It has been ten years since Poland and Sweden proposed the Eastern Partnership project, which was subsequently adopted on 7 May 2009 by the EU Council at the Prague Summit as the official policy of the European Union. It is a component of the broader EU foreign policy – the European Neighbourhood Policy, which was created in 2004. During this time, the EU has developed many forms of dialogue and cooperation with the six countries covered by the programme. Half of the countries have signed and started to implement new agreements to strengthen their relations. However, the Eastern Partnership is currently undergoing a serious test. Today, the biggest challenge of fundamental importance is the ongoing armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia, which is a sign of a return to geopolitics in the region. These events have significantly changed the outlook and conditions under which the Eastern Partnership is implemented. Therefore, it is worth trying to answer a few research questions: has the Partnership proved to be a useful tool for attracting beneficiary countries to the EU? Have the initial and long-term objectives been achieved? Finally, is the project worth strengthening and continuing? The article will analyse the specificity of the programme, including strategic goals and their evolution, and attempt to assess the implementation of assumptions and instruments from the point of view of the research approach, which is the transformational power of the EU.
B. Piskorska, Partnerstwo Wschodnie po 10 latach: sukces czy porażka, realizm czy iluzja?, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 9-39, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.1.
This article is devoted to the evaluation of the Eastern Partnership from the point of view of the implementation of Russia’s foreign policy. Using the research approach of constructivism, it analyses Russia’s attitude towards the EU’s Eastern Partnership project, as well as Russia’s reactions to the implementation of the EaP. Therefore, the subject of the analysis is not so much the relations of the EU and Russia with six states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, as well as Russia’s and the EU’s narratives on its neighbourhood. This will make it possible to examine to what extent the position of one actor (EU) in relation to another (Russia) has been strengthened/weakened and, secondly, how the argumentation has promoted (the given message) in legitimizing the project as a whole, for both internal and external use. These projects were, on the one hand, Russia’s “close abroad” and, on the other, the EU’s “common neighbourhood”.
A. Legucka, Rosja wobec Partnerstwa Wschodniego Unii Europejskiej, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 41-64, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.2.
May 2019 marked the 10th anniversary of the launch of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership initiative, which encourages democratic reforms in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and the strengthening of the relations and cooperation between these countries and the EU. During this period, significant results were achieved in terms of political association, economic relations and regulatory convergence. Thanks to this initiative, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine signed association and free trade area agreements (DCFTAs) and achieved visa-free travel. One of the main drawbacks of the programme at this stage is that it does not provide for a differentiated approach towards partner countries and deeper cooperation with those already signatory to Association Agreements. The anniversary of the Eastern Partnership encourages to take stock of the results of the initiative and identify perspectives for its further development. The aim of this article is to identify the main achievements of the Eastern Partnership from the perspective of Ukraine’s priorities and interests, as well as to propose a new effective model of relations between Ukraine and other partner countries with the EU under this initiative. The text sets out and analyses the main stages of the cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the years 1991–2019, especially the participation of Ukraine in the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. The article shows that the Eastern Partnership policy and its implementation mechanisms need a structural review and differentiated, individual approaches that would meet the needs, expectations and interests of all the parties. If the EU intends to continue building mutually beneficial relations with its eastern neighbours, it should not only maintain the existing initiative, but also adapt it effectively to the challenges of the present. The EU should therefore develop a sufficiently attractive and effective model of cooperation to support pro-European reforms in its partner countries.
H. Bazhenova, Ukraina w Partnerstwie Wschodnim: osiągnięcia i perspektywy, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 65-93, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.3.
The article is devoted to the analysis of relations between Belarus and the European Union within the framework of the Eastern Partnership programme. For Belarus, the Eastern Partnership is one of the important channels of communication with the European Union. In 2009–2013, Belarus’ relations with the European Union were complicated and the country actually minimized its participation in the Eastern Partnership. However, from 2013 onwards, Belarus and the European Union have intensified their cooperation within the framework of various initiatives of the Eastern Partnership. In Belarus, the European Union has implemented several programmes on politics, economics, energy efficiency and mobility, which have served to further deepen relations with Belarus. Programmes implemented in the field of economy were aimed at developing enterprises in various sectors and supporting entrepreneurial initiatives of Belarusian residents. Programmes on energy efficiency contributed to the implementation of EU standards and the improvement of the environmental situation in Belarus. Initiatives in the field of mobility of Belarusians served the purpose of exchanging experiences and acquiring new skills by various target groups. The implemented Eastern Partnership programmes had a certain impact on the rapprochement of Belarus and served to introduce new rules in the EU member states. Further development of relations within the Eastern Partnership depends on the foreign policy of both Belarus and the European Union.
