This article examines the multifaceted strategic dilemmas facing North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) frontline states in the face of the deteriorating security situation in Europe and uncertainty surrounding Donald Trump’s second term in office. NATO, widely recognised as the cornerstone of transatlantic security for more than seven decades, is facing a complex geopolitical challenge characterised by a resurgent Russia, the disintegration of the liberal rules-based order, and evolving global threats. The apparent radical shift in US foreign policy under the second Trump administration introduces an additional element of unpredictability with regard to Washington’s commitment to collective defence, burden-sharing expectations, and NATO’s strategic priorities. This analysis delves into the implications of this uncertainty for NATO’s core pillars, including Article 5, defence spending targets, and the alignment of member states’ strategic objectives. In addition, the article focuses on the specific challenges facing NATO’s frontline states (with Poland as a case study), examining their unique geostrategic situation and the adaptation efforts they are undertaking.
W. Michnik, Between resilience and adaptation? NATO’s frontline states in an era of Euro-Atlantic uncertainty, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 7-25, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.1
Until 2024, few policymakers in NATO countries stressed the importance of a peaceful solution in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Exceptions were the leaders of Hungary and Slovakia. The dominant NATO strategy was based on counterbalancing and containment in response to Russia, with an aim to support the defensive capabilities of Ukraine, and, rhetorically, to let Ukraine win the war against Russia. This strategy has been clearly conducted by most NATO eastern flank countries. However, Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election moved the issue of a peaceful solution into the mainstream of diplomacy. This raises the question of how NATO eastern flank’s counterbalancing/containment strategy addresses this new political reality. The concept of this research is to consider theoretical dimensions of counterbalancing/containment and a ceasefire/peace, and to identify the current and foreseeable conditions for the continuation of the eastern flank’s dominant strategy. The paper proceeds as follows: First, it depicts the strategy of counterbalancing/containment conducted by (most) NATO eastern flank countries in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Second, the article theorises a ceasefire/peace in the context of the strategies of counterbalancing and containment. Third, the author considers the flexibility of NATO eastern flank’s strategy and the conditions under which it could adapt to US goals. Methodologically, the article seeks to combine the theoretical framework of foreign policy strategies with the empirical evidence of NATO eastern flank countries’ conduct and discourse, and consequently, to provide a diagnosis of the conditions of their strategy toward Russia. The conclusions stress the adaptation and flexibility of the eastern flank countries’ policies based on their current practice.
T. Klin, NATO Eastern Flank Countries’ Counterbalancing and Containment Strategy and the Pursuit for a Peaceful Solution in the Russo-Ukrainian War, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 27–44, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.2
This article investigates the international dimension of Poland’s Deterrence and Defence Programme – “East Shield” and assesses whether the project strengthens the emerging collective deterrence network on NATO and the EU’s eastern flank and in East-Central Europe. A qualitative comparative case-study design is employed, combining primary document analysis, strategic mapping, and process tracing. Findings show that although “East Shield” originated as a national scheme, its layered fortifications, ISR architecture, and forward logistics hubs are technically and doctrinally interoperable with the Baltic and Finnish border projects, together forming a developing continuous denial belt. The system hardens the Suwałki Gap logistics corridor, enhances deterrence credibility vis-à-vis Kaliningrad and Belarus, and recasts Poland from a passive front-line consumer into a regional deterrence integrator. Practical implications include the need for a unified ISR framework, command-and-control harmonisation under Multinational Corps North-East, and a joint EU-NATO funding line for border fortifications. The study concludes that East Shield constitutes a pivotal bridge between NATO’s deterrence- by-denial doctrine and the EU’s critical-infrastructure agenda, catalysing deeper territorial defence integration across Central and Eastern Europe.
A. Moraczewska, The international dimension of the Polish Deterrence and Defence Programme – the “East Shield”, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 45–62, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.3
The article discusses the main changes in US security policy after the inauguration of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the USA and their impact on transatlantic relations. It offers the answers (tentatively) to three interlinked research questions: what are the main characteristics of current US security policy? How will the recent changes impact the US position internationally and its transatlantic leadership? What consequences will it generate for NATO’s European allies, and Poland in particular? These answers are based on an analysis of recent official statements and the actual actions of President Donald Trump, as well as key members of his administration, supplemented by the critical review of opinions on the matter presented in academic journals or think-tank reports and the press. The article also offers some recommendations on the Polish response to the changes introduced by Trump.
