billion and French investments exceeded PLN 108 billion. Poland – although not an equally large investor in Germany and France due to the differences in the size of the economies – is actively increasing its investment commitment, especially in strategic sectors. Polish investors in the German market include PKN Orlen, Ciech, Azoty, Boryszew, Comarch, Komputronik, or Asseco. Polish investors in France, meanwhile, include InPost, Nowy Styl, Comarch, and Chemet.

Conclusions and perspectives

  • Established in August 1991 in Weimar, Germany, the trilateral format for regional cooperation between France, Germany and Poland was a response to the challenges of a Europe undergoing profound political change at the time. More than thirty years after these events, the format is once again gaining prominence, demonstrating its ability to mobilise and coordinate action on key security issues in Europe. This is expressed not only through dialogue at the highest political levels, but also through an expansion of cooperation into new areas, including, for example, a disinformation warning programme. An important aspect of developing further cooperation in the Weimar Triangle is also the planned strengthening of the social dimension in trilateral relations.
  • The foundation for further deepening trilateral cooperation is also provided by strong mutual economic relations between France, Germany and Poland – both in the area of trade and investment. In the context of the declaration of the Foreign Ministers following the La Celle-Saint-Cloud meeting, which underlined the need to strengthen the resilience, innovation, and competitiveness of European industry, the Weimar Triangle can play an important role in promoting and achieving these goals through further joint initiatives.
  • Furthermore, an opportunity to strengthen relations within the Weimar Triangle is also provided by Poland’s active role as the keystone of Central and Eastern Europe. Thanks to its strategic location and historical and cultural links with its neighbours, Poland can contribute to deepening dialogue and cooperation in the region, which will translate into supporting stability and security, both within the Weimar Triangle and Central and Eastern Europe more broadly.

[Zdj. Spotkanie ministrów spraw zagranicznych Trójkąta Weimarskiego, 12 lutego 2024 r.: Annalena Baerbock, Stéphane Séjourné i Radosław Sikorski / Ambasada Francji w Polsce]

War in Ukraine: Kyiv’s efforts to ensure the availability of petroleum products

The ongoing war that began in 2022 has brought about significant changes in Ukraine’s energy market. In late 2023, the government in Kyiv introduced measures to bolster the country’s energy security by establishing a system of crude oil and petroleum products reserves. While work on the relevant legislation had been underway for years, it was the war and Ukraine’s attainment of associate state status in the International Energy Agency that expedited the process. These measures aim to ensure the availability of petroleum products, particularly considering the limited prospects for rebuilding Ukraine’s refining sector in wartime conditions.

Refining sector. The energy sector plays a crucial role in Ukraine’s economy[1]. Prior to the outbreak of full-scale war, the country had only one operational refinery – in Krzemenchuk – with a technical capacity of 372,000 barrels per day. However, due to a lack of modernisation, the actual petroleum products production capacity was significantly lower. Consequently, liquid fuel availability on the market relied heavily on imports, which constituted approximately 97% of domestic consumption (around 12% of which was from the “grey market”). Petroleum products for the domestic market were primarily imported overland from the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Lithuania, while sea imports primarily originated from Azerbaijan and Turkey.

As a consequence of the war, the refinery in Krzemenchuk was destroyed in 2022 and subsequently partially rebuilt (current information on whether petroleum products production continues at the plant is unavailable). The conflict in Ukraine has also shifted petroleum products import routes, with the majority of products now sourced from or passing through Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 778). The naval blockade of Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea has halted imports via this route since February 2022 (the last three deliveries by sea to the Odessa terminal occurred in 2022). One key import route is through Romania, which experienced a 30% increase in diesel imports in 2023 compared to 2022. Meanwhile, deliveries of this product from the Russian Federation plummeted by 87% (due to sanctions imposed since February 2023), but increased from other sources (including Kuwait, Italy, and Turkey).

Rebuilding refining capacity. The most favourable solution for Ukraine’s energy security, in terms of ensuring the availability of petroleum products on the domestic market, would be the reconstruction of the refinery in Krzemenchuk or the construction of new plants. However, constructing them during the ongoing war poses significant problems and risks (including a lack of funding and the possibility of attacks from Russia). Consequently, ensuring the availability of petroleum products from domestic plants is currently unfeasible. Nonetheless, the availability of petroleum products is assured and import channels operate without major obstacles. Additionally, there are refineries in the region capable of supplying products to Ukraine as well.

