The Kaliningrad region after February 2022: The shift of the region’s role in shaping the security of the Baltic Sea basin

Obwód kaliningradzki po lutym 2022 roku: zmiana roli regionu w kształtowaniu bezpieczeństwa basenu Morza Bałtyckiego

Krzysztof Żęgota

ORCID: Krzysztof Żęgota: 0000-0003-1925-197X

Afiliacja: University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland

Strony: 217–233

Wydanie: Lublin 2025

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.11

Sposób cytowania: K. Żęgota, The Kaliningrad region after February 2022: The shift of the region’s role in shaping the security of the Baltic Sea basin, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 217–233, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.11

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Abstrakt: The Russian full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, initiated in February 2022, has significantly affected the security environment of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea region, with the Kaliningrad region remaining a key element of Russian influence in this area. Even before 2022, Kaliningrad played an important military and political role as the base of the Russian Baltic Fleet. However, after 2014 – and especially following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – its autonomy was gradually dismantled, the region lost its cross-border relations, and its strategic role shifted as its military assets were deployed in Ukraine and Sweden and Finland joined NATO. The aim of the article is to present the transformation of the Kaliningrad region’s significance and role in Russian foreign and security policy towards the Baltic Sea basin after February 2022. The study applies methods of system analysis, comparative analysis, and factor analysis.

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