R. Romantsov, Białoruś w polityce Partnerstwa Wschodniego Unii Europejskiej w latach 2009-2019, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 95-135, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.4.
One of the foreign policy priorities of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is to support the Eastern Partnership (EaP) programme as a strategic dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy and a key element of stability and economic progress in Eastern Europe. The Baltic States are of the opinion that relations with the EaP states should remain one of the priorities of the Eastern Dimension of the EU’s foreign policy. The cooperation of the Baltic States with the Eastern partners results both from the ambitions and willingness to strengthen international prestige and role, as well as the need to ensure security and stability of the region in the context of Russia’s aggressive policy. The 10th anniversary of EaP is an opportunity to assess the contribution of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to the development of the programme and to discuss the future of cooperation.
A. Kuczyńska-Zonik, Partnerstwo Wschodnie jako kluczowy element polityki zagranicznej państw bałtyckich, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 137-153, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.5.
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is undoubtedly a key project of the European Union’s eastern policy. It is being implemented by the EU in cooperation with six partner countries, three of which (Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova) are more committed to establishing integration ties with the EU, while others are more restrained. The article tries to show that the functioning of EaP is influenced not only by its direct implementers, but also by various external actors. The most important of these are global and regional powers such as Russia, the United States, Turkey and China, as well as international financial institutions (including in particular the International Monetary Fund) and, to some extent, the North Atlantic Alliance. Their positions towards the Eastern Partnership may take the form of opposition, support or ambivalence. The analysis carried out allows us to conclude that while the impact of these actors on the functioning of the Eastern Partnership should not be overestimated, it should not be underestimated, especially in the light of possible scenarios for the future.
O. Barburska, Stanowisko głównych aktorów zewnętrznych wobec Partnerstwa Wschodniego Unii Europejskiej, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 155-169, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.6.
The economic relations of the European Union (EU) with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries are diverse in terms of their formal basis, scope and size. All EaP countries were already covered by the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in 1993/1994 and some by the additional GSP+ scheme in 2005, and bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (with the exception of Belarus) in 1998–1999, replaced in 2016–2018 by an Association Agreement with a DCFTA for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and in Armenia by a comprehensive and strengthened Partnership Agreement. However, the analysis of trade flows between 2007 and 2017 did not reveal a clear link between the volume of trade and the type of agreement governing economic relations. Although for most Eastern Partnership countries, the EU is the most important export market (except for Belarus) and the most important supplier (except for Armenia and Belarus), for the EU as a whole, the EaP countries remain second and third tier partners.
H. Dumała, Zróżnicowanie formalnych podstaw współpracy gospodarczej Unii Europejskiej z państwami Partnerstwa Wschodniego a wzajemna wymiana handlowa, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 171-195, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.7.
The article deals with the image of the Eastern Partnership in the Polish opinion-forming press in the years 2009–2019. The aim of the Partnership was to strengthen the stability of the states to the east of the borders of the European Union, and thus to reduce the threats appearing in this region, which was equivalent to increasing the security of the EU itself. The article presents the results of a qualitative analysis of research material in the form of press texts published in two national daily newspapers (Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita) and two opinion weeklies (Newsweek Polska and Polityka). The main criterion for constructing the image of the Eastern Partnership in the opinion-forming press were the most important players participating in the Partnership’s programme, i.e. the European Union and Ukraine. The third separate entity was Russia, as an opponent of the European initiative. Another criterion of analysis was to indicate the assumptions of the programme, their implementation and results in the context of each of the parties mentioned. The analysed articles often presented opinions and assessments of representatives of non-governmental organisations, experts from analytical centres and politicians connected with the Partnership. The assumptions and activities of the European Union were generally positively evaluated in the articles, while the opinions were definitely negative concerning Russia’s activities. Concerning the opinions on the activities of state entities invited to the Eastern Partnership programme, these were partly positive, depending on the country and the period evaluated. Particularly much attention was paid to Ukraine in the articles. It should be stressed that, most often, the opinion-forming press wrote about the Eastern Partnership on the occasion of successive summit meetings of representatives of European Union institutions, Member States and the Eastern Partnership.
B. Borowik, Partnerstwo Wschodnie na łamach polskich dzienników i tygodników opinii (2009-2019), „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 197-225, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.8.
The article analyses the main events and processes taking place during the last century in Crimea in the context of its occupation by the Russian Federation in 2014. They were presented in several phases: after 1917, when the future hosts were “white” Russians, Bolsheviks, local Tatars, Ukrainians and Ottoman Turks, and at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, when post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, as well as local Russian-speaking people of the peninsula and Crimean Tatars were competing. Agreements and apparent agreements, as well as the incompetent policy pursued by the authorities in Kiev, have led to a political crisis which, so far, has been won by Putin’s Russia.