It can be assumed that in the event of the war ending, Ukraine would take active steps to rebuild or construct the refinery. Subsequently, it would be necessary to determine a suitable location for the plant, as well as to guarantee access to crude oil (including the construction of a transmission system). The existing system currently only allows for crude oil supplies from the Pivdennyy terminal near Odessa. Additionally, there is a possibility to supply crude oil from the south through the Omišalj oil terminal in Croatia, the Adria pipeline, and a reverse flow on the Druzhba pipeline (although appropriate modernisation work would need to be carried out on the Hungary-Ukraine section). Another potential solution would be to construct the Brody-Adamovo pipeline and ensure the availability of crude oil shipped through the Gdansk oil terminal. In this regard, the most optimal solution would be to construct a refinery in the western part of Ukraine (rather than rebuilding the refinery in Kremenchuk) to maximise the ability to import crude oil through various channels.

Law on minimum stocks of crude oil and petroleum products. One of the tools for ensuring the availability of fuels in the event of shortages in the domestic market is the maintenance of adequate minimum stocks. This approach requires (1) appropriate national regulations for the creation and maintenance of stocks, as well as (2) the construction of suitable tanks.

In terms of appropriate national regulations, Ukraine enacted the Law on Minimum Stocks of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products[2] in 2023. This legislation was implemented not only for practical reasons, such as enhancing energy security, but also in response to international obligations. Ukraine, having attained the status of an associate state in the International Energy Agency since July 2022, and being designated as a candidate state for the European Union since June 2022, is obliged to establish an appropriate stockpile system as per the requirements of both organisations. The regulations introduced by Ukrainian law in 2023 are akin to the solutions adopted by member states of the IEA and the EU[3]. Presently, the responsibility for the cost of building and maintaining stocks lies with petroleum products importers and producers, including refineries.

In the latter case, an effective system of tanks is imperative to maintain crude oil and petroleum products (particularly given the destruction of the Krzemenchuk refinery in Ukraine, where petroleum products stocks, rather than crude oil, will primarily be created and maintained). As of now, no such system exists within the territory of Ukraine and the majority of petroleum products depots have been established by private entities (such as the SOCAR company from Azerbaijan). However, the foundation for an adequate stockpile system could be the oil terminals on the Black Sea (Pivdennyy and Yuzhnyy)[4], as well as tanks situated in idle refineries[5]. Following the introduction of the 2023 law, which mandated the establishment of appropriate tanks, entities importing petroleum products have been somewhat compelled to construct these facilities.

Conclusions

  • The Russian-Ukrainian war has substantially restructured the logistics of petroleum product supplies to Ukraine. In the present wartime context, access to petroleum products holds crucial significance from both economic and military standpoints. With the destruction of the nation’s sole operational refinery, the availability of products in the domestic market is now reliant solely on imports.
  • The prospects for rebuilding the refining sector in Ukraine, as well as securing the availability of crude oil, are currently minimal. The construction of new crude oil processing plants will only be feasible once the geopolitical situation stabilises.
  • The introduction of the Law on Minimum Stocks of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products in 2023 represents a significant step towards ensuring the country’s energy security. In Ukraine, efforts towards establishing an appropriate system had been ongoing for many years, but it was the exigencies of war that underscored the necessity for comprehensive legislation. This law sets the foundation for constructing a system that could guarantee the availability of petroleum products in emergency situations. Additionally, it can serve as a crucial tool in combating the ‘grey market’ within this sector and enhancing state supervision over the liquid fuel industry. A lack of adequate oversight had previously led to unregulated petroleum products imports from the Russian Federation before the war, as well as the collapse of the refining sector in Ukraine.

[1] See more: J. Olchowski, H. Bazhenova, Ukraina, [in:] Raport. Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, eds. B. Surmacz, M. Paszkowski, Lublin 2023, pp. 191-199.

[2] Law on Minimum Petroleum and Fuel Stocks, 21 November 2023, Document 3484-IX, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3484-20#Text [4.04.2024].

[3] The law specifically regulates, among other things: (1) the construction and maintenance of stocks (the volume of stockpiles to be determined based on either 90 days of average daily net imports or 61 days of average daily domestic consumption, whichever is greater); (2) the supervision of stocks, which has been entrusted to the relevant state bodies; (3) the manner in which market players – importers and refiners – accumulate stocks; (4) the definition of an emergency, including the protocol for the release and appropriate use of the accumulated stocks; and (5) the procedure for replenishing stocks after release.

[4] Ukraine maintained a terminal in Theodosia on the Black Sea, but after the annexation of Crimea, it is now under the control of the Russian Federation.

[5] In the past, seven refineries operated in Ukraine: Krzemenchuk, Kherson, Odessa, Lisychansk, Drohobych, Shevelinka and Nadvirnia.