M. Madej, US security policy in the first months of the Trump administration and transatlantic relations – tectonic shift or “just a few bumps”, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 63–79, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.4
The article examines Poland’s strategic engagement with the emerging European Defence Union against the backdrop of significant geopolitical transformations in Europe, particularly following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the re-election of Donald Trump in 2024. The central aim of the study is to assess whether and how Poland reconciles its enduring commitment to NATO and transatlanticism with its growing involvement in EU-level defence initiatives. Methodologically, the article employs a qualitative analysis grounded in primary and secondary sources, including official EU and Polish strategic documents, expert commentaries, and historical parallels such as the failed European Defence Community, to trace the evolution of Poland’s defence posture within the EU framework. The findings demonstrate that Poland adopts a dual-track approach characterised by conditional support: it pragmatically engages with EU mechanisms, such as PESCO, the EDF, and the SAFE Regulation, when these align with its national interests, particularly in terms of defence industrial development, infrastructure, and resilience. Simultaneously, Poland remains institutionally and ideologically cautious, resisting initiatives perceived as duplicating NATO’s role, undermining US strategic guarantees, or favouring Western European defence industries. The article concludes that Poland’s approach to the EDU is neither passive nor obstructive, but constitutive, shaping the trajectory of European defence integration from a position grounded in strategic pragmatism and regional security imperatives.
T. Zieliński, From integration to autonomy: Poland’s strategic dilemmas in the emerging European Defence Union, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 81–102, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.5
The objective of the article is to examine the impact of domestic political dynamics in Bulgaria and Poland on the perceptions of strengthening EU security. The study is based on a postfunctionalist approach, which assumes a growing ideological and cultural mobilisation of mass public opinion against solutions proposed at the EU level. Two hypotheses are presented, the verification of which requires a combination of factor, decision, and comparative analysis. The research results show that the peripheral geographical location of both states has had a positive impact on the emergence of a domestic political consensus on how to ensure state security, although Poland is more stable in this respect. It also tries to show that cultural and historical differences between Bulgaria and Poland do not result in fundamental discrepancies in the perception of all-European security. The main difference between these States is the presence of a relatively strong pro-Russian faction in Bulgaria and its almost complete absence in Poland. However, preliminary research indicates that the existence of a moderate pro-Russian option is not a factor that significantly influences the European policy of any EU and NATO member states.
S. Domaradzki, P. Tosiek, The impact of Bulgaria and Poland’s domestic political dynamics on EU security perceptions: A postfunctionalist perspective, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 103–122, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.6
For years, relations between Serbia (or the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia) and Hungary remained tense, primarily due to Budapest’s claims to Vojvodina, which was incorporated into the South Slavic state after World War I, and the events of 1941– 1945 still evoke negative emotions. Meanwhile, the rapprochement between Serbia and Hungary, under the rule of Viktor Orbán and Aleksandar Vučić, has resulted in the building of good neighbourly relations. However, trust-building and investments in the borderland have not led to dynamic economic development, causing a steady outflow of population.
M. Rekść, The Hungarian-Serbian borderland in the context of current bilateral relations between Hungary and Serbia, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 123–141, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.7
The article analyses the impact of changes in the security architecture in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) on Poland’s geopolitical culture. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led, on the one hand, to Finland and Sweden joining NATO and, on the other, to a crisis in relations between Poland and its partners in Central Europe. This resulted in a new opening in Poland’s policy towards its northern partners, who began to be seen as key allies in its multidimensional security policy. This latest diplomatic opening was in line with earlier investment and economic activities related to the BSR and ongoing socio-cultural processes, which have brought the countries of this region closer to Polish society. Therefore, according to the authors, we should speak in this case of a “Northern Turn” in Poland’s geopolitical culture, which means that this culture has been enriched with a new direction that is of great importance for multidimensional security and strategic development. The article analyses three spheres of this phenomenon: formal, which pertains to the analysis of international system dynamics; practical, which relates to actual political and strategic decisions; and popular, which reveals transformations in the spheres of culture and identity.
D. Szacawa, P. Oleksy, The “Northern Turn” in Poland’s geopolitical culture, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 143–167, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.8
The article analyses the political changes that have occurred since 2022 in the area of security and digital policy pursued by the Visegrád Group (V4) countries. By describing and analysing the main factors influencing the development of cyber potential and the political priorities outlined in strategic documents and V4 presidency programs, the study attempts to determine the positions of individual V4 members regarding digital policy. The comparative analysis allows the identification of conditions that may foster either integrative or disintegrative processes in the Central and Eastern European region.