A. Gil, Kwestia krymska w relacjach ukraińsko-rosyjskich przed 2014 rokiem. Uwarunkowania i konteksty, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 229-250, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.9.
This article is devoted to Ukraine; its focus is to present geopolitical and geo-economic determinants of its foreign policy. They are the source of a dilemma for those who govern Ukraine and since 1991 have been looking for strategic directions of development and cooperation with both the East and the West. In practice, this amounts to balancing between Russia and the European Union, and the dilemma of whether to apply for accession to NATO and the EU or to strengthen cooperation with Russia has a significant impact on Ukraine’s internal and foreign policy from the moment of regaining independence to the present day. This difficult choice is determined by many historical, cultural, social, economic and international factors. Moreover, in this article I present Poland’s position on the Ukrainian dilemma and on Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the European Union. I try to answer a few questions about this, such as which of these options is better for Ukraine, whether western or eastern, and which of them is better for Poland and its reasons for state. I would like to put forward a few theses and hypotheses here. Among other things, I would like to state that Ukraine should pursue a realistic policy, i.e. it should not succumb to illusions and should tread firmly on the ground. NATO and the EU membership should be a strategic objective of its foreign policy. To this end, Ukraine should also cooperate with Poland, which consistently supports the policy of NATO and EU enlargement to the East, and with the European Union and the United States.
J. M. Fiszer, Ukraina między Wschodem a Zachodem. Stanowisko Polski wobec akcesji Ukrainy do NATO i Unii Europejskiej, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 251-275, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.10.
The article analyses the current, post-crisis case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in cases concerning the so-called Dublin Regulation, i.e. Regulation 604/2013, which establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. The aim of the article is to analyze the standard of migration security in the area of Dublin cases. The key problem for the discussed issue was the judgment in the Jawo case, in which the Court of Justice examined the admissibility of Dublin transfers to the Italian Republic on the grounds that there was a risk of extreme material deprivation of the migrant. The Jawo case is a continuation of high-profile international court rulings in cases such as M.S.S., Tarakhel (ECtHR) and N.S. (CJEU), which decided to suspend transfers to Italy and Greece. Apart from the issues of protection against inhuman treatment, the jurisprudence of the CJEU also draws attention to the issues of legal security, effectiveness and accessibility of administrative procedures for third-country nationals seeking international protection in the EU. Finally, the standard of migration security in the Dublin area also includes the obligation to act in solidarity and mutual trust between the Member States, as set out in the judgments of the CJEU.
A. M. Kosińska, Standard bezpieczeństwa migracyjnego w świetle aktualnego orzecznictwa Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej w sprawach dublińskich, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 277-291, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.11.
The aim of the article is to analyze the image of economic emigration from Ukraine to Poland created by pro-Kremlin media after 2014. It shows how Russian propaganda changed during the 20th century, what function it had from the tsarist period, through the years of the Soviet Union, to contemporary times. Its significance in the period after the decomposition of the union state was presented, and in particular the changes that it underwent since Vladimir Putin’s first presidency. There were shown ideological changes, which more or less influenced the public discourse, and thus also the media coverage. The functions of the Russian propaganda after the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the way of presenting mass labour migration from Ukraine to Poland are presented, both in the context of creating a specific narrative about the current internal and foreign situation of Ukraine after the Dignity Revolution, as well as against the background of Polish-Ukrainian relations and migration processes taking place in Poland. It was shown which aspects of mass migration were most often presented by pro-Kremlin information platforms, in which context and how a specific propaganda discourse was constructed. An important element is the analysis of changes observed in the message of the state-controlled Russian media concerning the mass migration of Ukrainians to Poland and the analysis of the origins, scale, significance and consequences of this migration. More extensive research leads to the conclusion that the media controlled by the Kremlin authorities can skilfully construct the message by adapting it to the addressee. In Polish language information services, the information addressed to the recipient is much more detailed and prepared in such a way as to build an aversion between the host society and Ukrainian economic immigrants. While preparing the article, we used the analysis of data found with elements of a comparative analysis.
A. Szabaciuk, Emigracja zarobkowa z Ukrainy do Polski w propagandzie rosyjskiej po 2014 roku, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 293-315, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2019.2.12.
D. Milczarek, Recenzja książki: Olga Barburska, „Polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej jako część składowa polityki zagranicznej UE”, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR/Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2018, ISBN 978-83-7545-908-1, ss. 484, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 2, s. 319-322.