[Zdj. Informacja o braku paliwa na stacji benzynowej we Lwowie, 10 maja 2022 r. / UNIAN]

The Three Seas Initiative after the Vilnius Summit: security first

On 11 April 2024, the 9th summit of The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) occurred in Vilnius. The 3SI is a regional cooperation format initiated in 2016 and developed by the heads of Central European countries. A key objective of the initiative is to stimulate the development of energy, transport, and digital infrastructure. There are currently 13 EU Member States participating in 3SI, represented at the summit by the host President of Lithuania – Gitanas Nausėda, and the Presidents of Bulgaria – Rumen Radev, the Czech Republic – Petr Pavel, Estonia – Alar Karis, Latvia – Edgars Rinkēvičs, Poland – Andrzej Duda, Romania – Klaus Iohannis, Hungary – Tamás Sulyok, as well as the Prime Minister of Greece – Kiriakos Mitsotakis, and representatives of the Austrian, Croatian, Slovakian and Slovenian authorities. The summit was also attended by representatives of the 3SI associated countries: the President of Ukraine – Volodymyr Zelenski (“IEŚ Commentaries”, no. 639), and the Prime Minister of Moldova, Dorin Recean („Komentarze IEŚ”, nr 949). President Zelenski played a special role at the summit, stressing the importance of strengthening international support for Ukraine’s armed forces, which is necessary to repel Russian aggression. The speech was an appeal for greater solidarity in the face of a crisis that resonates beyond Ukraine’s borders, affecting the security situation in Europe. Also present at the summit were delegates from 3SI’s strategic partners, including representatives from the European Commission, Germany, and the US. A significant decision that was made at the meeting was the announcement of Japan as a new strategic partner, underlining the growing international profile of this cooperation format. In addition, representatives from Montenegro, Finland, Israel, Spain, and Turkey, among others, attended the summit as guests.

A key theme of the summit was the issue of regional security in the broadest sense. Military mobility was identified as an important element of cooperation („Komentarze IEŚ”, nr 966). The participating 3SI states are to continue to implement large infrastructure projects that can be used by the armed forces in a situation such as a potential escalation of the conflict in Ukraine. At the Vilnius summit, the strategic importance of the Via Carpatia international road route to connect Klaipeda in Lithuania with Greek ports and the Rail Baltica rail project was discussed in this context („Komentarze IEŚ”, nr 451). The need to continue to enhance energy security was also emphasised. The opening of the Polish-Lithuanian interconnector (GIPL), or the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, was among the most important achievements in this regard. The development of renewable energy sources and the pursuit of climate neutrality in the region were also among the topics addressed by summit participants. Mention was made, among others, of the need for small modular SMRs and wind power plants in the Baltic Sea („Komentarze IEŚ”, nr 314). Digital cooperation to increase the resilience of the 3SI countries to various cyber threats was also discussed. Another important topic of the Vilnius summit was the issue of the reconstruction of Ukraine and the European integration of the country (a special Common Interest Group for Ukraine (CIG4U) of the International Transport Forum (ITF) was established). A Business Forum was held alongside the summit, as well as more than 20 scientific and expert side events. From the perspective of the further development of this format of cooperation, the signing of a letter of intent on the establishment of the Three Seas Initiative Innovation Fund was significant.

Comments:

  • Lithuania is the third Baltic state, after Estonia and Latvia, to hold a 3SI summit, indicating a particular interest in the region in this cooperation format. The main promoter of 3SI in Lithuania remains President Gitanas Nausėda. The event is part of both Lithuania’s ongoing presidential campaign and the country’s policy of building its international reputation. Vilnius emphasises the development of energy, infrastructure, and digital projects that enhance the region’s security. This potential cooperation can provide Lithuania with an opportunity to fill infrastructure gaps and strengthen its economic competitiveness.
  • The Vilnius Summit shows that the 3SI still remains primarily a presidential format. Once again, the 3SI Parliamentary Forum was not held, nor was the Civil Society Forum organised. Nor was the topic of institutionalising 3SI, as advocated by the Hungarian side a few years ago, taken up. Prior to the summit, the idea of inviting Finland as a participating state and Georgia as an associate state to the 3SI emerged, but ultimately, the format was not expanded. At the same time, it was announced that 3SI’s strategic partners had expanded to include Japan. In addition, the 3SI Innovation Fund was established alongside the existing 3SI Investment Fund. The summit was traditionally accompanied by the 3SI Business Forum, where politicians, diplomats, experts, and entrepreneurs met.
  • Back at last year’s summit in Bucharest, the then Hungarian president Katalin Novák declared that Hungary would host the event in 2025. However, a change to this was announced in Vilnius, and Poland will eventually host the 10th anniversary 3SI summit. It was also announced that the 2026 summit would again be organised by Croatia. Intergovernmental cooperation was pursued to a lesser extent during the event.
  • In Vilnius on 11 April, an agreement was also signed between Ukraine and Latvia, initiating cooperation towards strengthening regional security. The agreement provides for annual Latvian military support to the Ukrainian side at the level of 0.25 per cent of Latvia’s GDP. Latvia pledged to assist Ukraine in areas such as cyber security, demining, and unmanned technologies while supporting the country’s aspirations for membership in the European Union and NATO.

[Zdj. Kancelaria Prezydenta]