M. Górka, L. Cabada, Integration or disintegration? The Visegrad Group in the face of contemporary security policy challenges, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 169–193, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.9
The paper aims to investigate the relationship between economic innovativeness and cybersecurity performance in the context of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Using a panel dataset for eleven CEECs over the 2014–2024 period, the empirical approach combines the Global Cybersecurity Index by the International Telecommunication Union, the European Innovation Scoreboard Summary Innovation Index, and an originally developed composite ICT Innovation Performance Index based on patent activity, R&D sector performance, and firm-level innovation metrics. The model is estimated using a Tobit regression with random effects, controlling for GDP per capita and tertiary education attainment. The results support the developed hypotheses, suggesting that general innovativeness is negatively associated with cybersecurity performance, whereas ICT-sector-specific innovation performance improves national cybersecurity resilience. These findings offer relevant implications for the innovation policies and digitalisation strategies of CEECs. In this light, innovation policy should prioritise investments in cybersecurity R&D and cross-sectoral technology transfer mechanisms that strengthen digital resilience. As digital transformation accelerates, these policy dimensions become not only complementary but also essential for sustainable, innovation-led growth in the region.
T. Kijek, P. Bolibok, A. Matras-Bolibok, Innovation and cybersecurity resilience in Central and Eastern Europe: An empirical analysis, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 195–216, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.10
The Russian full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, initiated in February 2022, has significantly affected the security environment of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea region, with the Kaliningrad region remaining a key element of Russian influence in this area. Even before 2022, Kaliningrad played an important military and political role as the base of the Russian Baltic Fleet. However, after 2014 – and especially following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – its autonomy was gradually dismantled, the region lost its cross-border relations, and its strategic role shifted as its military assets were deployed in Ukraine and Sweden and Finland joined NATO. The aim of the article is to present the transformation of the Kaliningrad region’s significance and role in Russian foreign and security policy towards the Baltic Sea basin after February 2022. The study applies methods of system analysis, comparative analysis, and factor analysis.
K. Żęgota, The Kaliningrad region after February 2022: The shift of the region’s role in shaping the security of the Baltic Sea basin, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 217–233, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.11
The military potential in the Kaliningrad Oblast after the aggression against Ukraine is of great importance to the Russian Federation. The most important reasons for its development are economic, political, and military. The Baltic Sea is an important route for the transmission of energy resources, especially crude oil and, previously, also natural gas. After Finland and Sweden joined the North Atlantic Alliance, the deployment of armed forces in the oblast completely counteracts Russia’s isolation in this direction. The level of military potential in the exclave significantly exceeds its defensive needs. What is more, offensive systems predominate, including those covering means of delivering nuclear weapons. This creates a military threat to the countries of the region. The military potential in the oblast serves Russia by deterring the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, whereas special units prepared to conduct hybrid operations compensate for the lack of land forces.
I. Topolski, Military potential of the Russian Federation in the Kaliningrad Oblast, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 235–252, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.12
The Russian Federation’s armed aggression against Ukraine in 2022 constitutes one of the most significant challenges to the security architecture of Central and Eastern Europe. Russia’s military policy and ongoing modernisation efforts pose a tangible threat to regional stability, compelling Central and Eastern European states to reassess their defence strategies and enhance cooperation within NATO. This is particularly urgent given the Russian Federation’s engagement in both conventional and hybrid operations. Consequently, the threat to NATO member states – especially those situated on the so-called “eastern flank” – is intensifying, necessitating greater cohesion among NATO allies and increased investment in defence and armed forces modernisation. This article aims to examine the reforms undertaken within the Russian Armed Forces following the dissolution of the USSR and to evaluate their implications for regional security. The central research question explores how successive stages of military modernisation have influenced the operational capabilities of the Russian army and the utilisation of its military potential in pursuit of the Federation’s security policy objectives. The paper is of a review nature and is based on the analysis of available academic sources.
M. Romańczuk, The transformation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: Implications for NATO and Ukraine, „Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 253–272, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.13
With the end of the Cold War, the process of broadening and deepening the term “security” began, drawing attention to its non-military aspects. Among other things, the concept of cultural security and, more recently, the cultural security of national and ethnic minorities have emerged in scientific discourse. This article aims to analyse the cultural security of the Russian minority under conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War in selected Central and Eastern European countries (Belarus, Lithuania, and Poland). It is noted that war is a significant determinant of the cultural security of minorities, regardless of the degree of involvement of the minority’s country of residence and spiritual homeland in the conflict. Hence, countries not directly involved in the war were selected for detailed analysis.
T. Szyszlak, Cultural Security of the Russian minority under conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War: The case of selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
„Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe”, 23 (2025), issue 3, pp. 273–292, DOI: https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2025.3.14
